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ABSTRACT
AL-FᾹRᾹBῙ, METAPHYSICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE:
IS DECEPTION WARRANTED IF IT
LEADS TO HAPPINESS?

Nicholas A. Oschman
Marquette University, 2020
When questioning whether political deception can be ethically warranted, two
competing intuitions jump to the fore. First, political deception is a fact of human life, used
in the realpolitik of governance. Second, the ethical warrant of truth asserts itself as
inexorably and indefatigably preferable to falsehood. Unfortunately, a cursory examination
of the history of philosophy reveals a paucity of models to marry these basic intuitions.
Some thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Mill, and Rawls) privilege the
truth by neglecting the realpolitik, i.e., the truth is inviolate. Others (e.g., Machiavelli,
Bentham, and the often infamous caché of 20th century dictators) focus upon the realpolitik
to the exclusion of the primacy of the truth. A third group of critical thinkers (e.g., Arendt
and Bok) examine the topic but offer no positive, systematic treatment of deception.
Lacking are theories which simultaneously recognize that political untruth is often
necessary, but that untruth is only justified when a) truth is politically impossible, b) the
necessity of untruth is demonstrable, and c) the truth can be replaced with a minimally
injurious untruth. Plato offers one such account in the Republic, arguing that deceit must
be applied medicinally to the city. However, his account is problematic in detail. One of
Plato’s inheritors, the 10th century thinker al-Fārābī, advanced Plato’s theoretical account,
arguing that political governance requires restrained political deception. This deception,
the expression of philosophical truths through the symbols of religion, meets the criteria
mentioned above, being necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious.
But while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what justified political deception
could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to create a viable model for
political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of justified political deception writ
large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the notion, notably a cosmos that does
not match our own. One must adopt very specific conceptions of human nature, association,
and happiness, as well as a particular metaphysics and epistemology. For, while al-Fārābī
shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also reveals its unjustifiability outside
an idealized setting.
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I. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL DECEPTION FROM PLATO ONWARD

1. Introduction
The oft quipped and bastardized truism that ‘politics is the art of compromise,’
derived from Otto von Bismarck’s less famous claim that ‘politics is the art of the
possible,’ speaks to the very nature of human association.1 Even in an ideal world,
conflicting desires, distinct aims, and differences in political methods mandate
compromise between groups. But, this dissertation is not about the kind of political
compromise occasioned by distinct human aims. Instead, this project will focus on an
altogether more primordial form of compromise than that which occurs between the
conflicting interests of disparate groups; this project will focus upon whether, and, if so,
when it is appropriate for the leaders of a city, state, or nation to compromise with the
truth itself. And, despite the prima facie obvious answer that in an ideal world the truth
alone ought to dictate policy and that the truth alone ought to be used in defense of said
policy, we do not live in an ideal world. Every human association will at times choose
opacity, deception, and obfuscation rather than honesty. Every real government will
attempt to negotiate and compromise with the truth. Yet, this negotiation remains one
sided, as facts are entirely uncompromising partners, ones who serve simultaneously as
plaintiff, interlocutor, and judge.
Otto von Bismarck’s original insight, which spawned the notion of politics as
compromise, serves as a better guidepost for best political practice than the more wellknown synopsis of his position, at least when one is concerned with whether a
government must obscure the truth, as the truth gives in to no demands. His claim that
1

“Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable — the art of the next best” (von Bismarck 1895, 248).
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“politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best” is more
insightful when dealing with an unyielding interlocutor like the truth itself.2 Real
compromise is not possible with the truth, but concessions can be made in one’s
communication of the truth. To negotiate with the truth is not to deny the truth’s
preeminence, but to justify a certain concession in which one abandons the expression of
simple truth, given certain conditions in which expressing the truth is not a possible
course of political action. The truth remains stalwart. But the truth is not always
politically possible. Two questions then remain: 1) What is ‘the next best’ thing after the
truth? And 2) what are the conditions by which ‘the next best’ thing is justified? Broadly
speaking, this dissertation concerns the answers to these two questions; it explores the
conditions of political action when openness and honesty expose themselves to be
politically untenable. Primarily, this project will narrow its focus to one particularly welldeveloped paradigmatic explanation of the parameters surrounding justified deception,
the political philosophy of Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Fārābī, a tenth
century Muslim Neo-Aristotelian thinker who takes seriously the need for both a ruler’s
obfuscation of the truth and a ruler’s duty to the truth.3 However, for now, the problem of
political deception itself must be motivated more thoroughly.

2

Ibid.
Special thanks to Richard C. Taylor for the recommendation of this term ‘Neo-Aristotelian’. Generally
speaking ‘Neo-Aristotelian’ should be taken to signify the amalgamation of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic
principles which begins concurrently in the 3 rd century with the commentary tradition of Alexander of
Aphrodisias and the Plotinian school of thought, gets carried through the commentaries of Themistius and
the Neoplatonic developments of Proclus, through Syriac translations of these texts, and ultimately arrives
in the Arabic language through the Proclus Arabus and Plotiniana Arabica, although the sources are more
numerous, and their relations more intricate, than stated here. At the moment, the term should be taken
loosely, although a careful study which taxonomizes the distinct threads contained within this tradition is
warranted.
3
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1.1. In Defense of Political Lies
The dissonance between unabashed pellucid truth-telling and the typical course of
political action is apparent upon even a cursory inspection. Nor is this a cynical stance.
Whether regarding external or internal politics, a certain amount of deception or, at least,
concealment is required. In terms of the external, the nature of negotiation itself requires
opacity; that each negotiator does not reveal fully her true intentions, her maximum
concessions, or her minimal demands lies at the heart of haggling. No skilled negotiator
introduces her aimed for price at the outset. In terms of politics inside a single political
association, to believe that societal consensus is likely to be achieved by honest and
straightforward propositional demonstration alone is naïve. As Aristotle explains, for
“some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for
what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies
instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct.”4 The art of political
persuasion requires the motivation of both non-experts and those for whom strict
demonstration holds little appeal. Unfortunately, as Plato points out in the Gorgias, nonexperts are ill-equipped to judge expertise (one reason he is so disinclined toward
democracy).5 When a body needs repair, the non-expert easily confuses the benefits of
medicine and those of sweetened dishes which are claimed to be beneficial, the benefits
of rigorous exercise for the aesthetic improvements brought about by cosmetics.6 When a
soul or a city need repair, the non-expert easily confuses the benefits of the truth, i.e. the
art of politics, with the flattery of oratory, which is the mere image of politics.7 An

4

Rhetoric 1.1.
Gorgias 462a-466a.
6
Gorgias 464c- 465e; see also Republic 557-559.
7
Gorgias 464d.
5
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unpleasant truth cannot rely on its rectitude alone to persuade a city. A good politician
must make the unpleasantness of the truth at least seem equally pleasant with its
falsehood. To quote Mary Poppins, in both the sphere of the body and the sphere of
politics, ‘a spoon full of sugar helps the medicine go down.’8
No politician worth her salt is entirely truthful, though the best, perhaps, artfully
dance within reach of the truth. Too many hard truths occur in the governance of a city,
state, or nation to simply air all secrets. Too few citizens can follow the subtle arguments
of policy or can reliably recognize expertise and not be duped by snake oil salesmen. Too
few human beings are capable of viewing the good of the city from the god’s eye view,
willing to make hard choices for what is truthfully best for the city as a whole. When
confronted with unpleasant conditions, the politician must communicate certain truths to
those who cannot or will not appreciate the complexities which have brought about said
conditions. Mere honesty is not enough. Rhetoric is required. Rarely will truthful honesty
suffice when the politician must navigate the tensions between the polis’s need for
boundaries and the obvious truth that those human beings who live within the polis and
those beyond its territory are essentially the same. It will not suffice when she
communicates the truth that the needs of the citizens are not in fact identical with the
desires of the citizens. Mere facticity might not be enough when the politician must
inspire a low-ranking soldier to bravely stand in defense of her homeland before a
hopeless battle, given the brazen, and often ugly, truth that her service will likely turn
into a sacrifice which will bring a victory which she will never see. And it is inadequate
to persuade a generation to surrender their own comfort for the well-being of the future, a

8

Walsh, et al. 2009.
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prosperity in which they will not partake. Or to sum up these examples most generally,
the truth seems a poor tool when the politician aims to convince the polis to support
political actions which are prima facie undesirable, actions determined to be necessary
only by those capable of following the intricate, and at times counterintuitive, arguments
concluded in the cold light of reason. What is best for a polis is determined by the
facticity of an action’s outcome, by uncompromising truth. What seems best for a polis in
the mind of any individual citizen is determined by the citizen’s own desires and the
persuasiveness of the polis’s politicians.
Unfortunately, persuasive arguments and sound arguments are not the same thing.
A city or a nation is swayed by many forces: tradition, values, emotion, ethos, facts on
the ground, and shifts in power, amongst other factors. The most convincing politician is
not always the one with the most knowledge nor the one who is most trustworthy. Politics
at its best and worst occurs, and has always occurred, in the lacuna between what is and
what seems. The good politician knows the truth of what is best for the polis and makes
the best seem appealing. The bad one leads the polis to what is worse, either through
ignorance, malevolence, or sheer ambivalence to any outcome but her own power. The
unfortunate reality is that naïve honesty is often bad politics. Plato knew this.

1.2 Defining the Problem
But before turning to the original philosophical discussion, or at least the first
philosophical discussion with any contemporary parlance, of the problem of political
deception, namely the one found in Plato, some parameters for the problem should be
discussed. After all, political deception is a unique species within a broader genus, i.e.
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deception, but also abuts a plethora of other issues unique to public life, e.g. concealment,
the arcana imperii, the ‘problem of dirty hands’, and the relationship between rhetoric
and truth.9 And, while ubiquitous in almost every variety of human life, deception writ
large remains surprisingly understudied. Perhaps this is because, as Sissela Bok contends
while citing Epictetus in her exemplary examination of lying, understanding deception,
especially in practical terms, can be frustrating and difficult.10
That said, for the purposes of this project, a working definition of deception and
lying will suffice, as the particular species of deception being examined, i.e. political
deception, brackets many of the most salient disagreements as to how deception should
be defined.11 And, on the whole, a working definition of deception and lying is possible.
Namely, a lie or a deception, at least a verbal deception, is the act of knowingly making a
statement to another which is false, as if it were true, with the intention of causing them
to believe the falsehood.12 And, by and large, these component parts, a) an informed act

For discussion about the pernicious and perplexing ‘problem of dirty hands’, see Walzer 1973 and Coady
2018.
10
Bok 1978, xxxvi, 10-11. Epictetus explains in the Encheiridion: “The first and most necessary division in
philosophy is that which has to do with the application of the principles, as, for example, Do not lie. The
second deals with the demonstrations, as, for example, How comes it that we ought not to lie? The third
confirms and discriminates between these processes, as, for example, How does it come that this is a proof?
For what is a proof, what is logical consequence, what contradiction, what truth, what falsehood?
Therefore, the third division is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first; while
the most necessary of all, and the one in which we ought to rest, is the first. But we do the opposite; for we
spend our time in the third division, and all our zeal is devoted to it, while we utterly neglect the first.
Wherefore, we lie, indeed, but are ready with the arguments which prove that one ought not to lie.”
Discourses 536.
11
Many of the disagreements regarding the definition of ‘deception’ or ‘lying’ involve qualifications
surrounding either the audience, mainly who is intended and whether the lie is successfully heard or
directed at the intended audience, or intention, for example, whether if one is physically coerced to speak
untruth qualifies as a lie. Political deception sidesteps these problems, insofar as these kinds of deception
pervade the entirety of a governed culture and are performed by those in power by definition. Thus, they
are always heard and not coerced. See Mahon 2014, 2016.
12
One may object to my seeming conflation between deception and lying. After all, it is possible to deceive
without resorting to a lie, e.g. when one wears a guise or camouflage, when a slight of hand artists palms a
card, or when a deft rhetorician changes the subject after an interlocutor makes a salient refutation. But by
and large, political deception occurs through political speech. And the imminent shift to the political sphere
9
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which produces b) a false statement with c) an intention that d) another believes the false
statement, are the shared central component parts for most definitions of lying and verbal
deception.13
But whereas a workable universal definition of lying and deception is rather
straightforward, if still harried by counterexamples and the need for further nuance,
defining political deception universally in the context of any realpolitik is impossible.
The definition of lying and deception is perhaps more amorphous than the caricature
drawn here, but political deception is multifaceted, so diverse in manifestations that a
useful universal definition is nigh impossible.14 For example, are political deceptions
only those deceits which are told by a leader to her people? Do they include deceits told
to trade partners? Enemies? Allies? In democracies, are the deceits citizens tell each other
political deceits? Are deceits which are told to temporarily hide negotiations or to prevent
the fomentation of war of the same kind of deceits as those intended for the accumulation
of power? Is a deceit told by a politician seeking office which is told to present an
illusion of knowledge and authority the same as a deceit by a ruler who has knowledge
and authority?

renders the distinction between deception and lie moot. And while imperfect, linking lying and deception
prevents confusion from the other direction. Namely, to only speak of lying is to risk removing the
connotation of intentionality, insofar as many who study this issue closely have questioned whether
intention is truly necessary for a definition of lying. Whereas, again, in the political sphere, intentionality is
a clear essential component to political deception. See Chrisholm and Feehan 1977, Carson 2006, and
Mahon 2014, 2016.
13
For example, Bok defines a lie as “any intentionally deceptive message which is stated” (Bok 1978, 13).
Primoratz defines lying as “making a statement believed to be false, with the intention of getting another to
accept it as true” (Primoratz 1984, 54n2). Isenberg defines a lie as “a statement made by one who does not
believe it with the intention that someone else shall be led to believe it” (Isenberg 1973, 248). And Mahon,
while rejecting a universally acknowledged definition of lying, suggests four necessary conditions for
traditional definitions of lying: a) a statement, b) untruthfulness, c) an addressee, and d) an intention to
deceive (Mahon 2016).
14
For some thorough, if incomplete, examinations of the topic, see Bok 1978, 165-181; Arendt 1972, 3-47.
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Certainly, a kind of definition for political deception which encompasses all of
these cases can be found, e.g. a political deception is the act of making a statement in the
public sphere to another which is false, as if it were true, with the intention of causing
them to believe the falsehood. But, along with being uninteresting and far removed from
the realpolitik that makes an examination of political deception worthwhile, such a broad
definition would be nearly impossible to study in detail. To assess political deception, to
examine political deception, one must arrive at a narrower, more manageable conception,
even if stipulative, even if it does not characterize political deception in toto.
For this reason, henceforward, a political deception will be defined in such a way:
the dissemination of information by one in governing power, particularly one with higher
epistemic standing than the populace regarding the content of said information, which is
conveyed to the governed populace for the purpose of the populace adopting the false as
true.15 Of course, this definition is insufficient to define political deception writ large; it
defines a subspecies, not the whole, of deceptive speech in the political arena. Moreover,
it anthropomorphizes government, putting the onus on a bilateral interpersonal
relationship between the governor and governed, ignoring the much more complicated
but well-established interplay between individuals, societies, and systems.16 Nonetheless,
for the purposes here, it will suffice.

15

Two things are worth clarifying regarding this definition. First, while narrowing the scope of political
deception, it still leaves quite a bit open. The form of government is not stipulated. Neither is the number of
governors in a society determined, insofar as any one member of a governing body can participate in this
definition as readily as a monarch. It even leaves certain epistemological commitments undetermined. The
governor need not have certain knowledge about her falsehood to deceive, she need only have higher
epistemic standing regarding the deception than the governed, need only have better information than the
ruled. Second, while the phrasing of the above definition is carefully chosen, its meaning should not be lost.
It is tantamount to a common notion, namely that which occurs when a ruler with knowledge feeds the
populace disinformation.
16
For one fascinating account of such an interaction directly related to lying, see Simon-Kerr 2015.
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1.3. A Method for Study
Given the preceding definition of political deception, the original central
questions raised gain clarity, namely:
1) If the truth is not politically possible, what is ‘the next best’ thing after the
truth?
2) What are the conditions by which ‘the next best’ thing is justified?
In this context, Question 1 takes on a moral character. Whatever ‘the next best’ thing is,
surely the arbiter which designates it as such contains a moral element. It presumes
(rightly) that speaking truth is the best recourse, and any substitute for truth must
approximate, if not match, its value. Question 2 guards against arbitrariness. Untruth
must be justified. And, given the preeminence of truth, justification implies that untruth
must be necessary, only used when truth cannot suffice. Many politicians and rulers have
attempted to defend their lies on these grounds; many theorists, including some of whom,
discussed below, have carved out a category for those that aim to meet these conditions,
to describe what is variously called ‘lying for the public interest’ or ‘lying for the public
good.’17 Although it is difficult to say how much of the former group’s description are
sincere and equally difficult to assess whether the latter groups characterizations are
ideal.
Nonetheless, these two characteristics, the ‘next best thing’ condition, i.e. that a
lie aims at the next best thing to truth, and the necessity condition, i.e. that the truth is not
a viable alternative to the lie, mark the difference between benevolent and malevolent (or
ambivalent) political deceptions.18 Beneficent political deceptions (which should be
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E.g., Pasquerella and Killilea 2005 and Bok 1978, 165.
As will be discussed in future chapters, al-Fārābī will add a third condition, the certainty condition, to his
theory of justified deception. This condition demands that justified deception not only be necessary, but
performed by someone that is certain that it is necessary, e.g., AH 44-47; AH (Ar.) 61-65.
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viewed henceforth as a technical phrase) truly aim at the good of the polis, with those that
use them always using the best possible tools, only resorting to untruth when necessary.19
However, the questions remain. Do beneficent political deceptions actually exist? Can
political deceptions, broadly considered, ever be justified? And what do beneficent
political deceptions look like?
The proposed method for answering these questions is simple: find an example of
a beneficent political deception or a defense of beneficent political deceptions writ large
which succeeds and analyze it.20 Such a project, of course, cannot be the definitive study
of the issue, but it may lead to some preliminary conclusions about the nature of
beneficent political deception. It can serve as an introductory jumping off point for the
topic. In this sense, this project is dialectical, not demonstrative. It will confine itself to
the examination of an exemplary case and derive its conclusions from there. Of course,
such a project will not be exhaustive, nor need it be. Because, as will be shown shortly,
there is unfortunately rather meager discussion of the issue in the history of philosophy.
My hope is that this this will be a start.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on finding an exemplary case of
beneficent political deception beginning with a thorough examination of the original
discussion, or at least the first prevalent discussion, of the topic in Plato. This will be

A great deal of thought went into which adjective should be used to describe al-Fārābī’s model for
political deception. ‘Necessitated’, while reflecting the inevitability of a cosmos which requires the use of
political deception, does not capture the positive effect intended in al-Fārābī’s model. ‘Benevolence’, while
suggestive of the aim of al-Fārābī’s brand of political deception (literally, ‘to wish well’), does not capture
the real effects of political deception on society. Ultimately, ‘beneficent political deception’ was chosen,
because, for al-Fārābī, political deception by the Imām is an act in which the Imām ‘does good’ for the city,
even it is through a deceitful act. See also Footnote 22.
20
Without firmly establishing a broader metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical framework, reaching
any conclusion on this issue seems impossible. For this reason, this project will examine the topic through
the lens of another thinker who has developed a systematic philosophical program which allows for a
fulsome model of beneficent political deception.
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followed by a cursory account of the subsequent history of the topic, most of which is
subsumed under broader discussions of lying which are themselves subsumed under
broader discussions of normative ethical systems. But, those few (often infamous)
thinkers who escape the historical trend toward theoreticality when thinking about
political deception tend, themselves, to devolve into reverence for a realpolitik and power
at the expense of ethics, leaving a historical lacuna between those who have no place for
lies and those who hold little regard for the moral weight of the truth. Put bluntly, it is
difficult to find a contender for an exemplary case for beneficent political deception.
That said, one thinker can be found who gives a compelling and fulsome case for
beneficent political deception: Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Fārābī.21 The
remaining chapters will explore al-Fārābī’s discussion of beneficent political deception
pertaining to why he thinks it is necessary, what constrains the nature of beneficent
political deception, when it is permitted, who is permitted to deceive, what gives them
warrant to deceive, and the mechanisms that make it justifiable.22 Whereas the
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His successors, some of whom will be discussed in Chapter 4, also give fulsome accounts, though in part
through emulation of al-Fārābī. Also, this is not to say that no other worthwhile examinations of the topic,
as constrained here, exist, simply that any that do have not come to light in the research of this dissertation.
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Of all the concepts which are clarified in this dissertation, finding the proper terminology by which to
label the action of al-Fārābī’s Imām is perhaps the most difficult. On the one hand, one could say the Imām
does not deceive, but merely ‘translates’ the truth, insofar as the images which he espouses contain within
themselves the means by which to access the truth. However, ‘translate’ does not involve intentional
obfuscation. Nor does the Imām merely ‘obfuscate’, ‘camouflage’, ‘dissimulate’, ‘conceal’, or ‘misdirect’
the truth. Al-Fārābī’s Imām performs a double-action; his images at once are intended to deceive, insofar as
the person without the requisite capacity, habituation, and education to deconstruct the images back to
demonstrative truth is intended to take these (strictly speaking untrue) images at face value, yet
simultaneously these images are ultimately intended to guide those with the requisite capabilities toward
the truth itself. To my knowledge there is no adequate vernacular with which to label the Imām’s action.
Neither ‘Noble Lie’ which is inexorably tethered to Plato’s doctrine (and I will argue is distinct from alFārābī’s position) will suffice, nor will ‘pious fiction’ which also contains too much connotative baggage.
As a result, following the oxymoronic example set by Plato’s own labelling of his doctrine, as well as the
oxymoronic double move which al-Fārābī endorses, I prefer to describe the Imām’s act as a ‘beneficent
political deception’, or, to be less turgid, a beneficent deception. So, when I intend to reference this doublemove, the notion of ‘deception’ will be modified with ‘beneficent’. The term absent the modifier can be
read as signifying the normal, less technical and perhaps more ambiguous, sense of ‘deception’. I would
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penultimate chapter will draw conclusions concerning al-Fārābī’s position, as such, the
concluding chapter will discuss what al-Fārābī’s exemplary case of beneficent political
deception reveals about political deception itself and, ultimately, any construction of
social knowledge.23

1.4. Thesis
Given what was stated above, the thesis of this project is twofold:
1) Al-Fārābī’s account successfully justifies beneficent political deception.
While not totally immune to critiques of underdetermination concerning
the intricacies of aspects of his position, on the whole, he is able to
successfully show why a) political deception is necessary and b) the
criterion by which ‘the next best’ thing to the truth may be determined.
2) While al-Fārābī’s account justifies beneficent political deception when
considered within its own framework, the particular cosmological,
metaphysical, psychological, ethical, and epistemological preconditions
which ground his account render it implausible when viewed from a
modern day lens.24 Moreover, the lengths to which al-Fārābī must go to
achieve a cogent, necessary, yet ethical account of beneficent political
deception reveals how problematic the notion of political deception is in
itself.
All told, by showing the numerous preambles needed to justify beneficent political
deception in al-Fārābī’s framework, this project aims to show that political deception is
even unjustifiable within the context of any realpolitik, though political lies are often
rationalized by appealing to the needs of the realpolitik.

like to thank both Michael Chase and Therese Cory for their individual challenges to my use of the term
‘deception’ to describe al-Fārābī’s model. While their concerns, namely that the term ‘deception’ is too
connotative of brazen and harmful falsehood and is a term which does not capture the ever-present link to
the truth in al-Fārābī’s conception of religious imagery, accurately identify the peculiarity of al-Fārābī’s
position in the history of thought concerning deception, the adjective ‘beneficent’ is meant to mitigate the
application of the term to al-Fārābī’s idiosyncratic model.
23
For a discussion of the meaning of the term ‘construction of social knowledge’ and its relevance to
beneficent political deception, see Section 3 of the present chapter.
24
For example, the heliocentric model of the solar system renders a great deal of al-Fārābī’s justification
ineffective.
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2. Origins in Plato: The Noble Lie
To grapple with the notion of beneficent political deception one must, to some
degree, return to the origin of the idea in Plato. Plato knew that even an ideal ruler would
have to resort to political deception at times. So, he suggested a city run by those with the
most knowledge, but whose rule was ensured by a convincing ruse of the people, not by
the communicability of philosophy.25 According to his recommendation, the rulers ought
to ensure their status through lying, even to the point of banishing those who are most
equipped to counter their fictions with appealing fictions of their own.26 Knowledge of
the truth might qualify one to rule, but it is woefully inadequate to put one in the position
to rule.27 Only persuasion centralizes power.
His doctrine, most famously known as the Doctrine of the Noble Lie, has served
as a key tool for governance in the medieval world, as both a precursor and foil for
modern political theory, and as a lightning-rod for controversy in contemporary political
discourse.28 But for all of the conversation surrounding the Noble Lie and even Plato’s
own recurring discussion of the topic in the Republic, what exactly makes a Noble Lie
noble remains unclear.29 Plato does not give an exact list of which conditions make a

25

Republic 473c-480a.
Republic 379a-b; 398a-b.
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Republic 477d.
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Al-Fārābī’s ruling Imām is equipped to ‘rouse [other people’s] imaginations by well chosen words’ like
Plato’s ‘austere poet’ from Republic 3 in his innovative and adaptive work based on the Republic. See PS
15.11. He also mirrors Plato’s idea that the ruler should alone be free from political deception, instead
knowing the truth through philosophy. See AH 44; AH (Ar.) 61; and Republic 414b. Averroes expands
these ideas in his Commentary on the Republic. See CR 32.20-25. Patrick Coby notes how civic virtue
functions as a noble lie for Machiavelli, mirroring the Phoenician Lie in the Republic, even though it is not
directly referenced, while Hobbes clearly has the doctrine in mind when he rejects the ‘art of words’ which
can represent good in the likeness of evil. See Coby 1999, 146; Knowles 2010, 77; Lloyd 2013, 166;
Leviathan 119. The contemporary critiques are numerous, both academic and social, with the doctrine itself
even coming under scrutiny in response to the fall of the Soviet Union and the run up to the Second Iraq
War. See Popper 2013; Burch 2007; Nankov 2015.
29
Of course, whether the term γενναίος should even be translated as ‘noble’ is a matter of dispute. See
below for more.
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mere political falsehood a ‘Noble Lie’. And while the Republic contains both discourse
about the qualities of Noble Lies and a very specific example of a Noble Lie, the essential
characteristics which give these lies moral permissibility remain enigmatic, largely
because his archetypical example of a Noble Lie is not clearly emblematic of all the
qualities he abstractly discusses.30 I will explore the general conditions which Plato
suggests mark Noble Lies as a particular species of lie below, but first I will examine the
singular example of a Noble Lie which Plato gives, the Phoenician Story, in part because
it is often discussed as if it were the only Noble Lie, as if Plato’s singular example
encompassed the entire set of all possible Noble Lies, and in part to reveal why it at least
seems problematically ignoble.31

2.1. The Phoenician Story
After having discussed the falsehood of most myths in Republic 2, and having
established the need for rulers to apply falsehoods as medicine to their people, while
banishing from the city anyone skillful in imitation (i.e., lying) who is not subservient to
philosophy in Republic 3, Plato has Socrates aim to “devise (μηχανὴ) one of those useful
(δέοντι) falsehoods (ψευδῶν) we were talking about a while ago, one (ἓν) noble
(γενναῖόν) falsehood (ψευδομένους) that would, in the best case, persuade (πεῖσαι) even
the rulers, but if that’s not possible, then the others of the city.”32 He calls the deceptive
myth which follows the ‘Phoenician Story’. Plato’s language here is confusing for two
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See Republic 377b-380c, 382a-382e, 389a-d, 398a-b, 459c-d, and 414b-415c.
To avoid the possible confusion brought about by discussing the Noble Lie (i.e. the Phoenician Story) in
contrast with a Noble Lie (i.e. any lie which meets the criteria for nobility), I will henceforth restrict my
language to signify Plato’s example by the term ‘Phoenician Story’, leaving the term ‘Noble Lie’ to signify
the general set of all possible Noble Lies.
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reasons. First, by indicating that Socrates will devise only one useful falsehood, the
impression is given that there is in fact only one possible useful falsehood (or perhaps
one single genealogical falsehood per city).33 And in fact, many interpreters read it this
way. When discussing the Noble Lie, these authors discuss the Phoenician Story which
follows as if it is the singular Noble Lie; it is not always clear if this is genuine confusion
or merely shorthand. For example, Catalin Partenie remarks informatively that Plato
often modifies existing myths for his own unique purpose (a point I will return to
shortly), and that “this is the case, for instance, of the Noble Lie (Republic 414b–415d),
which is a combination of the Cadmeian myth of autochthony and the Hesiodic myth of
ages,” as if the phrase ‘Noble Lie’ ought to only signify the Phoenician Story.34 The great
Allan Bloom falls prey to the same shorthand, saying, “The only remedy that Socrates
can find is a great lie—the noble lie. This famous lie consists of two very diverse parts.”35
Thus, he too collapses the notion of the Noble Lie (i.e., Plato’s general doctrine of
political deception) into Plato’s singular example (i.e., the Phoenician Story) while
explaining the Cadmeian and Hesiodic amalgamation of the Phoenician Story. And
Malcolm Schofield introduces the Phoenician Story as ‘the Noble Lie of the Republic’,
again identifying it as singular and again remarking upon its dual Hesiodic and
Phoenician character. He says, “The Noble Lie of the Republic (3.414B–415D) is
presented to the reader as a myth (415A). It is really two myths, or a myth in two parts: a
‘Phoenician’ theme (414C), on which Socrates then places a no less important Hesiodic
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Plato also describes the laws, hymns, deceptions, and falsehoods used to ensure procreation between the
fittest members of the city as a “useful form of drug”. Republic 459c-460c. Whether this lie should be
considered distinct from the Phoenician Story or as merely a part of the larger program which maintains the
rule of the golden members of society is unclear.
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Partenie 2014.
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Bloom 1968, 335.
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variation (cf. 8.546E).”36 Of course, to address the Phoenician Story this way is not
strictly speaking wrong; it is, after all, the only tangible example Plato gives of his ‘one
noble falsehood’, and the particular terminology shows up here (even though his
discussion of the term ψευδής both precedes this passage and extends well beyond it).37
However, it is (a) misleading when Plato is clear that the rulers of his ideal city will have
to use not one falsehood, but a “considerable use of falsehood and deception for the
benefit of those they rule… [as] such falsehoods are useful as a form of drug,” and (b)
problematic when the critiques of the notion of the Noble Lie qua beneficent political
deception are often aimed, not at the concepts of beneficent political deception or Noble
Lies as such, but the particularity of the Phoenician Story.38 In sum, despite common
practice which equates the Noble Lie with the Phoenician Story and Socrates’ ambiguous
language directly preceding the introduction of the Phoenician Story, the Phoenician
Story is not identical with the Doctrine of the Noble Lie, but merely one example of it.
Plato’s language in Republic 3, right before he begins the Phoenician Story, is
also elusive for another reason. The translation of ψευδής, especially in combination with
γενναίος, is particularly vexing, given the possibility that ψευδής can mean anything from
‘lie’ (i.e., an intentional untruth), ‘falsehood’ (i.e., an untruth with undefined intention) or
even a fiction, while γενναίος can indicate both nobility (i.e., indicating its moral value)
and grandiosity (i.e., indicating its aesthetic value or even size). G.M.A. Grube translates
the phrase as ‘noble falsehood’; Eric Voegelin prefers the playful ‘big whopper’ or ‘big
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Schofield 2006, 284.
See also Footnote 33. One valuable treatment of this issue can be found in the work of Carl Page, who
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and the Noble Lie, which he identifies with the Phoenician Tale. Page, counter what I present here, views
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lie’; Benjamin Jowett translates it as ‘royal lie’; Desmond Lee, in perhaps the most
charitable of all interpretations, suggests ‘magnificent myth’; Chris Emlyn-Jones and
William Preddy translate it as ‘noble lie’ in the Loeb edition of Republic 1-5; and
Cornford prefers the less literal ‘bold flight of invention.’39 No matter the translation
though, the Republic is clear that the companion to the ruler’s use of ψευδής is deceit
(ἀπάτη) applied medicinally to the city.40 As Schofield notes, remarking on Hannah
Arendt’s rejection of the term ‘lie’ being used for ψευδής:
The still influential political philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote in 1967 as follows:
“I hope no one will tell me any more that Plato was the inventor of the ‘noble lie’.
This belief rested on a misreading of a crucial passage (414C) in the Republic,
where Plato speaks of one of his myths—a ‘Phoenician tale’—as a pseudos. Since
the same Greek word signifies ‘fiction’, ‘error’, and ‘lie’ according to context—if
Plato wants to distinguish between error and lie, the Greek language forces him to
speak of ‘involuntary’ and ‘voluntary’ pseudos—the text can be rendered with
Cornford as ‘bold flight of invention’ or be read with Eric Voegelin . . . as
satirical in intention; under no circumstances can it be understood as a
recommendation of lying as we understand it.” It will by now be evident that
Arendt was simply wrong about the interpretation of pseudos. The Noble Lie is
specifically introduced as one of the ‘falsehoods that get created as needed which
we were talking about a little while back’ (3.414B). Socrates is referring to the
useful medicinal lies first exemplified in Book 1 by the case of the deranged
friend’s dagger, and then categorized near the end of Book 2.41
Even though ψευδής can be translated with a term as innocuous as ‘fiction’, Plato clearly
does not intend something so innocuous here. The Noble Lie is no mere fiction or
parable, but a tool for unreflective assent. As Allan Bloom explains, “The difference
between a parable and this tale is that the man who hears a parable is conscious that it is
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an invention the truth of which is not in its literal expression, whereas the inhabitants of
Socrates’ city are to believe the untrue story to be true.”42
As for the term γενναίος, whether it is interpreted as ‘grand’, ‘magnificent’,
‘bold’, or ‘noble’, matters little in this context, as it is clearly both ‘grand’ and ‘bold’,
being believed by everyone except maybe the rulers in the city, and also ‘noble’ due to its
proximity to happiness, civic duty, and educational value, as only ‘fine and beautiful’
stories will be allowed in the city, ones which are not entirely false, but in accordance
with the pattern required for the education of the citizens of the city.43 As Schofield
explains:
Quite how we should understand the main connotation of ‘noble’ (gennaion) in
the expression ‘noble lie’ is unclear. Perhaps it is only ironic, or a term of literary
appraisal: an impressively massive lie, a right royal lie. But it is easy enough to
see why Plato might think it noble. Devotion to one’s city was a widely accepted
and frequently hymned Greek ideal, familiar from Homer (particularly in the
figure of Hector in the Iliad) to the Athenian funeral oration. So a myth designed
to promote such devotion to what Socrates will describe as the good city (e.g.
4.427E) might well be regarded as something noble.44
In other words, whether the authorial intent of γενναίος is ‘grand’ or ‘noble’ the
Phoenician Story and all of Plato’s useful lies are clearly intended to be both grand and
noble, being instituted at a young enough age to be believed by all citizens but the highest
leaders, yet having been done so for the sake of education.45 As for how such a big lie
could be noble, Voegelin explains, “Plato enjoys the paradox that the education of
children begins with untrue stories, that is, with fables and myths.” 46 As Socrates notes,
“We first tell stories to our children… these are false, on the whole, though they have
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some truth in them.”47 A Noble Lie is noble because it leads to a life of nobility which in
turn is the case because every Noble Lie holds proximity to the truth.

2.1.1. Content of the Phoenician Story
And yet, even though Noble Lies are used for the sake of education, containing a
bit of the truth within them, they remain on the whole false, which raises moral questions
about the educational value and moral permissibility of such a lie. Take the Phoenician
Story, which is literally the exemplary case. The story is an amalgamation of two myths.
The Phoenician portion of the tale is rooted in a myth wherein Cadmus, the son of
Agenor, King of Tyre, founded Thebes by sowing a dragon’s teeth into the ground, out of
which bloomed the warriors who would become the progenitors of Thebes’ noble
families.48 The Hesiodic portion comes from Hesiod’s Myth of Ages, in which Hesiod
describes five periods of history: the golden age under Cronus, in which lived men of
nobility such that they even mingled among the gods, “free from toil and grief”; the silver
age, during which the first men under the rulership of Zeus lived, those whose lives were
marked by longevity in adolescence and foolish strife in abbreviated adulthood; the
bronze age, which was marked by a “brazen race” of those who “loved the lamentable
works of Ares and deeds of violence”; then the age of heroes, Cadmus, Oedipus, and
Achilles, who deserve honor and glory; last, the age of iron, Hesiod’s own people, who
are restless and full of sorrow.49 Socrates, though embarrassed and hesitating, suggests
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that the city ought to be founded on a tale modelled after these.50 The citizens should be
told that all their progenitors were “fashioned and nurtured inside the earth”, so that they
“think of the other citizens as their earthborn brothers” in times of peace and war,
echoing the origin of the Thebans.51 But unlike the Thebans, the gods instilled both
fraternity and distinction in the citizens of Socrates’ ideal city. For while all are brothers,
the gods “mixed some gold into those who are adequate to rule, because they are the most
valuable”, “silver in those who are auxiliaries”, and “iron and bronze in the farmers and
craftsmen”.52 Thus, the Hesiodic portion of the myth takes the naturally ordained
legitimacy of civic fraternity which is found in the myth of Cadmus and transforms it into
loyalty; the ruling class rules because the gods, and civic destiny, have ordained it to be
so.

2.1.2. Exposition of the Phoenician Story
One can easily see how the Phoenician story can be of utilitarian benefit to the
city as a whole, but also problematically totalitarian. Not only does belief in the story
garner civic devotion, but clear and established social order, as Socrates concludes the
story by noting that “there is an oracle which says the city will be ruined if it ever has an
iron or bronze guardian.”53 Each class knows that it shares in the success of the city as a
whole, as all citizens come from the same origin; yet each class also knows its proper and
immutable place.54 As Bloom notes:
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The tale makes them brothers and relates them to this particular patch of land. It
identifies city and regime with country, which is the object of the most primitive
political loyalty; it gives the motherland life and the principles of the city body.
Short of a universal state, nothing but such a tale can make a natural connection of
the individual to one of the many existing cities. Moreover, in this way, the
regime itself is lent the color of naturalness. The fact that regimes require human
institution, as other natural things do not, calls their naturalness into question. But
here the very functions which the regime has educated the citizens to fulfill are
attributed to nature; the citizens grow into their political roles as acorns grow into
oaks. Each might have wondered why he should be devoted to his particular
specialty to the exclusion of all others; but now they see that the equipment of
their arts belongs to them in the same way their bodies do. This regime is also
vulnerable because it conquered or stole the land in which it is established; this
imperfect beginning gives ground for later men to argue the right of the stronger
in their own interest. This tale provides for that eventuality by concealing the
unjust origin of this regime (which we have seen) by a just account of its origin.
On the basis of the lie, the citizens can in all good faith and conscience take pride
in the justice of their regime, and malcontents have no Justification for rebellion.
Such are the advantages of autochthony. The second part of the lie gives divine
sanction to the natural hierarchy of human talents and virtues while enabling the
regime to combine the political advantages of this hierarchy with those of
mobility. In the Socratic view, political justice requires that unequal men receive
unequal honors and unequal shares in ruling. This is both advantageous and
fitting. In order to be effective and be preserved, the inequality of right and duty
must receive institutional expression.55
By ingraining the civic order into civic education itself, which in turn mythologizes the
civic order into a natural order, Socrates preempts the possibility of dissent. In doing so,
Socrates transmutes the very natures of the citizens of the city into their civic functions,
with only one class, the guardians, having voice in the organization of civic functionality.
And while the Cadmeian portion of the myth maintains the possibility of generational
social mobility (i.e. the child of a farmer can be “found to have a mixture of gold or
silver” during her education, thus placing her in a higher class), there are no mechanisms
for adult advancement.56 In other words, for the adult, the Phoenician story is a lie which
excludes her political voice and denies the possibility of class improvement. Here lies the
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problem. As Schofield explains, “The Republic’s explicit reliance on such a mechanism
to secure assent and commitment to the political arrangements it proposes still has the
capacity to shock and offend. It makes the Noble Lie a natural focus for many of the
major questions the dialogue provokes.”57 This is echoed by Pappas, who notes:
The myth is meant to generate blind loyalty: it implies that the city is its citizens’
mother (414e), and that nothing matters more than each citizen’s assignment to
the right class (415b–c). The principle of the division of labor, has by now
outweighed any question of how the citizens want to live. This might be the first
point in the Republic, therefore, at which its readers accuse Plato of totalitarian
politics.58
The Phoenician Story guarantees civic stability while stripping individual autonomy and
establishing totalitarian rule.
However, while this does not mean that the Phoenician story is necessarily
malicious, it is difficult to conceive of it as overly magnanimous either. Instead, it seems
to achieve a minimal aim, namely to bolster against the tyrannical rule which purely
favors the powerful.59 As Schofield asks of the famous lie and its corresponding use of
the citizenry as functionaries:
Lying and using in whose interest? Isn’t this ideology mediating a distorted
representation of reality designed to deceive and thereby control those who can be
got to believe it? To the first question Plato would reply: in the interests of those
lied to, or in whom religion is to be inculcated. In other words, he would enter the
defence [sic] of paternalism. With the second question he would reject the charge
of distortion. What the Laws’ religious rhetoric and the Republic’s Noble Lie
communicate is truth.60
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31). For Plato, whose city is orchestrated toward a particular civic end which is tied up in his conception of
the good, tyranny is untenable.
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The Phoenician Story turns most people into functionaries, but Plato seems to think this
very transformation through deception is warranted, and even beneficial, for both civic
and personal education, though it remains unclear if any of these educational benefits
actually affect ‘bronze’ citizens. Whereas the auxiliaries and guardians, even those who
never truly attain philosophical knowledge themselves, benefit from having their sight
“looking where it ought to look”, having their nature “hammered at from childhood and
freed from the bond of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened to it by
feasting, greed, and other such pleasures”, and having been removed from the
temptations raised by private property, the bronze citizen seems only to benefit from a
political landscape which does not foment civil war.61 The bronze citizen in Plato’s city
seems no better off than she would be in a democracy, at least in times of peace, as she
lives just as the democratic citizen does, plying her trade and valuing “desires that make
money”.62 So while the Phoenician Story guards the city against tyranny, ensuring that
those who rule are precisely those who do not desire honor or power, and thus guards
against the horrors of civil war, the deception does not in any way truly educate the
lowest of the city’s citizens, but only appeases them.63 It does not teach them virtue or
bring them nearer the philosophical life. Rather it encourages them to accept their fate as
incapable of the sort of virtue achieved by the guardians.
That said, there are more charitable readings of the Phoenician Story which read
its role as intended for the eudaimonia of the entire citizenry. For example, in his analysis
of Plato’s totalitarianism in response to Karl Popper’s critique in The Open Society and
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Its Enemies, C.C.W. Taylor tries to characterize whether the totalitarianism of the
Republic should be dismissed out of hand by analyzing what kind of totalitarianism the
Republic endorses. Taylor critiques Popper for his lack of engagement with the text itself
and Popper’s mistaken characterization of Plato as subsuming the happiness of the
citizens under the happiness of the city as a whole, arguing that while Plato does privilege
the city over any individual class, he does so for the sake of the individual.64 He explains:
The goal of the polis is the production of as much individual eudaimonia as
possible. But the majority of people are not capable of eudaimonia on their own;
since they are incapable of grasping the Good, they cannot provide for themselves
that impetus towards it which is a necessary condition for psychic harmony. Left
to themselves they will be a prey to their lawless lower impulses, and will
therefore sink into an uncoordinated chaos of conflicting desires.65
Thus, Taylor reads Plato as adopting a totalitarianism, but a beneficent totalitarianism.
Plato is a paternalist. Taylor elaborates:
The good condition of the state is thus defined as the state of maximum wellbeing for the citizens; as…both individual good and the good of the state are of
intrinsic value, but here the good of the individual is ultimately valuable, that of
the state derivatively. This form of totalitarianism, then, is a form of
paternalism… The paternalist theory is a humanist, teleological theory of a
familiar kind; it treats recognizable, individual human goods as paramount and
evaluates social institutions in terms of their efficacy and efficiency in producing
them. Its dubious features are its denial of autonomy as itself a constituent of
human welfare, and its claim that some individuals are entitled to wield absolute
political power in virtue of possessing knowledge of what is good for themselves
and for others, a claim which is contestable both on the metaphysical ground that
it is dubious whether such knowledge is possible and on the moral ground that,
even if possible, it is doubtful whether it confers political authority.66
Note the tenor of Taylor’s argument: it is possible to be a totalitarian, a humanist, and on
questionable moral and metaphysical ground all at once. Plato is most assuredly a
totalitarian insofar as he endorses the concentrated authority of the golden guardian class.
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And he is arguably a humanist, as the rule of the guardians is for the benefit of the other
classes. For example, Socrates explains in Republic 7 that whereas philosophers who
spring up randomly and naturally in the unorganized city are prone to isolation, they have
a duty in the city who fosters them. Socrates can:
…compel them to guard and care for others… We’ll say: “When people like you
come to be in other cities, they’re justified in not sharing they’re city’s labors, for
they’ve grown there spontaneously, against the will of the constitution. And what
grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its
side… But we’ve made you kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were,
both for yourselves and for the rest of the city… Therefore each of you in turn
must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others.”67
The philosopher must obligatorily descend into the darkness of the cave, because there is
a symbiosis between all the classes, such that each class reaches their maximal possible
fruition. While the guardian class might be the only one capable of full-fledged
eudaimonia and the only class capable of escaping ignorance, the guardians too have a
duty to allow the other classes to flourish, even if this means merely preventing civil
war.68
On balance, Plato is both concerned with the good of the city and the good of the
individual simultaneously, even if the maximal good of the bronze citizen pales in
comparison to the good achieved by the golden guardians.69 As many have noted, Plato’s
totalitarianism is based, not upon political ruthlessness, but upon an epistemological and
anthropological pessimism in which a significant portion of the population is incapable of
knowledge. In fact, his pessimism is so great that he fears that death awaits anyone who
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tries too forcefully to teach these ignorant masses, just as death awaited Socrates.70 The
rule of the guardians is based upon their simple desire not to be ruled by someone worse,
more wicked, and more ignorant than themselves, and the medicinal use of deception is
mandated by the poor intellectual breeding of those of the lower classes.71 As Taylor
explains:
The combination of Plato's metaphysics and his pessimistic moral psychology
seems thus to offer a compellingly neat solution to the difficulty we have been
discussing. There is an objective good for the individual, which everyone wants to
achieve, but which most are incapable of achieving by their own efforts, since its
achievement requires a grasp of the nature of that good of which most are
incapable. Hence society must be so organized that the direction towards that
good is provided by a ruling elite with the power to direct themselves and others
towards the good which they alone grasp.72
In theory, while the guardian class is the only class to achieve eudaimonia (though it
should be noted, by requiring the guardians to care for the other classes, they too must
sacrifice for the good of the city), the Phoenician Story establishes a societal structure
which enables each class to maximize their virtue and allows each class to get as close as
possible to happiness.73

2.2. Noble Lies and Education
But even granting (for the sake of argument) Plato’s metaphysics and
psychological pessimism, a topic too vast to evaluate here, Plato’s Phoenician Story still
raises ethical concerns, particularly insofar as it seems not to exemplify the types of
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useful lies which are intended for the sake of education. To put it bluntly, Plato’s sole
example of a Noble Lie does not exemplify his description of Noble Lies all that well.
Recall that the only stories allowed in Plato’s city “are false, on the whole, though they
have some truth in them”, “fine and beautiful”, intended for the education of the citizens’
souls, meant to instill virtue, and intended to imitate the speech of a decent person.74 The
Phoenician Story does not achieve these aims very well. While on the one hand the
Phoenician Story does contain some fine elements (e.g. all humans are brothers), some
truth (e.g. not all humans are equally skillful), and educates the citizens about the proper
social order for a city, it lacks educational merit for the bronze citizens, in effect
instructing them to forsake their education, as their natures will prevent them from
achieving knowledge anyway. Coupled with Plato’s lack of instruction as to how one
distinguishes between the gold citizen and the bronze citizens, and further, the deceptive
and seemingly arbitrary testing amongst the guardian class in order to distinguish
between he who rules and he who is rejected because he “fails to prove himself”, Plato’s
fatalistic view that the majority of the citizenry lack any prospects of achieving
eudaimonia highlights the problems inherent within the Phoenician Story.75 If the lie is,
in part, intended to stifle the educational aspirations of the majority of the citizenry, it
ought to have a mechanism in place to identify those who can and cannot achieve
eudaimonia with perfect accuracy.76 Even if the Phoenician Story qualifies as a Noble Lie
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in theory, it cannot function as a Noble Lie in practice, because it divides humanity
without foolproof mechanisms to accurately apply this division. He even admits that his
proposed testing (which only distinguishes the guardians who are equipped to rule from
the guardians who are not) provides “only a general pattern and not the exact details.”77
From the viewpoint of the individual citizen awaiting whether they will have the
opportunity to pursue the philosophical life, the exact details matter.
Plato enacts a policy of division and legitimizes it through a lie, because no
rational discourse can justify it. As Bloom explains:
The lie implies that the city must have some wise ruler who can distinguish the
qualities of souls, but here that is not underlined, and the emphasis is on preparing
the citizens to accept both a stability and a movement which go against their
grain. The first part of the lie differs from the second in that the former attempts
to make the conventional attachment to the city and its regime seem natural, while
the latter must provide a conventional support for natural differences which men
have reason to want to forget. This is why, in the second part of the lie, a god
must be invoked. The lie, because it is a lie, points up the problems it is designed
to solve. Perhaps no rational investigation of them could yield a basis for political
legitimacy.78
And while Bloom argues that ultimately there are still good reasons for the lie, it should
unsettle and disturb anyone concerned for justice.79 Plato might contend that any seeming
injustice brought about by the Phoenician Story merely reflects a natural injustice in the
distribution of talents within the human populace, but he does so without demonstration
of this fact or the mechanism by which one might flawlessly identify these talents. The
Phoenician Story strips human beings of their dignity without providing a means to
assess dignity; it curbs opportunity without first assessing individual limits. While the
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Phoenician Story might function as a Noble Lie macroscopically, ensuring the stability
and virtue of the city as a whole, microscopically it actually stifles education.
Surely, this is odd. That the Phoenician Story suppresses the educational
ambitions of a majority of his perfect city seems inappropriate in light of Plato’s
conception of the good life. As Bloom notes, “Socrates, who gaily abandons the
founding myth or noble lie he himself made up for the sake of the city, looks quixotic in
this light.”80 The same Socrates who views the ultimate goal of humanity as an escape
from the darkness of the cave, himself proposes to chain the majority of his citizens to
their seats in the shadows, even if he provides slightly better shadows than those which
are encountered in the democratic city. This is suggested by the selfsame Plato who in the
Laws claims that “truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. Let
anyone who intends to be happy and blessed be its partner from the start, so that he may
live as much of his life as possible a man of truth.”81 This is suggested by the selfsame
Plato who claims in the Phaedo that even faulty language “does some harm to the soul.”82
And again, this is suggested by the selfsame Plato who earlier in the Republic confidently
claims that “to be false in one’s soul about the things that are, to be ignorant and to have
and hold falsehood there, is what everyone would least of all accept, for everyone hates a
falsehood in that place most of all.”83 Later, he even goes so far as to say the soul is
immortal, and its most perfected state is its love of philosophy.84 Nonetheless, he
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proposes a founding myth which relegates most of his citizens to an entirely
unphilosophical life.
And while nature might be the main culprit which disables most individuals from
knowing truth, as most of the citizens “are naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and
follow their leader,” Plato’s city is not natural, nor does it perfectly mirror nature.85 The
system of dividing the classes is an artificial one, built upon a lie, which has no
guarantees or checks upon its rectitude.86 Plato justifies denying universal access to
philosophy because there are some humans naturally unequipped to learn, but never
carefully establishes how to distinguish between those who are capable of learning and
those who are not (and never considers the possibility that one’s condition might change
throughout one’s life). This is clearly in dissonance with Plato’s own esteem for the truth.
As F.E. Sparshott notes:
Plato frankly regards as sinister the use of non-rational means of persuasion to
support policies whose merits are objectively uncertain: to use them is necessarily
to give opinions more weight than they are known to deserve (Gorgias 455A456C, 458E-459C). Two palliative considerations may be noted, however. One is
that non-rational support is as available to a sound opinion as to an unsound
(Gorgias 456C-457C, Statesman 303E-304E); in fact since not everyone can
appreciate the true merit of all opinions, a sound opinion (even a demonstrable
truth) needs such backing no less than an unsound one.87
The entire problem raised by the Phoenician Story is that the truth which it contains
(despite its apparent falsehood) is not certain, nor can its implementation be certain. It is
not persuasion in defense of certain knowledge, but a deception which establishes a civic
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order divorced (at least without a better mechanism for assessing the capabilities of the
individual) from nature. It is not a representation of the truth. The critiques of Plato’s
doctrine which I will address in Chapter 5 hinge upon the unfaithfulness of this
representation. A Noble Lie, as such, is intended to be in service to the truth and
education, yet the Phoenician Story is not. Ultimately, the Phoenician Story is a lie which
is not actually representative of one of Plato’s useful falsehoods. His sole example of a
Noble Lie is not itself a very good example of a Noble Lie.

2.3. Noble Lies as a Concept
However, to repudiate the Phoenician Story is not the same as a repudiation of the
concept of a Noble Lie as such. To suggest that the Phoenician Story is inadequately
adjacent to the truth, insufficiently effective at bringing about the happiness of the
citizens, and educationally deficient does not preclude that there might be some Noble
Lie which avoids these pitfalls. It remains possible, despite one’s repudiation of the
Phoenician Story, that there is still merit to the idea of a Noble Lie. As Sparshott noted
above, in the realm of politics, even “a sound opinion (even a demonstrable truth) needs
such [non-rational] backing.”88 Plato’s Doctrine of the Noble Lie might remain morally
justifiable if one does not collapse the concept of the Noble Lie as such with the example
of the Phoenician Story. As Shofield explains:
The culture is and must be saturated with myths that are literally false, and
deceptive if believed to be factually true. But the deception is legitimate if like the
Noble Lie and the stories Socrates wants the young to hear, they are morally
admirable fictions that drug people into sound convictions and lead them to virtue
(2.377B–C, 378E–379A). What is wrong with Homer and Hesiod is not in the end
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that they lied, but that there was nothing morally admirable in most of the lies
they told (2.377E).89
As noted when this chapter began, political lies seem an unfortunate necessity of politics
as a whole. They are the politically possible course of action when brash truthfulness is
untenable. But such lies must be in the service to something nobler than brazen
untruthfulness for the sake of political power. They must themselves stand in for and
represent the truth which is politically impossible, as an aid for an ideal. They cannot be
the mere flights of fancy of Homer and Hesiod, nor can they be political tools which do
not withstand scrutiny, as is the Phoenician Story. Unfortunately, there are not many
models for warranted political deception in the history of ideas.
While Plato’s Phoenician Story fails to live up to criteria established above for
beneficent political deception, it remains instructive in how it fails. Plato carefully
considers each criterion for beneficent political deception, both why untruth is necessary
and what ‘the next best’ thing to the truth could be. Regarding the former, he contends
that not all humans are endowed by nature to know the truth. Regarding the latter, he
gives a description of a Noble Lie in which the lie is educational, containing some, if not
the whole, truth in it. Thus, Plato provides a theoretical model for beneficent political
deception. And yet, his implementation of the theory is flawed; the Phoenician Story
lacks necessity (at least at the level of the particular human being) and fails to be ‘the
next best’ thing after the truth, i.e. an educational falsehood, instead stifling education.
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But by providing a defective model of beneficent political deception, Plato gives an
adumbration of what a successful model might look like.

3. A Possible Model: A Construction of Social Knowledge
Through Plato, a clearer conception of what could constitute a successful
archetype for beneficent political deception manifests itself. The ambiguous notion of
‘the next best’ thing to the truth is shown to be quite a particular notion after Plato’s
examination of the Noble Lie. If the truth is impossible, ‘the next best’ thing to the truth
must be falsehood in service to the truth. In other words, a beneficent political deception
must be a lie which is educationally valuable to those who hear it. Of course, the caveat
remains that the truth is always preferable to falsity, but now it is clear that any justified
beneficent political deception requires (a) that deception is necessary and (b) that any
political deception must profit the advancement of the truth.
Such a deception could never become tantamount to truth; believing a lie can
never properly be characterized as knowledge. However, assuming the prior conditions
for beneficent political deception, one could readily imagine a scenario in which (a)
knowledge of truth is necessarily unattainable for a certain portion of a society and (b) an
educational fiction is created and presented as a stand-in for the truth, as a bulwark
against more pernicious falsehoods and an impetus toward the truth should the
impediment which necessitates falsehood ever be removed. In other words, the model for
beneficent political deception, as well as the model for the Nobel Lie, is a falsehood for a
society which serves as a supporting scaffold when truth in unattainable, but which,
importantly, does not serve as an impediment to truth when or if conditions change.
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Such beneficent political deceptions must by definition be artificial, insofar as
they are created by a political actor who deceives for necessary and altruistic ends. More
importantly, such deceits are not divorced from truth; they do not supplant truth. They are
in service to truth; they are constructed in reference to truth to function as a necessary
political proxy for knowledge in a society. Thus, they will henceforth be termed
‘constructions of social knowledge’—political deceptions which serve as necessitated
educational surrogates for the truth within a society.90 These are not mere lies; rather,
they are deceptive fictions which orient a society toward the truth.
To fully explicate such a concept, one needs a model of its instantiation. Exactly
why such constructions of social knowledge are necessitated must be explained. How
such constructions of social knowledge can serve the truth needs further explication. But
the criteria for an ideal model, while not found in Plato, is revealed in Plato; through
these criteria a search for an educational political deception can proceed.

4. The Paucity of Models for Beneficent Political Deception
Lamentably, after Plato, there are not very many fully developed models of
political deception which acknowledge both conditions which must undergird any
possible justification for warranted beneficent political deception: (a) that political
deception is necessary, and (b) that political deception must profit the advancement of the
truth in order to be justifiable. Those few which exist are themselves inheritors of
Platonic philosophy (as well as Fārābīan philosophy) and will be discussed in subsequent
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chapters.91 The remaining thinkers who discuss political deception tend to fall into three
distinct camps: 1) those who value the truth to such a degree that they deny that deception
could ever be ethically necessary, 2) those who emphasize the importance of the
realpolitik and political consequence to the extent that they deny any intrinsic duty to the
truth, and 3) critical thinkers who explore the topic without providing a model for
political deception of their own. Unfortunately, only a cursory examination of these
camps is possible here.

4.1. Truth Dominant views of Deception
Perhaps the most straightforward of the approaches to political deception is the
position which is put forward by those thinkers who believe that truth, as such, is
inviolate. For these thinkers, lying to another is simply wrong. For these thinkers, e.g.
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, John
Rawls, and even John Stuart Mill, lying violates a central duty in ethics, whether said
duty resides in a responsibility to the divine or natural law, the rights of others, the moral
law within oneself, one’s social contract with others, or to utility.92 For, while the
motivations of these thinkers differ, their approach to the topic of deception is generally
the same.
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For example, Augustine (d. 430) admits to no exceptions; lying is never
permissible. He explains, “To use speech, then, for the purpose of deception, and not for
its appointed end [i.e., making known one’s thoughts to another], is a sin. Nor are we to
suppose that there is any lie that is not a sin, because it is sometimes possible, by telling a
lie, to do service to another.”93 Aquinas (d.1274), citing Augustine as a source, follows
suit, even while acknowledging that lying admits to varying degrees of sin, e.g. a
mischievous or pernicious lie (perniciosus) is worse than a jocose or humorous lie
(iocosus).94 He explains:
An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good
and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every
respect... Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on
undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural
and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind...
Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares.95
Moving into the modern period, Hugo Grotius (d. 1645) and Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679)
each decry the violative character of lies. Hobbes is the more straightforward case,
following the Augustinian argument that lies (and even metaphor) violate the intended
purpose of speech, saying that to “use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than
that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others” is an abuse of speech.96 Grotius is
a more interesting case, insofar as he shifts the importance of truth into the domain of
rights. He explains:
But a lie, in this stricter acceptation, [has] some thing unlawful in its very nature...
It seems, that no other explanation of it is necessary to be given, except that it is a
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violation of the existing and permanent rights of the person, to whom a discourse,
or particular signs, are directed. It is a violation of the rights of another.97
In shifting the moral obligation from the intended purpose of speech or the truth itself to
the rights of another, Grotius reconstructs the problem in an interesting way: he allows
for consensual lies (for example in the course of treaty negotiation), he allows for the
deception of those who lack rights (e.g., madmen and children), and he opens up the
possibility of unrestrained political deception by the sovereign, iff her subjects have
relinquished their rights in exchange for benefits (e.g., protection).98 That said, none of
these thinkers leave room for beneficent deception or a construction of social knowledge;
all of them, even those that leave room for minor exceptions, hold truth to such a
preeminent degree that they deny the possibility of morally justified political deceit.99
In the late modern period, Immanuel Kant (d. 1804) famously espoused an ethic
that allows for no lying whatsoever. He explains:
Lying (in the ethical sense of the word), intentional untruth as such, need not be
harmful to others in order to be repudiated; for it would then be a violation of the
rights of others. It may be done merely out of frivolity or even good nature; the
speaker may even intend to achieve a really good end by it. But this way of
pursuing his end is, by its mere form, a crime of a man against his own person and
a worthlessness that must make him contemptible in his own eyes.100
Contra Grotius, the harm of deception is not directed outward, but inward, toward one’s
inner sense of the moral law and the goodness of one’s will.101 Lying is incongruous with
a good will, even if it does not harm another. Interestingly, John Stuart Mill (d. 1873)
follows this course. He explains in Utilitarianism:
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But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject
of veracity is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of
the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental... we feel that
the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency is
not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of convenience to himself or to some
other individual... acts the part of one of their worst enemies.102
As mentioned above, Mill follows this passage by admitting of exceptions (particularly
when the truth will bring another to immediate harm), but these cases are very limited
and nothing he says suggests that he has any conception of a kind of deception which
simultaneously recognizes the obligatory pull of the truth and good consequence.103
Rather, truth-telling should be one’s default stance unless an immediate and defined
threat to another permits lying. Concluding with a more contemporary political
philosopher, John Rawls (1921-2002) goes even further toward transparency in the
political sphere. He adopts a publicity condition as a part of his social contract theory
(hinted at in Hobbes’ own social contract theory) which demands publicly accessible
information. He says, “The point of the publicity condition is to have the parties evaluate
conceptions of justice as publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral constitutions of
social life.”104 Following Kant, there is no room in his position for any kind of political
deception. And, as a whole, this group of thinkers lacks any useful model for justified
political deception as constrained by the discussion above.105
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4.2. Realpolitik Dominant views of Deception
Likewise, there is another, often infamous, approach to political deception which
lacks the tools to provide a model for justified political deception. This approach, in
many ways, suffers deficiencies from the opposite side of the dilemma, i.e., the dilemma
between the necessity of deception and one’s obligation to truth, than those suffered by
the thinkers in the Truth Dominant camp. Whereas the Truth Dominant approach
privileges truth too much to allow any deception, the Realpolitik Dominant approach
values outcomes (and devalues truth) too much to allow any form of robust moral
justification. Rather, the realm of politics gets privileged beyond the realm of ethics, and
truth is no longer obligatory for leaders.
The most famous theoreticians of this approach are unsurprising. Niccolò
Machiavelli (d. 1527), in one of the most famous passages in The Prince, extols his
Prince to “know how to follow evil courses if he must” and that “a prudent Prince neither
can nor ought to keep his word when to keep it is hurtful to him and the causes which led
him to pledge it are removed”, for while “it is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane,
religious, and upright, and also to be so; but the mind should remain so balanced that
were it needful not to be so, you should be able and know how to change to the
contrary.”106 Such capricious loyalty to the truth is hidden behind what we now call ‘the
problem of dirty hands’, the idea that rulers, by virtue of having to rule, operate on a
different ethical plane than their subjects.107 The position itself reduces to a base form of
act utilitarianism; lying is permissible for a ruler if it leads to great deeds. Machiavelli
suggests as much when he says:
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The Prince, Chapter 18, 80.
See Walzer 1973 and Coady 2018.
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How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live with integrity and
not by cunning, everyone knows. Nevertheless, one sees from experience in our
times that the princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have
thought little about keeping faith and who have known how cunningly to
manipulate men’s minds.108
But such a position can never justify political deception; it simply denies that political
deception needs justification. Jeremy Bentham (d. 1747) can be characterized likewise,
for while his act utilitarianism holds the virtue of being egalitarian, i.e. his disregard for
the preeminence of the truth does not hide behind the arcana imperii as does
Machiavelli’s position, he is also unable to justify political deception. (Although, he can
condemn it or laud it as being nefarious or valuable, respectively.)109 As he explains,
“Falsehood, take it by itself, consider it not as not being accompanied by any other
material circumstances, nor therefore productive of any material effects, can never, upon
the principle of utility, constitute any offense at all.”110 While lies can cause harmful
consequences, these consequences are not a result of any intrinsic duty to truth or truthtelling. Rather than constructing a model to navigate the dilemma, these approaches
simply deny any ethical obligation to the truth.
Of course, the aforementioned positions become particularly perilous when they
are taken out of the theoretical sphere and implemented in practice.111 This is not to say
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The Prince, Chapter 18, 79.
In fact, Bentham is particularly critical of the effect of political deception, saying: “Parliament (is) a sort
of gaming-house; members on the two sides of each house the players; the property of the people—such
portion of it as on any pretence may be found capable of being extracted from them—the stakes played for.
Insincerity in all its shapes, disingenuousness, lying, hypocrisy, fallacy, the instruments employed by the
players on both sides for obtaining advantages in the game: on each occasion—in respect of the side on
which he ranks himself—what course will be most for the advantage of the universal interest, a question
never looked at, never taken into account: on which side is the prospect of personal advantage in its several
shapes—this the only question really taken into consideration...” Book of Fallacies 21-22.
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Principles of Morals, Chapter 16, §24.
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Of course, any treatment of political deception, even if beneficent political deception, must account for
and recognize the danger it poses. In the most infamous and heinous of cases, those in which deception is
entirely unmoored from any subservience to the truth and, more destructively, political power is unmoored
from a leader’s responsibility to her people, atrocities often ensue.
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that either Machiavelli or, especially, Bentham would endorse or are responsible for the
most common real instantiations of the Realpolitik Dominant position. For, while tyrants
often take this tact in their own ‘moral’ reasoning, tyrants preceded this discussion and
will likely endure long past it. But, without dwelling overly long on amoral, immoral, and
vicious men—that is a job for historians—, one should note that rejecting the primacy of
truth has been a central political ploy from Callicles and Thrasymachus to Hitler and
Stalin, and one used by every tinpot dictator who has emulated them.112 Whether through
defining justice as the advantage of the stronger, conjecturing the transcendent status of
the leader via the Führerprinzip, weaponizing education to wield against one’s enemies,
or adopting the strategy and use of a große Lüge, divorcing morality from the truth and
tethering it to power and consequence alone is always dangerous.113 All told, the
Realpolitik Dominant position admits great variation, from an egalitarian strict adherence
to act utilitarianism to brazen power politics, but, regardless of the variation, any insight
in justifying political deception while maintaining that the truth ethically asserts itself
will not be found here.

4.3. Critical views of Deception
One final approach to the topic of political deception should be mentioned,
namely the more recent approach by thinkers like Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and
Sissela Bok (1934-). (Similar approaches can be found in thinkers who are specifically
critical of Plato’s approach to deception, like Karl Popper, R.H.S. Crossman, and others,
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as will be addressed in Chapter 5). While not systematic in their approaches and, thus,
unhelpful for providing a successful model for political deception, the descriptive, rather
than prescriptive, examinations of deception add careful nuance to the topic. Both Arendt
and Bok, both responding, in part, to the release of the Pentagon Papers, share a helpful
intuition. In particular, they both suggest that the truth asserts itself. As Bok explains in
her sequel to her comprehensive book, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life,
“I take lying to be prima facie wrong...”114 Despite a landmark study on the topic, it is
this primal intuition that she highlights that any justified deception must contend with.
Arendt’s intuition, rooted in her experience in and study of the happenings and aftermath
of the Second World War, is even more ominous and daunting to those trying to justify
political deception. She says, “The trouble with lying and deceiving is that their
efficiency depends entirely upon a clear notion of the truth that the liar and deceiver
wishes to hide. In this sense, truth, even if it does not prevail in public, possesses an
ineradicable primacy over all falsehoods.”115 If the truth asserts itself, if it is more primal,
ethically and really, than falsehood, then no deception is justifiable, unless the purpose of
said deception is to be supplanted by the truth. Only a deception whose aim is to fail can
be warranted. But whereas Plato provides the parameters of what such a deception could
look like, his model fails. And the rest of the history of philosophy is lacking as well.

5. Al-Fārābī as a Useful Model
Into this gap steps al-Fārābī, the 10th century Abbasid thinker who, inspired by
Plato, proposes his own account of beneficent political deception enfolded within his
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conception of revelation, which is synonymous with his Doctrine of Beneficent Political
Deception.116 Like Plato, he asserts that political rule must at times be maintained
through the use of some kind of fiction, and like Plato, these fictions must be subservient
to the truth. However, unlike Plato’s Phoenician Story, al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent
Political Deception is explicitly pedagogical and intended for the education of all
citizens. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will be devoted to explicating al-Fārābī’s position,
but a brief introduction to al-Fārābī’s doctrine is appropriate here.
Al-Fārābī argues that perfect political governance requires political deception, but
that this deception requires restraint. This beneficent deception, the expression of
philosophical truths through the images and symbols of religion, meets the criteria
mentioned above. It is necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious
(insofar as these deceptions are in fact pedagogically useful and subservient to the truth).
Al-Fārābī contends that political deception is necessary for human happiness
insofar as all humans require association (ijtimā‘) and cooperation (ta‘āwun), yet all but
the most exemplary humans are inherently deficient. This deficiency (naqṣ) is
necessitated by al-Fārābī’s entire cosmological model, which necessitates the deficiency
of the human being, insofar as she is brought about through a deficient cause (i.e. the
motions of the heavens) and constituted through a mixture (ikhtilāṭ) of matter (mādda)
and contrary forms (al-ṣuwar al-muḍādda). In other words, while all humans seek
happiness (al-sa‘ada), an entirely intellectual condition only fully realized when a human
being achieves the psychological status of becoming an ‘acquired intellect’ (‘aql al-

Henceforth, any reference to the conception of Fārābīan revelation should be read as synonymous with
the Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception and vice-versa. The only distinction between the two is that
the former connotes the religious sphere while the latter connotes the political sphere.
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mustafāḍ), most humans lack the rational capability to achieve this status. They can only
achieve a facsimile of this happiness through facsimiles of the truth, expressed by the
ruling Imām of a city, which enable them to live virtuous lives and contribute to a
community in which, at least, some community members are happy.
Al-Fārābī describes these necessitated facsimiles of the truth as near similitudes
(mithālāt qarība) of the truth, which have an affinity (munāsaba) to the truth and by
which the truth is known (ma‘lūm), even if never known fully. They are not simply
deceptions, but untruths subservient to the truth, translations of philosophy into the
language and imagery of religion. These are poetical statements (al-’aqāwīl al-shi‘riyya),
statements which serve as a kind of syllogism (sulujismus) with the force of analogy
(quwwa qiyās) and cause appropriate attractions and aversions in the human soul such
that a human being with no theoretical or philosophical understanding can still live a life
according to the precepts laid down by the philosophers. And for those lucky few
members of a society who have the theoretical wherewithal to achieve genuine
philosophical happiness, these similitudes of the truth serve as pedagogical steppingstones on their way to theoretical knowledge.
Central to this entire doctrine is al-Fārābī’s conjecture that the ruling Imām of a
city is not only qualified to deceive his subjects because humans are deficient and in need
of deception or that some deceptions can function in service to the truth (or at least a
virtuous life), but also the belief that the ruler is certain (yaqīn) about this deficiency and
the truth which underlies the images of religion. In other words, the Imām is not only
acting justly by translating the truths of philosophy into the images of religion, but he is
certain that he is acting justly, having demonstrated the need for deception through the
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sciences of metaphysics and psychology and having demonstrated the usefulness of
deception to the attainment of happiness through the demonstrative science of ethics
(despite this being a rather idiosyncratic view of ethics by al-Fārābī). In sum, al-Fārābī
justifies political deception by having a cosmology which necessitates that most human
beings are too deficient to relate to the truth directly, contending that there are
mechanisms through which the truth can be reliably altered without losing its pedagogical
value, and maintaining an epistemology and view of the sciences that allows rulers to
have certainty about when and whether deception is appropriate.
Ultimately, I will argue that while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what
justified political deception could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to
create a viable model for political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of
justified political deception writ large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the
notion, notably a cosmos that does not match our own. One must adopt very specific
conceptions of human nature, human association, and human happiness. One must
contend that there are some untruths which remain ‘near’ the truth. And one must hold to
an epistemology which allows for certainty about this entire model. For, while al-Fārābī
clearly shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also shows how unlikely it is
to be justifiable in an unidealized setting.

6. The Aims of the Chapters to Follow
The purpose of this introductory chapter was to raise some of the broader themes
surrounding political deception: noting the reality that deception is often a necessary
political course, defining the notion of the “construction of social knowledge” and
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identifying its intrinsic relationship to beneficent political deception, highlighting and
foreshadowing the Platonic origins for constructing social knowledge, noting the scarcity
of alternative models for beneficent political deception in the history of philosophy, and
introducing al-Fārābī’s adoption and adaptation of Plato’s use of constructed social
knowledge. All of this aims to set up my thesis that al-Fārābī’s model for constructed
social knowledge is justified within his own philosophical context, and that, while not a
universally applicable doctrine, it does provide a model of what the justification for a
construction of social knowledge entails.
Moving forward, several issues require exploration. A more detailed introduction
to al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception is required, including a
literature review of the issues surrounding al-Fārābī’s position and the unique
methodological concerns raised by al-Fārābī’s cannon. After charting out the specific
methodological approach for this project, a more detailed examination of beneficent
political deception will be possible, especially insofar as it is grounded, for al-Fārābī, in
the structure and principles of the cosmos which lead to an inherent deficiency within
human associations. This justification is both apparent in al-Fārābī’s texts and in the
thought of his successors. Once al-Fārābī’s model for beneficent political deception is
fully explored, possible critiques to his justification can be raised. And within the context
of critique, al-Fārābī’s reliance upon very unique metaphysical and epistemological
principles to justify beneficent political deception becomes apparent, and the
exportability of his model is put into doubt. Ultimately, this project concludes with some
tangible discoveries about the nature of constructed social knowledge and its usefulness
in the public sphere, as highlighted by the Fārābīan approach.
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II. CONTESTS SURROUNDING AL-FᾹRᾹBῙ’S DOCTRINE OF BENEFICENT
POLITICAL DECEPTION: BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY, AND
SCHOLARSHIP

1. Introduction
In Chapter 1, two broad topics worthy of inquiry were raised. The first, simply
put, asked how a ruler or government should proceed when overt truth is not politically
possible. The second, inquired as to the conditions, if any such conditions exist, by which
a ruler or government can ethically justify abandoning overt communication of the truth.
As has already been noted, it is impossible to definitively answer these questions without
firmly establishing a broader metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical framework, a
task beyond the bounds of this present project.1 Thus, rather than adopting a direct
methodology which approaches the conclusions to these questions decisively, a more
cautious methodology has been adopted, one which aims to evoke a shared intuition
through a dialectical examination of an already established model of beneficent political
deception, by which a more careful examination of this topic can advance, namely the
model provided by al-Fārābī. The selection of al-Fārābī is, in part, a response to a lacuna
which exists in historical discussions of political deception: thinkers tend to take either
Truth Dominant, Realpolitik Dominant, or Critical views of deception, none of which
provide a helpful model for justified deception, or at least a model that recognizes both
the realpolitik need for falsehood and the ethical pull of truth-telling.2

Although two general conditions were established, ‘the next best’ thing condition and the necessity
condition, these conditions lend little clarity to the issue, being, in essence, reformulations of the very
questions they answer. How these conditions could be applied to a practical model has yet to be
determined.
2
See Chapter 1, 4.1-3.
1
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The dialectical framework of this project will proceed through an examination of
al-Fārābī’s discussion of these problems. Al-Fārābī is a subtle systematic thinker, who is
himself responding to two other subtle systematic thinkers, Plato and Aristotle (as well as
the broader Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions). His position is a mature theory of
beneficent political deception, even if his broader political, metaphysical, and
epistemological commitments may seem foreign to modern philosophical discourse,
particularly within a modern democratic context. And while the context of his
metaphysics, his historical remoteness, at times, divorces his solutions from tenability
within a contemporary context, focusing on someone independent of the modern context
has certain advantages, namely the ability to examine political deception outside of any
contemporary political climate. In short, one gets the benefits of a careful systematic
study of political deception without committing to its first premises. Unfortunately, as
will be seen shortly, the study of al-Fārābī poses its own methodological challenges.
Nonetheless, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, before assessing the
nuance of al-Fārābī’s position, a basic outline of his position must be reported. Second, if
the topic of beneficent political deception is to be approached through the lens of the
Fārābīan system, problems within the study of al-Fārābī and the specific methodology by
which one navigates these problems must be raised and established, respectively. AlFārābī is no simple thinker, and the relationships between the individual works within his
corpus and the relationships between the doctrines within these works remain difficult to
navigate. Through examining these puzzling and entangled relationships here, a less
convoluted path will be available in Chapter 3, in which a more definitive version of alFārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception will be established. Third, this
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chapter will orient this discussion within the broader context of scholarship regarding alFārābī. While little has been written which specifically addresses the ethical justification
for al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception, there is abundant study of alFārābī’s politics, al-Fārābī’s metaphysics, and the relationship between the two more
generally.

2. Al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception
In 1945, during his first published foray into Fārābīan interpretation in which he
delves into the relation between Fārābīan philosophy and politics through the lens of alFārābī’s 12th century Jewish successor Maimonides, Leo Strauss makes one single
overarching claim about al-Fārābī’s position: philosophy reduces to politics (and vice
versa).3 Strauss admits that al-Fārābī does not say this overtly, but thinks al-Fārābī’s
esoteric position is clear; politics, which aims ultimately at the happiness and virtue of
humankind, and philosophy, whose consequence is the perfection of the human intellect,
are coextensive.4 And, in a certain sense, Strauss is right.

2.1. Al-Fārābī’s Educational Program
For the human being, happiness is the ultimate end; politics is, of course, the
ordering of the city toward this end or highest good.5 And, according to al-Fārābī,

Of course, in “Farabi’s Plato” Strauss is interpreting al-Fārābī’s own interpretation of the 4th century
B.C.E. Athenian. However, as Strauss claims that al-Fārābī held Plato’s philosophy to be the true
philosophy, this need not pose a stumbling block as to Strauss’s view of al-Fārābī’s own position.
4
Strauss 1945, 361, 368-369.
5
NE 1.7; Politics 1.1; NE 1.2. Here, of course, ‘happiness’ should be read in the Aristotelian sense of
eudaimonia, to be well in spirit or to flourish, not simply as pleasure. Happiness, as explored in NE 1.7, is
the aim of the human life. And “the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity
with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best
3
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happiness is attained only through intellectual perfection, such that the intellect no longer
requires matter, but functions on a universal level.6 In short, happiness, which is the
ultimate aim of politics, and knowledge, which is the ultimate aim of philosophy, are
coextensive within the human being. To have universal knowledge is to be perfected and
therefore happy, and to be happy is to have universal knowledge. And as humans are the
only creatures below the heavens who can possibly be perfected in this most complete
way and thus happy, and proper human associations are necessary for this possibility,
human beings in the proper political configurations are the only non-heavenly beings
capable of this condition.7 A necessary component of these political configurations is the
encouragement of philosophy.8 In other words, for al-Fārābī, philosophy cannot exist
without a proper political configuration, but a proper political configuration (i.e., politics)
is itself defined through philosophy.
As a result of the inseparability of politics and philosophy, al-Fārābī recommends
a Platonic/Aristotelian program of education for the virtuous city which manifests itself
through the practical and particular activity of religion. Human beings, as communal
creatures, “cannot attain the perfection” which is their telos, “unless many people who
co-operate come together.”9 But cooperation (ta‘āwun) is merely a practical means
toward the end of happiness and does not alone suffice to bring about human fulfillment.
Cooperation must be oriented toward truth, and the telos of any educational program

and most perfect among them. Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not
make a spring.”
6
PS 13.5; AH 14f.; AH (Ar.) 15f.; PR 73. To aid the reader in understanding the core of al-Fārābī’s
doctrine, both the Arabic of al-Fārābī’s texts and a popular published English translation (unless otherwise
noted) has been provided in Chapters 2 and 3. For a list of abbreviations to these works, see SHORTHAND
FOR PRIMARY TEXTS on page 400.
7
PR 55, 69.
8
PR 76.
9
... اال باجتماعات جماعة كثيرة متعاونين،  الذي ألجله جعلت له الفطرة الطبيعية،  ;فلذلك ال يمكن أن يكون االنسان ينال الكمالPS 15.1.
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must be correctly oriented toward the telos of what it is to be human in order to result in
human happiness, scil., a proper understanding of the metaphysical nature of human
beings. As al-Fārābī explains:
Since what is intended by the existence of the human being is that he obtain
ultimate happiness, to obtain it he needs to know happiness and to set it before his
eyes as his end. Then, after that, he needs to know the things that ought to be done
so as to gain happiness by means of them, then to perform those deeds.10
وإذا كان المقصود بوجود اإلنسان أن يبلغ السعادة القصوى فإنه يحتاج في بلوغها إلى أن يعلم السعادة
 ثم يحتاج بعد ذلك إلى أن يعلم األشياء التي ينبغي أن يعلمها حتى ينال بها.ويجعلها غايته ونصب عينيه
11
. ثم أن يعمل تلك األعمال،السعادة
In other words, while the need for philosophical education mandates that the city install a
religious program which is at heart political, the notion of ‘politics’ should not be thought
of in the tawdry sense of mere political power, but rather cooperation (ta‘āwun) within an
association (ijtimā‘) which aims toward the perfection of philosophical truth (and
ultimately the good). Politics is societal ethics.12

2.1.1. The Imām as Educator
Accordingly, al-Fārābī proposes a figure of seemingly mythic perfection, the
originary Imām, whose own genesis cannot itself be accounted for except by conjecture
(as he surely did not himself benefit from well-orchestrated political cooperation), who,
through his knowledge and perfected nature, is able to direct the cooperation of the city
toward its proper aim of happiness.13 This rare figure, whom al-Fārābī never identifies
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PR 78.
PR 78.
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For this reason, al-Fārābī subjugates religious jurisprudence under political science, as politics is the
most generic form of the practical sciences which concern human volition. ES 102-107.
13
PR 79; Of course, al-Fārābī does account for the appearance of the Imām; but his explanation is less than
satisfactory. He merely arises on account of his “great nature” and such an occurrence is “very rare.” See
PR 79 and PS 15.13.
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specifically, but who can be tacitly insinuated to reference the prophet Muḥammad (and
likely also the other great Abrahamic founders, Moses and Jesus), establishes religion,
not as a response to mystical revelation, but as a practical exercise in politics.14 The
Imām is a philosopher qua poet. That is, the Imām is “a wise man and a philosopher
(ḥakīm faylasūf)” who, through his perfected intellect and imagination, translates
philosophical truths to those who cannot themselves assess the validity of
demonstrations, in order to “rouse imaginations by well chosen words” toward the goal of
prompting right action.15 And most importantly, the Imām “knows every action by which
felicity can be reached” as “this is the first condition for being a ruler.”16 The Imām is
first and foremost a philosopher who knows what it is to be human and thus what is
required for human beings to be happy.
Put otherwise, the Imām is an instrument of truth and justice for the city.17
Analogous to the way God orders the heavens, the Imām brings order to that which is
disordered in the city.18 He “determines [the people’s] actions and directs them toward
happiness” while arranging the city via law and images.19 As most people are incapable
of conceptual understanding, the Imām must express propositional truths via images, i.e.,
poetically, resulting in the vast majority of inhabitants holding mere representations of
the truth, either by persuasion or compulsion, in order that the city might be properly
constituted.20 He first knows the truth through demonstration, and only after knowing,

Al-Fārābī is quite open in acknowledging the diversity of peoples, and as a result, the need for multiple
religious orientations. See PR 70-71, BL 147f., and PS 17.2.
15
. ;ثم أن يكون له مع ذلك له قدرة بلسانه على جودة التخيل بالقول لكل ما يعلمهPS 15.10-11. See also 17.2.
16
 قدرة على جودة... ثم أن يكون له مع ذلك. فهذا أول شرائط الرئيس.وهذا االنسان هو الذي يقف على كل فعل يمكن أن يبلغ به السعادة
. وإلى األعمال التي بها تبلغ السعادة،  ;االرشاد إلى السعادةPerfect State 15. 11.
17
PS 15.12.
18
PS15.6.
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... إذا رأسهم قدر أفعالهم وسددها نحو السعادة... ; PR 101.
20
PR 85; AH 31-32; AH (Ar.) 47-48.
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translates the truth into religious imagery. As al-Fārābī explains, in a passage which will
be referenced on multiple occasions, “Now these things are philosophy (falsafa) when
they are in the soul of the legislator (fī nafs wāḍi‘ al-nawāmīs).”21 While the Imām might
know the truth, he does not, strictly speaking, speak the truth, but rather speaks in images
qua images and imperatives which form the basis of the myth and law of religious
discourse. Of course, neither an image nor an imperative hold propositional truth value;
they can strictly speaking be neither true nor false.22 Instead, following the
recommendations of Plato, the virtuous city employs the Imām as “a more austere and
less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who would imitate the speech of a decent
person and who would tell his stories in accordance with the patterns we laid down.”23
The Imām organizes the city and leads its inhabitants to those actions and activities which
lead to happiness by reducing the truth into images.
Here, of course, is the bewilderment. To lead the people to happiness, the Imām
must orient them toward the truth.24 He does so by instituting an imagistic and legalistic
religion which is not, strictly speaking, true, but rather a near similitude (mithālāt qarība)
of the truth.25 In effect, the Imām has access to what is true and certain, namely the
conclusions of demonstrations, but only gives the inhabitants of the city what is not,

... ;وهذه بأعيانها إذا كانت في نفس واضع النواميس فهي فلسفةAH 44.6-8; AH(Ar.)¶ 61.
There are several complications which will need to be addressed here. First, it is obvious that al-Fārābī
understands that while the Imām may not intend images as propositions, the vast majority of the population
will receive the images this way. This appears to be partly due to the expression of these images through
language. An image of Zeus is clearly a mere statue, whereas a poetic description of Zeus may be taken
either as a genuine description with a truth value or merely a piece of poetic artistry. The willful ignorance
of how these images will be received itself raises certain moral concerns. Second, al-Fārābī states clearly
that these images can be more or less true. Exactly what that entails needs to be examined more thoroughly
in Chapter 3. See AH 44; AH (Ar.) 61; PS 17.2; PR 86-87.
23
Republic 398b.
24
Of course, given the fact that most people are incapable of fulsome happiness (i.e., theoretical
perfection), happiness for the average citizen is an ambiguous notion for al-Fārābī. See Chapter 3, 3.2.1.1.1.
25
PS 17.2; AH 41; AH (Ar.) 56; PR 85.
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strictly speaking, true.26 Al-Fārābī even has the audacity to say the truth behind these
symbols is known (ma‘lūm) through these symbols.27 But how can the belief in mere
images constitute knowledge? Moreover, how can the Imām, who has access to certain
demonstrable truth be justified in expressing, at best, opaque, or, at worst, disingenuous
doctrines to the denizens of the city? The answer to these questions is subtle and will not
be entirely clear until later in this study. Suffice it to say that while al-Fārābī meets these
objections in his works, at times his solutions seem to reduce to mere conjecture.28

2.1.1.1. The Necessity Condition: Human Deficiency
It is clear, however, that the bedrock of any possible justification for the Imām’s
use of images lies in al-Fārābī’s repeated claims that not all people are capable of
conceptual thought. As was referenced in Chapter 1 and will be developed in Chapter 3,
human deficiency is a key condition for how al-Fārābī justifies his use of deception. If
most human beings are incapable of understanding the truth itself, then some alternative
to the truth becomes necessary. And while al-Fārābī’s depiction of the citizenry strikes
the modern ear as acute elitism (and elitism is perhaps the most obvious charge against
al-Fārābī’s warrant outside of his own philosophical context), within his own
epistemology al-Fārābī maintains that the conceptual thinker is a rarity, outside the norm
of typical human life according to both nature and custom. As he explains:

To paraphrase A Few Good Men, they can’t handle the truth.
PS 17.3.
28
For example, in answering how images can be more true or less, al-Fārābī asserts that of the lower
faculties, the imagination is uniquely suited to conjoin with Active Intellect due to its substructures which
parallels the substructures of the rational faculty (which he argues extensively can conjoin with the Active
Intellect). See PS 14.7. This argument is at worst obscure and at best underdetermined. Delving too deeply
into these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter about methodology, but these concerns will be
addressed in Chapters 3, 5, and 6.
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The philosophers [ḥukamā’ (lit. the wise)] in the city are those who know these
things through strict demonstrations and their own insight; those who are close to
the philosophers know them as they really are through the insight of the
philosophers, following them, assenting to their views and trusting them. But
others know them through symbols which reproduce them by imitation, because
neither nature nor habit has provided their minds with the gift to understand them
as they are.29
 ومن يلي الحكماء يعرفون هذه على.فحكماء المدينة الفاضلة هم الذين يعرفون هذه ببراهين وببصائر أنفسهم
 والباقون منهم يعرفون بالمثاالت.ما هي عليه موجودة ببصائر الحكماء اتباعا لهم وتصديقا لهم وثقة بهم
 ألنهم ال هيئة في أذهانهم لتفهمها على ما هي موجودة إما بالطبع وإما بالعادة وكلتاهما،التي تحاكيها
30
.معرفتان
According to al-Fārābī, the third category of people, those that need symbols, comprises
the majority of the city, as “most people have no ability, either by innate character or
custom, to understand the form or concept [of the principles of existents which are
required for happiness].”31 At minimum, the Imām ought to be ethically permitted to
express himself imagistically to this third category of people, as deception can do no
harm to those inhabitants of the city who are incapable of grasping the truth anyway. Yet,
al-Fārābī’s claim is stronger. The Imām ought to express himself in images. Al-Fārābī
makes this claim despite his demand that any Imām “should by nature be fond of the truth
and truthful men and hate falsehoods and liars.”32 Al-Fārābī does not merely think that
the Imām’s actions are warranted, but that his imagistic expressions are a sort of
beneficent deception.33
Recall that the Imām, as a religious leader, is a source of orderly action and
practice for the city, analogous to how God is the source of order for the cosmos.
Initially, the idea of ordering the city through means other than demonstration, i.e.,
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ordered and certain argumentation, seems contrary to the Imām’s aims. Why resort to
images, a disordered means of communication, when demonstration is available? This
seems cruel, unjust, and raises the plethora of ethical concerns associated with the
Doctrine of the Noble Lie which I foreshadowed in Chapter 1 and will outline in Chapter
5. Of course, the answer is that demonstration as a means of communication is not
available to the Imām, as the innate character and habituation of the average person, she
whom the Imām wishes to communicate with most, renders demonstration
incomprehensible.34 In other words, the Imām is limited in his options; the city is
inherently and perpetually disordered by the inhabitants who dwell there. He must meet
their limitations.35 As they cannot possibly comprehend the ordered nature of
demonstration and currently wallow in the disorder of sensible deception, he must give
them a beneficent deception, an ordered disorder. Visually, the phenomenon looks
something like this:
Figure 2.1.1.1
Ordered Disorder

Order
Imām

Limit of Truth’s Scope

‘True’
Images

Truth

34

Disorder

Limit of People’s Intellectual Capacity

Beneficent Deception

People

Falsehood

This relationship is an analogue to the Platonic problem of participation, in which what is received is
received in accordance with the nature of the recipient, not the extrinsic cause of the participation. This, of
course, shows up in the Proclean tradition, eventually arriving in Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, through the
Liber de Causis, as the pithily phrased ‘Receiver Principle’, to use Stephen Ogden’s term: “whatever is
received is received according to the mode of the receiver.” Summa Theologiae 1.75.5. See Ogden 2016,
35f.
35
See Vallat 2004, 169-170.
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The Imām, through demonstration, has access to the truth and a responsibility to use this
truth to encourage the fulfillment of the human telos in his fellow inhabitants. He is
obligated to educate. However, the majority of people are unable to digest demonstrative
knowledge; they must encounter the truth in a manner which is coherent to their own
faculties. The Imām, through images, raises the people from a state of ignorance to a
higher state. They cannot replace falsehood with truth, but they are able to replace it with
an image, a beneficent deception, which is ‘near truth.’ They move from rank disorder to
something more orderly, even if it is not perfect.

2.1.1.2. ‘The Next Best’ Thing Condition: Constructed Social Knowledge
The resulting religion functions as a sort of social or societal knowledge. At first
glance, the use of the term ‘knowledge’ may seem inappropriate, as opposed to, say,
‘belief’ or ‘opinion’. Yet al-Fārābī is clear that both the symbols of religion and the
demonstrative truth behind those symbols are known (ma‘lūm) through religious
imagery.36 This may have the appearance of a mistake; religion in the Fārābīan context is
constructed and political. How can true knowledge be constructed? The key is in the
faculties of the Imām. The Imām, who knows the truth through demonstration, translates
the truth into symbols which are familiar to each city and nation. As al-Fārābī explains,
“These things are reproduced by imitation for each nation and for the people of each city
through those symbols which are best known to them.”37 The familiarity of these symbols
both ensures that the people of the city a) will value the imagistic religion, respecting the
order it imposes, and b) potentially discover the limitations of the religion itself, as

36
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familiar images, qua images, contain hints and indications which point toward the
constructed nature of the religion. In other words, the Imām’s religion, because it is
constructed via images which the people are accustomed to, holds within it the clues and
keys to deconstruct itself. While the images themselves are not strictly speaking
demonstrative, they contain the requisite information to lead those people capable of
demonstration to demonstrative knowledge.
The goal of the Imām is not merely to bring the masses near the truth, though for
those who have limited faculties the persuasion and compulsion of religion will bring
them nearer felicity than they would have otherwise achieved.38 Rather, the Imām causes
the masses to assent to ordered rule and habituates society as a whole to virtuous
behavior. This provides the necessary ethos in which any rare individuals who do have
the natural ability to recognize demonstrative truth can transcend their circumstances and
obtain demonstrative truth. The images are an introduction to felicity for all, and, for
those capable, an initiation into philosophy. As Maimonides explained after inheriting
al-Fārābī’s doctrine, every parable of the prophets is twofold, holding an outer and inner
meaning, like a golden apple covered in silver filigree.39 The outer imagistic meaning is
itself beautiful and valuable, like the silver filigree, but nothing in comparison to the
internal golden demonstrative truth. He says:
The external meaning ought to be as beautiful as silver, while its internal meaning
ought to be more beautiful than the external one, the former being in comparison
to the latter as gold is to silver. Its external meaning also ought to contain in it
something that indicates to someone considering it what is to be found in its
internal meaning, as happens in the case of an apple of gold overlaid with silver
filigree-work having very small holes.40
38
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For those with limited faculties, the outer imagistic meaning provides order, allowing
them to live a virtuous, if unreflective, life, as opposed to life in pursuance of war and
pleasure.41 But for those who look closer, the Imām’s construction of social knowledge,
i.e. religion, deconstructs itself.
Before examining the esoteric core of the Imām’s religious images, it must be
emphasized that the societal order which the exoteric meaning of religion provides is
itself worthwhile. While this order is expressed in an imagistic way, it is still established
by an Imām who knows the human telos demonstrably. As al-Fārābī points out:
Political science that is part of philosophy is limited… to universals and to giving
their patterns. It also brings about cognizance of the patterns for determining
particulars… This science has two parts. One part comprises bringing about
cognizance of what happiness is—that is what happiness truly is and what is
presumed to be happiness… Another part comprises bringing about cognizance of
the actions by which virtuous actions and dispositions are established and ordered
among the inhabitants of the cities.42
 و يعرف ايضا الرسوم، على الكليات و اعطاء رسومها...و العلم المدني الذي هو جزء من الفلسفة يقتصر
 جزء يشتمل على تعريف السعادة و ما هي السعادة فيالحقيقة: و هذا العلم جزءان...فيتقديرها فيالجزئيات
 و جزء يشتمل على تعريف االفعال التي بها تمكن االفعال و الملكات...و ما هي المظنون بها انها سعادة
43
.الفاضلة و ترتب فياهل المدن
In short, the Imām knows 1) what happiness is and 2) how the city should be ordered
such that he can bring about happiness.44 To use Fārābīan vocabulary, persuasion directs
itself toward communicating (1) to the denizens of the city, while compulsion directs
itself toward manifesting (2) in the laws of the city. The division can be put otherwise as
a distinction between orthodoxy/orthopraxy, symbol/law, or Aggadah/Halakhah
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according to one’s preference. Regardless, the veneer of prophetic imagery itself provides
its own progress toward happiness, especially in comparison to the lack of religion or
misinformed religion of the vicious city. Moreover, prophetic imagery provides a
citywide educational opportunity for each generation to recognize the veneer for what it
is, exoteric imagery which points toward something more substantial.
Al-Fārābī’s educational program, worked out a millennia before Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus, provides justification for the morality of the Imām’s imagistic deception of the
multitude: the Imām’s ultimate aim is not for people to believe in the images
themselves.45 In one of his most famous passages, Wittgenstein introduced a pedagogical
method which would forever after be associated with him: Wittgenstein’s Ladder. At 6.54
he explains, reflecting on the entirety of the work which came before:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used
them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the
ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then
he will see the world aright.46
Effectively, Wittgenstein claims that his work and the propositions claimed therein are
not themselves true, but rather are steps on the way to truth. Insofar as the reader
understands each proposition and then subsequently transcends each proposition, she
advances in knowledge. No individual step is unqualified, and each qualification leads
the reader pedagogically forward. The aim of each proposition is not the truth of itself,
but the truth of the next proposition, whose aim is itself the truth of the following
proposition, and so on. The value of each and every proposition rests on the

Of course, in recognition of human nature, the Imām is fully aware that some individuals will, and must,
believe in the images initially and, in all likelihood, will spend their entire lives believing in in the images
alone.
46
Tractatus 6.54.
45
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transcendence which Wittgenstein promises. Unless it is possible, in the end, as he says,
to “see the world aright,” the entire exercise, and subsequently each step, is futile.
The Imām’s religious images and their educational value are justified by al-Fārābī
in a way corresponding to Wittgenstein’s propositions. He remarks:
When one of them rejects anything as false, he will be lifted towards a better
symbol which is nearer to the truth and is not open to that objection; and if he is
satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. When the better symbol is also
rejected by him as false, he will be lifted to another rank, and if he is then
satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. Whenever a symbol of a given
standard is rejected by him as false, he will be lifted to a higher rank, but when he
rejects all the symbols as false and has the strength and gift to understand the
truth, he will be made to know the truth and will be placed in the class of those
who take the philosophers as their authorities. If he is not yet satisfied with that
and desires to acquire philosophical wisdom and has himself the strength and gift
for it, he will be made to know it.47
 فإن قنع، ال يكون فيه ذلك العناد،فما تزيّف عند أحد من هؤالء شيء ما رفع إلى مثال آخر أقرب إلى الحق
 وإن تزيف عنده مثال في مرتبة. فإن فنع به ترك، وإن تزيف عنده ذلك أيضا رفع إلى مرتبة أخرى،به ترك
 وجعل في، فإن تزيفت عنده المثاالت كلها وكانت فيه نية للوقوف على الحق عرف الحق،ما رفع فوقه
48
.مرتبة المقلدين للحكماء؛ فإن لم يقنع بذلك وتشوق إلى الحكمة وكان في نيته ذلك علمها
The constructed images and symbols of religion contain within them their own
mechanisms for deconstruction, assuming the inhabitants of the city have sufficient
intellectual faculties. But the inhabitant who examines her own faith is unlikely to
dismiss images immediately out of hand. Rather she recognizes the limitations of one
image only to replace it with another subtler, more qualified image. Eventually, if she
does not become confused in her examination or simply become an utter skeptic, she
arrives at the truth which the Imām intended to convey through the image initially.49 Like
Wittgenstein’s Ladder, the entire legitimacy of the method rests upon the end of the
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pedagogical chain, the truth. Ultimately, religious images are only warranted if they are
grounded in and may ultimately provoke knowledge, true, demonstrative, and
unassailably certain knowledge. The ethical warrant of religion reduces to questions of
psychology and epistemology. Insofar as the symbols of religion really are ‘the next best’
thing to the truth, insofar as they are subservient to the truth, they are justified. The
mechanisms of this process will be explored more in Chapter 3.

2.1.1.3. The Certainty Condition: Demonstration
While al-Fārābī’s doctrine, pending further explanation, has already met the two
conditions need for justified deception established in Chapter 1, al-Fārābī gives himself a
third condition which is required for the justification of the expression of philosophy
through religious symbols: certainty. While I will attempt to show why al-Fārābī is
convinced that the Imām has certain demonstrable knowledge that the city needs religious
symbols in Chapters 3 and 6, for now I will simply highlight a simpler explanation for his
justification. While his doctrine has myriad mechanisms which must be examined and
upheld in order for the doctrine as a whole to be warranted, for al-Fārābī the most
fundamental justification as to why the Imām ought to express philosophy through
images is that the Imām knows he ought to. The value of religious symbols and laws does
not lie in the symbols and laws themselves, but in the certainty of the philosopher-Imām
who knows they have value, not as a rote or arbitrary declaration of authority, but as a
practitioner of philosophical demonstration whose conclusions can be independently
assessed by other philosophers. Al-Fārābī repeatedly insists that the warrant for the Imām
comes from demonstration. He explains regarding religion, “When these things thus held
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in common are known through strict demonstrations, no ground for disagreement by
argument can be found in them.”50 He contends that the Imām must have a perfected
rational faculty, among other things, and must be the kind of “man who knows every
action by which felicity can be reached.”51 Such a man is “not possible without the
theoretical sciences, without the greatest of deliberative virtues, and without the rest of
those things that are in the philosopher.”52 Most importantly, the Imām does not himself
hold to his own religion, but rather constructs the religion according to his own
demonstrative knowledge. Al-Fārābī claims:
Although it is the legislator who also represents (yatakhayyalu) these things
(hāḏihi al-’ashyā’) through images, neither the images (mutakhayylāt) nor the
persuasive arguments (muqanna‘āt) are intended for himself. As far as he is
concerned, they are certain (bal yaqīnīa li-hu). He is the one who invents
)ikhtara‘a( the images (mutakhayylāt) and the persuasive arguments
(muqanna‘āt), but not for the sake of establishing these things in his own soul (al’ashyā’ fī nafs) as a religion for himself (malaka li-hu). No, the images
(mutakhayyil) and the persuasive arguments (’iqnā‘) are intended for others,
whereas, so far as he is concerned, these things are certain (yaqin). They are a
religion for others, whereas, so far as he is concerned, they are philosophy
(falsafa). Such, then, is true philosophy (al-falsafa bi-l-ḥaqīqa) and the true
philosopher (al-faylasūf bi-l-ḥaqīqa).53
ّ على
 وهو، وال المقنعات فيه؛ بل يقينية له، ليست المتخيالت له،أن واضع النواميس يتخيّل أيضا ً هذه األشياء
ٌ
 <إنما> على انّها،الذي اخترع المتخيالت والمقنعات ال ليم ّكن بها تلك األشياء في نفسه على أنّها ملكة له
 فهذه هي الفلسفة بالحقيقة والفيلسوف.وعلى أنها <مِ لّة> وله هو فلسفة،متخيل وإقناع لغيره ويقين له
54
.بالحقيقة
Put simply, the Imām is justified in deceiving the people because he knows with certitude
both that which he aims to communicate through religious symbols and that he ought to

. لم يمكن أن يكون فيها موضع عناد بقول أصال، إذا كانت معلومة ببراهينها، ; وهذه األشياء المشتركةPS 17.3.
 قدرة على جودة... ثم أن يكون له مع ذلك. فهذا أول شرائط الرئيس.وهذا االنسان هو الذي يقف على كل فعل يمكن أن يبلغ به السعادة
. وإلى األعمال التي بها تبلغ السعادة،  ; االرشاد إلى السعادةPS 15.11.
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communicate via these symbols, as these symbols are the best possible means in which
the denizens of the city will reach their own telos, felicity (al-sa‘ada). The Imām acts
politically, but not in the pejorative sense of ‘politics’ in which the politician exercises
power for the sake of some hoped for subjective aim (whether with noble or selfish
intention). The Imām acts politically according to the Aristotelian model, in which
politics aims at the good of the city and its inhabitants, namely happiness.55 And alFārābī’s Imāms act with certainty, as they have themselves “reached the highest degree of
felicity (’a‘lā darajāt al- sa‘āda)”, and they have “united as it were (kāmila muttaḥida)
with the Active Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl)”.56 Knowledge is a necessary precondition for
rule.

2.1.2. Real or Ideal?
Of course, the city which has such a political leader would represent a sort of
utopian ideal. This should not be surprising given al-Fārābī’s Platonic inspiration for his
doctrine and the common utopian characterizations of Plato’s own Republic and Laws.57
That said, it should be reiterated that according to al-Fārābī, the foundation of religious
images is conditional upon the advent of a rare human being that knows the telos of
human beings and has himself achieved felicity.58 In the absence of such a leader (or
group of leaders), there can be no virtuous city and no warrant for religion. Strikingly,
one of the most important defenses for why al-Fārābī is warranted in recommending that
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the Imām deceive the masses is al-Fārābī’s own conditions for who qualifies as an Imām.
The list of human beings qualified to translate philosophical truths into images is
exceedingly short, precisely because the list is constituted exclusively of those human
beings who have attained certainty and felicity. For al-Fārābī’s doctrine to be warranted,
not every religion needs to be warranted. In fact, only those religions which express
demonstrative truths imagistically and legislate virtue according to rational felicity
qualify.59
But al-Fārābī’s doctrine is not merely a utopian ideal, nor was he proposing it as a
merely theoretical experiment. Al-Fārābī was no skeptic, as I will address in Chapter 6.
Along with his aforementioned insinuation that this process has occurred for several
peoples, particularly those peoples who follow monotheism (a position insinuated by alFārābī’s successors and contemporaries, Ibn Ṭufayl, Maimonides, and the Ikhwān alSafā, respectively), al-Fārābī is explicitly committed to the human capability of achieving
knowledge and attaining the state of the acquired intellect (‘aql al-mustafāḍ).60 Those
who achieve this state and also have a perfected imaginative faculty (along with several
other characteristics like a healthy body and a proper moral disposition) are Imāms.61 In
sum, while the religion which qualifies as virtuous to al-Fārābī must be based upon
demonstrative knowledge, such religions can and do emerge within cities, even if only

See BL 147f. In fact, al-Fārābī’s standard is so high, Ibn Khaldūn thought al-Fārābī’s political system
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rarely. In fact, he even speaks to the possibility of successive generations having their
own visionary Imāms within the same city (and speaks twice to the question of rule if two
such Imāms occur in the same time and place).62

3. The Primacy of Metaphysics over Politics
In order to reexamine Strauss’s initial claim, recall that philosophy is inherently
rooted in the political for al-Fārābī, while politics exists as an expression of philosophy.
The preeminent figure of both politics and philosophy is the Imām, who by definition
functions as both a philosopher and politician.63 In fact, even the philosopher who lacks
the political skill and persuasion of the Imām has a political role to play in the city, and
even the poetic politician who lacks demonstrative skill must work in conjunction with
the philosophers.64 No human activity is apolitical; no human activity is unphilosophical
(though some activities may be antiphilosophical). But Strauss is incorrect, strictly
speaking, to insinuate that philosophy and politics are synonymous for al-Fārābī.
Strauss overstates his position, overreaching and claiming a strict identity
between Fārābīan philosophy and politics, despite his own acknowledgement that alFārābī never equates the two disciplines explicitly in his writings. He admits in his earlier
work that while homo philosophus and homo rex are the same person for al-Fārābī, “it
does not necessarily mean that the two arts themselves are identical.”65 But later in the
same essay, he expands the link between the two disciplines. Strauss explains that while
al-Fārābī…
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leaves no doubt as to this that philosophy and the royal art are coextensive, he
certainly does not say with so many words that they are identical. It would be
unfair however to insist too strongly on subtleties of this kind and thus to
overlook the wood for the trees… For all practical purposes, Farabi identified
philosophy with the royal art.66
However, in this case the subtleties matter. Al-Fārābī follows Plato in the relationship
between philosophy and politics; the best philosophers and the best politicians are the
same. As he explains:
Then [Plato] explained that the man who is philosopher and the man who is prince
are the same; each of them is rendered perfect by a single skill and a single
faculty; each of them possesses a single skill that supplies the desired knowledge
and the desired way of life from the outset.67
ّ <أن> [االنسان] الفيلسوف و [االنسان] الملك شئ واحد و
ّ ثم بيّن
أن كل واحد منهما انما يكمل بمهنة واحدة
68
ّ وقوة وحدة
...وأن كل واحد منهما <له> مهنة وحدة تعطى العلم المطلوب منذ اول االمر
But despite the fact that perfected philosophy and perfected politics exist within the same
person, this does not mean that they reduce to the same science for al-Fārābī.
While politics and philosophy always exist in tandem within the human person,
and the consequences of properly executed political programs and philosophical
programs are identical (namely, the achievement of felicity), the telos of philosophy is
fundamentally distinct from the telos of politics. Whereas the telos of politics is identical
with its consequence—human happiness —, philosophy results in happiness, but aims at
something higher and altogether foreign to terrestrial concerns—universal knowledge and
knowledge of the heavenly intelligences.69 In other words, while philosophy and politics
both result in the human good, only politics concerns itself with the human good qua
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human. Philosophy is concerned with that which is transcendent of humanity. Philosophy
is concerned with truth. And it is via a link to the truth that the Imām is able to justify
beneficent political deception, insofar as it functions pedagogically.
This is important, because there are strong scholarly accounts which argue that alFārābī’s interest in the truth of metaphysics is disingenuous, as will be discussed shortly.
But there are stronger textual and contextual reasons to read al-Fārābī as having a deep
commitment to metaphysics which he takes quite seriously, as will be shown in Chapter
3. If al-Fārābī’s metaphysics is insincere, his justification for deception is void. Without
certainty that humans need beneficent deception and certainty about what religious
symbols symbolize, al-Fārābī cannot justify beneficent political deception, and the Imām
is just a liar. Religion, in this case, would be just a farce.
But rather than read al-Fārābī as establishing an elaborate deception in which alFārābī himself lies about the proper conditions by which the Imām can justifiably
deceive, as some suggest, I read him as doing something altogether more ingenious. AlFārābī does as he says, and he lays out the proper conditions which enable the Imām to
lead a city toward happiness that would not have otherwise been directed toward
happiness. To do this, the Imām must use the only available tool at his disposal:
beneficent deception. More esoteric readings of al-Fārābī, mentioned below, seem to
conjecture a hidden premise—deception cannot be used for honest intentions. Yet, alFārābī inventively does just this and employs deceptive images for the sake of truth. In
short, al-Fārābī promotes deception, but honest deception. And insofar as these
beneficent deceptions, images which are themselves translations of philosophy for the
sake of the people of city, are based upon knowledge, one can rightly call them
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beneficent deceptions. And insofar as these deceptive images themselves both contain
and lead to further knowledge of human felicity, one can rightly describe the resulting
religion which is composed of these images as a sort of constructed social knowledge.
But, like Wittgenstein’s Ladder, the justification of the entire doctrine hinges on its aim.
If it all reduces to human politics, then the symbols mean nothing, because they lead
nowhere. But if the beneficent political deceptions are a human way to convey
transcendent truth that most humans cannot understand otherwise, a way of conveyance
which can help lead to human happiness, then they are justified.
Ultimately, if al-Fārābī is to be warranted in his recommendation that the Imām
deceive the people of the city through expressing the truth imagistically, the Imām must
have genuine, indisputable knowledge of the truth. The broader philosophical position
espoused by those who read al-Fārābī esoterically may ultimately be correct in its claim
that certain knowledge is impossible, but this is not al-Fārābī’s claim. And if al-Fārābī’s
doctrine is to be tenable, it must rely on certain knowledge for its warrant. If not, his
philosophy reduces to, at best, a confused and indefensible doctrine, or at worse, a crass
and cynical political ruse. But al-Fārābī’s beneficent deception is a sincere deception, a
deception directed at truth.

4. Methodology for reading al-Fārābī
A project of this ilk, one which not only analyzes and deciphers a philosopher as
enigmatic as al-Fārābī, but also assesses his doctrines philosophically, presents unique
methodological challenges. In the broadest terms, assessing the warrant of al-Fārābī’s
recommendation that the Imām translate demonstrative truth into non-demonstrative
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images in a single monograph length work introduces four overarching concerns: 1)
exactly what method should one use when approaching the history of philosophy, at least
regarding a philosophical project of this nature; 2) what is the scope of the Doctrine of
Beneficent Political Deception within al-Fārābī’s corpus, given the cryptic and protean
nature of some of his positions and the disputable authorship of some of his works; 3)
what exactly is the issue being assessed, between namely, a) the effectiveness of alFārābī’s justification for his doctrine of the Imām assuming that his other supporting
doctrines are true or b) the effectiveness of al-Fārābī’s justification for the Doctrine of
Beneficent Political Deception considering the plausibility of al-Fārābī’s other supporting
doctrines; and 4) what are the limits for the scope of this project.

4.1. Reading History of Philosophy Texts
All projects within the history of philosophy have a twofold mandate. On the one
hand, one must address the historical queries of the project, on the other hand, one must
address the philosophical queries. The first methodological concern for this project is
how these two separate aims relate to one another. Which is methodologically more
critical, one’s commitment to historical evidence or one’s commitment to philosophical
verisimilitude? Of course, the proper course of action is to adopt a methodological
strategy which can incorporate both approaches adequately. By prioritizing history, one
does not want to neglect philosophy or vice versa. One does not want to throw the baby
out with the bathwater. Nonetheless, a methodological strategy must be adopted.
Regardless of whether one finds a historical or philosophical interpretive lens to
be more crucial, chronologically, one must first and foremost be historically grounded.
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While I have some methodological concerns with Leo Strauss’s approach, he is
absolutely right when he instructs the student of the history of philosophy, “The task of
the historian of thought is to understand the thought of the past exactly as it understood
itself; for to abandon that task is tantamount to abandoning the only practicable criterion
of objectivity in the history of thought.”70 Any project which responds to another thinker,
whether historical or contemporary, must begin by listening to the concerns of one’s
interlocutor. But when approaching a historical figure, special care must be taken because
there is no chance for correction by the author herself; accuracy becomes even more
paramount. To put it otherwise, any ‘conversation’ which broadly follows the method of
elenchus, must start with listening. Accurate history must chronologically come first.
The dilemma between taking a historical or philosophical lens shows up uniquely
in the history of philosophy since one’s elenchic partner cannot cite her own motivations,
clarify her own positions, or respond to objections. Whereas in a dialogue with a living
individual, one may ask one’s interlocutor about her hidden premises and assumptions,
historical figures are unable to answer except through already established texts and
possible clues from their predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. In short, one
must supply their responses for them. And there are two possible approaches to do so:
historical or philosophical. The historical approach attributes to the author only those
premises which are explicitly stated by the author, or perhaps by other authors
historically related to them. The philosophical approach contests that the argument itself
should guide one’s interpretation, and any assumption required to make the argument
sound should be supplied as a necessary premise, even if this premise is absent from or
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ambiguous within the historical record. The former method ensures accuracy, but only
accuracy regarding available texts and not necessarily accuracy as to the beliefs of the
historical figures themselves. The latter method ensures a stronger philosophical position,
but it may be sullied by divorcing itself from the text and historical context of the author.
Strauss, who prefers the philosophical approach, fears that the historical approach
leads one into disregarding the brilliance of historical philosophers. As he explains,
“Now, all philosophers of the past claimed to have found the truth, and not merely the
truth for their time. The historicist however asserts that they were mistaken in believing
so. And he makes this assertion the basis for interpretation.”71 By turning the philosopher
into an object of study, rather than a living subject, the philosopher becomes leaden and
unable to respond to the anachronistic philosophical concerns of contemporary scholars.
By assuming the invalidity of these philosophers’ positions and only following the
explicit text, thinkers of the past can appear as dullards, lacking the sophisticated
contextual and internal philosophical motivations which drove them to their conclusions
within their own contexts. And Strauss is right to fear an extreme version of this historical
methodology. But there is no reason to believe that a more moderate historical approach,
one which both looks for hidden motivations while also maintaining a deep commitment
to the text, is not possible. One need not reduce one’s commitment to the explicit text to a
blind naivety which assumes philosophical commitments end precisely where the texts
do.
On the other hand, the philosophical methodology risks rupturing one’s
interpretation from the historical and textual context entirely. Strauss is right when he
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suggests that ignoring the philosophical nature of philosophical texts distorts their
meaning. He says:
It remains then true that if one wants to understand a philosophy of the past, one
must approach it in a philosophic spirit, with philosophic questions: one’s concern
must be primarily, not with what other people have thought about the philosophic
truth, but with the philosophic truth itself. But: if one approaches an earlier
thinker with a question which is not his central question, one is bound to
misinterpret, to distort, his thought.72
However, to maintain a philosophical spirit does not mean only being concerned with the
questions that the philosopher herself raises. It is not distortion to ask questions about an
author which might be tangential to their larger projects; to do so is itself philosophical,
as it engages in the secondary premises which construct the author’s central positions. It
is also not a distortion to be concerned with issues which arise out of the text itself,
independent of the author’s concerns. Examining inconsistencies, asking questions about
authentic authorship, and identifying historical influences is not pedantic; it is an
appreciation of the value of the text. It is naïve to assume that as a reader divorced from a
philosopher’s historical context, one can confidently even identify which issues are
central or not to the author’s philosophy. However, one can assess the textual and
historical role that an argument plays.
Ultimately, the approach one takes must be dictated by the question one is asking.
In the case of this particular project, the question is primarily philosophical—is al-Fārābī
warranted in proposing his Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception given his own
philosophical commitments? That said, it is a philosophical question which is predicated
upon a solid understanding of al-Fārābī’s authentic position. As a result, my approach
must be twofold. First, I must properly establish al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent
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Political Deception. However, as I will note below, such a task raises several difficulties
due to the nature of the Fārābīan corpus, most notably questions about al-Fārābī’s
intellectual development, which texts are genuinely his, and whether his doctrine should
be read as sincere or esoteric. Given these difficulties, the historical grounds of my
inquiry must be humbler and less definitive. As the primary question of this project is not
“What is al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception?” but rather “Is this
doctrine warranted?” priority must be given to the philosophical assessment of the
doctrine rather than the doctrine itself. Nonetheless, the doctrine itself cannot be
neglected or the assessment is an assessment of a strawman.
Thus, although the success of my project cannot be predicated upon a definitive
interpretation of al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception which concludes
further scholarly examination, neither can my project be deemed successful unless it
assesses what can rightfully be described as al-Fārābī’s doctrine. So, there are two
historical interpretive hurdles which this project must clear. First, I must present a
plausible, comprehensive account of al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political
Deception and a comprehensive account of those surrounding doctrines which justify his
politics. Insofar as these doctrines are presented comprehensively in one single place, this
is a feat which has yet to be achieved in scholarly literature. Second, I must account for
and expand upon the established scholarly research and demonstrate advancement and
continuity with the research that has already been published. This enables the project to
proceed to the philosophical stage. The true success of the project depends on the
philosophical analysis of al-Fārābī’s warrant and whether I successfully show that given
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the Imām’s knowledge, al-Fārābī is justified in recommending that he express
demonstrative truth to the denizens of the city via images.

4.2. The Fārābīan Corpus
The second major methodological concern, which emerges in any Fārābīan
scholarship whose scope extends beyond any single Fārābīan text, addresses how one
should approach the coherence of the Fārābīan corpus. Three main issues arise. First,
which texts should be considered al-Fārābī’s texts; in particular, should the
Harmonization of Plato and Aristotle be included in the Fārābīan corpus? Second,
considering the seeming discrepancies and tensions within the corpus as a whole, should
one adopt a theory of Fārābīan maturation, and if so, how should the texts be ordered
chronologically? Third, given the secondhand quality of our knowledge of al-Fārābī’s
lost Commentary on the Ethics, how should the reported doctrines from this treatise be
integrated into one’s understanding of al-Fārābī? These three questions must be answered
if one wants to appropriately label any Fārābīan doctrine ‘Fārābīan.’ The questions need
not be settled (such an undertaking would merit three distinct dissertations of their own),
but must be addressed. In this chapter, I will refrain from providing an exhaustive
discussion of these three questions on the Fārābīan corpus, instead merely gesturing
toward my methodological approach, though I will touch upon these issues more as they
arise in the following chapters.
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4.2.1. Authenticating Texts
Addressing the first concern, several works traditionally attributed to al-Fārābī,
most notably Answers to Questions Put to Him, Demonstration of Immaterial Things,
Source of Questions, and the Harmonization of Plato and Aristotle, have been examined
under increasing scrutiny in recent scholarship, particularly as to whether they were
penned by al-Fārābī himself.73 For the purposes of this project, the authenticity of the
Harmonization of Plato and Aristotle is of particular importance, as it gives special
insights as to how al-Fārābī understood Plato’s doctrines.74 The scholarship is unsettled,
but I find it methodologically prudent to follow the prevailing opinion of the most recent
literature. Scholars like Cecilia Martini Bonadeo have shown the explicit consistency
between the Harmonization and other Fārābīan works, particularly his conception of
vision, and as a result, the majority opinion has shifted in favor of the authenticity of the
Harmonization.75 As Janos explains, retracting his own former doubt, “The cumulative
evidence supporting [the Harmonization’s] authenticity cannot be ignored and renders the
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Under a more esoteric model of scholarship, the distinct doctrines found in the Harmonization were
never questioned in light of al-Fārābī’s other competing doctrines; any discrepancy was assumed to lie in
the difference between esoteric and exoteric texts. In fact, Butterworth never considers the possibility of the
Harmonization’s inauthenticity in his translation. Butterworth 2001. It wasn’t until Joep Lameer raised
specific concerns in 1994 due to the lack of any Fārābīan attribution in available manuscripts of the
Harmonization, the idiosyncratic frequency of the use of coordinate expressions in the Harmonization
compared to the rest of the Fārābīan corpus, and the distinctive doctrines of the Harmonization, that the
authenticity of the Harmonization was really questioned. Lameer 1994, 30-39.While the former reasons are
circumstantial, the doctrinal differences require explanation, and in 2008 Marwan Rashed reiterated
concern over the authorship of the Harmonization citing four distinct doctrines not found in al-Fārābī’s
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ibn ‘Adī was the most likely author other than al-Fārābī in 2009. As both were students of Abū Bishr Mattā
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leaving the question of authorship open. Janos 2009, 13-14. The question is certainly not settled, and the
question is too far afield of this dissertation for me to aim at settling it here.
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attempt to reject [the Harmonization] from the Fārābīan corpus premature.”76 For the
purpose of this project, in which the Harmonization is used primarily as a tool to show
how al-Fārābī read Plato, knowing that the text was likely written by him, and, if not, it
was written by a close student, will still serve as an indicator for how al-Fārābī may have
acted as a Platonic interpreter.

4.2.2. Developmentalist Approach
However, affirming that al-Fārābī did write the Harmonization leads to another
set of challenges. Given the doctrinal discrepancy between the Harmonization and other
works like the Perfect State, how does one resolve which doctrines are ‘Fārābīan’?
Which texts are given priority? In this, I will follow Damien Janos’ developmentalist
approach, born out of his cosmological study. He explains when deliberating upon the
authenticity of the Harmonization:
Indeed, doctrinal resemblance or divergence cannot be used in itself as a decisive
criterion, since it neglects other factors, such as chronology, intention, or context,
which might play a preponderating role. Moreover, this comparative approach has
limited explanatory potential, since it does not account satisfactorily for the
peculiar features of these works, even if one upholds their authenticity and
stresses their connection with al-Fārābī’s other treatises. The approach I will
endorse relies instead on the hypothesis of a chronological evolution of alFārābī’s cosmological works…77
While the Harmonization seems to be written by al-Fārābī, it still has distinctive features
which must be accounted for. Janos navigates the tensions in al-Fārābī’s texts by dividing
the corpus into two major periods, the early Baghdad period and the later post-Baghdad
period. The former contains primarily his early creationist works like the Harmonization
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and also his commentaries. The latter period contains his emanationist texts like the
Political Regime, Perfect State, the Attainment of Happiness, and most likely the Epistle
on the Intellect.78 This division, while provisional and subject to correction, seems right.79
Moving forward, I will adopt Janos’ developmentalist division between late and early
texts, not because it has been conclusively settled, but because it is both explanatory and
its adoption encourages care when comparing multiple texts.

4.2.3. Commentary on NE
Last, one hermeneutical difficulty for the Fārābīan scholar remains, how to
incorporate the reported doctrines contained within his no longer extant Commentary on
the Ethics. The lost Commentary, of which we only have fragments and secondary
accounts, seems to undermine al-Fārābī’s entire doctrine of human happiness, but exactly
what it says is disputable. As Chaim Meir Neria lays out, there seem to be four positions
in the lost Commentary which disrupt traditional understandings of al-Fārābī, passed
down to us through the texts of four separate authors.80 However, these four supposed
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Fārābīan doctrines not only disagree with extant Fārābīan texts, but with one another.81
The confusion raised by the inconsistency of the lost Commentary’s doctrines is
magnified by the genre of the text itself. The very fact that the text is a commentary raises
concerns about whether the doctrines attributed to the text are doctrines which al-Fārābī
himself affirms or whether they are merely doctrines he attributes to Aristotle.82 All told,
cannot unite with them and specifically with the Active Intellect; or (3) that the Active Intellect is an agent
cause only, not a final or formal cause. 4) Higher moral quality amounts to a higher degree of God’s
providence. This teaching is reported by Maimonides.” Neria 2013, 76.
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Of these three premises, only 4 does not risk undermining the warrant for al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of
Beneficent Political Deception. However, it does provide a clue as to how centrally one should incorporate
the doctrines from the lost Commentary into one’s reading of al-Fārābī. Noted in the GP 3.18, Maimonides
claims, “Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] says in the Introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean
[Ethics]’: Those who have the capacity of making their soul pass from one moral quality to another are
those of whom Plato has said that God’s providence watches over them to a higher degree.” GP 3.18.
Maimonides is the only place we find evidence of al-Fārābī holding this premise in the lost Commentary.
Observe that the reliance of premise 4 upon a providential God indicates that the Commentary would be in
agreement with the Harmony, an early work according to Janos’ developmental theory, as would its genre
as a commentary. Yet the other 3 premises seem more topically in line with the later works, specifically
insofar as they focus upon conjunction and political happiness. Premise 4 suggests that the lost
Commentary should be an exoteric work within an esoteric model, due to its religious veneer. While
premises 1-3 suggest that it is esoteric, given its political nature, skepticism, and denial of the afterlife. In
short, given our evidence, the lost Commentary is both early and late, providential and against the afterlife,
exoteric and esoteric. It simply defies proper categorization. Of course, that does not mean it is not
authentically Fārābīan or faithfully transmitted, but it does raise doubts. One approach would be to simply
dismiss premise 4, as only Maimonides reports it, but this too is problematic as our four main sources—
Maimonides, Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Bājja, and Averroes—are all eleventh and twelfth century Andalusians; while
we do not know whether they had access to identical manuscripts or how widely it was disseminated, their
shared access to the text, geography, and time period denies simply dismissing any account as idiosyncratic
without further argument and context. Likewise, there is little reason to assert that the text available in
Andalusia was falsely attributed to al-Fārābī. See Neria 2013. Summarily, we do not have much
information about the context of the doctrines contained within the lost Commentary, and the information
that we do have is enigmatic.
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Thérèse-Anne Druart has proposed that the doctrines of the lost Commentary should not be incorporated
into one’s reading of al-Fārābī, due to both its inconsistency with extant texts and the fact it is a
commentary. Druart 1997, 403; Neria 2013, 84. As Neria explains: “Recently, Thérèse-Anne Druart
advanced a new strategy. Druart argues that we should read al-Fārābī as an independent philosopher whose
views are shaped with, but also against, Aristotle. On some occasions, al-Fārābī thinks that Aristotle’s
philosophy does not give an adequate and satisfactory account of reality. According to this view, one may
argue that, as a commentator, al-Fārābī is obligated to search for Aristotle’s views even if these views are
not shared by him. Al-Fārābī thus argues that Aristotle is rejecting the opinion that the separate good, the
good for itself, is the end of political science. However, as for himself, al-Fārābī thinks that conjunction
with the intellect is a relevant end for political science.” Neria 2013, 84. However, she is not convinced by
this strategy. She continues: “This is, of course, a very elegant solution, but is not free of problems.
Consider, for example, al-Fārābī’s ‘tone’ in the following passage: ‘this is falsehood and something of
deceit for Aristotle. It is also invalid in his [Aristotle] view that this good will be the end of political
governance.’ Similarly, the expression from his commentary on the EN, mentioned by Ibn Bājja, Ibn
Ṭufayl, and Ibn Rushd, that it is ‘an old wives’ tale,’ indicates his identification with Aristotle’s position. It
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without more of the text it is impossible to know exactly what doctrines the lost
Commentary contains and whether these doctrines are supposed to express al-Fārābī’s or
Aristotle’s position. Small fragments and reported summations by narrators with clear
agendas—Ibn Ṭufayl aims to defend Avicenna and al-Ghazālī against al-Fārābī’s
‘failings’ and Averroes aims to show that the material intellect must be immaterial in
contrast to al-Fārābī’s more transformative approach—should not form the central core of
one’s Fārābīan interpretation.83 Ultimately, while the doctrines reportedly within the lost
Commentary should be noted, without more context and manuscript support, these
doctrines will play a minimal role in this dissertation.

4.3. Criteria for Assessment
The third major methodological question concerns what exactly the issue being
assessed is, namely between: a) the effectiveness of al-Fārābī’s justification for his

would be especially strange if al-Fārābī had worked hard to reject alternative explanations, just to arrive at
the conclusion that Aristotle rejects as a ‘tall tale’ al-Fārābī’s own views. In the end, it seems that alFārābī’s commentary on the EN is as much a scandal to the modern reader as it was a scandal to the
medieval philosophers, even if for different reasons.” Neria 2013, 84. While Neria’s point is well taken, we
do not have the ‘old wives’ tale’ text in question or its context. Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Bājja seem to disagree
on what the ‘old wives’ tale’ is, with Ibn Ṭufayl describing that human happiness in the afterlife is an ‘old
wives’ tale’ and Ibn Bājja saying that all immaterial things which are not seen by the senses are ‘old wives’
tales.’ Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān 100; Pines 1988, 82-83. Meanwhile Averroes adds two more understandings of
what al-Fārābī means by an ‘old wives’ tale.’ He both asserts that al-Fārābī believes that the human soul’s
transformation into an incorporeal being is an ‘old wives’ tale’ and separately that conjunction with the
Active Intellect is an ‘old wives’ tale.’ EPC 14; See also Davidson 1992, 71. Again, the reports we have are
confused. Add to this the fact that Ibn Bājja himself thinks that the lost Commentary does not reflect alFārābī’s own positions. He explains: “As to what is believed about Abu Nasr [al-Farabi] regarding that
which he says in his Commentary on the Book of Ethics, namely that after death and demise there is no
afterlife, that there is no happiness except political happiness, that there is no existence except that which is
perceived by the senses and that that through which it is said another existence than the one which [has just
been mentioned comes about] is nothing but an old wives' tale. [I am of the opinion that] all this [that which
is believed about al-Farabi] is false, [that those are lies used to attack] Abu Nasr [al-Farabi]. For Abu Nasr
[al-Farabi] has made these remarks at his first reading [of the Ethics]. But what he says on this subject does
not resemble these statements of his that are entailed by a demonstration.” Pines1988, 82-83.
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Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception assuming that his other supporting doctrines
are true, and b) the effectiveness of al-Fārābī’s justification for his Doctrine of Beneficent
Political Deception considering the plausibility of al-Fārābī’s other supporting doctrines.
This project will not even address the latter concern until the Conclusion, as the
plausibility of al-Fārābī’s doctrines is beyond the scope of this project, having no bearing
upon whether al-Fārābī was justified given his own context and intellectual
commitments. Instead, I will focus on what al-Fārābī asserts and how these assertions
support, validate, and justify his Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception. To assess his
success or failure based upon the veracity of his 10th century physics, epistemology, and
metaphysics would predetermine the result, as simple commitments like his commitment
to his own astronomical model, which is itself entangled with his cosmology and
psychology, would render his position unjustified given our heliocentric solar system.84
Instead, I will take al-Fārābī’s first principles as truthful at face value and attempt to
justify his warrant from these doctrines alone.

4.4. Defining the Scope
The last and final methodological concern is the magnitude of the scope of this
project. A doctrine as central to al-Fārābī’s philosophy as beneficent political deception
undeniably raises innumerable tangential questions about al-Fārābī’s philosophical
system as a whole. However, this dissertation must have a defined scope. This scope is
limited to al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception in Chapter 3, the legacy
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of this doctrine in Chapter 4, potential problems raised by this doctrine in Chapter 5, that
epistemology which justifies the warrant of the Doctrine of Beneficent Political
Deception in Chapter 6, and the possible warrant for the use of constructed social
knowledge outside of al-Fārābī’s specific doctrines in the Conclusion. While tangential
issues will be noted as they arise, they will not be addressed in full.

5. The Status of the Problem
With the possible exception of his commentaries on Aristotelian logic, al-Fārābī is
most famous for his political contributions to medieval philosophy within the Dār alIslām, contributing to or evoking a response from most of the major figures surrounding
the Falsafa tradition, including Avicenna, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl, Averroes,
Maimonides, and Ibn Khaldūn, among others.85 Fittingly, abridged accounts of his
contribution to the history of philosophy within historical, popular, and encyclopedic
publications tend to exclusively highlight the political theory which undergirds his
Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception, with perhaps a gesture toward his logical
achievements and his famous moniker as ‘The Second Teacher’ following Aristotle.86 Of
course, more focused scholarly works delve much deeper into his philosophy. However,
the clarity of al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception is often taken for
granted, perhaps assumed to be obvious due to its fame. Expositions which
comprehensively describe his conception of revelation have certainly been written, but
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heretofore have lacked insight into his justificatory method and often focus primarily on
the distinction between revelation (waḥy) and prophecy/divination (nubūwa), the
theoretical and imaginative faculties, respectively.87 These accounts explore, explain, and
elucidate his Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception (and the historical sources for his
doctrine) but are apt to neglect adequately reflecting upon the warrant of his claims, with
the exception of a brief digression by Philippe Vallat in his 2004 book.88 Many scholars
tend to approach the mechanisms at play within al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent
Political Deception in a cursory manner in order to approach related, but distinct
doctrines, whether it be al-Fārābī’s psychology, cosmology, epistemology,
theology/philosophy of religion, theory of divination, or his broader political aims.89 This
scholarship is not at fault; the scope of these projects is simply delimited to other topics.
However, a vacuum remains regarding how al-Fārābī justifies one of his most central
positions.
Despite the fame and frequent references to al-Fārābī’s conception of religion,
scholarship has yet to be developed and devoted to exactly how al-Fārābī can justify the
warrant of the Imām’s translation of demonstrative truths into images. Needless to say, as
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contemporary scholarship has yet to fully address the question of how al-Fārābī justifies
his Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception, the question of whether al-Fārābī
succeeds in justifying his Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception has yet to be
explored. Of course, these are two questions I aim to address in this project. The novelty
of these questions in spite of the multitude of related research which surrounds them
leaves the status of this topic in a peculiar position. While there is a seemingly endless
amount of peripheral scholarship available to draw upon in support of each aspect of this
project, there are no immediate corollaries in conversation with this project with which to
directly engage throughout the entirety of this study. As a result, this project must be
situated properly within three distinct scholarly conversations: what information
beneficent political deception conveys (and more broadly the epistemic limits of human
knowledge), what psychological and epistemic conditions allow the Imām to claim he has
knowledge, and what concerns al-Fārābī must respond to in order to be warranted in
holding his doctrine. The former two topics have an extensive library of literature; the
third topic requires borrowing from objections commonly levied against Plato’s Noble
Lie.

5.1. The Political Dominance and Metaphysical Dominance Interpretations
Before exploring these three topics, it is helpful to note that broadly speaking,
Fārābīan scholarship can be demarcated into a division between two roughhewn camps:
that camp which views al-Fārābī’s metaphysical projects as subservient to his political
aims and that camp which views al-Fārābī’s politics as issuing from his metaphysical and
epistemological commitments. The former group, comprised of those who read al-Fārābī
primarily through the lens of an esoteric/exoteric division, feels that al-Fārābī’s
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metaphysical concerns are political in the most etymologically plain sense of the term
‘political’; al-Fārābī’s cosmos reflects the proper construction of the polis, not the other
way around.90 While his metaphysical claims are still meaningful, they are politically
meaningful, rather than actual descriptions of the universe as such.91 The extremity of
these views vary in degree, and some authors are more bald-faced than others in their
claims regarding how insincere al-Fārābī is when making metaphysical commitments.92
While these thinkers are sometimes grouped together under the heading of ‘Straussians’,
for the sake of clarity, both because I do not see any apparent connection between
holding this view regarding Fārābīan interpretation and holding to Straussianism in toto
and in order to avoid lumping such a wide and varied collection of approaches under a
monolithic label, I will call this position ‘The Political Dominance Interpretation’ of alFārābī.93 Notably, this group is comprised by authors such as Leo Strauss, Muhsin
Mahdi, Charles Butterworth, and Joshua Parens, among others.94
Those who tend to read al-Fārābī as more candid take al-Fārābī’s metaphysical
and epistemological claims as sincere in their meaning. As a result, politics arises out of a
grand cosmological universe, of which humans are just a small part. While it is true that
the order of the cosmos mirrors proper political governance, it is we who aspire to mirror
the ordered governance of the heavens, not the heavens who are constructed by al-Fārābī
as a mirror for our ideal governance.95 Like the Political Dominance Interpretation, such
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a position comes in varying degrees, and while I admit to belonging to this latter camp, I,
for example, do not read al-Fārābī as entirely devoid of irony, persuasion, or the
occasional obfuscation for the sake of appearances. On the whole though, this camp reads
al-Fārābī as speaking plainly when he addresses the reader as a metaphysician, an
epistemologist, an ethicist, and, yes, a political scientist. This group does not read alFārābī’s cosmos as merely a component part of his politics. Politics is a human science
which exists within the context of his broader metaphysics. For this reason, I will call this
position ‘The Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation’ of al-Fārābī.96 This group is
comprised of scholars such as Dominic O’Meara, Philippe Vallat, Thérèse Anne Druart,
and Damien Janos, as well as myself.97 And while the Political Dominance Interpretation
of al-Fārābī and the Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation of al-Fārābī represent two
vastly distinct ways of reading al-Fārābī’s texts, it should also be noted that it is possible
to differ in one’s approach regarding specific issues.98
Ultimately, the Political Dominance Interpretation of al-Fārābī and the
Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation of al-Fārābī are distinguished by their
approaches. Either one methodologically reads an esoteric hidden meaning behind what
al-Fārābī says, or one reads that al-Fārābī explicitly writes those positions he intends the
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reader to adopt. I find the latter approach to be more methodologically neutral, best
preserving the Fārābīan corpus’s own sense of purpose. Of course, as with any thinker
who proposes the use of political innuendo, there is a possibility that al-Fārābī uses
esotericism at times. However, I would argue that the onus of proof lies in showing the
insincerity of the explicit text, not the sincerity.99 The sincerity is to be assumed. But
given the broad and influential scope of the Political Dominance Interpretation of alFārābī, this is an important methodological question. However, definitively arguing for
the Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation of al-Fārābī over the Political Interpretation
of al-Fārābī is far beyond the possible scope of this project, although some reasons for
my preference of the Metaphysical Dominance interpretive approach can be gleaned from
Chapter 3. For now, orienting my position within the landscape must suffice. It should
also be noted that I will draw on the wealth of literature and insights from each
interpretative position moving forward, while highlighting where there is tension.

5.2. The Content of Beneficent Political Deception
The first, and perhaps primary, place of tension in establishing al-Fārābī’s
Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception concerns exactly what information the
symbols of religion convey (i.e., what is the content of the Imām’s deception), and
relatedly, what information the Imām has access to (i.e., what does the Imām know). The
two general responses to this question follow the roughhewn divisions of Fārābīan
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scholarship sketched above. The Political Dominance Interpretation does not define
religion by the information that the Imām conveys, but rather the political function which
religion plays in establishing the Imām as the ruler of the city. As Muhsin Mahdi
explains, the “specific function assigned to revelation” is the “operation of this rulerfounder's craft”, and only functions to determine the opinions and actions of the city.100
His notion of determination is central, because the Imām does not convey knowledge to
the people, but merely determines opinion, established not by demonstration, speculation,
or theory, but a particular political aim of the Imām.101 Miriam Galston, who adopts a
similar view, is more subtle. While she admits that the “kind of interaction between the
agent intellect and imagination may be seen as supporting a close connection between the
original theoretical discoveries and the subsequent imaginative recasting of them”, she
denies that the establishment of religion is dictated by the truth (favoring instead political
power and effectiveness), as “when one must choose, therefore, between an image that is
truly fitting and one that is effective, the former consideration must bow to the latter”.102
Shlomo Pines, following the aforementioned accusation of al-Fārābī by Ibn Ṭufayl, in
particular that al-Fārābī’s lost Commentary espouses a radical skepticism which places
prophecy wholly in the imagination, suggests that revelation contains no rational
content.103 Joshua Parens recognizes the central problem—how can the prophet translate
universal philosophical truths into particular edicts and images—, but still casts a
skeptical worry, as “the line between imagination and prudence, between mere divination
and true revelation becomes hazy. The difference between imagination and prudence can
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be elusive at times even for the philosopher”.104 The central theme which links all of
these positions together, as well as the positions of Charles Butterworth and Leo Strauss
mentioned above, is the skeptical lens with which metaphysics is viewed. In sum,
because the Political Dominance Interpretation doubts the possibility of metaphysical
knowledge, religious symbols cannot properly be a communication of that knowledge.
Whereas the Political Dominance Interpretation finds religion problematic, except
as a political function, due to the uncertain source of religious knowledge, the
Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation finds the translation of universal truths into
particulars to be the central problematic issue. This position does not doubt al-Fārābī’s
commitment to metaphysics. As Damien Janos explains:
Mahdi is undoubtedly right in pointing to the political relevance of al-Fārābī’s
cosmological theories. Indeed, they form the backdrop against which his
prophetology and political system unfold and bear an intricate link with other
aspects of his thought. But it is important to stress that it is al-Fārābī’s cosmology
and metaphysics that are the foundation on which politics can be developed, and
not vice versa, as Mahdi would have it.105
Likewise, Philippe Vallat devotes an entire chapter to refuting Mahdi in Farabi et l'école
d'Alexandrie and to establishing the centrality of al-Fārābī’s metaphysics to his political
philosophy.106 Instead, the Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation recognizes that the
Imām has metaphysical knowledge and that this is somehow communicated through
images. When he turns to the topic of revelation, Vallat emphasizes that the Imām has
access to this divine knowledge, and his revelation is not “pieuse mais factice, mais en
une expression fidèle de l'ordonnance des réalités divines,” a refraction of the truth.107
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However, as Paul E. Walker explains, the problem appears within the relationship
between philosophy, which operates within the theoretical faculty, i.e., the realm of the
universals and demonstration, and symbolic religion, which operates in the practical
faculty and the imagination, i.e., the realm of particulars.108 As Carlos Fraenkel points
out, images taken literally are bound to be false in reference to theoretical truths.109
Nonetheless, these facsimiles are intended to instill moral and even, as Joep Lameer
notes, theoretical truths.110 Each of these thinkers recognizes that there is metaphysical
knowledge and that this is somehow communicated through revelation. However, as alFārābī leaves underdetermined how translation from an Imām’s knowledge of universals
to particular religious images could possibly occur, there is wide disagreement as to how
to solve the problem of translation. Deborah Black explains translation through the
imagination’s mimetic abilities.111 Herbert Davidson conjectures that the emanations of
the Active Intellect empower the imagination of the Imām to achieve unique feats.112
Vallat claims that the problem of translating from the theoretical faculty to the
imagination was foreign to al-Fārābī, and the ease of an Imām translating theoretical
truths into images was never in doubt.113 Fraenkel argues that as long as one understands
that religion is comprised of allegorical content, there is no conflict.114 Lameer sees the
solution to this translation problem in al-Fārābī’s reliance on the Republic, arguing that
the relationship between the images of religion and demonstrative knowledge echoes the
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epistemic relationship between eikasia and knowledge within Plato’s divided line.115 W.
Craig Streetman invents a term, ‘prophetic reason,’ for how translation can be possible.116
Walker rightly notes the problem by explaining that Imāms have perfected imaginations,
practical faculties, and theoretical faculties and shows how if translation is possible, the
Imām would be the person most equipped to translate, but he never shows how, in
principle, theoretical knowledge can be translated into images without a loss of
content.117 And Dimitri Gutas, in a brief introductory treatment of the issue in the
Encyclopedia Iranica, merely gestures toward emanation.118 In sum, there is little
agreement as to how the Imām translates knowledge of universals into particular images,
though universal agreement among those espousing the Metaphysical Dominance
Interpretation, including myself, that the Imām does, in fact, know and translate the truth.
To claim that the Imām is warranted in his actions, one must provide a solution to this
problem.

5.3. The Mechanisms of Revelation
The second obstacle to understanding al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political
Deception, particularly for the Metaphysical Dominance Interpretation, involves the
exact epistemic and psychological mechanisms which are at play in order for revelation
to occur. As E.I.J Rosenthal noted and Richard Walzer expanded and clarified, al-Fārābī
discusses prophecy using two distinct terms, nubūwa (‘prophecy’, but in context
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‘divination’) and waḥy (‘revelation’).119 While often synonymous terms within an Islamic
theological context, for al-Fārābī, nubūwa tends to refer to those people who receive
prophetic images directly within their imaginative faculty without the intermediary of
their rational faculty, while waḥy refers to prophets who intentionally translate their
knowledge into images, although al-Fārābī does not painstakingly maintain this
distinction, leaving room for ambiguity.120 The distinction relies heavily on al-Fārābī’s
psychology and epistemology. The receivers of revelation (waḥy) require no supernatural
or, more accurately, superlunar explanation for their certitude beyond the normal activity
of the Active Intellect upon human reason.121 Like the philosopher, they can know what
they know through abstraction and demonstration.122 However, the role of the Active
Intellect for the process of normal human intellection is already controversial, before
even introducing the unique case of prophecy. Herbert Davidson suggests the Active
Intellect directly emanates the first principles of science, but does not discuss the power
for abstraction.123 Black credits the Active Intellect as an efficient cause for
abstraction.124 Vallat argues that the emanation of first principles is itself adequate for
abstraction.125 And Richard Taylor considers the possibility that the Active Intellect
provides both a power for abstraction and first principles (but never states explicitly if
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these reduce to the same emanation).126 None of these positions (nor al-Fārābī himself)
ever suggest that emanations from the Active Intellect ever provide the typical human
being with intelligibles other than first principles. Yet al-Fārābī claims that the Imāms
who receive revelation (waḥy) and the diviners who receive divination (nubūwa) are
given emanations directly to their rational faculties (and through them their imaginative
faculties) and their imaginative faculties, respectively.127 While these emanations are
acknowledged by those who study al-Fārābī’s psychology generally, their less than
parsimonious place in al-Fārābī’s psychology and their curious epistemological status
need further examination, particularly in light of al-Fārābī’s insistence that the Imām
knows with demonstrative certitude and al-Fārābī’s idiosyncratic conception of certitude,
memorably explained by Deborah Black.128

5.4. Borrowed Critiques from Plato
Finally, moving outside the bounds of Fārābīan scholarship, the central objections
to the warrant of al-Fārābī’s Imām must be devised from Plato scholarship, due to the
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aforementioned vacuum in Fārābīan literature on this topic. While I will not provide a
comprehensive examination of the criticisms of Plato’s doctrine, I will use Plato
scholarship to guide my critiques of al-Fārābī’s position. The major objections which I
will focus upon, borrowing from R.H.S. Crossman and Karl Popper, are reactions to: 1)
the paternalistic control of information, 2) the rejection of equality, freedom, and selfgovernment, 3) a hereditary caste system, 4) censorship, 5) the identification of the state
with the ruling class, and 6) totalitarianism.129 Each problem emerges at the nexus
between dishonesty and the abuse of power, but each problem raises its own unique
concerns. As previewed in Chapter 1 though, there is a vast difference between the
example of the Phoenician Story and a Noble Lie, as such. Most of these critiques are
leveled primarily at the former, but do not deeply consider the latter. That is not to say
that the latter is not itself worthy of criticism, only that insofar as al-Fārābī adopts the
Doctrine of the Noble Lie, as such, and not the Phoenician Story, he has more
philosophical room to maneuver than Plato, proper.

6. Conclusion
Out of the aforementioned tangle of al-Fārābī scholarship, several questions come
to the fore. First, is al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception ethically
justifiable? Second, even if it is justifiable, how does al-Fārābī systematically establish
the component mechanisms within his Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception in
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order to make it so? And third, what can one glean from the way al-Fārābī builds his
ethically justifiable system which speaks to the problem of political deception more
generally? By examining al-Fārābī’s cosmology, psychology, and poetics in Chapter 3, as
well as the reception of his cosmology, psychology, poetics, and politics in Chapter 4, the
first two questions will begin to be answered; the third will have to wait until the
Conclusion. And while none of these questions will be settled without a more careful
examination of al-Fārābī’s epistemology and ethics, Chapter 3 will provide a clearer
framework within which these examinations may occur.
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III. THE METAPHYSICAL AND COSMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
BENEFICENT POLITICAL DECEPTION

1. Introduction
The crux of al-Fārābī’s justification for beneficent political deception lies in his
navigation of an apparent dissonance between two strongly held principles: a) human
beings need community to fulfill their purpose (i.e. happiness for the individual and the
community, which occurs through knowledge), and b) unvarnished truth is antithetical to
the establishment of community. The tension is obvious. While the ultimate purpose of
the community is to orient its citizens toward the truth, the nature of the typical citizen
makes truth corrosive to the structure of the community.1 Here lies the key, and the
challenge, to understanding al-Fārābī’s political thought: the polis holds a dual allegiance
to both truth (ḥaqq) and cooperation (ta‘āwun). However, truth and cooperation are often
antithetical to one another. What is purely said for the purpose of cooperation is, at best,
only accidental in relation to what is true, and, at worst, discordant with truth. The Imām
is the exceptional case, an individual able to harmonize the truth within the establishment
of a community.

1

That most citizens are unable to encounter truth at the outset of their existence is apparent for numerous
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AH (Ar.) 23-24; BL 114-119. But, ‘typical’, here, means something particular, namely someone who lacks
the wherewithal to fulfill the full human telos, even in association, i.e., someone who is not a philosopher
and lacks the natural disposition for philosophy. As will be discussed below, in al-Fārābī’s cosmos,
teleological fulfillment for embodied existents is the exception, not the rule. That the purpose of the
community is to orient citizens toward truth, rather than social harmony, given the dispositions and abilities
of the typical citizen, is challenged by Averroes. See Chapter 4, 3.4 and Taylor 2018.
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The present chapter will explore the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of al-Fārābī’s position.
Why does he believe the purpose of the community is knowledge? How does one achieve
knowledge for al-Fārābī? Why are most citizens incapable of happiness without
constructed social knowledge? How does the Imām translate truth into images for the
community? Whether or not al-Fārābī’s position provides adequate justification for such
deception will be dealt with in Chapter 6. The present chapter focuses on the mechanisms
al-Fārābī uses to mount such a justification. And while this project is most focused on the
political manifestations brought about by the dilemmatic tension between truth and
cooperation, knowledge and unity, respectively, the ultimate source of this tension is
more fundamental than politics for al-Fārābī. The tension rests upon the particular
metaphysical, cosmological, epistemological, and psychological commitments of the
mature al-Fārābī.2

2. Cosmology
For al-Fārābī, the purpose of the human person (and thus the community as a whole)
rests within the teleology of the cosmos in toto. His teleology is not geocentric or
anthropocentric, but rather stilted toward intelligibility itself, sourced in the absolute
simplicity of the First Intellect, scil., God. The role of the human person is not the
fulfillment of this cosmology; the perfected human person is the lowest, most inferior of
all existent intellects. Nonetheless, while human beings do not play a particularly
important role in his cosmology absolutely considered, human beings are unique, insofar
as they are the only intellect in the cosmos to become actualized through interactions with

2

For the division between the mature al-Fārābī and his earlier work, see Chapter 2, 4.2.2.
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material objects.3 In other words, humans, while lowly in reference to the cosmos, are
preeminent within the sublunary world, i.e., the world of material composites.
That said, a full and precise exploration of the totality of al-Fārābī’s cosmos is
beyond the scope of this project, and other instructive attempts to harmonize his various
positions on this subject have already been written.4 For the moment, a general sketch,
with particular focus on the human’s place within the cosmos, must suffice.

2.1. The First
Al-Fārābī’s cosmological scheme centers around “the First Existent” (al-mawjūd al’awwal) who is “the First Cause of the existence of all the other existents”.5 As a result,
the telos of every existent, including human beings, refers back to the First. The heavens
are ranked according to their deficiency (naqṣ) in relation to the First (which lacks any
deficiency), and the excellent city, too, is excellent or virtuous (fāḍila) according to its
imitation of the First.6 Put otherwise, the First, elsewhere referred to as God (al-’ilāh), is
the cause of every existent and the cause of the ranks and purposes of every existent.7
Thus, al-Fārābī’s cosmological model is, not unexpectedly, entirely theocentric. The First
alone lacks any exterior purpose or aim (ḡaraḍ wa ḡāya), as it has no other cause
whatsoever for its existence.8 Its existence is the most excellent (’afḍal) and most prior
(’aqdam) existence, needing nothing, and intelligizing only Itself.9 And, as will be shown
below, all other existents derive their telos from the First, aiming to know the First,

3

PR 67-68. See also PR 32-33, 67-68; BL 115, 140; PS 8.4-5, 13.2-5; EI 12-20.
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9
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whether directly or mediately.10 In one sense, the aforementioned competing allegiances
within the city between cooperation and truth find their source in the nature of the First,
as to emulate the First requires emulating the First in both its oneness (waḥda) and its
knowing “the most excellent intelligible through the most excellent knowledge”, i.e.,
Itself.11 More properly speaking though, the competition between these allegiances is
sourced in human deficiency (naqṣ), which divides cooperation and knowledge into
distinct activities, whereas all the activity and substance of the First is entirely indivisible
(ḡayr munqasim).12

2.1.1. Divine Attribution
For this reason, discussing and emulating the First is problematic, as the topic
runs afoul of the famous complications surrounding divine attribution.13 How is one to
characterize an Existent (mawjūd) who lacks any characteristics beyond Its substance
(jawhar)? How is one to define the First if It lacks a genus or a differentia specifica
distinct from Its own ipseity?14 Al-Fārābī is less than helpful in this regard, lacking either
the kind of commitment to apophasis found in the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius and
Maimonides or any developed doctrine of analogy like what is found in Aquinas.15
Instead, al-Fārābī is inconsistent, even within the same texts. For example, as Hannah
Kasher has noted, al-Fārābī takes two distinct positions about the First within the first
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chapter of The Perfect State, saying both that It is “different (mubāyin) in its substance
(bi-jawhar) than everything else”, i.e., placing it outside the ordered rank of the cosmos,
and that It is the most excellent (’afḍal) existent, i.e., placing It as the source of, but
within, the ordered cosmos.16 Likewise, al-Fārābī is of two minds as to whether familiar
terminology can adequately describe the First in the Political Regime, saying, “There is
no link between our own apprehension and Its apprehension, nor between our knowledge
and Its knowledge. And if there is a link, it is a trifling link.”17 Here, he again
simultaneously presents both the possibility that the First is entirely distinct from, i.e.,
transcending, the rest of the cosmos and the possibility that the First is the most
preeminent and the most superior rank within the cosmos. He never clearly decides the
issue.18
The closest he comes to a true doctrine of divine attribution occurs during his
discussion of the First as ‘living’(ḥayy), when he describes the term as predicated
metaphorically (ista‘āra).19 However, while yusta‘āru is a technical term, defined in alFārābī’s Short Commentary on De Interpretatione, its definition leaves a great deal to be
desired for the purposes of this discussion. He explains:
A term is used metaphorically (ista‘āra) if at the time it was first introduced it
was allotted to a certain thing as its proper signifier, but as time went by another
thing came to be labelled by it owing to some affinity, no matter of what kind,
between it and the original (referent), though the word is not the appointed
signifier of the second (referent).20

"… ;"سواه ما لكل بجوهره مباين وهوPS 1.2, 1.1; Hannah Kasher 1994, 471.
"...  وإن كانت له نسبة فهي نسبة ما يسيرة،  ;"وإذا كان ال نسبة إلدراكنا نحن إلى إدراكه وال لمعلومنا إلى معلومهPR 47; This
passage is echoed almost word for word in the PS 1.14, the only difference being that the PS passage also
compare our beauty and the First’s beauty.
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VIII.122-124, 130, 140-141, 183-186, X.1-10; Greek Sage 1.1-16; Divine Knowledge 1, 45-51, 99, 106116, 121-128, 129-132.
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ْ فاالسم الذى يقول على الشيء باستعارة هو
أن يكون اسم ما داال على ّات شيء رابتا عليه وانما من ّأول ما
لألول بنحو ما من أنخاء المواصلة أي نحو كان من
ّ وضع فيلقب في الحين بعد الحين شيء أخر لمواصلته
21
ْ إير
. أن يجعل راتبا ً للثاني داال على ّاته
From this, one can surmise that terms predicated of both the First and creatures reveal
some affinity of some kind between the First and creatures. Whether this affinity is
anything more than the relationship between Cause and caused is not clear. Moreover,
whether these terms more properly signify the First or creatures depends on whether one
is speaking linguistically or metaphysically, as genealogically speaking, creatures are the
appointed signifier for attributes during the development of a language, i.e., as language
develops, creatures are called ‘one’, ‘living’, and ‘existent’ first.22 Al-Fārābī admits as
much when he says, “It is not impossible that for our calling the First by these names to
be subsequent to in time to our calling something else by them.”23 In linguistic terms,
according to the definition of a metaphor al-Fārābī supplies in his Short Commentary on
De Interpretatione, creatures, and not the First, are the primary referents of these terms.
Yet, al-Fārābī insists at times that the First “deserves more than anything else to be
called” terms like ‘one’, ‘real’, ‘true’, and ‘living’, as these terms are said “in the most
prior and deserving ways” about the First.24 Here, he seems to be speaking
metaphysically. For example, when he talks about the terms ‘existent’ and ‘one’, he says,
“For these two first of all signify only what makes the First substantial; then they signify
the rest of the things insofar as they are made substantial from the First and are secured
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and procured from it.”25 In effect, al-Fārābī is arguing that the First, as Cause, is more
deserving of being credited with the attributes of creatures than creatures, despite the
First’s lack of attributes. And while this position is perfectly coherent when considering
the issue from the standpoint of metaphysics, as every attribute is ultimately sourced in
the First as the “Cause of the existence of all other existents”, it moves one no closer to
understanding the content of terms predicated of the absolutely simple First.26
There are two things one can know for sure about al-Fārābī’s doctrine of divine
attribution, however. First, despite the fact that al-Fārābī does allow for careful
predication of terms while describing the First, any term predicated of the First only
signifies Its absolutely simple substance. Al-Fārābī is, as H.A. Wolfson describes, an
Antiattributist.27 The only exceptions al-Fārābī allows are those terms which signify
something outside the substance of the First, but again, do not really attribute any
plurality to the First, namely relations. Thus, as he says in the Political Regime:

It ought not to be presumed that the kinds of perfections signified by Its many names
are many kinds into which It is divided and by all of which It is made substantial.
Rather, those many names ought to signify a single substance and a single existence
that is not at all divided… Of the names that signify perfection and excellence in the
things around us, some signify what is in Its essence and not insofar as it is related to
another thing—like being, oneness, and what is similar to that. Others signify what is
in relation to something else external to it—like justice and generosity.28
ّ ُظن
ّ وليس ينبغي أن ي
أن أنواع كماالته التي يُدَ ُّل عليها بأسمائه الكثيرة أنواع كثيرة ينقسم إليها ويتجوهر بجميعها
 واألسماء التي تد ّل على الكمال...ًبل ينبغي أن يُدَ ّل بتلك األسماء الكثيرة على جوهر واحد غير منقسم أصال
 مثل، ال من حيث هو مضاف إلى شيء آخر، منها ما يد ّل على ما هو له في ذاته،والفضيلة في األشياء التي لدينا
 مثل العدل، ومنها ما يد ّل على ما هو له باإلضافة إلى شيء آخر خارج عنه.الموجود والواحد وأشباه ذلك
29
.والجواد
ّ
ّ األول ثم
ّ "فإن هذين إنّما
األول
ّ األول وأنّها مقتبسة عن
ّ يدالن على سائر األشياء من جهة أنّها متجوهرة عن
ّ يدالن ّأوالً على ما يتجوهر به
". ;ومتستفادة عنهPR 50. See also The Discourse on the Pure Good 1-8.
26
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The terms which are predicated of the First are predicated as a perfection of the First
Itself, i.e., in virtue of its substance and essence, like the ‘One’, ‘Existent’, or, as will be
discussed below, ‘Intellect.’30 Or, they are predicated as relations between the First and
the ordered cosmos, like ‘justice’ and ‘generosity’, but do not properly predicate the First
Itself.
The second thing which al-Fārābī makes explicit is that the problem of divine
attribution itself stems from human deficiency, not the substance of the First. The
difficulty issues from human beings projecting their own plurality on to what is properly
speaking One. Unlike more familiar usages of the term ‘one’, in which ‘one’ is a
predicate of an existent which has other predicates (e.g., one horse), when referring to the
First, the term ‘one’ signifies the First as a singular, unified existent devoid of any
predication.31 ‘One’ is not a predicate of the First. Rather, the term ‘One’, in one sense,
signifies the First qua existent. Al-Fārābī goes on to link these terms to ‘intellect’,
‘intelligible’, and ‘thinking’, as well as ‘knowing’, ‘wise’, ‘real’, ‘true’, ‘living’, ‘life’,
‘greatness’, ‘majesty’, ‘glory’, ‘beauty’, ‘brilliance’, and ‘splendor’. Moreover, the First
is the ‘happiest’ and the most ‘loving’ and ‘loved’.32 Yet all of these terms signify only
one single referent, the First Itself. Naturally, one could object to al-Fārābī’s many-in-one
approach to the First as nonsensical. Something cannot be both many things and one
thing at the same time (barring equivocation of the terms ‘many’ and ‘one’). Yet, this is
not al-Fārābī’s claim. Instead, he argues that human beings necessarily treat, cognize, and
speak of the One as many. He explains:
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Hence, since the First has the highest perfection of existence, it follows that what
we think of it in our minds ought to have utmost perfection as well. We find,
however, that this is not the case. One ought to realize that for the First it is not
difficult to apprehend itself, since the First itself is of the utmost perfection. But it
is difficult and hard for us to apprehend (perceive) it and to represent it to
ourselves because of the weakness of our intellectual faculties, mixed as they are
with matter and non-being: we are too weak to think it as it really is. For its
overwhelming perfection dazzles us, and that is why we are not strong enough to
represent it to ourselves perfectly (completely). Likewise, light is the first and
most perfect and most luminous visible, the other visibles become visible through
it, and it is the cause of the colours becoming visible. Hence our visual
apprehension of any colour which is more perfect and powerful (strong) should
have been more perfect. But we see that just the opposite happens. The more
perfect and the more powerful a visible is, the weaker is our visual apprehension
of it, and not because of its being hidden or deficient-it has, on the contrary, in
itself the utmost brightness and luminosity —but because the perfection of its
splendour dazzles our sight so that our eyes are bewildered. Thus are our minds in
relation to the First Cause, the First Intellect and the First Living. Our thinking it
is deficient, not because of any deficiency in the First, and our apprehension of it
is difficult for us, not because of its substance being difficult to apprehend, but
because our minds are too weak to represent it to ourselves. That is why the
intelligibles within our minds are deficient. Our representation of them is of two
kinds: one kind of intelligible is in itself impossible for man to represent to
himself or to think of by way of perfect representation, because of the weak
nature of their existence and the defects of their essences and substances. The
other kind of intelligible could in itself be represented completely and as perfectly
as they are, but since our minds are weak and far from the substances of these
objects, it is impossible for us to represent them to ourselves completely and with
all the perfection of their existence. Each of these two things is at opposite
extremes, one being of the utmost perfection, the other of the utmost deficiency.
Since we are mixed up with matter and since matter is the cause of our substances
being remote from the First Substance, the nearer our substances draw to it, the
more exact and the truer will necessarily be our apprehension of it.33
 أن يكون المعقول منه في نفوسنا على نهاية،  إذ هو في الغاية من كمال الوجود، فلذلك كان يجب في األول
 إذ كان،  فينبغي أن نعلم أنه من جهته غير معتاص االدراك،  ونحن نجد األمر على غير ذلك.الكمال أيضا
 ويعسر علينا،  يعتاص ادراكه، في نهاية الكمال؛ ولكن لضعف قوى عقولنا نحن ولمالبستها المادة والعدم
 فال نقوى على تصوره،  فإن افراط كماله يبهرنا،  ونضعف من أن نعقله على ما هو عليه وجوده، تصوره
،  به يصير سائر المبصرات مبصرة،  كما أن الضوء هو أول المبصرات وأكملها وأظهرها، على التمام
 كادراك البصر له،  ويجب فيها أن يكون كل ما كان أتم وأكبر.وهو السبب في أن صارت األلوان مبصرة
 ليس ألجل خفائه،  فإنه كلما كان أكبر كان ابصارنا له أضعف،  ونحن نرى األمر على خالف ذلك.أتم
 يبهر،  بما هو نور،  بل هو في نفسه على غاية ما يكون من الظهور واالستنارة؛ ولكن كماله، ونقصه
 ليس. وعقولنا نحن،  كذلك قياس السبب األول والعقل األول والحق األول. فتحار األبصار عنه، األبصار
 لكن لضعف قوى عقولنا،  وال عسر إدراكنا له لعسره في وجوده، نقص معقوله عندنا لنقصانه في نفسه
 وهذا على ضربين. وتصورنا لها ضعيف،  فتكون المعقوالت التي هي في أنفسنا ناقصة.نحن عسر تصوره
33
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،  ضرب ممتنع من جهة ذاته أن يتصور فيعقل تصورا تاما لضعف وجوده ونقصان ذاته وجوهره:
 ولكن أذهاننا وقوى عقولنا ممتنعة.وضرب مبذول من جهة فهمه وتصوره على التمام وعلى أكمل ما يكون
. من أن نتصوره على التمام وعلى ما هو عليه من كمال الوجود،  لضعفها وبعدها عن جوهر ذلك الشيء،
،  أحدهما في نهاية الكمال: وهذان الضربان كل واحد منهما هو من اآلخر في الطرف األقصى من الوجود
 كانت هي السبب في أن صارت جواهرنا،  ويجب إذا كنا نحن ملتبسين بالمادة.واآلخر في نهاية النقص
34
. كان تصورنا له أتم وأيقن وأصدق،  إذ كلما قربت جواهرنا منه، جوهرا يبعد عن الجوهر األول
Thus, al-Fārābī, following Aristotle, distinguishes between what is most knowable for us
and what is most knowable in itself.35 There is nothing more intrinsically intelligible than
the First, but, owing to human deficiency, the First is impossible for the human intellect
to properly apprehend.36 Instead, human persons are drawn toward knowing intelligibles
which, in themselves, are deficient, e.g., material objects.37 While these are more
intelligible for humans, owing to their shared deficiency with humans, e.g., materiality
and plurality, they are not more intelligible in themselves than the First.38 For this reason,
as will be discussed below, human happiness is contingent upon knowing “the most
beautiful, the most brilliant, and the most splendid objects” and requires knowledge of
intelligibles which are not tied to matter, i.e., the Separate Intellects which will be
discussed below.39 But, human knowledge begins with what is more familiar and
knowable to us, progressing toward less deficient things, until ultimately arriving at
happiness.40 Even human felicity is marred by our deficiency; our starting point in
plurality and materiality prevents us from achieving a higher rank, because we cognize
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things that are material and plural before cognizing immaterial things and acquire our
knowledge in a piecemeal fashion, rather than all at once.41
Perhaps, this explains why al-Fārābī lacks a fully (or clearly) explicated doctrine
of divine attribution. Whereas figures like Maimonides and Aquinas have specific
agenda, encouraging apophasis in order to excise conceptions of divine corporeality and
developing a doctrine of analogy in order to identify God with existence, respectively, alFārābī remains pessimistic such projects could succeed.42 Because, while none of these
three figures are altogether very distant from one another’s positions, al-Fārābī’s
insistence on the deficiency of both human language and thought renders such projects
moot. Even the philosopher will not be able to attain what, how, from what, and for what
the First is, as these distinctions are meaningless with regard to the First.43 Instead, these
inquiries begin with the Second, and the knowledge that the First is its Cause. And yet, as
the for what of every being, the telos of the entire cosmos relates always back to the First,
and the nature of the First remains essential in any discussion of happiness. (It is likely
for this reason that al-Fārābī’s political works consistently contain discussions of his
cosmology, as determining the good of the city requires reference to happiness, and
understanding happiness requires reference to the First.)44
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Put another way, all knowledge is, in some trifling sense, knowledge of the First
as Cause, and all positive terms are, in some trifling sense, terms attributable to the First
as Cause. Yet, no human knows the First qua Substance, and none of these terms signify
the First qua One. Inversely, knowledge of the First qua Substance is knowledge of all
beings, as their cause.45 This is a critical point. Because within al-Fārābī’s theocentric
model of the universe, to know everything, one must simply know One Thing.46 And to
be perfectly happy, one must simply be One Thing.47 And to be happy is the same as
knowing.48 Unfortunately, this is only possible for one Existent, the First Cause. Every
other being must strive for modest imitation.

2.1.2. The First as Intellect
Given the preceding caveat that any discussion of the First is consigned to
imprecision, al-Fārābī discusses the First in vivid detail, although he frequently reminds
the reader that the First is entirely indivisible (ḡayr munqasim), despite his predication.
And while his insistence upon the First’s indivisibility may seem unremarkable,
considering the importance placed on divine unicity (tawḥīd) by the practitioners of
Kalam (the Mu‘tazilites in particular) and Islam more generally, his assertions are based

These entities, which lie beyond the orb of the moon, are in a sense the counterpart of the beings in the
sublunary realm, and their perfect harmony and order stand as a model for the ideal human life. This
explains the close symmetry al-Fārābī establishes between cosmology, human psychology, and the ideal
political organization.” Janos 2012, 39.
45
Physics 194 b17–20; Posterior Analytics 71 b9–11; 94 a20. In fact, al-Fārābī attributes omniscience
without plurality to the First using this logic. PS 1.7; PR 45. Of course, this is not to say that the First
knows particulars qua particular, as this would introduce plurality in God. Rather, he knows all existents
only insofar as he knows the Cause of all existents, i.e., the only intelligible within the First’s intellect is the
First. Al-Ghazali takes issue with this doctrine of the philosophers (though his attack remains focused on
Avicenna). See Incoherence 13.
46
PR 34.
47
PS 1.14-15.
48
PS 1.14-15.
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equally upon Aristotelian (and Neoplatonic) concerns.49 For example, while he bows to
traditional Islamic rejections of God having partners or association (shirk), saying that no
other thing could share in the existence of the First, he relies on Aristotelian noetics,
mereology, and substrate theory to prove his point.50 Likewise, he gainsays the idea that
“metaphysics and the science of divine unicity (’ilm al-tawḥīd) are one and the same” in
The Aims of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, insisting that “the universal science is that which
examines something in common to all existents, like ‘existence’ and ‘oneness’
(waḥda)”.51 Here, al-Fārābī foregoes use of the technical and theological term tawḥīd,
which applies only to God, for the term waḥda, which can be said of any existent,
echoing his use of the non-theological terms waḥda in the Perfect State and wāḥid in the
Political Regime to refer to the First.52 This, coupled with al-Fārābī’s derision for the
dogmatic nature of dialectical theology (‘ilm al-kalām) in The Enumeration of the
Sciences, conspicuously reveals a glaring characteristic about al-Fārābī’s philosophical
style in general and the topic of the First’s oneness in particular—al-Fārābī is not

49

See Mayer 2016, 47. See also Leaman 2006, 651-652; Esposito 2003, "Tawhid"; Gimaret 2006,
“Tawḥīd”; El-Bizri 121-140, 2008. For an explanation of the account of tawḥīd by al-Fārābī’s Christian
Student, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, see Lizzini 2016b. For texts which aimed to reconcile the Islamic doctrine of
tawḥīd with the Greek doctrine of divine unity, see Wakelnig 2015; Kaya 2014. For a discussion of
Neoplatonic Influences, see Druart 1992, 132; Davidson 1992, 46, 121; Twetten 2016b, 364, 367; Janos
2012, 138f.
50
PS 1.2-4; Fakhry 2002, 80. See also Jaques 2004, 631; Gimaret 2006, “Shirk”.
51
"قال قصدنا في هذه المقالة هو ان ند ّل على العرض الذي يشتمل عليه كتاب ارسطوطاليس المعروف بما بعد الطبيعة وعلى االٔقسام االٔول
التي هي له اذ كثير من الناس سبق الى وهمهم ان فحوى هذا الكتاب ومضمونه هو القول في الباري سجانه وتعالى و العقل والنفس وسائر ما
 وأما العلم الكلّي فهو الذي ينظر في الشيء العا ّم لجميع الموجودات مثل الوجود...يناسبها وان علم ما بعد الطبيعة وعلم التوحيد وأحد بعينه
".  ; والوحدةAAM 34-35 (translation mine). See also Druart 1992, 128f; McGinnis and Reisman 2007, 78;
Bertolacci 2006, 67. Druart prefers ’ilm al-tawḥīd as ‘Kalam’ or ‘Islamic Theology’. McGinnis and
Reisman translate it as ‘theology’ in Classical Arabic Philosophy. Bertolacci, similar to my preference,
translates ’ilm al-tawḥīd as ‘the science of the profession of God’s oneness.’
52
PS 1.5; PR 49. For al-Fārābī’s own treatment of the terms, see OO. See also, Janos 2016, 101-128.
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doctrinaire.53 His insistence upon the simplicity of the First stems from philosophical, not
sectarian, concerns.54
That said, al-Fārābī’s philosophical rationale for adopting a doctrine of divine
simplicity is situated within a historical context, both religious and philosophical, in
which divine simplicity is the prevailing view. He is not the first to present the First as
indivisible, nor is he the first to present the characteristics of existence, unicity, and
intelligibility as inextricably necessitating one another, all while denying that any of these
characteristics signify anything beyond the First’s substance. (For example, the Arabic
Plotinus, in particular, emphasizes a similar divine Gordian knot composed of strands of
existence, unicity, and intelligibility, while still upholding divine simplicity.)55 Both this
context and the complications raised by al-Fārābī’s approach to divine attribution render
any attempt to assert a coherent Fārābīan account of the First which gives predominance
to any single characteristic moot; no individual characteristic of the First truly grounds
any other.
Mutually necessitating divine predicates—all of which signify a single substance—
make reasoning about the First impossible, as any argument must divide the First into
distinct premises. In reference to the First, first premises are identical to conclusions,
which are identical to middle terms as well. Cause, Intellect, Intelligible, One, and
Existent all signify a singular substance, and any narrative that describes the First’s

53

ES 107-113.
In fact, Janos even considers whether Kitāb al-Wāḥid wa-l-waḥda (OO, The Book on the One and
Oneness) is both philosophical in nature, insofar as it echoes the linguistic precision and argumentation of
the Book of Letters, and apologetic, insofar as it aims to philosophically ground al- Fārābī’s broader
theology, similar to Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s Discourse on Divine Unity. See Janos 2016, 104-105, 122. See also
Lizzini 2016b.
55
Divine Knowledge 224-228. Janos argues that the Arabic Plotinus undergirds, at least, al-Fārābī’s early
works. Janos 2012, 261-262. See also Adamson 2003, 113f; 129-130. See Footnotes 18 and 56 of the
present chapter.
54
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existence as necessitating Its oneness or Its oneness as necessitating Its intelligibility is
doomed to failure. While such accounts are informative in one sense, they also run the
risk of insinuating problematic plurality and priority, e.g., that the First’s intelligibility
somehow rests upon Its existence or that Its oneness somehow depends upon Its
intelligibility. Yet such depictions are required, if one is to discuss the First at all. Thus,
only with an admonition that one should proceed with caution and that the First is
entirely indivisible in its substance can one attempt to explore al-Fārābī’s description of
the substance of the First. What follows is, strictly speaking, imprecise, although it is
certainly not uncharacteristic of the level of precision al-Fārābī gives consideration to
while predicating of the First.
In view of this, one must start with one of the predicates al-Fārābī ascribes to the First
if one wants to give a cohesive narrative. But, while any narrative beginning is
metaphysically arbitrary with regard to the First (as one could start with any of the
characteristics al-Fārābī gives to the First—oneness, existence, cause, intelligible, etc.—
and tell a cogent story as to how the other characteristics stem from this starting point),
some are more hermeneutically useful for exploring al-Fārābī’s cosmology. For the
purpose of this project, one predicate augurs the most instructive starting point for
exploration of the First, as al-Fārābī’s depiction of human happiness depends on one
particular predicate about the First, namely the First as Intellect.
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2.1.2.1. The First as a Noetic Unity
The First as One is inextricably tied to the First as Intellect and the First as
Intelligible.56 Al-Fārābī, following Aristotle in Metaphysics Λ 9, identifies the First cause
as self-thinking thought. As al-Fārābī explains:
It [the First] is, then, actual intellect. The First is also intelligible through its
substance; for, again, what prevents a thing from being actually intelligible and
being intelligible through its substance is matter. It is intelligible by virtue of its
being intellect; for the One whose {being} is intellect is intelligible by the One
whose {being} is intellect. In order to be intelligible the First is in no need of
another essence outside itself which would think it but it itself thinks its own
essence. As a result of its thinking its own essence, it becomes actually thinking
and intellect, and, as a result of its essence thinking (intelligizing) it, it becomes
actually intelligized. In the same way, in order to be actual intellect and to be
actually thinking, it is in no need of an essence which it would think and which it
would acquire from the outside, but is intellect and thinking by thinking its own
essence. For the essence which is thought is the essence which thinks, and so it is
intellect by virtue of its being intelligized. Thus it is intellect and intelligized and
thinking, all this being one essence and one indivisible substance-whereas man,
for instance, is intelligible, but what is intelligible in his case is not actually
intelligized but potentially intelligible; he becomes subsequently actually
intelligized after the intellect has thought him. What is intelligible in the case of
man is thus not always the subject which thinks, nor is, in his case, the intellect
always the same as the intelligible object, nor is our intellect intelligible because it
is intellect. We think, but not because our substance is intellect; we think with an
This doctrine can be a source of confusion given Plotinus’s insistence that the Good (i.e., the First) is
beyond Intellect and is not Intellect (Enneads V.6.4, 6.6). Rather, Intellect is below the First and is the
highest hypostases of intelligible being (Enneads V.1.7-8, 2.1-2, 4.1-2, V.6.4, V.9.2). Given al-Fārābī’s
broad adoption of the Plotinian tripartite hypostases of God, Intellect, and Soul for his cosmology, one
might expect intellect to begin with the Second Cause. Yet as will be discussed presently, al-Fārābī is
emphatic that the First is an actual intellect as a noetic unity. This largely follows the Arabic Plotinus in
identifying God as exemplifying the highest order of being, rather than something situated beyond being.
(This is likely the source of al-Fārābī’s confusion concerning whether God is the highest being within or
entirely outside the cosmos, as mentioned above.) Drawing the parallels between the hypostases of Plotinus
and al-Fārābī has led to some imprecision in language regarding when intellect begins in the cosmos. See
Twetten 2016b, 364-65; Janos 2012, 170, 174. For example, Twetten, pointing out al-Fārābī’s likely
sources, the Theology of Aristotle and The Sayings of the Greek Sage, identifies Intellect, as such, as being
the first effect of the First, despite the fact that Intellect, as such, precedes any effects, given that the First is
Intellect, which Twetten acknowledges on the following page. Likewise, Janos also links Intellect, as such,
following the Arabic Proclus, to multiplicity for al-Fārābī, despite acknowledging that God is actual
Intellect several pages later. Rather, another Intellect is the effect of the First and the first example of
multiplicity for al-Fārābī, namely the Second. This concern is not a pedantic one. The intelligibility of alFārābī’s cosmos begins with its First Principle. For some particularly stark examples of the Arabic
Plotinus’ conception of God as being and as Intellect, see Theology of Aristotle I.47, VII.21, VIII.129-130,
183-186; Treatise on Divine Knowledge 1; Greek Sage 1.7. See also Taylor 1998, 241-64; Adamson 2003,
124-137. For related issues in the Arabic Proclus, see D’Ancona 1998, 51-97.
56
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intellect which is not what constitutes our substance; but the First is different; the
intellect, the thinker and the intelligible (and intelligized) have in its case one
meaning and are one essence and one indivisible substance.57
 فإن المانع أيضا للشيء من أن يكون بالفعل معقوال هو. وهو أيضا معقول بجوهره،فهو إذن عقل بالفعل
 وهو معقول من جهة ما هو عقل؛ ألن الذي هويته عقل ليس يحتاج في أن يكون معقوال إلى ذات أخرى.المادة
 وبأن ذاته تعقله،  فيصير بما يعقل من ذاته عاقال وعقال بالفعل، خارجة عنه تعقله؛ بل هو بنفسه يعقل ذاته
 وكذلك ال يحتاج في أن يكون عقال بالفعل وعاقال بالفعل إلى ذات يعقلها ويستفيدها من.(يصير) معقوال بالفعل
 فهو عقل من جهة ما هو،  فإن الذات التي تعقل هي التي تعقل. بل يكون عقال وعاقال بأن يعقل ذاته، خارج
 فإن االنسان مثال معقول. هي كلها ذات واحدة وجوهر واحد غير منقسم.معقول؛ فإنه عقل وإنه معقول وإنه عاقل
 فليس إذن. بل كان معقوال بالقوة ثم صار معقوال بالفعل بعد أن عقله العقل، وليس المعقول منه معقوال بالفعل
 وال عقلنا نحن من جهة ما هو عقل هو،  وال العقل منه أبدا هو المعقول، المعقول من االنسان هو الذي يعقل
 بل،  فاألول ليس كذلك. ونحن عاقلون ال بأن جوهرنا عقل؛ فإن ما نعقل ليس هو الذي به تجوهرنا، معقول
58
. وجوهر واحد غير منقسم،  وذات واحدة، العقل والعاقل والمعقول فيه معنى واحد
Here, al-Fārābī endorses the Aristotelian doctrine of noetic identity found in De Anima
3.5, that “actual knowledge is identical with its object.”59 Nowhere is this more
conspicuous than in the substance of the First, whose Intellect (‘aql), act of thinking
(‘āqil), and object of thought (ma‘qūl) are all identical. The First Intellect is nothing more
(or less) than Its act of thinking, Whose intention is the First Intellect Itself (qua
Intelligible). And, while language breaks down with regard to the First, one could rightly
say that Its unity, simplicity, and indivisibility stem from the noetic identity between
Knower, Knowing, and Known, as long as one recalls that no attribute of the First is truly
distinct and a cause for the First as a whole.60 The First’s being (huwiyya) is Intellect, and
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PS 1.6. Translation slightly modified within the brackets ({}). Whereas Walzer translates huwiyya as
‘identity’ (ipseitas), which would be its normal usage, and appropriate given the way Ta‘liqāt and Fuṣūṣ
use the term (dubious, perhaps Avicennian, texts traditionally and, in all likelihood, erroneously attributed
to al-Fārābī, which equate huwiyya with shakhṣ, i.e., ‘individual’), a more appropriate translation here
would be ‘being’, given the use of the term by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq to translate τὸ ὂν in the famous passage in
Metaphysics Γ which describes that ‘being’ is said in many ways, as reported by Averroes in his Long
Commentary on the Metaphysics. And in fact, al-Fārābī links the term huwiyya to being, not identity, in the
Book of Letters. See BL 86; Ta‘liqāt, 21,8; Fuṣūṣ 2,3; LCM 300f.; EM 38. See also Alon 2002, 497, 619;
Goodman 2013, 107, 117; Wisnovsky 2018, 151; Menn 2008, 76; Endress 2002, 236-37; Arnzen 2010,
194; Shehadi 1982, 12-17, 40-41; Janos 2012, 383f.
58
PS 1.6.
59
De Anima 430a20-430a26; This doctrine is also Plotinian, appearing in Arabic in Divine Knowledge 1,
64.
60
For this reason, one could also reverse this explanation and claim the First’s unity is the basis upon which
Its intellect, thinking, and intelligible are one, given the same caveats mentioned above.
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Its Intellect is intelligible. As al-Fārābī explains, “It knows (ya‘lamu) and It is what is
Known (ma‘lūm) and It is the Knowing (‘ilm). And it is one essence and one
substance.”61 The terms predicated of the First originate from this noetic identity.62
In fact, al-Fārābī identifies this perfect noetic unity as the preeminent model of
several other terms predicated of the First, like pleasure, happiness, and love. And it is
clear that the First is the source of these attributes in other creatures according to his
cosmological model. His reasoning is as follows:
1) “Pleasure (surūr) and delight (ḡibṭa) result and increase only when the most
accurate apprehension concerns itself with the most beautiful, the most brilliant
and the most splendid objects.”63
2) Pleasure in apprehending these objects is coextensive with feeling
delight/happiness (iḡtabaṭa).64
3) “The First is in the most excellent state of existence, its beauty surpasses the
beauty of every other beautiful existent, and the same applies to its splendour and
its brilliance. Further, it has all these in its substance and essence by itself and by
thinking (intelligizing) its essence.”65
4) Given 1, 2, and 3, perfect apprehension of the First is the height of pleasure and
delight/happiness.
5) The First’s “apprehension of its own essence is most accurate in the extreme and
its knowledge of its own substance most excellent in the absolute meaning of the
term, the pleasure which the First enjoys is a pleasure whose character we do not
understand and whose intensity we fail to apprehend, except by analogy (qiyās)
and by relating it to the amount of pleasure which we feel, when we have most
accurately and most completely apprehended what is most perfect and most
splendid on our level, either through sensing it or representing it to ourselves or
through becoming aware of it intellectually.”66
PS 1.7. (Translation modified);".  فهو ذات واحدة وجوهر واحد." فإنه يعلم وإنه معلوم وإنه علم.
Again, only metaphysically, not temporally, speaking and not in such a way as to reify these terms into
attributes. See The Discourse on the Pure Good Chapter 8.
63
PS 1.14; ".  إنما ينتج ويحصل أكثر بأن يدرك األجمل واألبهى واألزين باالدراك األتقن واألتم، "واللذة والسرور والغبطة
He defines wisdom in a similar way, as ‘thinking the most excellent thing through the most excellent
knowledge’. This, of course, is a reference to the First thinking Itself. PS 1.8;
".  فإن الحكمة هي أن يعقل أفضل األشياء بأفضل علم."وكذلك في أنه حكيم
64
PS 1.15; This term for ‘happiness’ if the Form VIII Maṣdar of ḡ-b-ṭ which relates to envy. It connotes
enviable happiness.
65
PS 1.13;  ثم هذه كلها له في. وكذلك زينته وبهاؤه،  فجماله فائق لجمال كل ذي الجمال، "وإذ كان األول وجوده أفضل الوجود
".  ;جوهره وذاته؛ وذلك في نفسه وبما يعقله من ذاتهNote that even here, he insists that beauty is not merely intrinsic to
the First, but intrinsic qua self-thinking-thought.
66
PS 1.14;  واللذة التي يلتذ بها األول لذة ال نفهم،  وعلمه بجوهره العلم األفضل على االطالق، "فادراكه لذاته االدراك األتقن في الغاية
،  عند ما نكون قد أدركنا ما هو عندنا أكمل وأبهى ادراكا، نحن كنهها وال ندري مقدار عظمها اال بالقياس واالضافة إلى ما نجده من اللذة
61
62
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6) Given 4 and 5, the First, alone, experiences maximal pleasure and
delight/happiness by apprehending Its own essence.
7) “The more something enjoys its own essence and the greater pleasure and
happiness it feels about it the more it likes (yaḥibbu) and loves (ya‘shaqu) its
essence.”67
∴ ) Given 6 and 7, the First is not only the most pleased and the happiest, but the
most loving and the most loved.
Indeed, al-Fārābī concludes his discussion of the First Itself in the Perfect State with
precisely this motif, before turning to a discussion of the emanation of other existents. He
says:
In Its case, subject and object of affection, subject and object of pride (mu‘ajjib
and mu‘ajjab), subject and object of love are identical… in the First’s case,
subject and object of love and affection are identical. It does not make any
difference whether anybody likes it or not, loves it or not: it is the first object of
love and the first object of affection.68
 فأما هو فان... والعاشق منه هو المعشوق،  والمعجب منه هو المعجب منه، والمحب منه هو المحبوب بعينه
 أحبه غيره،  فهو المحبوب األول والمعشوق األول،  والمحب هو المحبوب، العاشق منه هو بعينه المعشوق
69
. وعشقه غيره أو لم يعشقه، أو لم يحبه
Here, even the notion of the First’s independence, its lack of need for any other being, a
point underscored repeatedly by al-Fārābī, is itself entrenched within the notion of noetic
unity, as the First needs no external adoration. Al-Fārābī’s cosmic account of love,
pleasure, and happiness is an entirely intellectualized one. In fact, as will be discussed
below, it is in emulation of the First that the Secondary Causes wish to be
delighted/happy (maḡbūṭ) and think the First, resulting in the further continuance of al-

".  إما باحساس أو تخيل أو بعلم عقلي،  ; وأتقن وأتمLater in the passage, he again links this pleasure (surūr) to
delight/happiness (iḡtibāṭ).
67
PS 1.15; ".  فهو يحب ذاته ويعشقها ويعجب بها أكثر، "وان كان ما يلتذ بذاته ويسر به أكثر ويغتبط به اغتباطا أعظم
While Walzer translates yaḥibbu and ya‘shaqu as ‘like’ and ‘love’, respectively, each term properly means
‘love’. Perhaps translating yaḥibbu as ‘love’ and ya‘shaqu as ‘adore’ would be more appropriate.
68
PS 1.15.
69
PS 1.15.
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Fārābī’s emanation scheme.70 And it is from the First that human beings are connected to
one another through love. As al-Fārābī explains:
The First’s substance is also such that the existents, when they have issued from it
in their ranks, are necessarily united and connected with one another and arranged
in a way that they become one whole and are established like one thing. Some of
them are connected and united by something within their substance, so that their
substances to which they owe their existence produce their connection and their
union; others by modes which accompany their substances, such as love
(maḥabba) by which human beings are connected, for love (maḥabba) is a mode
in them and not the substance to which they owe their existence. These modes of
theirs are also derived from the First, because its substance is such that many
existents receive from it together with their substances the modes by which they
are connected with each other and united and arranged.71
 إذا حصلت الموجودات مرتبة في مراتبها أن يأتلف ويرتبط وينتظم بعضها مع، وجوهره أيضا جوهر
 والتي بها. وتحصل كشيء واحد،  ائتالفا وارتباطا وانتظاما تصير بها األشياء الكثيرة جملة واحدة، بعض
ترتبط هذه وتأتلف هي لبعض األشياء في جواهرها حتى ان جواهرها التي بها وجودها هي التي بها تأتلف
 فانها حال،  مثل المحبة التي بها يرتبط الناس،  ولبعض األشياء تكون أحوال فيها تابعة لجوهرها.وترتبط
 ألن في جوهر األول،  وهذه أيضا فيها مستفادة عن األول. وليست هي جواهرهم التي بها وجودهم، فيهم
 ويأتلف، أن يحصل عنه بكثير من الموجودات مع جواهرها األحوال التي بها يرتبط بعضها مع بعض
72
.وينتظم
And while romantic and familiar love may only account for the smallest and most
imperfect connection for al-Fārābī, the association of a home (ijtimā‘ fī manzil), the First
as most loving and loved should not be viewed so narrowly, as It is also the first subject
and object of pride (mu‘ajjib and mu‘ajjab).73 The First as the initial source of unity, the
love and pride in one’s family, city, and nation (umma), is surely intended.

2.1.2.2. The First as Prime Actuality
That said, the noetic unity of the First does not simply account for the First as
‘one’; even the First as ‘existing’ and ‘true’ are explained according to Its noetic unity.
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PR 52.
PS 2.3.
72
PS 2.3.
73
PS 15.2; 1.15; 18.8; SA 70.
71
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Al-Fārābī consistently links being and intelligibility in his cosmology, although, as will
be discussed below, he is most transparent regarding this point in reference to the
secondary causes and human beings. Nonetheless, he is consistent in this regard: to fully
be is to either know or be known. One’s ontological rank in the cosmos corresponds to
one’s intelligibility.
The First, holding the highest rank in the cosmos as the cause of all other ranks, is
the First Existent insofar as it is the First Intellect and the First Intelligible.74 In the
passage from the Perfect State 1.6 quoted above, al-Fārābī makes clear that the First is an
Intellect in act (‘aql b’il fi‘l), an Intelligible in substance (ma‘qūl bi-jawhara), an
Intelligible in act (ma‘qūl b’il fi‘l), and is in no need (lā yaḥtāju) of any other existent due
to Its noetic unity.75 In other words, al-Fārābī relates the actuality of the First to Its
substance as both Intellect and Intelligible, in need of no other existent because Its noetic
unity entails self-sufficiency. Of course, such an observation is unremarkable, given that
the First’s noetic unity rests within a broader notion of First’s indivisibility. That
existence and intelligibility are linked in the First is indubitable, not only because alFārābī links existence and intelligibility more broadly within his cosmology, as will be
discussed below, but because every predicate of the First entails every other predicate.
Extrapolating too much from the relations between predicates ascribed to the First is
trivial.

74

Again, it is worth repeating that this statement can be reversed concerning the First, i.e., the First is the
First Intellect and the First Intelligible insofar as it is the First Existent.
75
See Section 2.1.2.1 of the present chapter.
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Nonetheless, the First as Intellect and Intelligible is one of al-Fārābī’s most
prevalent characterizations of the First (if not the most prevalent), and it is in this vein
that al-Fārābī depicts the First as the source of truth/reality (ḥaqīqa). Al-Fārābī explains:
The same applies to its being 'real' and 'true' (ḥaqq). For real and true (al-ḥaqq) go
with existence (al-wujūd), and 'reality' and 'truth' (al-ḥaqīqa) go with existence
(al-wujūd). For the reality and truth of a thing is its particular existence and the
most perfect state of the existence which is its lot. Further, real and true are said
of the intelligible through which the intellect happens to meet an existent, so as to
grasp it. It is then said of that existent that it is real and true, inasmuch as it is
intelligible, and that it exists with regard to its essence and by not being related to
what intelligizes (thinks) it. But now, in the case of the First, it can be said that it
is real and true in both these senses at once, in that its existence is the most perfect
and in that it is the intelligible by means of which he who thinks it comes into
contact with the existent as it exists. In order to be real and true it is by the fact of
its being intelligible in need of no other external essence which would think
(intelligize) it. It also deserves more than anything else to be called real and true
in both these senses at once. And its reality and truth are nothing else but its being
real and true.76
 فإن حقيقة الشيء هي الوجود،  والحقيقة قد تساوق الوجود،  فإن الحق يساوق الوجود.وكذلك في أنه حق
 وأكمل الوجود هو قسطه من الوجود؛ وأيضا فإن الحق قد يقال على المعقول الذي صادف به.الذي يخصه
 ومن جهة ذاته من،  يقال له إنه حق،  وذلك الموجود من جهة ما هو معقول.العقل الموجود حتى يطابقه
 بأن وجوده الذي هو له،  فاألول يقال إنه حق بالوجهين جميعا.غير أن يضاف إلى ما يعقله يقال إنه موجود
 وليس يحتاج في أن يكون. وبأنه معقول صادف به الذي عقله الموجود على ما هو موجود، أكمل الوجود
. وأيضا أولى بما يقال عليه حق بالوجهين جميعا.حقا بما هو معقول إلى ذات أخرى خارجة عنه تعقله
77
.وحقيقته ليست هي شيئا سوى أنه حق
This passage, along with description of the First as ‘knowing’ and ‘wise’, follows the
aforementioned passage in PS 1.6, which establishes the First’s noetic unity. As will be
explored further below, al-Fārābī identifies being real/true (ḥaqq) with being an intellect
or an intelligible. The First, as both Intellect and Intelligible at once, is the perfect
reality/truth (ḥaqīqa) and the highest rank of existence (wujūd). Within the First, and thus

PS 1.9. Walzer’s translation here divides the term ḥaqq into two distinct predicates, real and true, while
the Arabic is a single term. The Arabic term carries both of these senses. He does likewise with the term
ḥaqīqa.
77
PS 1.9.
76
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in the most primordial conception of reality, the characteristics of intelligibility and
existence are coextensive.

2.1.3. The First as Primordial
Returning to the issues raised at the beginning of this chapter, two takeaways
should be emphasized regarding the First. First, the First is the metaphysical ground upon
which any teleological question rests. In al-Fārābī’s cosmos, the city is not divorced from
the First Cause, and, as will be shown, any good leadership of a city will emulate the
First. Second, to emulate the First is to be a knower, an actual intellect, and to think the
most beautiful, and splendid things, but it is also to emulate the unity of the First. The
competition between the city’s dual allegiance to both truth and cooperation is a false
competition, as truth and unity, properly speaking, signify the same identical Substance.
As discussed below, the dichotomy between knowing the truth and cooperating in unity is
sourced in the metaphysical constitution of the sublunary world, i.e., the world of
material composites, by the celestial bodies. Nonetheless, in the most primordial senses
of the terms, to know, to be, to be true, to be one, and to be happy are all coextensive. It is
only due to deficiency (naqṣ) that any political deception is required.

2.2. Secondary Causes
From the First the cosmos emanates, with each existent, from the highest rank to
the lowest, aiming to emulate the First in Its unity, knowledge, and happiness. For this
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reason, one can say that the First is the Cause of each individual existent and that It
knows all existents, insofar as It is the cause of all existents.78 As al-Fārābī explains:
The First is that from which everything which exists comes into existence. It
follows necessarily from the existence belonging to the First that all the other
existents which do not come into existence through man’s will and choice are
brought into existence by the First in their various kinds of existence, some of
which can be observed by sense-perception, whereas others become known by
demonstration. The genesis of that which comes into existence from it takes place
by way of an emanation, the existence of which is due to the existence of
something else, so that the existence of something different from the First
emanates from the First’s existence.79
 لزم ضرورة أن يوجد عنه سائر،  ومتى وجد لألول الوجود الذي هو له.واألول هو الذي عنه وجد
 على ما هي عليه من الوجود الذي بعضه مشاهد، الموجودات التي وجودها ال بارادة االنسان واختياره
،  ووجود ما يوجد عنه انما هو على جهة فيض وجوده لوجود شيء آخر.بالحس وبعضه معلوم بالبرهان
80
.وعلى أن وجود غيره فائض عن وجوده هو
Thus, from the very being of the First something different emanates. The First does not
need to act, except insofar as it is always actuality, and no change occurs in the First by
bringing about the Second.81 Rather, the First brings about, as Cause, always and
perpetually, all of the other existents in the cosmos.82

78

PS 1.7; PR 34, 45.
PS 2.1. (Translation slightly modified)
80
PS 2.1.
81
PS 2.1.
82
The nature of the First’s causality is itself somewhat open to interpretation in the texts of the mature alFārābī, although he does clearly state in the Fusụ̄l Mabādi’ that the First is the “first cause for the motion of
the existents” (sabab ’awwal li-sā’ir al-mawjūdāt), as the “first actor” (’awwal fā‘il) for them, i.e., the
efficient cause, the “end” (ḡāya) for them, i.e., the final cause, and the “form” (ṣūra) for them, i.e., the
formal cause. ".  ;"وأنّه سبب ّأول لسائر الموجودات على أنّه ّأول فاعل لها ث ّم على أنّه غاية لها ث ّم على أنّه صورة لهاFusụ̄l
Mabādi’ 79. Michael Chase shows that al-Fārābī was familiar with a Porphyrian notion of an eternally
dependent causality, which requires no motion on the part of the cause. Chase 2016, 256. Druart identifies
the First as the agent, final, and formal cause of the Secondary Causes, following Fuṣūl Mabādi’. Druart
1981, 36. Twetten credits the First with the onto-poietik, i.e., efficient, and final causation of the rest of
being. Twetten 2016b, 364. Janos likewise describes the First as an efficient and final cause, but also
acknowledges the First’s formal causality while reflecting on the Fuṣūl Mabādi’. Janos 2012, 189, 200,
294, 297, 331, 351, 355, 375. However, Vallat argues that the First only exerts final causality on the
cosmos, reducing both formal and efficient causality into final causality within al-Fārābī’s eternal cosmos,
saying that al-Fārābī “equates the final cause with the efficient cause which therefore is efficient only
insofar as it is final. Thus Fārābī regards the final cause as sufficient reason for the existence of its effect,
which plainly reduces efficient causality to the final one.” Vallat 2011, 280-81; cf. Janos 2012, 200;
Twetten 2016b, 366. For the purposes of this project, the important fact is that the First is universally read
79
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That said, while the First is the Cause of the rest of the cosmos, It causes through
mediate causes. For, while al-Fārābī lacks the explicit doctrine that “from the one, insofar
as it is one, comes only one” later found in Avicenna, a doctrine that the First as simple
can only emanate a single existent, al-Fārābī shares a similar intuition.83 In order to
explain the plurality of the cosmos while maintaining a singular, simple cause, one needs
mediate and increasingly deficient causes, as crediting the First as the direct Cause of the
plurality, contrariety, and materiality of the world is unbefitting the perfection of the
First. Nonetheless, every existent traces back its source to the First, as “the substance of
the First is a substance from which every existent emanates, however it may be, whether
perfect or deficient”.84

2.2.1. The Ordering of Secondary Causes
From the First the Second emanates. The Second alone originates immediately
from the substance of the First. The Second, like the First, is entirely incorporeal (ḡayr
mutajissim) and free from matter (mādda).85 Likewise, the Second is free from the
deficiencies that characterize material composites—contrariety, potentiality,
instrumentality, etc.86 And again, like the First, the Second is an intellect which thinks
itself, its very essence (ḏātihi).87 And again, like the First, it needs no other external thing

to be a final cause for every existent for al-Fārābī (and thus the primordial teleological model for all
existents). That said, despite Vallat’s nuanced argument, there is abundant evidence (e.g., see the authors
noted above) that al-Fārābī views the First as an efficient cause of the eternal cosmos (even if such a notion
is an idiosyncratic efficient causality, i.e., an eternal efficient causality) and a formal cause, despite alFārābī’s complicated relationship with the term ‘form’ (ṣūra). See note 175.
83
Shifā’ (Metaphysics) 9.4.5-6, 10-11, 9.5.3. See Lizzini 2016a. For al-Ghazali’s and Maimonides’ critique
of this principle, see note 95.
84
PS 2.2; ".  كان كامال أو ناقصا، "وجوهره جوهر يفيض منه كل وجود كيف كان ذلك الوجود
85
PS 1.6, 3.1; PR 39.
86
PR 39.
87
PS 3.1.
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to produce another existent.88 However, unlike the First, the Second is deficient in three
ways. First, the Second’s “existence follows upon the existence” of another and is
“procured from something else”.89 This deficiency is shared by every existent other than
the First. Second, while the Second needs nothing external to produce another existent
and, like the First, is self-thinking-thought, the Second cannot attain delight/happiness
(ḡibṭa) alone. As was discussed above, delight/happiness (ḡibṭa) occurs through
apprehending the most splendid and beautiful intelligible, and to attain this state the
Second must think something more perfect than itself, namely the First.90 So, along with
thinking itself, the Second thinks the First.91 And while in one sense thinking the First
leads to a perfection of the Second, namely it attains delight/happiness (ḡibṭa), it also
increases its deficiency. Because, along with its existence being procured from another
and its delight/happiness requiring another, the Second is deficient in a third way—the
Second is the first existent within the cosmos to contain “some countenance of
multiplicity” (al-wajh kathra mā).92
Whereas the First is completely indivisible and completely One, a noetic unity in
which Knower, Knowing, and Known all signify the same Substance, the Second thinks
something outside its substance. The First is one pure Act, an actual Intellect intellecting
an actual Intelligible (ma‘qul bi-l-fi‘l), in which the Intellect is the Intelligible; the
Second, too, is a noetic unity, but along with thinking itself, it thinks the First. The
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PR 52.
PR 40; "...  ووجودها تابع لوجود غيرها، " وذلك أنّ جواهرها مستفادة من غيرها
90
PR 40, 52.
91
PS 3.1.
92
PR 40; "... " فهي ذات ك ّل واحد منها من هذا الوجه كثرة ّما
89
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Second contains two distinct acts: self-thought and First-thought.93 Here is the first
instantiation within the cosmos of the problem which plagues the city—for the Second to
know the Truth requires it to increase in multiplicity. Outside of the First, truth and unity
are not coextensive.94 That said, the dual activity of the Second begins to explain how alFārābī accounts for the multiplicity of a cosmos which originates with a perfect noetic
unity as its source. While the First only emanates the Second, the Second, by thinking
both itself and the First, can produce two existents. Following Avicenna’s later principle,
that from one only one is produced, the First only emanates a singular second unity, but
the relation between the Second and the First helps account for multiplicity. (Notably,
both al-Ghazali and Maimonides critique the philosophers for misunderstanding the
from-one-one principle on this particular issue, in defense of their rejection of the eternal
emanation of the cosmos.)95

93

This is evidenced by the duel production of the Second, resulting in both the production of the First
Heavens and the Third. It is for this reason that al-Fārābī denies the possibility that the mover of the First
Heavens (i.e., the Second) can be the “First Principle of all existing things”, as it cannot be “necessarily one
in all respects” if it is responsible for a duel production. He explains: “Therefore, it is a substance through
two natures, only through both of which does it exist. Therefore, its existence has a principle, since
whatever is divisible has a cause that makes it a substance. Therefore, the mover of the first heaven
certainly cannot be the First Principle for all existing things; rather, it must [itself] have a principle, and that
principle undoubtedly has a more perfect existence than it… The Principle of the mover of the first
heaven—that is, the Principle by virtue of which it is a substance—is necessarily one in all respects. It is
absolutely impossible for there to be an existent more perfect than It or for It to have any principle.
Therefore, It is the Principle of all the principles and the First Principle of all existing things. This is the
Principle that Aristotle discusses in Book Lambda of Metaphysics.”; "انما يتجوهر بطبيعتين بهما وجوده فلوجوده اذن
مبدا اذ كان ما ينقسم اليه هو السبب فيما يتجوهر به فاذن ليس يمكن ان يكون محرك السماء األولى هو المبدأ األول للموجودات كلها بل له
 فاما مبداه الذى هو مبدا ما يتجوهر به محرك السماء األولى فهو واحد من كل الجهات... مبدا ضرورة وذلك المبدا ال محالة اكمل وجودّا منه
اضطر ارا وليس يمكن ان يكون موجود اكمل منه وال ان يكون له مبدا فهو اذا مبدا المبادى كلها ومبدا اول للموجودات كلها وهذا هو العقل
"... ; الذى يذكره ارسطو في حرف الالم من كتاب ما بعد الطبيعةEI 35-36. See also, Druart 1992, 135.
94
Of course, this instantiation is a completely different manifestation of the issue which leads to political
deception being required. As will be shown below, the Secondary Substances have their own form of
cooperation which is a less deficient version of the order aimed at in the virtuous city.
95
Both al-Ghazali and Maimonides critique Aristotle and his followers for holding and then violating this
“universally agreed upon” premise, arguing that such a cosmos would simply result in a series of simple
intellects and could not account for the celestial bodies which contain at least two component part, i.e.,
matter and form. Al-Ghazali seems to originate the critique, while Maimonides develops it. According to
Maimonides, the heavens, composite beings, could never come from a simple intellect if the principle
holds. Maimonides bolsters his point by showing that most of the celestial bodies actually contain more
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Through the intellective acts of the Second, two existents are produced. When the
Second thinks itself, it produces the first heavenly body, the First Heavens, as “a result of
its substantification (mutajawhir) of its specific essence”.96 The nature of the heavenly
bodies will be discussed below. When the Second thinks the First, a Third Intellect
emanates.97 This Third shares all of the characteristics of the Second, save only that it
depends upon the Second, not the First, to immediately procure its existence.98 The Third
also thinks itself and the First. When it thinks itself, the heavenly body of the fixed stars
is produced.99 When it thinks the First, the Fourth existent, which is also an Intellect, is
emanated.100 This pattern continues. Nine total existents with identical characteristics
(excepting only the source of their immediate procurement of existence) follow the
First.101 Each of these existents produces a heavenly body as a result of its
substantification, i.e., its thinking itself, totaling nine heavenly bodies.102 When the Tenth

than two component parts, e.g., Venus contains both the Sphere of Venus and the Planet Venus, each of
which have both form and matter, a tenet al-Fārābī holds, meaning that the absolutely simple Eighth would
have to cause the existence of five existents (i.e., the Ninth, the form of the Sphere of Venus, the matter of
the Sphere of Venus, the form of the Planet Venus, and the matter of the Planet Venus). Neither al-Ghazali
nor Maimonides ever address that this principle, even if implied, was never expressed by Aristotle (or alFārābī), nor do they address how either the bipartite intellection of the intellects (according to al-Fārābī) or
the tripartite intellection of the intellects (according to Avicenna) help account for multiplicity. See
Incoherence 3.3; GP II.22.
96
PS 3.1; ".  وبما هو متجوهر بذاته التي تخصه يلزم عنه وجود السماء األولى،  ;" فما يعقل من األول يلزم عنه وجود ثالثcf.
Twetten 2016b, 365. Twetten suggests that the Secondary Causes are “‘substantified’ (tajawhara) as
Intellecting the First” in reference to a passage in the Political Regime (PR 40). Whether or not there is a
contention between our two readings depends on the meaning of ‘as’, here. Because, while it is certainly
the case that the Secondary Causes are substantified at the same time as they think the First (i.e.,
perpetually), al-Fārābī does not seem to suggest that they are substantified because they think the First. In
fact, he says the opposite; they need no other to be made substantial or for something else to come to exist
from them (PR 52). Rather, al-Fārābī suggests two distinct acts by the Secondary Causes: 1) the act of
thinking themselves (i.e., their substantification), which results in the existence of the Heavenly bodies,
and, 2) the act of thinking the First (i.e., the attainment of their delight/happiness), which results in the
existence of lower Secondary Causes.
97
PS 3.1.
98
PS 3.2; 3.10.
99
PS 3.2.
100
PS 3.2.
101
PS 3.1-3.9.
102
PS 3.1-3.9.
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Intellect (the ninth existent emanated from the First) thinks the First, it emanates an
Eleventh Existent. This Eleventh Intellect differs from the prior nine Intellects, as it not
only thinks itself and the First, but all of the other preceding Intellects, also.103 It does not
produce a heavenly body. Al-Fārābī calls this Eleventh Intellect the Active Intellect, and
it will be discussed in further detail below. This cosmological scheme is mapped out in
Figure 2.2.1.

In the PS 3.10, al-Fārābī discusses the Eleventh as the stage where the existents who are in their
substances Intellect and Intelligible end and where the prior Sphere of the moon ends, but he only identifies
the thought of the Eleventh as having two intelligibles (itself and the First), like the other Secondary
Substances which follow the First. However, in PR 34 he clarifies that the Active Intellect intellects all of
the preceding Intellects and its own essence.
103

125
Figure 2.2.1
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2.2.2. Extrapolations from the Secondary Causes
For the purposes of this project, three characteristics about al-Fārābī’s cosmos can
be extrapolated from his discussion of the Secondary Causes, the first two having been
alluded to above in the discussion of the First. First, being and intelligibility are largely
coextensive for al-Fārābī. Whereas this was indicated also in regard to the First, the
indivisibility and noetic unity of the First renders any appraisal about the correspondence
of any predicates attributed to It unclear. Coextension is difficult to determine in an
absolutely indivisible existent. However, beginning with the Second (and multiplicity)
language gains traction and more robust observations can be made. Al-Fārābī is clear that
the eleven most ontologically prior existents in the cosmos which act as the causes for
every other existent are separate things (al-’ashyā’ al-mufāraqa) whose substances (aljawāhira) exist as intellects (‘uqūl) and intelligibles (maqūlāt).104 Furthermore, it is in
this capacity as intellects which think themselves that the heavenly bodies come to exist
(and ultimately sublunar material composites come to exist, as will be discussed below),
and it is as intellects which think the First that the intelligible cosmos is constituted. The
First Intellect emanates (yafīḍu) the cosmos, and each proceeding rank of intellect further
emanates that which follows it by thinking the First.105 Intelligible intellects perdure as
the ground for every existent. And while not every existent is itself intelligible (although,
as will be discussed below, every existent exists for the sake of an intelligible existent),
al-Fārābī does make clear that intelligible existents are the cause of all existents, as the
most prior and least deficient existents.
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PS 3.10.
PS 3.1; PR 52.
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Second, al-Fārābī’s cosmology continues to depict happiness as an entirely
intellectual trait. Each successive level of emanation occurs as a result of intellects lower
than the First requiring the First as an intelligible to achieve delight/happiness (ḡibṭa). As
al-Fārābī explains:
Moreover, not one of the secondary [causes] nor the active intellect is so
sufficient (yaktafī) that, by limiting itself to intellecting its essence alone (ya‘qalu
ḏāthu waḥdha), it attains (yaḥṣulu) a splendid and radiant existence or delight (alḡibṭa), pleasure, and beauty. Rather, for that, it needs to intellect the essence of
another more perfect and more splendid being in addition to its [own] essence
(ya‘qalu ma‘a ḏāthu ḏāt mawjūd ’ākhar ’akmal minhu). So in the essence of each
of them there is, in this respect, some kind of multiplicity (al-wajh kathra mā).
For in some respect the essence of what intellects a particular thing becomes that
thing, even though it nonetheless has an essence particularly characteristic of it. It
is as though the virtue of its essence does not become complete except by some
kind of multiplicity assisting it. Therefore, multiplicity in what makes something
be a substance becomes a defect in the existence of that thing.106
ّ ومع ذلك
 وال الغبطة، فإن الثواني والعقل الفعّال ليس واحد منها يكتفي في ان يحصل له بهاء الوجود وزينته
 لكن يحتاج في ذلك إلى أن يعقل مع ذاته ذات، واإللتذاذ والجمال بأن يقتصر على أن يعقل ذاته وحدها
ّ  إذ كان ما يعقل شيئا ً ّما،  ففي ذات ك ّل واحد منها من هذا الوجه كثرة ّما.موجود آخر أكمل منه وأبهى
فإن
ّ
ّ ذاته من وجه ّما تصير ذلك الشيء على
فكأن فضيلة ذاته ال ت ّ ّم إالّ بتعاون كثرة
.صها
ّ أن لها مع ذلك ذاتا ً تخ
107
ً
. فلذلك صارت الكثرة فيها يتجوهر به الشيء نقصا في وجود ذلك الشيء، ّما
Here again, al-Fārābī uses the doctrine of noetic identity, sourced in De Anima 3.4 and
3.5, to explain his metaphysics. However, rather than the simple noetic unity of the First,
the Secondary Causes’ intellectual activity results in multiplicity. Lacking the sufficiency
to attain happiness alone, the Secondary Causes think that which is more perfect than
themselves. And in doing so, they ‘become that thing’, even though what they become is
extraneous to their own substance. In other words, they share in the happiness of the
First, at the expense of their own simplicity. To attain happiness, they must rely on
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PR 40.
PR 40.
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something outside their substance; to realize happiness, the First must become an
intelligible for them.
The disparity between the level of happiness attained within the Secondary
Causes’ own substances and the happiness attained through thinking the First is
determined by each Secondary Cause’s proximate relation to the First. As al-Fārābī
notes:
Then, after the first [cause], there exist the secondary [causes] and the active
intellect. The secondary [causes] have rankings in existence. However, each of
them also has a particular existence by which it is made substantial in its
essence… Each of them intellects the first [cause] and intellects its [own] essence.
Yet none of them suffices in its essence for being delighted with its essence alone.
Rather, it comes to be delighted in itself through intellecting the first [cause] in
addition to intellecting its essence. The superiority of the first [cause] over the
excellence of its [the secondary cause's] essence is proportionate to the superiority
of its delight in itself through intellecting the first [cause] over its delight in itself
through intellecting its essence. Similarly, the analogy between its [the secondary
cause's] pleasure in its essence through intellecting the first [cause] and its
pleasure in its essence through intellecting its essence is proportionate to the
increased excellence of the first [cause] over the excellence of its [the secondary
cause's] essence. The same holds for its marveling at its essence and its passion
for its essence. So what is first beloved and first marveled at in its soul is what it
intellects of the first [cause] and, second, what it intellects of its essence. The first
[cause], then, according to its relation to these as well, is the primary beloved and
the primary object of passion.108
ّ  غير،  والثواني على مراتب في الوجود. األول يوجد الثواني والعقل الف ّعال
أن لك ّل واحد منها
ّ ث ّم من بعد
 وليس في واحد منها كفاية، األول و يعقل ذاته
ّ  وك ّل واحد منها يعقل... أيضا ً وجودا ً ّما يتجوهر به في ذاته
. األول مع عقله لذاته
ّ  بل إنّما يكون مغبوطا ً عند نفسه بأن يعقل، في أن يكون مغبوطا ً عند ذاته بذاته وحدها
األول على اغتباطه بنفسه بأن
ّ األول على فضيلة ذاته يكون فضل اغتباطه بنفسه بأن عقل
ّ وبحسب فضل
األول إلى التذاذه بذاته بأن عقل ذاته بحسب زيادة فضيلة
ّ  وكذلك قياس التذاذه بذاته بأن عقل. عقل ذاته
 فيكون المحبوب ّأوالً والمعجب ّأوالً عند نفسه.  وكذلك إعجابه بذاته وعشقه لذاته. األول على فضيلة ذاته
ّ
فاألول إذن بحسب اإلضافة إلى هؤالء أيضا ً هو المحبوب
.  وثانيا ً ما يعقله من ذاته، األول
ّ
ّ هو ما يعقله من
109
. األول
ّ األول والمعشوق
ّ
In other words, the incommensurable perfection of the First outstrips all other
intelligibles qua intelligible. Presumably, there is a greater disparity between when the
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Ninth thinks itself versus thinking the First than when the Second thinks itself versus
thinking the First, but even in the latter case, the First, lacking deficiency, is the perfect
and most desirable intelligible. The First, as the most intelligible existent, is the primary
source of love and happiness for the Secondary Causes and their teleological aim as well.
Third, the Secondary Causes reveal a novel model for unity within al-Fārābī’s
cosmos. Whereas the unity of the First is a perfect and peerless noetic unity, the
Secondary Causes introduce the first example of unity amongst multiple existents. With
the Secondary Causes, the universe is revealed as ordered. For, while the First cannot
properly be described as ordered (being sui generis), it is the Cause of order. As
mentioned above, al-Fārābī says:
The First’s substance is also such that the existents (mawjūdāt), when they have
issued from it in their ranks (murattaba fī marātibhā), are necessarily united
(ya’talifa) and connected (yirtabaṭa) with one another and arranged (yantaẓima)
in a way that they become (taṣīru) one whole and are established like one thing
(bi-hā al-’ashyā’ al-kaṯīra jumla wāḥida). Some of them are connected
and
united by something within their substance, so that their substances to which they
owe their existence (wujūda-hā) produce their connection and their union; others
by modes which accompany their substances, such as love by which human
beings are connected, for love is a mode in them and not the substance to which
they owe their existence (wujūda-hā). These modes of theirs are also derived from
the First, because its substance is such that many existents receive from it together
with their substances the modes (’aḥwāl) by which they are connected (yirtabaṭa)
with each other and united and arranged.110
 إذا حصلت الموجودات مرتبة في مراتبها أن يأتلف ويرتبط وينتظم بعضها مع، وجوهره أيضا جوهر
 والتي بها. وتحصل كشيء واحد،  ائتالفا وارتباطا وانتظاما تصير بها األشياء الكثيرة جملة واحدة، بعض
ترتبط هذه وتأتلف هي لبعض األشياء في جواهرها حتى ان جواهرها التي بها وجودها هي التي بها تأتلف
 فانها حال،  مثل المحبة التي بها يرتبط الناس،  ولبعض األشياء تكون أحوال فيها تابعة لجوهرها.وترتبط
 ألن في جوهر األول أن، وهذه أيضا فيها مستفادة عن األول. وليست هي جواهرهم التي بها وجودهم، فيهم
 ويأتلف، يحصل عنه بكثير من الموجودات مع جواهرها األحوال التي بها يرتبط بعضها مع بعض
111
.وينتظم
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The Secondary Causes are given ranks (marātib) according to that which they owe their
existence. By their ordering, they become, despite being multiple, unified. As al-Fārābī
explains, “They become in their many things one whole (taṣīru bi-hā al-’ashyā’ al-kaṯīra
jumla wāḥida).”112 And while each Secondary Cause is deficient, owing its existence to
another as Cause, with each successive rank increasing in deficiency (naqṣ), they also
share in the perfection of the First, both by increasing in delight/happiness (ḡibṭa) when
intellecting the First, even while increasing their multiplicity, and by emulating the First
in Its oneness through the ordering of their ranks, despite their multiplicity.
The Secondary Causes serve as a new model for the city, for, while they are less
intelligible in themselves than the First, their ordering and ranking is more intelligible for
us. These existents, which religion brands as ‘angels’ (malā’ika), both model the unity of
the First and establish a standard for cooperation (ta‘āwun) which is, if not attainable, at
least pursuable for the city. Whereas the First exists as an impossible ideal, an entirely
unattainable exemplar of happiness and unity for the city, the Secondary Causes provide
an archetype to be mimicked, even as they mimic the First. In particular, they introduce
the notion of order as a source of intelligibility and unity within the cosmos.

2.3. Celestial Bodies
In contrast, the celestial bodies, the spherical byproducts of the substantification
(mutajawhir) of the Secondary Causes, introduce the notion of disorder into the cosmos.
While still holding ranks, insofar as each sphere of the heavens is produced as a result of
a ranked Secondary Cause’s self-thought, the order that occurs between the celestial
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bodies is accidental to the substance of the celestial bodies themselves. In other words,
the ordering of the heavens supervenes upon the ordering of the Secondary Causes.113
The celestial bodies are ranked, but uncoordinated. The motions of the heavenly spheres
are teleologically unconnected to one another, as they move one another accidentally,
resulting in the first instance of contrariety in the cosmos.114
As a result of the Second thinking itself, the existence of the First Heavens
follows necessarily.115 While the Second acts as the cause of both the First Heavens and
the Third Intellect, the Third Intellect is more excellent as a result of both its substance
lacking matter and its ontological origin, i.e., it is the result of the Second thinking a more
Perfect Existent, namely the First, rather than a less perfect existent, namely the Second.
As al-Fārābī notes:
Other existents follow in a descending order of excellence until the most deficient
is reached. The most excellent and most perfect of them is the First; among those
which arise out of the First those which are neither bodies nor in bodies are
altogether more excellent, and the celestial bodies come after them. The most
excellent of the ‘separate’ (immaterial) existents is the Second;
all the others
follow according to rank and order until the Eleventh is reached. The most
excellent of the celestial bodies is the First Heaven, the secondary celestial bodies
follow according to that rank and order until the sphere of the moon is reached.
The ‘separate’ (immaterial) entities which come after the First are ten in number;
the celestial bodies are nine altogether; and the sum total of all the superlunar
entities is nineteen.116
 فاألنقص إلى أن تنتهي إلى،  ثم األنقص،  فانها تترتب أوال أفضلها، وأما الموجودات التي سلف ذكرها
 فأفضلها بالجملة هي التي ليست بأجسام،  فأما األشياء الكائنة عن األول. وأفضلها وأكملها األول.أنقصها
 ثم سائرها على الترتيب إلى،  وأفضل المفارقة من هذه هو الثاني. ومن بعدها السماوية، وال هي من أجسام
 إلى،  ثم سائرها على الترتيب،  ثم الثانية،  وأفضل السماوية هي السماء األولى.أن ينتهي إلى الحادي عشر
 واألشياء المفارقة التي بعد األول هي عشرة واألجسام السماوية في.أن ينتهي إلى التاسع وهو كرة القمر
117
. فجميعها تسعة عشر، الجملة تسعة
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Each Secondary Cause is more excellent than any of the celestial bodies insofar as each
Secondary Cause lacks matter and is produced as a direct result of the intelligibility of the
First.118 The souls/forms of the celestial bodies, too, are actual intellect, as they think the
First, the Secondary Cause from which each derives, and themselves, but, due to the
celestial bodies’ composition, i.e., their multiplicity in being composed of both form and
substratum (mawḍū‘a), they remain “in all this much below the level of the ten
[Secondary Causes]”.119
When the nine Secondary Causes below the First and above the Active Intellect
think themselves, the substances of the celestial bodies result, both their souls/forms and
substrata.120 Insofar as the celestial bodies have substrata, they belong to the same genus
as the material composites found in the sublunary world.121 These substrata “resemble the
matters which serve as underlying carriers of forms (tashbahu al-mawādd al-mawḍū‘a liḥaml al-ṣuwar)”, except the substratum of each celestial body can only receive the
specific form appropriate to it, cannot exist without it, and lacks privation (lā ‘adam).122
Due to this lack of privation, “their substrata, consequently, do not prevent their forms
from thinking and from being intellect in their essences.”123 But while each soul/form of
each celestial body is an actual intellect which thinks the First, its proximate Secondary
Cause, and itself, it is deficient insofar as thinking itself requires thinking its substratum,
which is not intellect. Thus, as al-Fārābī describes, “Not all of what it thinks of its
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essence is intellect, because it also thinks its substratum which is not intellect… there is
then an intelligible which is not intellect…It thus thinks with an intellect which is not
identical with its entire substance.”124 In other words, the celestial bodies are divisible,
not only in their intellective acts, but as soul and body.125
Like the Secondary Causes, the celestial bodies attain happiness/delight
(muḡtabiṭ) through thinking themselves and that which is ontologically prior to
themselves. Al-Fārābī explains:
The celestial body also feels joy (muḡtabiṭ) in its essence, not only by what it
thinks of its own essence, but also by what it thinks of the First and by what it
thinks of the essence of the ‘separate’ (immaterial) intellect from which it derives
its existence; it has its love of the First in common with the ‘separate’ intellects,
and its pride in itself, on account of the share in the splendour and beauty of the
First which it acquires. But it remains in all this much below the level of the
ten.126
 ثم بما يعقل من ذات المفارق،  ولكن بما يعقل من األول، فهو أيضا مغتبط بذاته ليس بما يعقل من ذاته فقط
 ويشارك المفارق في عشقه لألول وباعجابه بنفسه بما استفاد من بهاء األول وجماله؛ إال.الذي عنه وجوده
127
.أنه في كل ذلك دون العشرة بكثير
The soul/form of the celestial body experiences delight/happiness through thinking its
own essence, but also by having its proximate Secondary Cause and the First as
intelligibles. Idiosyncratically, al-Fārābī does not use the joy from or love of the First and
the Secondary Causes to explain heavenly motion. In fact, he never mentions ‘desire’ at
this stage of his cosmology.128 Instead, the intellectual activity of the celestial bodies is

PS 7.4. (Translation modified);  إذ كان،  وموضوعه ليس بعقل، "و ليس جميع ما يعقل من ذاته عقلال ألنه يعقل موضوعه
 ففيه معقول ليس بعقل — وما يعقل من صوره قهو عقل —فهو يعقل بعقل ليس هو كل ما به. ليس يعقل بموضوعه وإنما يعقل بصورته
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always already fulfilled; the soul/form of the celestial bodies always have themselves,
their proximate Secondary Causes, and the First as intelligibles.
Al-Fārābī’s account originates the motion of the celestial bodies in a more
quizzical way than the reason usually ascribed to explain the motion of the heavens, i.e.,
desire.129 Unlike the typical cosmological account which explains motion though the
intellectual activity of the celestial bodies, al-Fārābī seems to suggest that while the
souls/forms of the celestial bodies are actual intellect, this is tangential to their motions.
In fact, the motion of the celestial bodies does not seem to come about from anything
exterior to them at all. Nor is al-Fārābī’s account simply reduced to the fact that it is the
very nature of the celestial bodies to be spherical and move in a circular motion, although
he does ascribe these attributes to their nature.130 Rather, he attempts to explain motion as
a deficiency, an accident intrinsic to embodiment. For while there is a teleological
component to why the heavens move (e.g., al-Fārābī does discuss the needs of the
celestial bodies, if not their desires) and a certain kind of aim within the motions (e.g., alFārābī explains, “That towards which [the celestial bodies] move can in their case not be
provided from the very outset”), it is not clear how this telos can be said to be external to

virtually nothing about will (irādah), choice (ikhtiyār), and desire (shawq, tashawwuq), concepts that are
often associated with the rational activity of the orbs, and which furthermore played a key role in medieval
Arabic accounts of heavenly motion inspired by Aristotelian cosmology.” Janos 2012, 132; cf. Twetten
2016b, 364.
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the celestial bodies themselves, except perhaps to credit the First as the First Principle of
unity.131
On the contrary, it is an accident (‘arḍ) which brings about motion, as place is an
accident of corporality. Al-Fārābī seems to suggest that the deficiency of embodiment
itself is the immediate cause of the celestial motions. He explains:
But they differ from the immaterial existents inasmuch as that towards which they
move can in their case not be provided from the very outset: it is one of the
smallest and most inferior accidents (‘arḍ) which occur in a body; for every body
is in a place, and the species of the place which this body has is to be the
container of a body. But a body whose place is of this species cannot be moved
away as a whole from the whole of this species (of place); but this species (of
place) has parts (’ajzā’) and the body which is in this place has parts (’ajzā’).
Now, none of the parts of this body deserves (’awlā) any part of the container
more than another-but each part of the body must necessarily (yulzamu) occupy
each part of the container [successively]; nor does it deserve one part at one
moment (waqt) and not at another, but (each part of the body must occupy) at
every moment (a part of the container) perpetually (kull waqt dā’iman). Whenever
a part of this body happens to be in a definite part of the container, it needs
(iḥtāja) to occupy the part (of the container) which is in front of it. But it is
impossible that the two parts of the container should be occupied simultaneously
by that part of the body at the same moment, it must quit the part of the container
in which it is and move on to the part in front of it, until it has
accomplished
its passage through all the parts of the container. And because the part of the
container in which it was is not at one moment more worthy of it than at another,
it must unceasingly (perpetually) proceed from one part of the container to the
next. When it is not possible that that part of the body should belong all the
time to that part of the container by being one in number, it will become one in
species of that part of the container; occupying sometimes one part of the
container, and sometimes not. Then that part of the body will go on (revert?) to a
part of the container which is similar to the first part in species, then quit it too for
some time and go on to a third part of the container, which is similar to the first
part of the container. It will quit this too for some time and go on (revert?) to a
fourth part of the container which is similar to the first part. It will have this
motion forever.132
 وما إليه تتحرك هو من.وتفارقها في أنها لم يمكن فيها أن تعطى من أول أمرها الشيء الذي إليه تتحرك
 ونوع األين الذي هو لهذا الجسم. وذلك أن كل جسم فهو في أين ما، أيسر عرض يكون في الجسم وأخسه
 ولكن. فليس يمكن أن تنتقل جملته عن جملة هذا النوع،  وما نوع أينه هذا النوع.هو أن يكون حول جسم ما
 وليس جزء من أجزاء هذا الجسم أولى بجزء من أجزاء الحول ـ. وللجسم الذي فيه أجزاء، لهذا النوع أجزاء
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بل كل جزء من الجسم يلزم أن يكون له كل جزء من أجزاء الحول ـ وال أيضا أن يكون أولى به في وقت
 وكلما حصل جزء من هذا الجسم في جزء ما من الحول احتاج إلى أن. بل في كل وقت دائما، دون وقت
 وال يمكن أن يجتمع له الجزءان معا في وقت واحد؛ فيحتاج إلى أن يتخلى.يكون له الجزء الذي قدامه قدامه
 وألن الجزء الذي. ويصير إلى ما هو قدامه إلى أن يستوفي كل جزء من أجزاء الحول، من الذي هو فيه
 وإذا لم يمكن أن يكون ذلك الجزء. فيجب أن يكون له ذلك دائما، كان فيه ليس هو في وقت أولى به من وقت
 ثم يعود إلى. بأن يوجد له حينا وال يوجد له حينا،  وصار واحدا بالنوع، له دائما على أن يكون واحدا بالعدد
 ثم يعود إلى،  ويتخلى عنه أيضا مدة،  ثم يعود إلى شبيه له ثالث،  ثم يتخلى عنه أيضا مدة، شبيهه في النوع
133
.شبيه له رابع؛ وهكذا له أبدا
Al-Fārābī’s reasoning seems to go something like this:
Place (fī ’ayna mā) is divisible, having parts.
Bodies, insofar as they occupy place, are divisible, having parts.
A celestial body has parts.
It is the nature of the celestial bodies to have a particular type of place (naw‘a
al-’ayna).
5) The particular type of place occupied by a celestial body has parts.
6) The parts of a celestial body do not belong to any particular part of the
particular type of place which the celestial body occupies, but rather each part
of the celestial body belongs to all parts of its particular type of place.
7) It is the nature of a celestial body to have a body of a particular shape, namely,
a sphere.134
8) It is the nature of the particular type of place occupied by a celestial body to
have a particular shape, namely a sphere.
9) All parts of a spherical celestial body cannot occupy all parts of its particular
spherical type of place while keeping its shape.
10) Yet, all parts of a spherical celestial body must occupy all parts of its
particular spherical type of place while keeping its shape.
11) If all parts of a spherical celestial body cannot occupy all parts of its particular
spherical type of place while keeping its shape perpetually, each part of a
spherical celestial body must occupy each part of its particular spherical type
of place while keeping its shape, at some moments.
∴ ) The celestial bodies move in time.
1)
2)
3)
4)

Unfortunately, al-Fārābī does not provide much more insight than the passage above
regarding this argument.135
A few things can be determined, however. First, with the introduction of the
motion of the First Heavens, al-Fārābī introduces time (waqt) to the cosmos, following
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Aristotle.136 Because the parts of the celestial bodies are unable to be in their proper place
“always at every moment” (fī kull waqt dā’iman), the cosmos must allow for divisible
and measurable time so that each part of the celestial bodies can be in each proper place
sometimes. Second, it is a deficiency of the celestial bodies which brings about motion.
They are unable naturally to fulfill their natures at the outset, requiring motion to
reconcile their need (i.e., for each part to be in its proper place perpetually) with their
deficiency (i.e., divisible corporeality). Third, while never explicitly stated by al-Fārābī,
there must be some teleological drive to the motion of the heavens, as what is many seeks
the perfection of unity. For while his ingenious argument as to why each celestial body
moves is void of desire for the Secondary Causes, it does require that each celestial
body’s nature, a substantification (mutajawhir) of its proximate Cause, needs to attain
something which is impossible for a corporeal existent to achieve. The celestial bodies
aim at a unity in which their parts are not divisible, their place in the cosmos is not
divisible, and time is not divisible. Movement is a concession to their corporeality. Each
part needs to be in each place at every moment, and movement is a facsimile to this state.
And while this movement is not immediately caused through desire for the Secondary
Causes, the natures of the celestial bodies are brought about as the substanitification
(mutajawhir) of the Secondary Causes. So, while motion does not come about through
any extrinsic desire for the Secondary Causes, the Secondary Causes, as the causes of the
celestial bodies, produce within the intrinsic nature of the celestial bodies a need to be
void of the multiplicity brought about by the accident of corporeality. Achieving this
need is impossible, and motion results through their Sisyphean attempt at perfect unity.
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Thus, the oneness of the First remains the final cause of their motion, even if they are not,
in fact, moved by their thinking the First as an intelligible.

2.3.1. Contrary Heavenly motions
Regarding the heavens, as has been noted by others, al-Fārābī’s cosmological
structure, as a whole, follows a broadly Neoplatonic framework, in which the First acts as
a source for the Secondary Intellects which themselves are a source for the souls/forms of
the celestial bodies.137 However, al-Fārābī innovatively merges this structure with an
Aristotelian and Ptolemaic account of the heavens, even if it is a rather spartan
astronomical account.138 For, while his discussion is limited to the nine ranks of the
celestial bodies which are produced through the self-intellection and subsequent
substantification of the nine Secondary Causes between the First and the Active Intellect,
his discussion of the movements of the heavens contains a more elaborate and
astronomically technical account than it may seem at first glance. As Janos notes, alFārābī’s account of each rank of the celestial bodies is, in fact, an account of groups or
systems (jumal) of motions, a novel contribution to astronomy and philosophy which
allows for the eccentric, concentric, and epicyclical motions which ensure that the
practical mathematics of Ptolemaic astronomy remain predictive.139 It is beyond the
scope of this project to give a comprehensive account of Fārābīan astronomy (if such a
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project is even possible), but a brief exposition of the motions of the heavens, insofar as
they produce accidental motion and contrariety, is required.
The system (jumla) of the First Heavens is produced through the substantification
of the Second Cause. It is surrounded by a spherical body, like all of the celestial bodies,
and is filled with light, like all of the celestial bodies, to the point of being transparent.140
It is the highest rank of the celestial bodies, containing only one body and moves in one
very quick circular motion which affects all of the other celestial bodies.141 The next
system, the Fixed Stars, is the substantification of the Third Cause.142 Like the First
Heavens, the system of the Fixed Stars is surrounded by one spherical body, but unlike
the First Heavens, it contains within it numerous other bodies (namely, the stars).143 All
of these bodies participate in the same motions, of which there are two: the motion
intrinsic to the Fixed Stars and an extrinsic and accidental motion, in which they naturally
participate, as they are moved by the motion of the First Heavens.144 These bodies,
produce light, rather than simply being filled with their own light to the point of
transparency.145 Below the Fixed Stars is Saturn, the substantification of the Fourth.146 It
is surrounded by a spherical body, but contains only one body.147 It has its own motion
but also takes part in the motions of the spheres above it.148 All of the remaining celestial
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bodies share these characteristics with Saturn, namely an encompassing sphere
containing a single body and a multiplicity of motions.149 Some of their parts are
transparent, being perpetually filled with light, some produce light, and some acquire the
light of the other celestial bodies.150 Each celestial body has its own intrinsic speed at
which it moves (e.g., the sphere of the moon moves faster than the sphere of Saturn).151
In sum, the celestial bodies total nine in number, beginning with the First Heavens and
terminating in the Sphere of the Moon.152 And their motions are such that, while
seemingly chaotic, they are measurable; the placement of the bodies contained within the
surrounding spheres will predictably revert to previous states of relative placement over
time.153
For the purposes of this project, only one aspect of the motions of the celestial
bodies is germane—that the motions of the celestial bodies introduce contrariety and
disorder into the cosmos. As will be seen below, contrariety and disorder brought about
by the motions of the celestial bodies will ultimately serve as the impediment to perfect,
truthful governance within the city, an impediment expressed through the natural
deficiency of human persons. But concerning the celestial bodies themselves, while

over Saturn, and Saturn over Jupiter, etc. This would explain the increasing multiplicity of the motions of
the lower celestial bodies. However, to my knowledge, al-Fārābī never claims this, explicitly. He only
explains in the Political Regime that they each have powers that give them distinctly different motions.
That said, while there is some conjecture required here, it seems as if each higher celestial body has a
power (quwwa) to move that which is below it, and every lower celestial body has a natural potency
(quwwa), which is perpetually in a state of being actualized, to be moved by what is above it. Strictly
speaking, there is no compulsion to this motion, as it is intrinsic to each celestial body’s nature (ṭabī‘a) to
be moved by what is above it. However, the motion itself is external and accidental to the lower celestial
body, as a power of the higher celestial body. PS 7.1, 7.11; PR 55.
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contrariety is ultimately sourced in their deficiency (insofar as they are corporeal and in
need of motion), there is no contrariety in their natures. As al-Fārābī explains:
It follows also from their mutual relations that they sometimes come together and
sometimes separate, and that they have contrary relations to one another. They
also sometimes come near some bodies on the lower level and sometimes recede
from them. These contrarieties follow neither from their substances nor from the
accidents which are near to their substances but from their relations (i.e. accidents
which are remote from their substances). For example rising and setting are two
contrary relations of the celestial bodies to the level below them. Among existents
the heavenly body is the first to be affected by contraries. The first things in
which contrariety manifests (reveals) itself are the relations of this body to what is
on the level below it and the mutual relations of the heavenly bodies. These
contrarieties, it is true, are the most unimportant contrarieties, but contrariety is
itself a deficiency of existence, and the celestial body is therefore affected by a
deficiency of the most unimportant kind in existence… There is also a difference
in their substances but there is no contrariety in it, like the difference between
Mars and Jupiter, between any star and any other star and between any sphere and
any other sphere. But then they are affected, as we said before, by a contrariety in
their relations. Moreover, these relations change in their contrarieties which
succeed one another. They quit one relation and proceed towards its contrary, and
then revert to a relation which belongs to it in species—as the one quitted—but
not in number. Thus the celestial bodies have relations which repeat themselves
and come back, some, in a longer and some in a shorter interval, and they also
have modes and relations which do not repeat themselves at all. There exist also
contrary relations between a number of celestial bodies and one particular thing,
as for instance that some of them are near to a thing and others are remote from
the very same thing.154
 ويكون بعضها من بعض على،  بأن تجتمع أحيانا وتفترق أحيانا، وانها تلحقها بإضافة بعضها إلى بعض
 وتظهر أحيانا وتستر،  وتبعد أحيانا عنه،  وأيضا فإنها تقرب أحيانا من بعض ما تحتها.نسب متضادة
 بل في نسبها،  وال في األعراض التي تقرب من جواهرها،  فتلحقها هذه المتضادات ال في جواهرها.أحيانا
 والجسم السماوي أول. متضادتان،  فإنهما نسبتان لها إلى ما تحتها،  وذلك مثل الطلوع والغروب،
 وأول األشياء التي يكون فيها تضادّ هي نسب هذا الجسم إلى ما تحته.الموجودات التي تلحقها أشياء متضادة
 فالجسم. وهذه المتضادات هي أخس المتضادات؛ والتضاد نقص في الوجود. ونسب بعضها إلى بعض،
 وبينها أيضا تباين في جواهرها من غير.) ...السمائي يلحقه النقص في أخس األشياء التي شأنها أن توجد
،  كما قلنا،  ثم يلحقها. وكل كرة لكل كرة،  وكل كوكب لكل كوكب،  مثل مباينة زحل للمشتري، تضاد
 فتتخلى من نسبة ما وتصير إلى ضدها،  وان تتبدل تلك النسب ومتضاداتها وتتعاقب عليها، تضاد في نسبها
 ويعود بعضها في مدة أطول،  فيكون لها نسب تتكرر،  ثم تعود إلى ما كانت تخلت منه بالنوع ال بالعدد،
 ويلحقها أن يكون لجماعة منها نسب إلى شيء واحد.وبعضها في مدة أقصر؛ وأحوال ونسب تتكرر أصال
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. وبعضها بعيدا من ذلك الشيء بعينه،  مثل أن يكون بعضها قريبا من شيء، متضادة
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Al-Fārābī’s reasoning here is rather simple. All of the celestial bodies have particular
accidents (defined magnitudes, shapes, etc.).156 They also have particular motions
intrinsic to them. But while the upper celestial bodies move the lower celestial bodies,
these movements are not coordinated.157 Each celestial body moves according to its own
nature, being affected by the celestial bodies above it, but also moving independently.
This independent motion changes the relative positioning of the heavens, without
reference to any sort of stability or orderliness. At one moment, bodies can be near to one
another; at another moment, they are far from one another. And while this does not
introduce contrariety into the nature of the celestial bodies as such, it does introduce
contrariety into the cosmos, insofar as there is contrariety between the relative
positioning of the celestial bodies. As a result, contrariety is brought about in those things
which are caused through the relations between the celestial bodies, namely the material
existents residing below the Sphere of the Moon.

2.3.2. Extrapolations from the Celestial Bodies
Al-Fārābī’s exposition of the celestial bodies both reinforces many of the aspects
of the cosmos already revealed through an examination of the First and the Secondary
Causes and introduces a new class of existent into the cosmos. Regarding the former, the
celestial bodies are yet another typical example of existents within an ordered,
systematically ranked cosmos whose telos is purely intelligible. Like the Secondary
Causes, the celestial bodies are ranked, even if incidentally, and like the Secondary
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Causes, the celestial bodies find their delight/happiness in thinking that which is more
intelligible than themselves.
But regarding their novel instantiations, they reveal several new phenomena
within the cosmos. Their substrate represents the first instance of something not
intelligible in itself, being only intelligible as a principle of the composite. Their
perpetual motion is occasioned through their inevitable deficiency; they are the first
example of any existents whose deficiency sets limitations on the attainment of their
needs. In other words, they have a frustrated telos, needing to be perpetually in place, but
being consigned to be in place only successively, through motion.158 And their relations
are the first occurrence of contrariety within the cosmos. While they themselves are
actual intellects and in a perpetual state of happiness and while not themselves
exceedingly deficient, multiple, or at all having contrariety, they are the superlunar agents
of deficiency, multiplicity, and contrariety, and they establish the obstacles to happiness
within the city.

2.4. Extrapolations from al-Fārābī’s Cosmos
All told, al-Fārābī establishes two distinct superlunary principles within his
cosmos to explain the character of the sublunar world, i.e., the world of material
composites which is occupied by humankind.159 The first, a series of noetic unities, the
Secondary Causes, is a principle for intelligibility. Through them, he reveals the telos of
all existents, namely to be known and to know. Like the superlunar world, the sublunar
world will be ordered according to this telos. And, as will be discussed below, the lowest
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level of these Intellects providentially helps the sublunar world, particularly humankind,
to achieve this telos of knowing and being known.160 But the celestial bodies act as the
second principle for the sublunar world. And, whereas the Intellects act upon the world in
such a way as to bring about happiness, the celestial bodies pass on their deficiencies.
These deficiencies (e.g., corporeality, contrariety, and a frustrated teleology) ultimately
obstruct some humans from even the possibility of obtaining the kind of knowledge
which is the telos of the human life and, thus, also the possibility of reaching individual
happiness. These humans, who comprise the majority of citizens within the city, are
ultimately the source of the political complications which plague proper governance.
They are the reason that beneficent deception is necessary. It is the Imām who ultimately
bridges the gap between true knowledge and deficiency, by giving deficient images that
are near to the truth. He expresses the intelligibility of the Intellects through the deficient
language of that which comes from the celestial bodies. However, a fuller account of this
will have to wait.

3. The Sublunar World
Al-Fārābī’s cosmos continues to be ranked and ordered below the Sphere of the
Moon. For, while the highest ranks of the causes of the material world are not principles
that are in bodies or were ever in bodies, the lower ranks are themselves in bodies.161 The
former, the First, the Secondary Causes, and the Active Intellect, are all immaterial noetic
unities.162 The latter, soul (nafs), form (ṣūra), and matter (mādda), exist exclusively
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within bodies.163 This hierarchy of principles— the First, the Secondary Causes, the
Active Intellect, soul, form, and matter— follows the patterns already established,
namely beginning with what ‘cannot possibly not exist’ and continuing to ‘what can
possibly not exist’, but possibly exists.164 These rankings correspond to the intelligibility
of things, insofar as all of those existents which ‘cannot possibly not exist’ are intelligible
in themselves (e.g., the First, the Secondary Causes, the Active Intellect, and the souls of
the celestial bodies), whereas those things which ‘can possibly not exist’, but can
possibly exist, are only potentially intelligible (e.g., the souls of animals, the forms of
elements, and matter as a principle).165
From these principles, different kinds of bodies arise. These too are ranked, both
according to their subservience to one another, their complexity, and their
intelligibility.166 The celestial bodies are the highest rank of body (and the only rank
which ‘cannot possibly not exist’), their souls being actual intellect.167 The bodies of the
rational animal, i.e., humankind, follow, insofar as their souls are potentially intellect.168
The bodies of the non-rational animals are next, having a ruling imaginative faculty (or,
in the lowest cases, only a sense-perceptive faculty) in their souls which takes the place
of the rational faculty.169 Then, plants are ranked, albeit al-Fārābī never specifically
mentions for what reason they have this rank, other than their distance from prime matter
and usefulness to the higher ranks (although, one could presume that the nutritive soul is
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a distinguishing factor, here).170 Then, minerals follow.171 Finally, the elements are ranked
as the lowest possible body.172 (Prime matter, while the lowest existent, does not actually
exist independently, being only a principle for composites.)173 The final two ranks of
bodies, minerals and elements, lack souls to delineate their ranks, but are accorded their
respective positions because the elements are closer to matter and assist the minerals
materially, servilely, and instrumentally.174
So, al-Fārābī structures the sublunary world in such a way that the highest ranks
are identified by their intelligibility and the lowest ranks are identified by being closest to
matter, with soul and form functioning as intermediary principles.175 The telos of the
sublunary world is expressed exclusively through the highest rank of sublunary existents,
i.e., human beings, insofar as humans are able to become actual intellects.176 In this
capacity, many of the lower ranked existents assist humans, and humans assist no other
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existents (except accidentally).177 This is true from the outset and is due to the respective
forms of the existents.178 As al-Fārābī explains:
Possible existents have rankings. The lowest in ranking is what has no definite
existence, not in either one of the two contraries—and that is primary material.
The ones in the second ranking are what attain existence through the contraries
they attain in primary material—namely, the elements. When these come to be an
existent through particular forms, through attaining the forms they attain the
possibility that other opposite existents also come to exist. They thus become
material for other forms so that when they also attain those forms, there arises for
them through the secondary forms the possibility that other opposite existents also
come to exist through other contrary forms. Thus those also become material for
other forms so that when they also attain those [forms], there arises for them
through those forms the possibility that other opposite existents also come to
exist. They thus become material for [yet] other forms. And they go on like this
until they terminate at forms such that the existents attained through them cannot
be material for other forms. Thus, the forms of those existents are forms for every
form preceding them. These final ones are the most venerable of the possible
existents. And primary material is the vilest of the possible existents. The ones
intermediate between these two are also in rankings; and whatever is closer to
primary material is more vile, while whatever is closer to the form of forms (ṣura
al-ṣuwar) is more venerable. So the existence of primary material is [such] that it
is always for something else and has no existence at all for its own sake.
Therefore, if that for whose sake it is created were not to exist, it would not exist
either. Thus if one of these forms were not to exist, it would not exist either.
Therefore, it is not possible for primary material to exist separate from a form at
any moment at all. Now the existents (mawjūdat) whose form is the form of forms
(ṣura al-ṣuwar) are always for their own sake. It is not possible that through their
forms they be formed so as to be for the sake of something else—I mean, that
through them something else be made substantial and that they be materials for
something else.179
 وتلك، صل وال بواحد من الضدّين
ّ  فأدناها مرتبة ما لم يكن له وجود مح: والموجودات الممكنة على مراتب
 والتي في المرتبة الثانية ما حصلت لها وجودات باألضداد التي تحصل في المادّة. هي المادّة األولى
 حصل لها بحصول صورها إمكان أن،  وهذه إذا حصلت موجودة بصور ّما.األولى—وهي األسطقسات
 حدث،  حتى إذا حصلت لها أيضا ً تلك الصور.  فتصير موادَّ لصور أخر، ً توجد وجودات أخر متقابلة أيضا
ّ فتصير تلك أيضا ً مواد. لها بالصور الثواني إمكان أن توجد أيضا ً وجودات أخر متقابلة بصور متضادّة أخر
 حدث لها بتلك الصور إمكان أن توجد أيضا ً وجودات أخر،ً حتي إذا حصلت لها تلك أيضا، لصور أخر
 وال تزال هكذا إلى أن تنتهي إلى صور ال يمكن أن تكون الموجودات.  فتصير موادّ لصور أخر، متقابلة
.  فتكون صور تلك الموجودات صورا ً لك ّل صورة تقدّمت قبلها. المتحصلة بتلك الصور موادّ لصور أخر
 والمتوسطات بينها. أخس الموجودات الممكنة
 والمادّة األولى. وهذه األخيرة أشرف الموجودات الممكنة
ّ
 وك ّل ما كان أقرب إلى صورة الصور. أخس
أيضا ً على مراتب وك ّل ما كان أقرب إلى المادّة األولى كان
ّ
177

PR 63-68.
PR 63.
179
PR 58-59. (Translation slightly modified.)
178

148
 فلذلك إذا. ً فالمادّة األولى وجودها هو أن تكون لغيرها أبدا ً وليس لها وجود ألخل ذاتها أصال. كان أشرف
 لم،  ولهذا إذا لم توجد صورة من هذه الصور. ً  لم توجد هي أيضا، لم يوجد ذلك الذي هي مفطورة ألجله
 وأ ّما الموجودات. ً فلذلك ال يمكن أن توجد المادّة األولى مفارقة لصورة ما في وقت أصال. ً توجد هي أيضا
— فهي ألجل ذاتها أبدا ً و ال يمكن أن تكون بصورها مفطورة ألجل غيرها، صورها صورة الصور
التي
ّ
180
. أعني ليتجوهر بها شيء آخر وأن تكون موادَّ لشيء آخر
Thus, only the existent with the highest form, the ‘form of forms’ (ṣura al-ṣuwar), has an
entirely independent telos. It exists for its own sake. This form, which is the ‘form of
forms’, is never explicitly identified by al-Fārābī, but it can only refer to one thing,
hearkening back to De Anima 3.8 where Aristotle uses the same terminology to refer to
the intellect.181 Intellect is the delineating factor which identifies a sublunar existent as
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Aristotle identifies intellect (νους) as the ‘form of forms’ (είδος ειδών) within the soul (De Anima
432a1-a3) but adds no more specific context for the phrase. Themistius, in his De Anima Paraphrase,
identifies the ‘form of forms’ (είδος ειδών) in two different ways. First, he identifies it with the Productive
Intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός). And in a later passage, he identifies the soul (ψῡχή), namely the rational soul,
with the ‘form of forms’ (είδος ειδών). He never resolves the issue. See De Anima Paraphrase, 100, 30-35;
115, 29. Ishāq ibn Hunayn’s translation of this text is still extent. In it, he translates είδος ειδών to ṣura alṣuwar (‘form of forms’), νοῦς ποιητικός to ‘aql al-fa‘‘āl (Active Intellect), and ψῡχή to nafs (soul). See De
Anima Paraphrase (Ar.), 182, 211. Alexander of Aphrodisias uses the phrase ‘form of forms’ (είδος ειδών),
but the phrase’s meaning is unclear. He seems to suggest that the ‘form of forms’ is a form which unifies
several kinds of bodies in order that they become one superior body, similar to al-Fārābī’s functional use of
the term ‘form’ mentioned in Footnote 175 above. And in this regard, Alexander’s influence on al-Fārābī is
apparent. But Alexander also identifies the ‘form of forms’ with the ‘perfection of perfections’ (τελειότης
τελειότήτων). And while he later identifies the highest perfection as the part of the soul which is rational
(λογῐκόν) [CDA 29, 22-24], he uses the term ‘perfection’ too frequently and in too many contexts, often
linked with actuality itself (ἐντελέχειᾰ) [CDA 17, 12-13], to know what he means. Either, the ‘form of
forms’ is simply any form which unifies multiple independent substances within a single substance (i.e., the
perfection of some other perfections), or the ‘form of forms’ is the intellect, the part of the rational animal
which unifies the abstracted forms of all other substances (i.e., the perfection of all other perfections) [CDA
89, 21-91,6]. Unfortunately, he never uses the phrase again, and Ishāq ibn Hunayn’s translation of the text
is no longer extant. A contemporary of al-Fārābī’s, Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī, who, at least, dwelled in
Baghdad at the same time as al-Fārābī between the years of 939 and 942 C.E. and studied under al-Fārābī’s
student Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, also used the terminology of ‘form of forms’ (ṣura al-ṣuwar) in his treatise On the
Specific Perfection of the Human Species. He identifies the ‘form of forms’ as the Intellect, and he credits
this doctrine to Aristotle. He also equates the ‘forms of forms’ with the ‘power of powers’ (quwwa alquwan). On the Specific Perfection of the Human Species, 220-221. See also Kraemer 1986, 1-2, 24-25,
300. All told, while the specific meaning behind al-Fārābī’s usage is unclear, it can be surmised that he is
either referencing the intellect of the rational animal, following an amalgamation of Themistius’ second
usage of the phrase and the second interpretation of Alexander’s usage, or the Active Intellect, following
Themistius’ first usage. The existents (mawjūdat) whose form is the ‘form of forms’ is clear, insofar as they
are the only sublunary existent who are always for their own sakes, namely humans. And it is clear that he
is referring to the intellect here, given the historical context of the phrase and the distinguishing accident
that makes the rational animal distinct from other creatures. However, at times he describes the fully
actualized intellect of the human being, the acquired intellect, as a substrate for the Active Intellect, and he
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existing for its own sake. Thus, the sublunar world is ranked, like the superlunar world,
according to the deficiency of its ranks. The highest existent is that which can become
actual intellect, i.e., humans, and the lowest, i.e., matter, is that which does not properly
exist at all, but only serves as a principle of bodies which themselves serve as both
intelligibles for and materials, servants, and instruments of the existents who have
intellect.
This is a fascinating quirk of al-Fārābī’s cosmos; many existents lack any innate
ability to fulfill their telos at the outset. (This echoes al-Fārābī’s introduction of the
concept of a frustrated telos with the celestial bodies, who lack that toward which they
move from the outset and whose teleological fulfillment is always achieved only in the
future.)182 Rather than a cosmos in which every existent has its own defined telos and the
ability to fulfill that telos, instead, it is the nature of the generosity (jūd) of the First, in alFārābī’s cosmos, to give existence to all possible existents, regardless of their deficiency.
As he explains in the Perfect State:
The substance of the First is a substance from which every existent emanates,
however it may be, whether perfect or deficient. But the substance of the First is
also such that all the existents, when they emanate from it, are arranged in an
order of rank, and that every existent gets its allotted share and rank of existence
from it. It starts with the most perfect existent and is followed by something a
little less perfect than it. Afterwards it is followed successively by more and more
deficient existents until the final stage of being is reached beyond which no
existence whatsoever is possible, so that the existents come to an end at the stage
beyond which nothing exists at all, or rather, beyond which there is that which
describes both the acquired intellect as a form for the actual intellect and the actual intellect as a form for
the potential intellect. See PS15.8; EI 22. This is all in spite of the fact that al-Fārābī denies the possibility
in the Political Regime that any form can exist independently from matter, explicitly denying that the
intellect is a form (unless one uses the term homonymously). PR 58-59. It seems that in the passage above,
he is using the term homonymously, following the tradition. And while the exact reference of ‘form of
forms’ remains opaque, it is clear that it references some intellect which acts as a form (to use the term
homonymously) for the rational animal.; cf. Vallat 2011, 280. Here, Vallat reads the passage from the
Fuṣūl Mabādi’, referenced in Note 82, as meaning the ‘form of forms’ rather than simply the formal cause
of the cosmos, along with PS 2.2-3, contra Druart, Janos, and my presentation here.
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cannot possibly exist. Inasmuch as the substance of the First is a substance from
which all the existents emanate, while it does not neglect any existence beneath its
existence, it is generous, and its generosity (jūd) is in its substance; and inasmuch
as all the existents receive their order of rank from it, and each existent receives
from the First its allotted share of existence in accordance with its rank, the First
is just, and its justice is in its substance.183
 وجوهره أيضا جوهر. كان كامال أو ناقصا، وجوهره جوهر يفيض منه كل وجود كيف كان ذلك الوجود
 حصل عنه لكل موجود قسطه الذي له من الوجود،  إذا فاضت منه الموجودات كلها بترتيب مراتبها،
 ثم ال يزال بعد ذلك يتلو األنقص إلى،  فيبتدئ من أكملها وجودا ثم يتلوه ما هو أنقص منه قليال.ومرتبته منه
 فتنقطع، أن ينتهي إلى الموجود الذي إن تخطى عنه إلى ما دونه تخطى إلى ما لم يمكن أن يوجد أصال
. وبان جوهره جوهرا تفيض منه الموجودات من غير أن يخص بوجود دون وجوده.الموجودات من الوجود
 ويتحصل لكل موجود قسطه من الوجود،  ويترتب عنه الموجودات،  وجوده هو في جوهره، فهو جواد
184
. وليس ذلك لشيء خارج عن جوهره،  وعدالته في جوهره،  فهو عدل.بحسب رتبته عنه
This is echoed in the Political Regime, where he says:
Since the existence of the possible is one of the two modes of the existent, and
possible existence is one of the two modes of existence, the first cause—whose
existence is in its substance—does not emanate (’afāḍa) existence only to what
cannot not exist; rather, it emanates existence to what can not exist, so that there
remains no mode of existence it has not given.185
ّ ، نحوي الموجود الممكن أحد نحوي الوجود
األول الذي وجوده
ّ فإن السبب
َ فل ّما كان الممكن وجوده هو أحد
في جوهره ليس إنما أفاض بوجود ما ال يمكن أن ال يوجد فقط بل بوجود ما يمكن أن ال يوجد حتي ال يبقى
186
. شيء من أنحاء الوجود إالّ أعطاه
This generosity of the First results in the most fecund of all possible worlds. Whether or
not the most fecund of all possible worlds, including every deficient form of existence, is
tantamount to the best of all possible worlds is a question which falls outside the purview
of this project. That said, al-Fārābī can only be understood in light of this fecundity,
because to judge, for example, the use of beneficent political deception within the context
of a cosmos whose existents are teleologically sufficient, rather than teleologically
deficient, would be to judge a straw man, i.e., assuming al-Fārābī’s political prescriptions
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are faulty by appealing to a notion that every existent is capable of achieving its telos
(and, in the case of humans, individual happiness) is not a critique of his politics at all,
but rather his metaphysics.187 For al-Fārābī, the sublunar world is an inherently deficient
portion of the cosmos, with relatively few of its existents fulfilling their telos. The
existents below the moon are comprised of two principles of possibility, matter, which is
possibly all substances below the moon, and form, which is definite but may be at one
moment and not be at another.188 For a thing to achieve its telos is an outcome which is
merely possible, not guaranteed.
As a result of the deficiency of sublunary existents, they require external movers.
As al-Fārābī explains, in a rich passage of the Political Regime:
The existents beneath the heavenly bodies are at the terminal point of defectiveness
with respect to existence. That is because at the outset they were not given
everything by which they are made completely substantial. Rather, they were given
only their substances in remote potentiality, not in actuality. For they were given
only their primary material. Therefore, they are always striving toward the form by
which they are made substantial. And primary material is potentially all of the
substances that are beneath the heavens. Insofar as they are potentially substances,
they move so as to attain substance in actuality. Then—due to their posteriority,
backwardness, and vile existence—it obtains that they are unable in and of
themselves to be aroused and to strive toward becoming perfected except by an
external mover. Their external mover is the heavenly body and its parts, then the
active intellect. For both of these perfect the existence of the things that are beneath
the heavenly body. Such is the substance, nature, and action of the heavenly body
that from it results first of all the existence of primary material. Then, after that, it
gives primary material all that is in its nature, possibility, and disposition to accept
from the forms, whatever they may be. By its nature and substance, the active
intellect is prepared to look into everything the heavenly body makes ready and
gives. Thus it wants to make whatever accepts transcendence and separation from
material in some particular way transcend material and privation so that it will come
to be in a ranking closer to it. That is, so that potential intelligibles become actual
intelligibles and an intellect that was a potential intellect thereby gets to be an actual
intellect. It is not possible for anything other than a human being to come to be like
187

And of course, as mentioned in Chapter 2, this project aims to provide a descriptive account of the
assumed premises for al-Fārābī’s Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception, not one which assesses their
validity.
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that. So this is the ultimate happiness that is the most excellent perfection it is
possible for a human being to obtain. Through these two is perfected the existence
—of the things that remain subsequent and that—to be drawn out into existence
need the modes such as to draw them out into existence and the modes such as to
continue their existence.189
وأ ّما الموجودات التي دون األ جسام السماويّة فإنّها في نهاية النقص في الوجود  .وذلك أنها لم تعط من ا ّٔول
بالقوة البعيدة فقط ال بالفعل إذ كانت
االٔمر جميع ما تتجوهر به على التمام  ،بل ٕانّما أعطيت جواهرها التي لها ّ
ٕانّما أعطيت مادّتها االٔولى فقط  .ولذلك هي أبدا ً ساعية إلى ما تتجوهر به من الصورة  .فالمادّة االٔولى هي
تتحرك إلى أن تحصل جواهر بالفعل.
بالقوة
ّ
بالقوة جميع الجواهر التي تحت السماء ؛ فمن جهة ما هي جواهر ّ
ّ
ث ّم بلغ من تأخرها وتخلّفها وخساسة وجودها أن صارت ال يمكنها أن تنهض وتسعى من تلقاء أنفسها الى
استكماالتها إالّ
ي وأجزاؤه ثم العقل الفعّال ّ .
فإن
بمحرك من خارج .
ّ
ّ
ومحر كها من خارج هو الجسم السماو ّ
ي فا ّٕن جوهره وطبيعته وفعله
ي  .والجسم السماو ّ
هذين جميعا ً يك ّمالن وجود األشياء التي تحت الجسم السماو ّ
أن يلزم عنه ا ّٔوالً وجود المادّة االٔولى  .ثم من بعد ذلك يعطي المادّة األولى كل ما في طبيعتها وإمكانها
واستعدادها أن تقبل من الصور كائنة ما كانت .والعقل الفعّال معدّ بطبيعته وجوهره أن ينظر في ك ّل ما و ّ
طأه
ي شيء منه قبل بوجه ما التخلّص من المادّة ومفارقها  ،رام تخليصه من المادّة
ي وأعطاه  .فأ ّ
الجسم السماو ّ
بالقوة معقوالت بالفعل  .فمن
ومن  /العدم فيصير في أقرب مرتبة اليه  .وذلك أن تصير المعقوالت التي هي ّ
بالقوة عقالً بالفعل  .وليس يمكن أن يصير كذلك شيء سوى اإلنسان ؛ فهذه
ذلك تحصل العقل الذي كان عقالً ّ
السعادة القصوى التي هي افضل ما يمكن اإلنسان أن يبلغه من الكمال  .فعن هذين يكمل وجود األشياء التي
بقيت متأخرة واحتيج إلى إخراجها إلى الوجود بالوجوه التي شأنها أن تخرج إلى الوجود بها  ،وبالوجوه التي
190
شأنها أن يدوم وجودها بها .
Along with reinforcing what has already been mentioned, that the sublunar world is the
most deficient domain of the cosmos and that this deficiency hinders teleological
fulfillment for sublunary existents, this passage introduces several new dimensions to the
teleological account of the world below the moon. First, he introduces the two external
movers which aid sublunary existents in fulfilling their telos: the celestial bodies and the
Active Intellect. These will be discussed shortly. Second, he again establishes the
cosmological priority of immateriality and intelligibility, and he defines human happiness
through the human person becoming actual intellect.
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3.1. The Effects of the Celestial Bodies on Material Composites
Within al-Fārābī’s political works, the composition of the material world is
entirely constituted through the nature and activity of the celestial bodies.191 Both matter
and contrary forms (al-ṣuwar al-muḍādda) come about through their natures and
motions. As he explains in the Perfect State:
There follows then by necessity (a) from the nature which is common to the
celestial bodies the existence of prime matter (al-mādda al-’ūlā) which is
common to everything below them; (b) from the difference of their substances the
existence of many bodies which differ in substance; (c) from the contrariety of
their relations the existence of the forms which are contrary to one another (alṣuwar al-muḍādda); (d) from the alternating contrary relations in them and their
succession, the alternating of the contrary forms which prime matter receives in
succession; (e) from the occurrence of contrary and mutually incompatible
relations of a number of celestial bodies to one particular thing at one and the
same moment the mixture and blending of things which have contrary forms. It
also follows by necessity (a) that from the classes of these different mixtures
many species of bodies arise; (b) that from those of their relations which repeat
themselves and come back things arise whose existence repeats itself and comes
back—some of them after a short interval, others after a long one—and that from
those of their relations and modes which do not repeat themselves but arise (only
once) in a given time, without having been before and without going to arise
(again) in future, things (arise) which arise once and never repeat themselves.192
 وجود المادة األولى المشتركة لكل ما تحتها ؛ وعن اختالف جواهرها، فيلزم عن الطبيعة المشتركة التي لها
 وجود الصور المتضادة ؛ وعن تبدل،  وجود أجسام كثيرة مختلفة الجواهر؛ وعن تضاد نسبها واضافاتها،
 تبدل الصور المتضادة على المادة األولى وتعاقبها؛ وعن حصول نسب، متضادات النسب عليها وتعاقبها
متضادة واضافات متعاندة إلى ذات واحدة في وقت واحد من جماعة أجسام فيها اختالط في األشياء ذات
 أنواع كثيرة من األجسام؛، الصور المتضادة وامتزاجاتها؛ وأن يحدث عن أصناف تلك االمتزاجات المختلفة
 األشياء التي يتكرر وجودها ويعود بعضها في مدة أقصر وبعضها، ويحدث عن إضافاتها التي تكرر وتعود
 بل إنما تحدث في وقت ما من غير أن تكون قد، في مدة أطول؛ وعن ما ال يتكرر من اضافاتها وأحوالها
193
. ومن غير أن تحدث فيما بعد األشياء التي تحدث وال تتكرر أصال، كانت فيما سلف
One must be careful when reading this passage to remember that al-Fārābī is primarily
discussing principles which actually exist only within substances and within the context
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of an eternal cosmos. In other words, prime matter (al-mādda al-’ūlā) does not exist
independently from form (ṣūra), nor have either material forms or matter ever existed
except as component principles of bodies.194 They are the two principles of possibility for
possible existents, matter being possibly all forms and material form always existing as
something, but possibly existing or not existing.195 As al-Fārābī says:
Opposite existents come to be only through contrary forms (al-ṣuwar almuḍādda). When something attains one of the two contraries, that is its definite
existence (taḥṣīl). What makes it possible for it to exist according to two contrary
existences is material. So through material the existence it comes to have is
indefinite, whereas through form its existence comes to be definite. Thus, it has
two existences: a definite existence through one thing and an indefinite existence
through another thing. Therefore, its existence by dint of its material is at one time
to be like this and at another time like that; whereas by dint of its form, it exists
like this, alone, without its opposite. Thus, it necessarily results that both
existences are given — that is, at one moment according to this and at another
moment according to its opposite.196
 وحصول الشيء على أحد المتضادّين هو وجوده على. وموجودات المتقابلة إنّما تكون بالصور المتضادّة
 فبالمادّة يكون وجوده الذي يكون له.  والذي به يمكن أن يوجد الوجودين المتضادّين هو المادّة. التحصيل
صل بشيء ّما ووجود غير
ّ  وجود مح:  فله وجودان. صل
ّ على غير تحصيل و بالصورة يكون وجوده المح
ّ
ّ  فلذلك وجوده. صل بشيء آخر
 وبحق صورته أن يوجد هذا، ومرة ذلك
ّ مرة هذا
ّ بحق مادّته أن يكون
ّ مح
 و ذلك بحسب حق هذا حينا ً و بحسب، ً  فلذلك يلزم ضرورة أن يعطى الوجودين جميعا. وحده دون مقابله
197 ً
. مقابله حينا
The form is that through which matter is defined, its acquisition or achievement (taḥṣīl).
Matter is that in which contrary forms successively come to be. But both of these
principles come from the celestial bodies.198
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Al-Fārābī is somewhat inconsistent between works concerning his cosmology. Largely, as mentioned in
Chapter 2, this can be explained by dividing up his corpus into an early phase which adopts creation in time
as a doctrine and a later phase which adopts an eternal emanationist account of the cosmos (i.e., what I
have called the mature al-Fārābī). But there are still works which do not fit neatly into either category,
namely his commentaries. Regarding the cosmological composition of the sublunar world in particular, alFārābī’s Epistle on the Intellect presents a distinct emanation scheme compared with his other later works,
specifically the Perfect State and the Political Regime. In the Epistle on the Intellect, al-Fārābī credits the
Active Intellect, rather than the celestial bodies, with the emanation of sublunar forms. This difference
between the texts has been used by others, along with some shifts in al-Fārābī’s terminology, to distance EI
195
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Returning to the rich passage from PS 8.1 quoted above, one can see that alFārābī credits the composition of sublunar bodies entirely to the celestial bodies. His
account is unfortunately rather meager here, and largely unsupplemented excepting only
a parallel passage from PR in which he says:
The heavenly bodies are many, and they move in many sorts of circular motions
around the earth. The power of the first heaven, which is one, attaches to all of
them. Therefore, they all move with the motion of the first heaven. And they have
other powers that make them distinct and in which their motions are different. So,
from the power in which the whole of the heavenly body shares, there results the
existence of primary material common to everything beneath the heavens. And
from the things that make them distinct, there results the existence of the many
different forms in primary material.199
 ويلحق جميعها. تتحرك باستدارة حول األرض أصنافا ً من الحركات كثيرة
واألجسام السماويّة كثيرة وهي
ّ
تتحرك كلّها بحركة السماء األولى ولها قوى أخر تتباين فيها وتختلف
فلذلك
.قوة السماء األولى وهي واحدة
ّ
ّ
ي يلزم عنها وجود المادّة األولى المشتركة لجيع ما
ّ . بها حركاتها
ّ فالقوة التي تشترك فيها جملة الجسم السماو
200
.  ويلزم عن األشياء التي تتباين بها وجود الصور الكثيرة المختلفة في المادّة األولى. تحت السماء
Thus, between these two accounts, al-Fārābī reveals that the entire sublunar world is an
effect of the celestial bodies’ motions. PS explains that prime matter comes about through

from the accounts found in PR and PS. See Davidson 1992, 47; Druart 1981, 35; Janos 2012, 179; Taylor
2006, 152; Finnegan 1957, 136. These authors give good reason for readers to treat the Epistle on the
Intellect with care, and they are right that some change in doctrine occurs between the Epistle on the
Intellect and al-Fārābī’s political works. But whereas the aforementioned scholars suggest that EI should be
viewed as espousing an entirely distinct, if still similar, cosmological model, there is good reason to read EI
as containing an unrefined, but compatible, version of al-Fārābī’s mature emanation scheme. Namely,
because al-Fārābī has a terminological shift concerning the term ‘form’ (ṣūra) in which al-Fārābī bundles
together two homonymous definitions of ‘form’ in the Epistle on the Intellect, i.e., form as a definitional
principle for material composites and form as an intelligible, he erroneously seems to suggest that the
Active Intellect emanates the former definition of form, while once he recognizes the distinction between
these homonymous definitions in his later works, he only places the latter definition of form under the
Active Intellect’s purview. In other words, al-Fārābī places intelligibility under the providence of the
Active Intellect and materiality under the providence of the Celestial bodies across his works. See EI 32-33.
That said, al-Fārābī’s mature political works are clear that only the Celestial Bodies constitute the material
world. Further study is warranted. For the purposes of the current project, the presentation of al-Fārābī’s
sublunar model will follow that which is explicitly presented in his political works, though passages from
EI will be used for context. In what follows, I will, however, take care to delineate between these
homonymous definitions when referencing form as definitional principle for material by referring to
‘material forms’ or ‘contrary forms’, simply to prevent this confusion and that which is referred to in Note
175. See also Note 208.
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“the nature which is common to the celestial bodies”, while the PR reveals what this
nature is, namely the power bestowed on all of the celestial bodies through the motion of
the First Heavens.201 Contrary forms (al-ṣuwar al-muḍādda) are brought about through
the contrariety between the relations of the heavens, insofar as each celestial body shares
in the motion which occurs above it while also having its own distinct motion.202 Put
simply, the sublunar world is just a mixture (ikhtilāṭ), an effect of the disarray of the
relations between heavenly motions, a mixture whose cause brings about the emergence
of substance always with the promise of its destruction, insofar as forms in the sublunar
world always have a contrary, being sourced in contrariety. Because of the complexity of
the motions of the heavens, complex bodies arise. As al-Fārābī explains, the motions of
the heavens bring about the bodies of the elements, and the mixing of the elements brings
about more complex bodies (with the rational animal being the highest rank of sublunar
body).203
This results in a dissonant teleological picture. On the one hand, the motions of
the celestial bodies generate a sublunar world which maximizes possible existence,
propagating substance as an expression of their ultimate origin in the First and their
proximate origin as the substantification of the Secondary Causes. On the other hand, the
generation of substances within the sublunar world does not occur as an expression of the
celestial bodies, per se, but the contrariety of their motions; the mixture (ikhtilāṭ) is
accidental to the celestial bodies themselves. The sublunar world reflects both the ordered
ranks of the cosmos and the contrariety between the motions of the heavens.
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Reflecting on one of the analogies used by al-Fārābī, borrowed from Book I of the
Physics, illustrates this point.204 He says:
Form is the bodily substance in a body, like the shape of a bed in a bed. And
material is like the wood of a bed. So form is that by which embodied substance
becomes actual substance, and material is that by which it comes to be potential
substance. For a bed is a potential bed insofar as it is wood, and it becomes an
actual bed when its shape is attained in the wood. Form is constituted in material,
and material is a subject to carry forms. For forms are not constituted in
themselves, but need to exist in a subject; and material is their subject. The
existence of material is only for the sake of the forms… Therefore, when forms do
not exist, the existence of material is in vain. And nothing in natural existents is in
vain (bāṭil).205
.  والمادّة مثل جشب السرير،  متل السريك في السرير، ي
ّ والصورة هي في الجسم الجوهر الجسمان
ً
ً
. بالقوة
ّ  والمادّة هي التي بها يكون جوهرا، فالصورة هي التي بها يصير الجوهر المتجسّم جوهرا بالفعل
ّ
.  ويصير سريرا ً بالفعل متى حصل شكله في الخشب، بالقوة من جهة ما هو خشب
ّ فإن السرير هو سرير
ّ .  والمادّة موضوعة لحصل الصور، والصورة قوامها بالمادّة
فإن الصور ليس لها قوام بذواتها وهي
...  والمادّة إنما وجودها ألجل ألصور.  وموضوعها المادّة، محتاجة إلى أن تكون موجودة في موضوع
206
.  وليس في الموجودات الطبيعيّة شيء باطل، ً كان وجود المادّة بالطال، فلذلك متى لم توجد الصور
This analogy informs the reader about al-Fārābī’s worldview in several, perhaps not
unexpected, ways: first, form functions as the determinate principle for sublunar
composites; second, material form requires a substrate; third, form and matter naturally
depend upon one another; and, fourth, natural existents (and the principles which
actualize natural existents) are teleologically necessitated. (This final point is a corollary
to al-Fārābī’s insistence that the cosmos is the most fecund of all possible worlds.) Little
about this analogy is novel to the discussion above about the sublunar world, except the
ill-fitting analogy itself, in which he follows Aristotle in comparing natural substances to
beds. This is notable, because beds are artifacts.207 As such, they imply an artisan. And
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Aristotle famously limits his analogy by designating the bed as disanalogous to natural substances
insofar as it is a product of art. Physics II 192b12-23. See also Physics II 193b7-193b12. Obviously, alFārābī is aware of this distinction, and he mentions that beds are not natural, but produced by art, when he
uses this analogy in other contexts (e.g., BL 99-100). However, he does not limit the analogy here.
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while this aspect of the analogy would hold if al-Fārābī’s cosmology had a demiurgic
principle like Plato’s Timaeus or a dator formarum (wāhib al-ṣuwar) like Avicenna’s
cosmology, as has been shown, al-Fārābī’s mature cosmology does not provide an
artisanal principle which imbues sublunar composites with intrinsic intelligibility.208 Put
otherwise, the generation of sublunar existents within al-Fārābī’s cosmos is dissimilar to
the generation of a bed, in which an artisan intentionally imposes a shape into the wood,
although al-Fārābī’s sublunar existents do have both shape and substrate. Rather, the
origination of sublunar composites is more akin to putting numerous pieces of wood and
nails (or rather the elements of which wood and iron are composed) into a giant cement
mixer, with the vigorous motion of the mixer producing a bed.
This is perhaps the oddest characteristic of al-Fārābī’s cosmological model,
namely, that an entirely unintentional and unintelligible process, whose principles are
matter produced through the motion of the First Heavens which is required by the
deficiency of embodiment and forms produced through the contrariety between the
motions of the rest of the heavens, causes existents who are themselves able to be made
intelligible and intended by intellects.209 (Although, the process of rendering the sublunar
world intelligible requires the help of another existent, the Active Intellect, as will be
discussed below.) Put simply, al-Fārābī’s model produces the same bed as the artisan
without working from a blueprint. Instead, the blueprint, i.e., the intelligibility of the
existent, is rendered after the bed has already been produced by the mixture. The sublunar
Al-Fārābī does seem to have the Active Intellect act as the dator formarum in his Epistle on the Intellect,
although it is unclear in what sense these forms given by the Active Intellect to the sublunar world are
anything above and beyond mere intelligibility, given that it only acts upon that which matter has made
ready. EI 29, 32-33; See Notes 175 and 198. See also Timaeus 28af.; Shifā’ (Metaphysics) 9.5.3; Najāt
(Ar.) 317. For Avicenna’s implicit critique of al-Fārābī’s lack of a dator formarum, see Davidson 1992, 7879.
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world is intelligible, but its intelligibility is extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the existents
within it. The intelligibility of existents is made actual only after they are already
actualized as substances. This process is modelled in Figure 3.1, which will be expanded
upon in more detail later.

Figure 3.1

As can be seen in Figure 3.1, human beings, as material composites, are not
immune to the foibles and imperfections brought about by the contrariety and deficiency
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which are the consequence of heavenly motions. In short, like the entire sublunar world,
human beings are naturally deficient. Humans, even as the only sublunar existents
capable of happiness, need external help in order to fulfill their teleological purpose. It is
no wonder, then, that human communities are themselves marred by deficiency.

3.1.1. The Effects of the Celestial Bodies on the Umma
Properly speaking, there is no account of human society prior to the influence of
the Active Intellect, which bestows upon the human person the power for abstraction and
the first principles which ground human intellection.210 The Active Intellect is ever
present, and the human soul is disposed toward knowledge even prior to the development
of language.211 But thematically speaking, it is useful for the purposes of this project to
divide up human societies into those societies unduly influenced by the celestial bodies,
i.e., those societies lacking demonstrative science or those ruled by “corrupt religion”
(milla fāsida), and those societies which are governed according to demonstrative
science, i.e., those societies whose rulers are philosophers and whose religion is “true
religion” (milla ṣaḥīḥa). For this reason, this section will proceed to account for the role
of the celestial bodies on societies, particularly those who lack true religion (milla
ṣaḥīḥa) even though, once speaking about any human persons, the influence of the Active
Intellect is felt (even if the fruition of the Active Intellect’s effects is only realized within
societies ruled by philosophy).
The character of any nation (umma) is determined by its relation to the celestial
bodies for al-Fārābī. That said, a large caveat should be made concerning the
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incommensurate role of the celestial bodies upon individual nations, namely the role of
any individual human’s volition, which appears to be a first principle for al-Fārābī and
the only factor preventing him from adopting an entirely deterministic metaphysics.212
Still, concerning societies writ large, the celestial bodies are the primary influence of
traits. As al-Fārābī explains:
One nation is distinguished from another by two natural things—natural
temperaments and natural states of character—and by a third, conventional, thing
having some basis in natural things, namely, the tongue — I mean, the language
through which expression comes about. And among nations, some are large and
some small. The first natural cause for the difference in nations with respect to
these objects are [various] things. One of them is the difference in the parts of the
heavenly bodies that face them with respect to the first sphere, then with respect
to the sphere of the fixed stars. Then, there is the difference in the positions of the
inclined spheres from parts of the earth and what occurs in those parts because of
the spheres' proximity or distance. Following that is the difference in the parts of
the earth that are the dwelling-places of the nations. For, from the outset, this
difference follows from the difference in the parts of the first sphere facing them,
then the difference in the fixed stars facing them, and then the difference in the
positions of the inclined spheres with respect to them. From the difference in the
parts of the earth follows the difference in the vapors that arise from the earth.
Because every vapor is generated from a soil, it resembles that soil. Following
from the difference in the vapors is the difference in air and the difference in
water, due to the water in every country coming into being from the vapors that
are beneath the soil of that country. And the air in each country is mixed with the
vapor that rises up to it from the soil. Likewise, from the difference in the sphere
of the fixed stars facing it, in the first sphere, and in the positions of the inclined
spheres follows the difference in air and in water. From these follow the
difference in plants and the difference in the species of nonrational animals; thus,
the nutriments of the nations differ. Following from the difference in their
nutriments is the difference in the materials and crops from which come to be the
people who succeed those who pass away. Following from that is the difference in
temperaments and in natural states of character. Moreover, the difference in the
parts of the heavens that face their heads is also a cause for the difference in
temperaments and states of character in a way other than what was mentioned.
Likewise, the difference in air is also a cause for the difference in temperaments
and states of character in a way other than what was mentioned. Then from the
mutual help of these differences and their being mixed arise different minglings
according to which the temperaments of nations and their states of character
212
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differ. In this way and according to this manner there is a consonance of these
natures, a tying of some to others, and rankings of them. And this is the extent
reached by the heavenly bodies in perfecting them. Now it is not up to the
heavenly bodies to give the other perfections that remain; rather, that is up to the
active intellect. To no species other than the human being is it possible for the
active intellect to give the remaining perfections.213
ي وله مدخل
واأل ّمة تتميّز عن األ ّمة بشيئين طبيعيّين  :بالخِ لَق الطبيعيّة والشيم الطبيعيّة  ،وبشيء ثالث وضع ّ
ّما في األشياء الطبيعيّة وهو اللسان أعني اللغة التي بها تكون العبارة  .فمن األمم ما هي كبار ومنها ما هي
األول في اختالف األمم في هذه األمور أشياء أحدها اختالف أجزاء األجسام
ي ّ
صغار  .والسبب الطبيع ّ
السماويّة التي تسامتهم من الكرة األولى  ،ثم من كرة الكواكن الثابتة  ،ثم اختالف أوضاع األكر المائلة من
أجزاء األرض وما يعرض لها من القرب والبعد .ويتبع ذلك اختالف أجزاء األرض التي هي مساكن األمم .
فإن هذا اإلختالف إنما يتنع من ّأول األمر إختالف ما يُسامتها من أجزاء الكرة األولى  ،ثم اختالف ما
يُسامتها من الكواكبه الثابتة  ،ثم اختالف أوضاع األكر المائلة منها .ويتبع اختالف أجزاء األرض اختالف
البخارات التي تتصاعد من األرض  .و ك ّل بخار حادث من أرض فإنّه يكون مثاكالً لتلك األرض  .ويتبع
اختالف البخار اختالف الهواء واختالف المياه من قِبَل ّ
تتكون من البخارهت التي
أن المياه في ك ّل بلد إنّما ّ
تحت أرض ذلك البلد  .وهواء كل بلد مختلط بالبخار الذي يتصاعد إليه من األرض  .وكذلك يتبع أيضا ً
اختالف ما يسا ّمها من كرة الكواكب الثابتة واختالف الكرة األولى واختالف أوضاع األكر المائلة اختالف
الهواء واختالف المياه  .ويتبع هذه اختالف النبات واختالف أنواع الحيون غير  /الناطق  ،فتختلف أغذية
األمم  .و يتبع اختالف أغذيتها اختالف الموادّ
يتكون الناس الذين يخلفون الماضين  .ويتبع
ْ
والزرع التي منها ّ
ذلك اختالف الخِ لَق واختالف الشيم الطبيعيّة  .وأيضا ً ّ
فإن اختالف ما يسامت رؤوسهم من أخزاء السماء
يكون أيضا ً سببا ً الختالف الخِ لق والشيم بغير الجهة التي ذكرت  .وكذلك اختالف الهواء أيضا ً يكون سببا ً
الختالف الخِ لق والشيم بغير الجهة التي ذكرت  .ثم يحدث من تعاون هذه اإلختالفات واختالطها امتزاجات
مختلفة تختلف بها خِ لَق األمم وشيمهم  .فعلى هذه الجهة وبهذا النحو ائتالف هذه الطبيعيّات وارتبات بعضها
ببعض ومراتبُها  ،وإلى هذا المقدار تبلغ األجسام السماويّة في تكميل هذه  .فما يبقى بعد ذلك من الكماالت
األخر فليس من شأن األجسام السماويّة أن تعطيَه بل ذلك من شأن العقل الفعّال  .وليس من هذه نوع يمكن
214
أن يعطيَه العقل الفعّال الكماالت الباقية سوع اإلنسان .
Here, al-Fārābī gives an entirely naturalistic account of the difference between one nation
(umma) and another. (The development of language will be addressed below.) Namely,
climatological differences explain the differences in peoples.215 He explains the effects of
the celestial bodies on the soil, vapors, water, plants, and thus the nutrients taken in by
people within a particular clime. However, in other texts, he is clearer about the causes of
these differences in effects. For example, the position of the sun affects the heat of a
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place, as the scattering of the sun’s rays through the air induces warmth, and the position
of the moon affects the tides, soaking the soil and creating lush growth (and fattened
animals).216 All told, different regions of the earth are affected according to their locations
in relation to the heavenly bodies, and the mixture which brings about sublunar existents
is affected both by the motions of the celestial bodies themselves (e.g., when the
placement of the moon affects the tides) and by the motions of their luminous emissions
which themselves carry heat (e.g., when the sun shines on a particular location).217
Differences in place result in differences in clime, which result in differences in soil,
vapors, vegetation, and wildlife. Altogether, this results in differences in nutriments
which result in differences in temperaments and states of character between peoples of
different regions.218 As a result, al-Fārābī establishes that nations are distinct not
according to culture, but according to nature. (In fact, the character of a nation’s culture is
fixed through natural causes.)219 Whether or not nations are the preeminent mode of
association (ijtimā‘) for al-Fārābī is matter of great debate, but it is clear that nations are
the only cosmologically determined association, insofar as they correspond to the
physical location of a people and are made manifest by natural causes like diet.220
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3.1.1.1. Human Association
That human beings require association (ijtimā‘) at all is both a practical and
metaphysical concern. As al-Fārābī explains:
In order to preserve himself and to attain his highest perfections every human being
is by his very nature in need of many things which he cannot provide all by himself;
he is indeed in need of people who each supply him with some particular need of
his. Everybody finds himself in the same relation to everybody in this respect.
Therefore man cannot attain the perfection, for the sake of which his inborn nature
(al-fiṭra al-ṭabī‘iyya) has been given to him, unless many (societies of) people who
co-operate (muta‘āwinīn) come together who each supply everybody else with some
particular need of his, so that as a result of the contribution of the whole community
all the things are brought together which everybody needs in order to preserve
himself and to attain perfection.221
 إلى أشياء كثيرة ال،  وفي أن يبلغ أفضل كماالته،  في قوامه، وكل واحد من الناس مفطور على أنه محتاج
 وكل واحد. بل يحتاج إلى قوم يقوم له كل واحد منهم بشيء مما يحتاج إليه، يمكنه أن يقوم بها كلها هو وحده
 اال،  الذي ألجله جعلت الفطرة الطبيعية،  فلذلك ال يمكن أن يكون االنسان ينال الكمال.من كل واحد بهذه الحال
 مما،  يقوم كل واحد لكل واحد ببعض ما يحتاج إليه في قوامه؛ فيجتمع، باجتماعات جماعة كثيرة متعاونين
222
.  جميع ما يحتاج إليه في قوامه وفي أن يبلغ الكمال، يقوم به جملة الجماعة لكل واحد
The practical benefits of living in association (ijtimā‘) with cooperation (ta‘āwun) are
obvious; together, human beings are better able to attain their needs and preserve
themselves. In this respect, humans are no different than any number of species of plants
and animals that require association for survival and perfection.223 But, as was mentioned
above, al-Fārābī makes special note of the teleological foundation for human
associations. In association, humans imitate the First in Its unity.

associations and may simply be indicating that nations are not component parts of a greater whole (like, for
example, a city is part of a nation). While not a trivial issue for understanding al-Fārābī’s political
philosophy as a whole, it is not particularly germane for the topic of political deception and need not be
settled here. See PS 15.1-3; PR 69-70. See also Mahdi 2001, 140. Mahdi here, within the context of a
discussion on war, notes the difference between al-Fārābī and both Plato and Aristotle concerning the
absolute priority of the city. See also Orwin 2017, 39f. Orwin treats this issue with great care, noting the
issues surrounding al-Fārābī’s access to Aristotle’s Politics, and is persuasive that “political cooperation in
its highest sense is possible in a community of any size” for al-Fārābī [cf. Mahdi (2001, 143) and Galston
(1990, 151f.), who both privilege the city, and Naṣṣar (1983, 37) and Pines (1975, 156), who both privilege
the international community.]
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Al-Fārābī highlights the teleological importance of unity for human beings in a
variety of ways. As noted, human connections are metaphysically grounded in imitation
of the First’s noetic unity as the first subject and object of love.224 This is a common
theme for al-Fārābī, who not only grounds love generally in the imitation of the First, but
credits it as the bond which unifies a nation and as that which keeps the parts of the city
in concert, preserving justice.225 (This model is particularly stark in comparison with his
depiction and critique of the democratic city, whose inhabitants love dwelling in this kind
of city, a kind of city which may produce a small amount of virtue but also produces vice.
But unlike an association truly bound by love, the democratic city is rife with multiplicity
and should be viewed as many cities coinciding in the same place, not one city.)226 AlFārābī’s model of the excellent city follows the unity exemplified through the rankings of
the superlunar cosmos, in which the king relates to the city as the First relates to all other
existents.227 The consonance between the parts of the city aims to reflect the unity of the
ranks of the heavens.228
This depiction of unity as a central theme of human association is perhaps best
seen through al-Fārābī’s depiction of the literal end of human existence, i.e., the afterlife.
While admittedly inconsistent on the topic, al-Fārābī’s depiction of the hereafter for
human beings leans heavily on the concepts of unity and love.229 In both the Perfect State
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and the Political Regime, al-Fārābī depicts the felicity of the afterlife as being communal.
As he explains:
When one generation passes away, their bodies cease to exist and their souls are
released and become happy and when other people succeed them in their ranks,
these people take their place and perform their actions. When this generation
passes away as well and is released [from matter], they occupy in their turn the
same ranks in felicity as those who passed away before, and each joins those who
resemble him in species, quantity and quality. And since they are not bodies their
association (ijtimā‘), whatever number it were to reach, would never get them into
each other's way, since they are not in space at all, and they do not meet and join
mutually in the same way as bodies do. The more similar separate souls grow in
number and join each other—in the way that one intelligible joins another
intelligible (ma‘qūl bi-ma‘qūl)—the more increases the self-enjoyment of each of
them. Whenever any member of a later generation joins them, the enjoyment of
the new arrival increases when he meets those departed before him, and the joys
of the departed increase when the new arrivals join them, because each soul thinks
(ta‘aqalu) its own essence (ḏāthā) and thinks (ta‘aqalu) the like of its own
essence (miṯl ḏāthā) many times, and thus the quality of what it thinks increases.
The increase which is taking place when the departed souls meet each other is
comparable to the increase in the ability of the art of writing, when the scribe
steadily applies himself to the acts of writing: the successive meetings of the souls
and the increase of each soul in its quality correspond to the successive repetitions
of the acts of the scribe and the resulting increase in his ability and the standard of
his writing. But since the number of these souls which meet each other is infinite,
the increase of the powers and joys of each of them is infinite in the eternal course
of time. All this is true of every generation which passes away.230
 قاموا،  وخلصت أنفسها وسعدت؛ فخلفهم ناس آخرون في مرتبتهم بعدهم، فإذا مضت طائفة فبطلت أبدانها
 فإذا مضت هذه أيضا وخلصت صاروا أيضا في السعادة إلى مراتب أولئك الماضين.مقامهم وفعلوا أفعالهم
 ولو بلغ،  وألنها كانت ليست بأجسام صار اجتماعها. واتصل كل واحد بشبيهه في النوع والكمية والكيفية،
 فتالقيها واتصال بعضها،  إذ كانت ليست في أمكنة أصال،  غير مضيّق بعضها على بعض مكانها، ما بلغ
 واتصل بعضها،  وكلما كثرت األنفس المتشابهة المفارقة. ببعض ليس على النحو الذي توجد عليه األجسام
 وكلما لحق بهم من. كان التذاذ كل واحد منها أزيد شديدا،  وذلك على جهة اتصال معقول بمعقول، ببعض
 ألن كل،  وزادت لذّات الماضين باتصال الالحقين بهم،  زاد التذاذ من لحق اآلن بمصادفة الماضين، بعدهم
 فتزداد كيفية ما يعقل؛ ويكون تزايد ما تالقى هنك شبيها، واحدة تعقل ذاتها وتعقل مثل ذاتها مرارا كثيرة
 ويقوم تال حق بعض ببعض في تزايد كل واحد.بتزايد قوة صناعة الكتابة بمداومة الكاتب على أفعال الكتابة
 يكون،  وألن المتالحقين (هم) إلى غير نهاية. مقام ترادف أفعال الكاتب التي بها تتزايد كتابته قوة وفضيلة،
231
. وتلك حال كل طائفة مضت. تزايد قوى كل واحد ولذّاته على غابر الزمان إلى غير نهاية
when freed from matter for eternity, and this is defined as the opposite of felicity. The Epistle on the
Intellect simply acknowledges that through intellection humans can achieve their ultimate perfection as the
acquired intellect, and he defines this as the afterlife. This passage mirrors PS 13.5. There are also reports
that al-Fārābī rejected the possibility of the afterlife entirely in his Commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics. For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 2, 4.2.3.
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After the inhabitants of the excellent city die, their bodies are nullified, but their souls
experience happiness together, not in the sense of place (makān), but by thinking each
other’s essences insofar as there is similarity between them. Put otherwise, the afterlife is
not individual felicity, but the felicity of forming a noetic unity with others, to the degree
that al-Fārābī describes the community as “like one soul” (ka-nafs wāḥida), becoming a
noetic unity not dissimilar to the way the Secondary Causes form a noetic unity with the
First.232 (In fact, as will be discussed below, human felicity is ranked as being similar to
the state of the existence of the Active Intellect.)233
All told, despite largely arising, as do all sublunar existents, as an accident of the
contrary relations between the heavens brought about through the deficiency of motion,
humans, like all existents, bear the teleological compulsion of their ultimate origin, the
unity of the First. The aim of unity is achieved through cooperation and association. And
this aim, while certainly aided by intellect, is not bestowed upon humans through the
activity of the Active Intellect alone. Al-Fārābī clearly credits love, longing, friendship,
and trust to the appetitive faculty, whose origination is brought about through the same
mixture as all other sublunar existents, embedded in each human’s natural character (alfiṭra al-ṭabī‘iyya).234

3.1.1.2. Language and the Origins of Rhetoric and Poetry
That said, much of the character of any nation is incidental, reflecting the
proximate cause of a nation’s character, namely the contrariety brought about by
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heavenly motions. For example, al-Fārābī credits language development initially to
incidental agreement (ittifāq) and subsequently to convention (iṣṭilāḥ) and legislation
(sharī‘a).235 As he describes:
That is how the letters of that nation and the expressions arising from those letters
first originate. They originate first among some group or another. It so happens
that one of them uses a sound or expression to indicate something when
addressing someone else and the hearer memorizes it. Then the hearer uses the
same expression when addressing the first inventor of that expression. In this
case, the first hearer will have followed the example [of the inventor] and will
have fallen in with it, in such a way that they will have agreed upon that
expression and acted in concert. They then use it to address others until it spreads
through a certain group. 236
.  ويكون ذلك ّأوال م ّمن اتّفق منهم. فهكذا تحدث ّأوال حروف تلك األ ّمة وألفاظها الكائنة عن تلك الحروف
فيتّفق أن يستعمل الواحد منهم تصوينا أو أو لفظة في الداللة على شيء ّما عندما يخاطب غيره فيحفظ السمع
األول قد احتذى
ّ  ويكون السامع، األول لتلك اللفظة
ّ  فيستعمل السامع ذلك بعينه عندما يخاطب المنشئ، ذلك
 فيخاطبان بها غيرهما إلى أن تشيع عند،  فيكونون قد اصطلحا وتواطئا على تلك اللفظة، بذلك فيقع به
237
. جماعة
From here, speech becomes a matter of convention (iṣṭilāḥ) until it is dictated by
legislation (sharī‘a).238 Put simply, speech is determined by chance, promulgated by
convention, and, finally, codified by grammatical rules into a language. This process
results in a language which is particular to an individual nation, even though, following
Aristotle, al-Fārābī holds that the traces in the soul, which are likeness to that which is
outside the soul, are universal, common to every association.239
While the initial utterances of a language are somewhat arbitrary, hinging upon
agreement, a nation’s linguistic development is still influenced by the specific location of
the nation, and, thus, the mixture which gives each nation its particular character.
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Different nations have different constitutions of their organs, and, as a result, one nation’s
tongues and mouths will be predisposed to certain placements of their tongues within
their mouths, thus producing different sounds when rapping inhaled air than when
compared to another nation.240 The beginnings of human speech are dictated both by
natural disposition and chance. And insofar as one considers only the most rudimentary
notion of language (e.g., language as utterances signifying traces in the soul which are
likenesses to that which is outside the soul, built upon incidental agreement within the
context of national temperament, insofar as it is determined by that nation’s incidental
relation to the celestial bodies), this poses no problem for proper signification or the
establishment of a proper association. At first glance, the aimless origin of language does
not pose a political problem.
However, human beings do have a teleological aim, and language, even the
structure of language, affects a human being’s ability to properly pursue this aim.
Because, while the linguistic sciences do not themselves produce knowledge, language is
the mechanism by which a way toward knowledge is found.241 The first art to form,
rhetorical science, is based upon language and unexamined opinion, influenced by the
natural character of a nation.242 The development of associations requires speeches, after
all.243 Shortly after rhetoric, humans, who seek order in all things, develop the art of
poetry, establishing the rhythm and harmony of language.244 Through these arts, an
association conveys its history, establishes linguistic habit (‘āda) and ways of thinking,
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and establishes its symbolism.245 These linguistic arts help determine the quality of any
human association in two main ways. First, the rhetorical science is used to develop
dialectic and distinguish it from sophistical argumentation, and dialectic is used to
develop the science of demonstration.246 Thus, the quality of rhetoric, explicitly built
upon a nation’s natural character (fiṭra), dictates whether demonstrative philosophy will
develop.247 Second, prior to the development of philosophy or true religion (milla
ṣaḥīḥa), language establishes the symbols of a nation.248
This latter effect of language is no paltry component to the quality of human
associations; rhetoric, poetry, and the images used by a people greatly influence the
demeanor and moral development of a people. (It is no wonder then that al-Fārābī
compares the importance of the establishment of language to the establishment of civic
laws.)249 As will be discussed below, rhetoric and poetry are that through which someone
with demonstrative knowledge is able to communicate theoretical truths (or near-truths)
to the masses.250 And the founding Imām is limited in this process by the symbols already
present within the language of his people, using “those symbols which are best known to
[the people of the city]”.251 In other words, the communication of philosophy is
constrained by the quality of a nation’s language.
However, the character of a nation’s language does not simply affect the
communication of knowledge, but also its attainment. Poetry can supply a kind of
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knowledge and shapes culture.252 It has the force of analogy and can cause associations
between disparate notions within the soul.253 It has the power to cultivate human
character, whether for good or ill.254 And in the developing nation (or the soul of the
philosopher beginning her studies), linguistic imagery, rhetoric, and poetry, can be the
difference between attaining knowledge or falling into error.255
In a little referenced treatise on the proper ordering of philosophical study, The
Epistle on What Should Come Before Learning Philosophy, al-Fārābī talks about the
importance of moral character prior to studying philosophy, i.e., prior to having
demonstrations about ethics. In a fascinating passage, to my knowledge first noted by
T.A. Druart, al-Fārābī considers a variety of possible curricula for the student of
philosophy (e.g., those curricula laid out by Plato, Theophrastus, Boethus of Sidon, and
Andronicus).256 He considers whether geometry, physics, or logic should precede
philosophy. The relevant passage, however, occurs when considering the position of
Theophrastus. He says:
And as for Theophrastus, he shows that one begins [one’s studies prior to
philosophy] with the ‘science of developing moral character’ (’islāh al-’aḥlāq)
and that one who does not develop the moral character of his soul cannot possibly
learn true science. And the evidence of this is that Plato says that he who is not
[already] blamelessly pure, he does not approach blamelessly purity, and
Hippocrates, where he says that bodies which are not pure are increasingly
nourished with evil.257
و اما آل اثوفرسطس فيرون ان يبدأ بعلم اصالح االخالق وذلك ان من لم يصلح اخالق نفسه لم يمكنه ان
ُ ي وبقرا
ط
ّ ي زك
ّ يتعلم علما صحيحا والشاهد على ذلك افالطن في قوله ان من لم يكن نقيّا زكيّا فال يدنو من نق
258
... شرا
ْتها
حيث يقول ان االبدان التي ليست بنقيّة كلما غذوتها زد
ّ
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When deciding between all of the alternatives, he acknowledges the value of studying
each discipline (e.g., geometry, physics, moral development, and logic), but again reemphasizes Theophrastus’ position, and notes the role of both proper speech and action.
He says:
And none of these beliefs [i.e., the beliefs of Plato, Theophrastus, Boethus of
Sidon, or Andronicus] should be discarded, and it is necessary, prior to the study
of the science of philosophy, to develop the moral character of the appetitive soul,
so that there is desire for virtue only, which is in truth virtue (not that which is
mistaken for it, like pleasure or love of conquest). And this occurs through the
development of moral character, not only through speech, but through deeds also.
Then, after that, one develops the rational soul, so that it is protected on the path
for truth and is safe from error and from falling into falsehood. And this occurs
through the fulfillment of the science of demonstration. And a ‘demonstrative
proof’ (burhān) is fashioned from two [sciences], from geometry and logic, as
those [sciences] which are necessary to understand first. From the science of
geometry [one understands] the amount of what needs to be fulfilled in a
geometrical proof, then [one understands] what is fulfilled after that through the
science of logic.259
وليس ينبغى ان يُرذل واحد من هذه االراء وذلك انه ينبغى قبل الدرس لعلم الفلسفة ان تصلح اخالق النفس
تتوهم انها كذلك اعنى اللذّة
ّ الشهوانية كيما يكون الشهوة للفضيلة فقط التي هي بالحقيقة فضيلة ال التي
 وذلك يكون بالصالح االخالق ال بالقول فقط لكن باالفعال أيضا ثم يصلح بعد ذلك النفس. والمحبّة الغلبة
ّ
للحق التي يؤمن معها الغلط والوقوع في الباطل وذلك يكون باالرتياض في
الناطقة كيما تقهم منها طريق
 والبرهان على ضربين منه هندسى و منه منطقى و كذلك ينبغي ان يوخذ أوال من علم، علم البرهان
260
. الهندسة مقدار ما يحتاج في االرتياض في البراهين الهندسية ثم يرتاض بعد ذلك في علم المنتق
This passage, while not addressing the effects of poetry and rhetoric directly, reveals the
power that poetry and rhetoric can have, given their influence on a people group prior to
philosophy. If language develops character and character development is required before
the proper study of philosophy can even begin, then the quality of a nation’s language
plays a pivotal role in the quality of a nation’s moral (and thus scientific) development. In
truth, insofar as human happiness is achieved through knowledge, knowledge through
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philosophy, philosophy through proper moral development, proper moral development
through language, and language through chance agreement and national character, human
happiness is de facto determined, in large part, by a nation’s incidental relative position to
the heavens.261
This is perhaps best exemplified in those nations where philosophy does not take
root, which are ruled by corrupt religion (milla fāsida). Al-Fārābī is clear that the
rhetorical method is that which is used to develop the dialectical method (which is itself
used to develop demonstration); whether rhetoric develops into demonstration depends
on the quality of the speech, human desire for knowledge, and the nation’s natural
character (fiṭra).262 As he says:
If a religion is dependent upon a philosophy that has been perfected after all the
syllogistic arts have been distinguished from one another, in the manner and order
that we have claimed, the religion will be a valid one with the greatest excellence.
However, if the philosophy has not yet become demonstrative, certain, and endowed
with the greatest excellence, and if its opinions continue to be verified using
rhetorical, dialectical, or sophistical methods, it is not impossible that all or most of
it might contain false opinions unawares. This would be an uncertain or dubious
philosophy. If a religion that depends upon this philosophy is founded some time
thereafter, it will contain many false opinions. Then, if many of these false opinions
are taken and their similes are put in their place – as religion does with those things
that are difficult or difficult to conceive for the multitude – these opinions will be
yet further from the truth. It will be a corrupt religion, and they will be unaware of
its corruption. It will be even more corrupt if a lawgiver arrives afterwards and does
not take his religion’s opinions from the philosophy that happens to exist in his
times, but takes them instead from the opinions contained in the first religion, which
he takes to be true. He will then acquire it, adopt its similes, and teach them to the
multitude. If yet another lawgiver arrives after him and is dependent upon the
second lawgiver, he will be yet more corrupt. A valid religion only occurs in a
nation in the first way mentioned; a corrupt religion occurs among them in the
second way. In either case, religion originates only after philosophy, either certain
philosophy, which is true philosophy, or uncertain philosophy, which is assumed to
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be philosophy though it is not in reality. This is the case when it originates among
them from their own genius, natures, and souls.263
فإذا كانت الملّة تابعة للفلسفة التي كملت بعد أن تميّزت الصنائع القياسيّة بعضها عن بعض على الجهة
 فأ ّما إذا كانت الفلسفة لم تصر بعد برهانيّة يقينيّة في.والترتيب الذي اقتضينا كانت ملّة صحيحة في غاية الجودة
 لم يمتنع أن تقع فيها كلّها أو في، بل كانت بعد تُصحَّح آراؤها بالخطبيّة أو الجدليّة أو السوفسطائيّة،غاية الجودة
 فإذا أُنشئت ملّة ّما بعد ذلك.مموهة
ّ  وكانت فلسفة مظنونة أو،جلّها أو في أ كثرها آراء كلّها كاذبة لم يُشعَر بها
 فإذا أُخذ أيضا كثير من تلك اآلراء الكاذبة وأُخذت مثاالتها. وقعت فيها آراء كاذبة كثيرة،تابعة لتلك الفلسفة
ّ
الحق أ كثر وكانت ملّة
 كانت تلك أبعد،تصوره على الجمهور
 على ما هو شأن الملّة فيما عسر وعسر،مكانها
ّ
 وأشدّ من تلك فسادا أن يأتي بعد ذلك واضع نواميس فال يأخذ اآلراء في ملّته من.فاسدة وال يُش َعر فسادها
ّ
 فيحصلها،الحق
الفلسفة التي يتّفق أن تكون في زمانه بل يأخذ اآلراء الموضوعة في الملّة األولى على أنّها هي
 فالملّة. كان أشدّ فسادا، وإن جاء بعده واضع نواميس آخر فيتبع هذا الثاني،ويأخذ مثاالتها ويعلّمها الجمهور
 والملّة الفاسدة تحصل فيهم متى،الصحيحة إنّما تحصل في األ ّمة متى كان حصولها فيهم على الجهة األولى
ّ ّ إال.كان حصولها على الجهة الثانية
 إ ّما بعد الفلسفة اليقينيّة التي،أن الملّة على الجهتين إنّما تحدث بعد الفلسفة
َ
ّ
ّ
،هي الفلسفة في الحقيقة وأ ّما بعد الفلسفة المظنونة التي يُظن بها أنها فلسفة من غير أن تكون فلسفة في الحقيقة
264
َ ِوذلك متى كان حدوثها فيهم عن قرائحهم وف
. طرهم ومن أنفسهم
This passage helps explain al-Fārābī’s quizzical claim, made in multiple places, that
“philosophy precedes religion in time” or that “religion, when man-made, is subsequent
to philosophy in time.”265 All man-made (ju‘alat ’insāniyya) religion follows philosophy;
not all religion follows true philosophy (al-falsafa fī al- ḥaqīqa).266 As a result, not all
religion is true religion (milla ṣaḥīḥa). Any religion that follows a philosophy based
upon rhetoric, dialectic, and sophistry— insofar as the establishment of these lower
sciences never resulted in the establishment of demonstrative philosophy, either because
of the natural character of the nation or because of some other chance or natural flaw in
the development of the nation’s sciences—is a corrupt religion (milla fāsida). Such a
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religion is based upon opinion and not certain philosophy (al-falsafa al-yaqīnīa).267 And
the failure or success of a nation’s religion depends upon that nation’s natural character
(fiṭra), as determined by that nation’s relative position to the celestial bodies.

3.1.2. Extrapolations from the Influence of the Celestial Bodies on Human Beings
All told, the celestial bodies have an outsized influence on human happiness, the
character of human associations, and the need for beneficent political deception, because,
even though, as revealed in the passage from the Political Regime quoted above, the
sublunar world requires two external movers, the celestial bodies and the Active Intellect,
the Active Intellect is evenhanded in its effects on the sublunar world, acting on
everything and anything it finds ready, as will be discussed below.268 The celestial bodies
are the source of contrariety in the world and its entropic character. They account for the
deficiency of sublunar existents, e.g., sickness, death, blemishes, imperfections, even
while fulfilling the fecundity promised by the nature of the First, insofar as the celestial
bodies actualize the substance of all possible existents. And while they ensure that all
possible existents exist, they also happen to ensure that many of these existents (including
the majority of human existents) are incapable of fulfilling their telos, much like the
celestial bodies themselves are unable to achieve their embodied telos at the outset,
requiring motion. The sublunar world, as constituted by the celestial bodies, is simply a
mixture resulting in every possible existent, not every perfect existent.
Of course, the imperfection and the deficiency of the sublunar world is true for
every kind of sublunar existent, including humans and human associations. Many humans
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are incapable of philosophy. Many nations are, due to their relative position to the
celestial bodies, the beneficiaries of suboptimal natural characters and, as a result, lack
certain philosophy or true religion. But the fecundity resulting from the celestial bodies
also touches upon human beings. The mixture of the sublunar world results in many
nations each with a distinct natural character (fiṭra), some of which produce true
philosophy (al-falsafa fī al-ḥaqīqa) and true religion (milla ṣaḥīḥa). Part of the natural
character (fiṭra) bestowed upon human beings is the need for unity through association
(ijtimā‘). But this unity needs to be brought about within associations set within a
deficient sublunar world. And as will be shown below, it is this deficiency which justifies
and necessitates the use of beneficent political deception.

3.2. The Effects of the Active Intellect on the Sublunar World
Whereas the celestial bodies account for the constitution of sublunar existents, the
Active Intellect, the Eleventh Intellect (the Tenth Secondary Cause), is the second
superlunar principle which acts as an external mover of sublunar existents, bringing about
their teleological fulfillment, as long as they are capable of fulfillment. Returning to the
passage from the Political Regime quoted above, al-Fārābī explains:
By its nature and substance, the active intellect is prepared to look into everything
the heavenly body makes ready and gives. Thus it wants to make whatever
accepts transcendence and separation from material in some particular way
transcend material and privation so that it will come to be in a ranking closer to it.
That is, so that potential intelligibles become actual intelligibles and an intellect
that was a potential intellect thereby gets to be an actual intellect. It is not possible
for anything other than a human being to come to be like that. So this is the
ultimate happiness that is the most excellent perfection it is possible for a human
being to obtain. Through these two is perfected the existence of the things that
remain subsequent and that—to be drawn out into existence—need the modes
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such as to draw them out into existence and the modes such as to continue their
existence.269
ّ والعقل الفعّال معدّ بطبيعته وجوهره أن ينظر في ك ّل ما و
ي شيء منه قبل
ّ  فأ. ي وأعطاه
ّ طأه الجسم السماو
.  العدم فيصير في أقرب مرتبة اليه/  رام تخليصه من المادّة ومن، بوجه ما التخلّص من المادّة ومفارقها
بالقوة
ّ ً فمن ذلك تحصل العقل الذي كان عقال. بالقوة معقوالت بالفعل
ّ وذلك أن تصير المعقوالت التي هي
 وليس يمكن أن يصير كذلك شيء سوى اإلنسان ؛ فهذه السعادة القصوى التي هي افضل ما. عقالً بالفعل
 فعن هذين يكمل وجود األشياء التي بقيت متأخرة واحتيج إلى إخراجها. يمكن اإلنسان أن يبلغه من الكمال
270
.  وبالوجوه التي شأنها أن يدوم وجودها بها، إلى الوجود بالوجوه التي شأنها أن تخرج إلى الوجود بها
And while the Active Intellect affects the sublunar world in several more curious ways, as
will be discussed below, this passage sums up the activity of the Active Intellect quite
nicely: the Active Intellect renders the sublunar world intelligible.271 The perfections it
gives are given to human beings alone but have a dual effect.272 Namely, through giving a
certain faculty to human beings by which they can strive for their own perfection,
humans are able to become actual intellect through abstracting potential intelligibles,
causing them to become actual intelligibles.273
That another superlunary principle apart from the motions of the heavens is
required as a cause for the sublunar world is borne out by al-Fārābī’s cosmology, insofar
as there are no other instances of an intelligible existent deriving its existence from a
cause which is itself unintelligible. If the aim of the material world is to transcend matter,
it must have an immaterial cause; if the aim of the material world is to be rendered
intelligible, it must have an intelligible cause. Thus, drawing upon Aristotle’s notion of a
‘productive intellect’ (νους ποιητικός) in De Anima 3.5, as well as interpretations of
Aristotle’s doctrine in Alexander, Themistius, and the Theology of Aristotle, al-Fārābī
makes his Eleventh Intellect the custodian of the sublunar world, that which imbues
269
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human beings with an intellectual power (quwwa).274 The Active Intellect, which alFārābī ascribes with the epithets traditionally ascribed to Gabriel the angel, empowers
human beings with that which is required for them to attain happiness.275

3.2.1. The Active Intellect as the Cause of Human Intellectual Powers
There is a great deal of excellent literature exploring al-Fārābī’s psychological
model, and, as a result, a full accounting of his position and the nuances of it between
various works is not necessary here.276 That said, as human happiness is attained through
the power given by the Active Intellect, even if its attainment is a result of human
striving, a brief synopsis of al-Fārābī’s psychology is called for.277 Like al-Kindī before
him, al-Fārābī’s psychological model arises from an established commentary tradition,
which, after its origination in Aristotle, is filtered for al-Fārābī through the commentaries
of Alexander and, in all likelihood, Themistius.278 And, again, like al-Kindī, al-Fārābī
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adopts a model which divides the component mechanisms of human intellection into four
distinct species of intellect: a potential intellect (‘aql bi-l-quwwa), an actual intellect (‘aql
bi-l- fi‘l) , the acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafāḍ), and the superlunary Eleventh
Intellect, the Active Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl).279 But whereas al-Kindī adopts a model
which relies heavily upon the beneficence of that intellect which is in act perpetually (bil-fi‘l ’abadan), i.e., the Active Intellect, for the acquisition of forms, al-Fārābī’s model
only situates the Active Intellect at the origination of human intellective power.280 The
culmination of human intellection, and the acquisition of universals, occurs through
interaction with the material world.
Al-Fārābī credits the Active Intellect with giving human beings a power by which
they can gain knowledge through interactions with the world, abstracting the intelligibles
(ma‘qūlāt) from that which is prepared by the celestial bodies (i.e., material composites).
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97, 34f. See also Oschman 2018; Taylor 2006, 151-68; Vallat 2004, 209f.; López-Farjeat 2020. Regarding
al-Kindī, the role the Active Intellect plays diverges from al-Fārābī’s account. What al-Kindī calls “the first
intellect” (al-‘aql al-‘awwal) or the intellect which is “in act perpetually” (bi-l-fi‘l ’abadan) does not only
give a power by which to abstract (intaza‘a) the intelligible form from material objects, but rather, acts as a
“benefactor” (ṣāra mufīdan) of forms to the soul. Also, both the actual intellect and the acquired intellect,
which al-Kindī calls either “the second” (al-thānī) or “the emerging” (al-nātī) intellect, depending on one’s
interpretation of an unvoweled manuscript, also differ. Treatise on the Intellect, 122-23. For the
development of classical philosophical psychology in the Muslim world, see Ivry 2012.
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The exact contours of this doctrine are disputed, both because al-Fārābī is opaque on some issues and
because al-Fārābī is inconsistent between works. In the case of the former, he is unclear whether the Active
Intellect bestows on human beings both the power for abstraction and universally known first principles (as
two distinct entities) or whether the bestowal of first principles is in fact what he means when he says that
the Active Intellect gives humans a power (i.e., the power is, itself, indistinguishable from being endowed
with the primary first principles common to all human beings). See PS 13.1-3; PR 35-36, 71-72; EI 24-27.
Concerning the latter, he changes vocabulary as to what occurs during the interaction between intellects
and intelligibles, saying that humans ‘abstract’ (intaza‘a) intelligibles in EI and that they transfer (naqala)
intelligibles in PS. See EI 13; PS 13.2. Furthermore, al-Fārābī changes how he describes what is
abstracted/transferred, naming them both forms (ṣuwar) in EI and imprints (rusūm) in PS. See EI 13; PS
13.2. See also Janos 2012, 179; Taylor 2006, 154-156; Vallat 2004, 209f.; Oschman 2018.
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This assists both human beings and other sublunar existents to transcend matter by
helping them become actual intellect (‘aql bi-l- fi‘l), in the case of humankind, and actual
intelligibles (ma‘qūlāt bi-l-fi‘l), in the case of other sublunar existents, whereas they
were, respectively, potential intellect (‘aql bi-l-fi‘l) and potential intelligibles (ma‘qūlāt
bi-l-quwwa) prior to the act of abstraction (intaza‘a).281 For any non-human sublunar
existent, becoming an intelligible for a human being is the only way that it is able to
“transcend material and privation so that it will come to be in a ranking closer” to the
Active Intellect.282 This, along with assisting the rational animal, seems to be the highest
possible teleological fulfillment for all non-human sublunar existents.283
However, for human beings, neither the status of being an actual intelligible or
even an actual intellect suffices for their teleological fulfillment, although it is the first
step. Using the famous Sun Analogy, again rooted in De Anima 3.5, where Aristotle
describes the ‘productive intellect’ (νους ποιητικός) as having “a sort of positive state like
light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours,” al-Fārābī compares
the Active Intellect to the sun. He says:
After [the ruling faculty of sense (i.e. the common sense)] the imprints of the
various kinds of intelligibles which are impressed on the rational faculty remain to
be discussed. The intelligibles which are such as to be impressed on the rational
faculty are (a) those which are in their very substances actually intellects and
actually intelligible (intelligized) — namely the immaterial things — and (b)
those which are not actually intelligible through their very substance — such as
stones, plants and, in general, everything which is itself body or is in a material
281

EI 15-18; PR 35-36; PS 13.1-2, 15.9.
ّ "والعقل الفعّال معدّ بطبيعته وجوهره أن ينظر في ك ّل ما
ي شيء منه قبل بوجه ما التخلّص من المادّة
ّ  فأ.ي وأعطاه
ّ وطأه الجسم السماو
".  رام تخليصه من المادّة و من العدم فيصير في أقرب مرتبة اليه،  ; ومفارقهاPR 54-55.
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PR 67-68. Al-Fārābī is unclear as to what sense material existents themselves play a role in abstraction.
In EI, the abstracted content is itself the form of the sublunar existent, but al-Fārābī is clear that actual
intelligibles have a distinct existence from the forms which are in matter, lacking place, time, and other
accidents. EI 16-17. In other words, what is abstracted is distinct from the material form. This issue is even
more unclear in the mature al-Fārābī where the intellect does not abstract (intaza‘a) forms (ṣuwar) from
matters, but instead transfers (naqala) imprints (rusūm). PS 13.1-2. Al-Fārābī never further explains the
metaphysical relationship between these imprints and the sublunar existents, themselves.
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body and matter itself, and everything which owes its substance to matter-for
these are neither actually intellects nor actually intelligible. But the human
intellect which arises in man by nature from the very outset is a disposition in
matter prepared to receive the imprints of the intelligibles, being itself potentially
intellect [and ‘material intellect’] and being also potentially intelligible. The other
things which are in matter or are matter or have matter are neither actually nor
potentially intellects. They are, however, potentially intelligible and can possibly
become actually intelligible, but their substances lack the wherewithal to be
actually intelligized of their own accord. Again, neither the rational faculty nor
what is provided in man by nature has the wherewithal to become of itself
intellect in actuality. To become intellect in actuality it needs something else
which transfers it from potentiality to actuality, and it becomes actually intellect
only when the intelligibles arise in it. The potential intelligibles become actual
intelligibles when they happen to be intelligized by the intellect in actuality, but
they are in need of something else which transfers them from potentiality to a
state in which [the intellect] can make them actual. The agent which transfers
them from potentiality to actuality is an existent. Its essence is an actual intellect
of a particular kind and is separate from matter. It is that intellect which provides
the ‘material intellect’ which is only potentially intellect with something like the
light which the sun provides to the sight of the eye, since its relation to the
‘material intellect’ is like the relation of the sun to the sight of the eye. For
eyesight is a faculty and a disposition in matter and is, before it sees, potentially
sight, and the colours are potentially seeable and visible before they are seen. But
neither is the faculty of sight in the eye itself sufficiently qualified to become
actually sight nor are the colours themselves sufficiently qualified to become
actually seen and viewed. It is the sun which gives light to the sight of the eye,
joining the two, and which gives light to the colours, joining it to them. Thus sight
becomes through the light which it acquires from the sun actually seeing and
actually sight, and the colours become through that light actually seen and viewed
after having been potentially seeable and visible. In the same way this ‘intellect in
actuality’ conveys to the ‘material intellect’ something which it imprints on it,
which is in relation to the ‘material intellect’ the same as light in relation to sight.
Sight sees, through light itself, the light which is the cause of its ability to see and
the sun which is the cause of light, and by this very light it sees the things which
are potentially seeable and visible so that they become actually seen and viewed.
In the same way the ‘material intellect’ becomes aware of that very thing which
corresponds to the light in the case of sight, and through it comes to know the
‘intellect in actuality’ which is the cause of having that thing imprinted on the
'material intellect'; and through it the things which were potentially intelligible
become actually intelligible, and the ‘material intellect’ in its turn becomes
actually intellect after having been potentially intellect. The action of this
‘separate’ intellect upon the ‘material intellect’ is similar to the action of the sun
upon the sight of the eye. It is therefore called ‘Active Intellect’ ranking tenth
among the ‘separate’ things below the First Cause which have been mentioned,
whereas the ‘material intellect’ is called ‘Passive Intellect’. When, then, that thing
which corresponds to light in the case of sight arises in the rational faculty from
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the ‘Active Intellect’, intelligibles arise at the same time in the rational faculty
from the sensibles which are preserved in the faculty of representation.284
ويبقى بعد ذلك أن ترتسم في الناطقة رسوم أصناف المعقوالت والمعقوالت التي شأنها أن ترتسم في القوة
الناطقة  ،منها المعقوالت التي هي في جواهرها عقول بالفعل ومعقوالت بالفعل  :وهي األشياء البريئة من
المادة؛ ومنها المعقوالت التي ليست بجواهرها معقولة بالفعل  ،مثل الحجارة والنبات  ،وبالجملة كل ما هو
جسم أو في جسم ذي مادة  ،والمادة نفسها وكل شيء قوامه بها .فان هذه ليست عقوال بالفعل وال معقوالت
بالفعل .وأما العقل االنساني الذي يحصل له بالطبع في أول أمره  ،فانه هيئة ما في مادة معدة ألن تقبل رسوم
المعقوالت  :فهي بالقوة عقل وعقل هيوالني  ،وهي أيضا بالقوة معقولة .وسائر األشياء التي في مادة  ،أو
هي مادة أو ذوات مادة  ،فليست هي عقوال ال بالفعل وال بالقوة  ،ولكنها معقوالت بالقوة ويمكن أن تصير
معقوالت بالفعل .وليس في جواهرها كفاية في أن تصير من تلقاء أنفسها معقوالت بالفعل .وال أيضا في
القوة الناطقة  ،وال فيما أعطي الطبع كفاية في أن تصير من تلقاء نفسها عقال بالفعل  ،بل تحتاج أن تصير
عقال بالفعل إلى شيء آخر ينقلها من القوة إلى الفعل وإنما تصير عقال بالفعل إذا حصلت فيها المعقوالت .
وتصير المعقوالت التي بالقوة معقوالت بالفعل إذا حصلت معقولة للعقل بالفعل .وهي تحتاج إلى شيء آخر
ينقلها من القوة إلى أن يصيّرها بالفعل .والفاعل الذي ينقلها من القوة إلى الفعل هو ذات ما  ،جوهره عقل ما
بالفعل  ،ومفارق للمادة  .2فان ذلك العقل يعطي العقل الهيوالني  ،الذي هو بالقوة عقل  ،شيئا ما بمنزلة
الضوء الذي تعطيه الشمس البصر .ألن منزلته من العقل الهيوالني منزلة الشمس من البصر .فان البصر
هو قوة وهيئة ما في مادة  ،وهو من قبل أن يبصر فيه بصر بالقوة  ،واأللوان من قبل أن تبصر مبصرة
مرئية بالقوة .وليس في جوهر القوة الباصرة التي في العين كفاية في أن يصير بصرا بالفعل  ،وال في
جوهر األلوان كفاية في أن تصير مرئية مبصرة بالفعل .فان الشمس تعطي البصر ضوءا يضاء به ،
وتعطي األلوان ضوءا تضاء بها  ،فيصير البصر  ،بالضوء الذي استفاده من الشمس  ،مبصرا بالفعل
وبصيرا بالفعل؛ وتصير األلوان  ،بذلك الضوء  ،مبصرة مرئية بالفعل بعد أن كانت مبصرة مرئية بالقوة.
كذلك هذا العقل الذي بالفعل يفيد العقل الهيوالني شيئا ما يرسمه فيه .فمنزلة ذلك الشيء من العقل الهيوالني
منزلة الضوء من البصر .وكما أن البصر بالضوء نفسه يبصر الضوء الذي هو سبب ابصاره  ،ويبصر
الشمس التي هي سبب الضوء به بعينه  ،ويبصر األشياء التي هي بالقوة مبصرة فتصير مبصرة بالفعل ،
كذلك العقل الهيوالني فانه بذلك الشيء الذي منزلته منه منزلة الضوء من البصر  ،يعقل ذلك الشيء نفسه ،
وبه يعقل العقل الهيوالني العقل بالفعل الذي هو سبب ارتسام ذلك الشيء في العقل الهيوالني  ،وبه تصير
األشياء التي كانت معقولة بالقوة معقولة بالفعل  ،ويصير هو أيضا عقال بالفعل بعد أن كان عقال بالقوة.
وفعل هذا العقل المفارق في العقل الهيوالني شبيه فعل الشمس في البصر  ،فلذلك سمي العقل الف ّعال.
ومرتبته من األشياء المفارقة التي ذكرت من دون السبب األول المرتبة العاشرة .ويسمى العقل الهيوالني
العقل المنفعل .وإذا حصل في القوة الناطقة عن العقل الف ّعال ذلك الشيء الذي منزلته منها منزلة الضوء من
البصر  ،حصلت حينئذ عن المحسوسات التي هي محفوظة في القوة المتخيلة معقوالت في القوة الناطقة؛
وتلك هي المعقوالت األولى التي هي مشتركة لجميع الناس  ،مثل أن الكل أعظم من الجزء  ،وأن المقادير
المساوية للشيء الواحد متساوية  .المعقوالت األول المشتركة ثالثة أصناف  :صنف أوائل للهندسة العلمية ،
وصنف أوائل يوقف بها على الجميل والقبيح مما شأنه أن يعمله االنسان  ،وصنف أوائل تستعمل في أن يعلم
بها أحوال الموجودات التي ليس شأنها أن يفعلها االنسان ومباديها ومراتبها  ،مثل السماوات والسبب األول
285
وسائر المبادي األخر  ،وما شأنها أن يحدث عن تلك المبادي .
Al-Fārābī, thus, divides the cosmos up into three categories: 1) actual intellects and
;intelligibles which are intelligible in themselves, e.g., the First and the Secondary Causes

PS 13.1-2. See also EI 26-27; PR 35-36.
PS 13.1-2.
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2) potential intelligibles which are not intelligible in themselves, e.g., any sublunar
existent in a body; and 3) a unique subset of the second category, intelligibles which are
not intelligible in themselves but can become both actually intelligible and actually
intellect through the activity of an external mover. An individual of this third type, i.e., a
human being, can only become an actual intellect when a) an external mover acts upon
her, and b) she encounters a potential intelligible which is prepared to become an actual
intelligible for her, rendering her potential intellect an actual intellect in the process.
(Insofar as the actual intelligible forms a noetic unity with the actual intellect, they are
metaphysically indistinct from one another.)286 Thus, due to a power bestowed upon it
from an external mover, the potential intellect is able to abstract (intaza‘a) the forms from
matters or transfer (naqala) the imprints (rusūm) from sensibles (maḥsūsāt).287 Al-Fārābī
seems to accept that this abstraction/transference happens reliably and infallibly, as he
never suggests any corrective process, like the methodic experience (tajriba) proposed by
Avicenna, according to Jon Mcginnis’ reading, or the “Active Principle Model” of
abstraction which Therese Cory suggests is embraced by Aquinas, both of which view
abstraction as an asymptotic natural process, not an unimpeachable fait accompli.288 For
al-Fārābī, when a potential intellect encounters a potential intelligible, the potential
intelligible is abstracted, eventuating in an actual intelligible and an actual intellect.
The Active Intellect is the external mover which confers the power of abstraction
to the potential intellect, however, the exact minutiae of this process are unclear.

Al-Fārābī uses the analogy of an imprint (the intelligible) forming an impression into a piece of wax (the
intellect), insofar as the shape of the imprint becomes the form of the wax, leaving no distinction between
them. EI 13-15. For the antecedents of al-Fārābī’s analogy in Aristotle, Alexander, and Themistius, see
Note 278.
287
For some possible reasons for this change in terminology, see Notes 198, 278, and 280.
288
McGinnis 2010, 146; Cory 2015, 607-646.
286
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Following the Sun Analogy above, Davidson and López-Farjeat have suggested that the
Active Intellect has a fourfold effect, affecting i) the potential intellect to render it actual
and ii) the potential intelligible to render it actual, while revealing iii) the activity of the
Active Intellect itself, rendering it knowable to the human intellect and iv) the source of
the activity (i.e., the Active Intellect), rendering it knowable to the human intellect.289 The
analogy of light implies that the Active Intellect acts upon both the potential intellect and
the potential intelligible (or renders some sort of medium transparent, removing an
impediment to the powers of both the intellect and the intelligible to know and be known,
respectively, just as light renders air transparent to allow for vision). However, al-Fārābī’s
mature psychology seems to indicate that the Active Intellect only acts directly upon the
human intellect.290 In other words, all four effects are brought about by a single act upon
the human intellect, with the Active Intellect being a proximate cause for the actual
intellect, but only a distal cause for actual intelligibles, even though the effect happens
simultaneously. That said, al-Fārābī’s position is not entirely obvious, and whether the
Active Intellect acts upon both potential intellects and potential intelligibles or only upon
potential intellects (and through their given-power subsequently upon intelligibles)
remains underdetermined.291 (Figure 3.1, above, pictorially shows a synthesis of these
two positions for the sake of simplicity.) In either case, though, one thing is clear: the
Active Intellect is the cause of sublunar intelligibility, and thus, sublunar teleological
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Davidson 1992, 50-51; López-Farjeat 2020. Davidson sources this reading in an amalgamation of
Alexander’s and Themistius’s doctrines, perhaps from an unknown predecessor. See Davidson 1992, 50.
290
For example, the Political Regime denies that the Active Intellect bestows any perfections to any being
other than human beings. PR 71. Meanwhile, the Perfect State seems to indicate that the Active Intellect
transfers intelligibles from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality, but is unclear as to whether it does
this as a proximate cause or a cause which works through the human intellect. PS 13.2. The Epistle on the
Intellect clearly portrays the Active Intellect as the proximate cause of potential intelligibles. EI 25-30. For
al-Fārābī’s conception of light, see HPA 35-41. See also Martini Bonadeo and Endress 2008.
291
PR 71; PS 13.2; EI 25-30.
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fulfillment. It is the proximate cause of human intellection and happiness, and either the
proximate or distal cause of the intelligibility of non-human sublunar existents.
But before turning to the Active Intellect’s role in the realization of human
happiness, one more cosmological feature of al-Fārābī’s model should be reiterated.
While the Active Intellect is the principle by which the existents of the sublunar world
achieve whatever teleological fulfillment is feasible according to their rank and operates
as the cause of sublunar intelligibility, the Active Intellect acts always and only on
sublunar beings whose hylomorphic existence originated entirely from the motions of the
heavens. Put otherwise, while the Active Intellect ought to be credited with the
constitution of sublunar intelligible existents qua intelligible, the celestial bodies are the
cause of sublunar existents qua existents. The Active Intellect’s agency is limited to that
which the “heavenly body makes ready and gives”, and even in the Epistle on the
Intellect, whose distinct cosmology labels the Active Intellect as a dator formarum, the
causal force of the Active Intellect is limited to that which the celestial bodies have
prepared, made ready, and from which they have removed all obstacles from the recipient
of its activity.292 While the Active Intellect allows for the possibility of sublunar
teleological fulfillment, the scope of its influence is determined by the heavens.293
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PR 54-55; EI 33. The only caveat to the influence of the heavens is the role that individual human
voluntary action plays in preparing oneself for happiness and removing obstacles from one’s habits which
may prevent happiness (although, even concerning human will, the heavens influence the original matter of
both nations and persons). See PS 13.6; PR 72-73.
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PR 72-73.
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3.2.1.1. Human Happiness
Knowledge through abstraction, alone, does not entail felicity. A human’s
achievement of the state of ‘actual intellect’ is not the end of the human life. For while
knowledge must begin with an interaction with the material world, the end of human life
is to transcend material deficiencies in order that a human being, through the activity of
the Active Intellect, “becomes an intellect in his essence after having not been like that
and an intelligible in his essence after having not been like that. And he becomes divine
after having been material. This is the function of the active intellect, and for this it is
called the active intellect”.294 This trope, the Neoplatonic conception of the procession
and return, found repeatedly in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology of Aristotle, brings both
al-Fārābī’s cosmological and psychological models to completion.295 Because, while
human happiness is not the pinnacle of his cosmological model, it is the culmination of it,
insofar as human transcendence from matter brings a close to the two effluences which
ultimately proceed from the First, e.g., the intelligible chain of Intellects and the
deficiency brought about by the motions of the Celestial Bodies. Humans alone are able
to evince the intelligibility of the sublunar world by transcending their material origins.
To do so, to be happy, is tantamount to becoming the acquired intellect (al-‘aql almustafāḍ).296 The reasoning is simple. Recall that, for al-Fārābī, “pleasure (surūr) and
delight (ḡibṭa) result and increase only when the most accurate apprehension concerns
itself with the most beautiful, the most brilliant and the most splendid objects.”297

PR 36;  فهذا هو فعل.  ويصير إلهيّا ً بعد أن كان هيوالنيّا،  ومعقوالً بذته بعد أن لم يكن كذلك، " فيصير عقالً بذاته بعد أن لم يكن كذلك
".  ولهذا س ّمي العقل الفعّال، العقل الفعّال
295
Theology I. 21-26; Theology II.1-6; Theology IV.1-4; Theology VIII.159-164.
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EI 20-22, 31; PS 13.5; PR 36.
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PS 1.14; ".  إنما ينتج ويحصل أكثر بأن يدرك األجمل واألبهى واألزين باالدراك األتقن واألتم، "واللذة والسرور والغبطة
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However, knowledge through abstraction, knowledge of paltry material things, cannot
comprise the fulfillment of human intellection. To know only the sublunar world, to
remain at the level of the actual intellect, to know only through encounters with matter,
this is not knowledge of brilliant and splendid objects. Happiness occurs through
knowledge of immaterial beings.298
For al-Fārābī, this requires a two-fold intellective act. First, one abstracts from
matter. The content of this act, the first intention, is content abstracted from the deficient
world, even though, through the process of abstraction the actual intelligible the intellect
receives no longer possesses many of the deficiencies that the potential intelligible
possessed while it was enmattered.299 Nonetheless, the object of the apprehension is the
enmattered existent. However, once the human intellect apprehends the actual intelligible
qua intelligible, i.e., once it reflects upon the content of abstraction qua abstracted, the
content of the intellection functions as a second intention, i.e., the intellect is thinking,
not about objects in the world, but thoughts (even if these thoughts are themselves about
material objects).300 As al-Fārābī explains:
It is clear that when it intellects itself, inasmuch as it is itself an actual intellect,
there does not come to be in it from whatever it intellects of itself any existing
thing whose existence in itself would be different from its existence as an actual
intelligible. Instead, it will have intellected of itself an existing thing whose
existence as an intelligible is its very own existence as such. Thus, this intellect
becomes an actual intelligible, even though prior to being intellected it was not a
potential intelligible but was in fact an actual intelligible... [This] is different from
the way in which these things themselves were intellected initially; for they were
intellected initially due to being extracted from the matters in which they existed
and as potential intelligibles.301
He defines wisdom in a similar way, as ‘thinking the most excellent thing through the most excellent
knowledge’. This, of course, is a reference to the First thinking Itself. PS 1.8;
".  فإن الحكمة هي أن يعقل أفضل األشياء بأفضل علم."وكذلك في أنه حكيم
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For a similar doctrine in Aquinas, see Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae 3.6-8.
299
E.g., accidents related to time, place, quantity, etc. See EI 16-17.
300
For a discussion about al-Fārābī, the constitution of the intellect, and intentionality, see Oschman 2018.
301
EI 19.
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وبين انه اذا عقل ذاته من حيث ذاته عقل بالفعل لم يحصل له مما عقل من ذاته شيء موجود وجوده في ذاته
غير وجوده و هو معقول بالفعل بل يكون قد عقل من ذاته موجودا ما وجوده و هو معقول هو وخوده في
ذاته فاذا تصير هذه الذات معقولة بالفعل وان لم تكن فيما قبل ان تعقل معقولة بالقوة بل كانت معقولة بالفعل
 هذه األشياء بأعيانها أوال فأنها عقلت أوال على انها انتزعت عن موادها التي كان فيها وجودها وعلى انها...
302
. كانت معقوالت بالقوة
Al-Fārābī designates this state of self-intellection, a state which no longer relies on
material interactions at all, the acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafāḍ).303
Two further features concerning the acquired intellect should be noted before
turning to its status as the teleological fulfillment of the human person. First, al-Fārābī
discusses the acquired intellect as both an act, i.e., the act of forming a second intention
about a particular intelligible, and a rank, i.e., the teleological standing achieved by a
human intellect which no longer needs material objects.304 He never clearly distinguishes
between the act and the rank, the former being that by which one achieves the latter.
Nonetheless, conceptually the distinction is obvious. For example, holding a single
second intention about the concept ‘dog’ is not the same as having attained an intellectual
status which no longer requires material interactions. When al-Fārābī defines happiness
as synonymous with the acquired intellect, he surely means the latter.305
Second, the intelligible content of the acquired intellect is not only second
intentions of material objects; through acting as an efficient cause for human thought, the
Active Intellect reveals itself and becomes an intelligible for the acquired intellect. As alFārābī explains, “By means of that thing [which is given by the Active Intellect], the
rational soul intellects the active intellect...”306 As a necessary causal precondition for the
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activity of human thought, the Active Intellect is knowable to human beings.307 That said,
knowledge of the Active Intellect, or any of the other Secondary Causes, is not obtained
through abstraction (given that these existents need not be abstracted from matter, having
never been enmattered).308 And as a result, first and second intentions do not apply in the
same way to them as objects of thought, insofar as “their existence as something
intellected a second time is the same existence they had before this [acquired] intellect
[began to] intellect”.309 In other words, to think the Active Intellect, the Secondary
Causes, or the First is to have them, qua existents, as one’s intelligible content. (This
mirrors the noetic unity and delight achieved by the Secondary Causes when thinking the
First, as noted in section 2.2.). This noetic unity between the Active Intellect as object of
thought and the acquired intellect as thinker of the Active Intellect is what is meant in alFārābī’s famous discussion concerning the conjunction (ittiṣāl) of the Active Intellect and
the acquired intellect, insofar as they are united (muttaḥida).310
All told, thinking the Separate Substances (including thinking one’s own intellect
qua separated from matter and intelligibles of material things qua separated from matter)
is what al-Fārābī means by happiness (sa‘āda).311 This noetic unity between thinker and
thought, especially insofar as these thoughts are of higher, more perfect intelligibles (e.g.,
the Active Intellect and the Secondary Causes), is the telos of the human person and the
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means by which human beings can transcend materiality. And, at least at times, al-Fārābī
suggests this can occur in both this life and the next.312 As al-Fārābī explains:
And at that point [when the actual intellect intellects its own essence as intellect in
actuality], it comes to be a substance that is intellected in that it is an intelligible
insofar as it intellects. And, at that point, what intellects, what is intellected, and
intellect come to be a single thing itself in it. Through this, it becomes such as to
be in the rank of the active intellect. And when a human being obtains this rank,
his happiness is perfected.313
 فيكون حينئذ العاقل والمعقول والعقل فيه. ويكون حينئذ جوهرا ً يعقل بان يكون معقوالً من جهة ما يعقل
.  وهذا الرتبة إذا بلغها اإلنسان كملت سعادة.  فبهذا يصير في رتبة العقل الفعّال. شيئا ً واحدا ً بعينا

314

This passage is echoed in numerous places. In EI, he describes the acquired intellect as
either belonging to the same species (naw‘) or as similar to the species of the Active
Intellect.315 Any difference between the Active Intellect and the acquired intellect is only
due to the order (tartīb) by which humans know intelligibles (i.e., humans begin with
material things and move toward the First, while the Active Intellect knows the First
initially).316 He describes the acquired intellect as the ultimate happiness (al-sa‘āda alquṣwā) and the afterlife (al-ḥayāh al-’ukhrā).317 In SA, he explains that wisdom is to aim
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toward happiness in truth (al-sa‘āda fī al-ḥaqīqa) and identifies true happiness with
knowledge of the First Cause.318 In PS, the Imām who has attained the status of the
acquired intellect and united with the Active Intellect is described as the most perfect
rank (’akmal marātib) of humanity and having the highest degree of happiness (’a‘lā
darjāt al-sa‘āda).319 And in PR, he describes the human who has become the acquired
intellect as divine (’ilāhiyy) after having been material (hayūlāniyy).320
Thus, al-Fārābī’s conception of happiness is an intelligible one, as is his depiction
of the teleological fulfillment of the sublunar world. Sublunar existents are the lowest
existents in the cosmos due to their deficiency, and this is expressed most acutely in their
need for an external cause to help them become intelligible.321 As al-Fārābī explains,
returning to the passage quoted above:
By its nature and substance, the active intellect is prepared to look into everything
the heavenly body makes ready and gives. Thus it wants to make whatever accepts
transcendence and separation from material in some particular way transcend
material and privation so that it will come to be in a ranking closer to it. That is, so
that potential intelligibles become actual intelligibles and an intellect that was a
potential intellect thereby gets to be an actual intellect. It is not possible for
anything other than a human being to come to be like that. So this is the ultimate
happiness that is the most excellent perfection it is possible for a human being to
obtain. Through these two is perfected the existence of the things that remain
subsequent and that—to be drawn out into existence—need the modes such as to
draw them out into existence and the modes such as to continue their existence.322
ّ والعقل الفعّال معدّ بطبيعته وجوهره أن ينظر في ك ّل ما
ي شيء منه قبل
ّ  فأ. ي وأعطاه
ّ وطأه الجسم السماو
 وذلك.  العدم فيصير في أقرب مرتبة اليه/  رام تخليصه من المادّة ومن، بوجه ما التخلّص من المادّة ومفارقها
ًبالقوة عقال
ّ ً فمن ذلك تحصل العقل الذي كان عقال. بالقوة معقوالت بالفعل
ّ أن تصير المعقوالت التي هي
 وليس يمكن أن يصير كذلك شيء سوى اإلنسان ؛ فهذه السعادة القصوى التي هي افضل ما يمكن. بالفعل
 فعن هذين يكمل وجود األشياء التي بقيت متأخرة واحتيج إلى إخراجها إلى. اإلنسان أن يبلغه من الكمال
323
.  وبالوجوه التي شأنها أن يدوم وجودها بها، الوجود بالوجوه التي شأنها أن تخرج إلى الوجود بها
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Through the activity of the Active Intellect, and subsequently the activity of human
beings, the sublunar world is rendered intelligible and (some) human persons are able to
become immaterial.324 Those humans that are able to accomplish this, in imitation of the
First, experience the delight and happiness associated with thinking the most beautiful,
splendid, and brilliant objects.

3.2.1.1.1. Practical Dimensions of Human Happiness
That said, one nuance about al-Fārābī’s conception of happiness should be
mentioned. While most of al-Fārābī’s texts define happiness through knowing the most
perfect intelligibles, i.e., becoming the acquired intellect, he does sometimes define
happiness as a matter of practical virtue and civic fulfillment.325 For this reason, though
most scholars define happiness for al-Fārābī through the attainment of knowledge, there
are places where he acknowledges that it has a political dimension.326 The best discussion
of this dispute occurs in Miriam Galston’s Politics and Excellence, where she identifies
three distinct possible positions: 1) happiness is theoretical, 2) happiness is practical, 3)
happiness is irreducibly both theoretical and practical.327 She is right to adopt the third
position, highlighting that happiness for al-Fārābī is defined, in part, through
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governance.328 One aspect of al-Fārābī’s position that can be revealed here, while
examining his cosmology in toto, is the relationship between the practical aims of
governance, i.e., unity, and the theoretical aims of philosophy, i.e., truth. (Recall that the
distinction between cooperation, i.e., unity, and truth is only prompted by human
deficiency. In the origination of the cosmos, i.e., in the First, unity and truth are
identical).
The central conundrum is whether civic and moral virtues, i.e., the traits that
allow for cooperation, are constitutive for happiness as independent components for
happiness along with theoretical virtues, i.e., becoming the acquired intellect, or as
instrumental to theoretical virtues. Are civic and moral virtues only prerequisites for
happiness or are they distinctive constituent parts of happiness? Galston argues that both
practical and theoretical virtues are constitutive for a comprehensive view of happiness,
which is irreducible to either the theoretical or the practical dimension. As she explains:
Although there are indications to the contrary, on balance it appears that Alfarabi
views governance, and not merely political philosophy or political science, as a
constitutive part of happiness. This insight appears to be what underlies the
Farabian dictum that “philosopher,” “supreme ruler,” “king,” “lawgiver,” and
“imam” comprise one idea. This interpretation of Alfarabi’s teaching makes sense
of Alfarabi’s assertion that the two parts of philosophy have one end, even though
theoretical and practical philosophy are presented as having different ends. And it
resolves the difficulty that one can know what happiness is and fail to do it, even
though knowledge of what happiness is presupposes theoretical perfection, or
most of it.329
Her argument hinges on several passages from PS and PR which suggest that it is
possible to know happiness without aiming toward happiness and boils down to her claim
that for al-Fārābī “both theoretical and practical perfection are sought for their own sakes,
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with neither being sought for the sake of the other”.330 Attaining the level of the acquired
intellect is not alone enough for happiness. Her argument is straightforward and lucid: if
one can know happiness, as al-Fārābī claims, and not be happy, then happiness is not
reducible to knowledge. That said, her additional claim, that practical perfection is not
instrumental to theoretical perfection and is sought for its own sake seems incongruous
with al-Fārābī’s broader psychological and cosmological model.
A closer examination of the text in question, especially in context of the preceding
passage, will highlight the issue. Al-Fārābī writes, prior to his assertion that some
individuals with knowledge of happiness do not obtain happiness:
Felicity means that the human soul reaches a degree of perfection in (its)
existence where it is in no need of matter for its support, since it becomes one of
the incorporeal things and of the immaterial substances and remains in that state
continuously for ever. But its rank is beneath the rank of the Active Intellect. That
aim is achieved only by certain voluntary actions, some of which are mental and
others bodily actions, and not by indiscriminate actions but by defined and
determined actions which arise out of definite and determined dispositions and
habits, since there are voluntary actions which are an obstacle to felicity. Felicity
is the good which is pursued for its own sake and it is never at any time pursued
for obtaining something else through it, and there is nothing greater beyond it for
man to obtain. The voluntary actions which help in attaining felicity are the good
actions; and the dispositions and habits from which these actions proceed are the
‘virtues’ (faḍā’il), these being goods not for their own sake but goods for the sake
of felicity only. But the actions which are an obstacle to felicity are the bad things,
namely the evil actions, and the dispositions and habits from which these actions
arise are defects, vices and base qualities.331
 وهذه المعقوالت إنما جعلت له ليستعملها في أن.وحصول المعقوالت األولى لالنسان هو استكماله األول
 وهي أن تصير نفس االنسان من الكمال في الوجود إلى. وذلك هو السعادة. يصير إلى استكماله األخير
 وفي جملة،  وذلك أن تصير في جملة األشياء البريئة عن األجسام، حيث ال تحتاج في قوامها إلى مادة
.  إال أن رتبتها تكون دون رتبة العقل الف ّعال. وأن تبقى على تلك الحال دائما أبدا، الجواهر المفارقة للمواد
 بل،  وليست بأي أفعال اتفقت،  وبعضها أفعال بدنية،  بعضها أفعال فكرية، وإنما تبلغ ذلك بأفعال ما ارادية
 وذلك أن من األفعال االرادية ما.بأفعال ما محدودة مقدرة تحصل عن هيئات ما وملكات ما مقدّرة محدودة
 وليست تطلب أصال وال في وقت من األوقات لينال،  والسعادة هي الخير المطلوب لذاته.يعوق عن السعادة
 واألفعال االرادية التي تنفع في.  وليس وراءها شيء آخر يمكن أن يناله االنسان أعظم منها، بها شيء آخر
 وهذه. والهيئات والملكات التي تصدر عنها هذه األفعال هي الفضائل.بلوغ السعادة هي األفعال الجميلة
330
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 واألفعال التي تعوق عن السعادة هي الشرور.خيرات هي ال ألجل ذواتها بل انما هي خيرات ألجل السعادة
 والهيئات والملكات التي عنها تكون هذه األفعال هي النقائص والرذائل والخسائس. وهي األفعال القبيحة،
332
.
Here, al-Fārābī makes some definitive assertions about the role that the practical
dimensions of human life play in achieving happiness, and the proceeding passage should
be read in this context given its placement only several lines later. First, happiness is the
state of immateriality achieved by becoming the acquired intellect, cosmologically
ranked immediately below the Active Intellect. Second, the virtues are sought, not for
their own sake, but for the sake of felicity (qua immateriality). Third, despite happiness
being defined as a theoretical accomplishment, it is an aim which is achieved only
through voluntary action, insofar as there are voluntary obstacles to happiness which
must be avoided. In short, happiness is theoretical but can be thwarted by improper habits
and desires, so proper habits and desires, while outside the theoretical domain, remain for
the sake of theoretical felicity.
Returning to the passage in question, al-Fārābī’s stance becomes clearer. AlFārābī explains:
When this felicity becomes known through theoretical reason and is set up as an
aim and desired by the appetitive faculty, and when the deliberative faculty
discovers what ought to be done in order to attain that with the assistance of the
faculty of representation and the senses, and when those actions are performed by
the instruments of the appetitive faculty, the actions of man will be all good and
noble. But when felicity remains unknown, or becomes known without being set
up as an aim which is desired, and something else different from it is set up as an
aim and desired by the appetitive faculty, and the deliberative faculty has
discovered what ought to be done in order to attain it with the assistance of the
faculty of representation and the senses, and when those actions are performed by
the instruments of the appetitive faculty, the actions of man will all be ignoble.333
فإذا علمت بالقوة النظرية السعادة ونضبت غاية وتشوقت بالنزوعية واستنبطت بالقوة المرويّة ما ينبغي أن
 كانت،  ثم فعلت بآالت القوة النزوعية تلك األفعال، تعمل حتى تنال بمعاونة المتخيلة والحواس على ذلك
332
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 بل نصبت، بتشوق
 أو علمت ولم تنصب غاية،  فإذا لم تعلم السعادة.أفعال االنسان كلها خيرات وجميلة
ّ
وتشوقت بالنزوعية واستنبطت بالقوة المروية ما ينبغي أن تعمل حتى تنال الحواس
الغاية شيئا آخر سواها
ّ
334
.  كانت أفعال ذلك االنسان كلها غير جميلة،  ثم فعلت تلك األفعال بآالت القوة النزوعية، والمتخيلة
Within this context, and especially within the context of the preceding discussion of how
al-Fārābī’s cosmology brings about the sublunar world, it becomes apparent, despite
Galston’s observations, that the practical dimensions of human life can be constitutive of
happiness as an irreducible component of happiness while also an instrumental good for
theoretical perfection. It is true that theoretical, intellectual perfection alone is not enough
for happiness, but this is because human beings, composed as they are through a mixture
of matter and contrary forms brought about through the contrary motions of the heavens
(which are themselves caused by the deficiency of embodiment), are not purely intellect.
Happiness, irreducibly, has a practical component because living human beings,
irreducibly, have, along with intellects, bodies. And while these bodies, when wellordered, are ruled by the rational faculty, they are composed of numerous deficient
faculties, the appetitive and representative faculties chief among them, that need
unification through habituation toward virtue.335 And while practical virtue alone cannot
be sufficient for happiness, at least in this life, neither is the acquired intellect alone
sufficient to rule the whole human being without proper education, habituation, and
will.336 Like the celestial souls, whose intellectual perfection is marred by their thinking
their substratum (mawḍū‘a) which is itself teleologically stifled by the condition of
embodiment, human beings do not transcend bodily needs even if they transcend thinking
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in a material way.337 However, a well-ordered body, even if still a deficiency, is preferable
to the alternative and necessary for happiness, just as the circular motions of the heavens,
while deficient, are preferable to stillness or disordered motion. Practical virtue is
irreducibly constitutive of happiness, but only insofar as practical vice is an obstacle
toward theoretical perfection.
Moreover, while Galston raises her challenge with the most difficult case, namely,
justifying practical virtue for the individual who has already obtained theoretical
perfection, the role of practical virtue as instrumental for achieving the state of the
acquired intellect is more apparent. Recall that for al-Fārābī, the development of moral
character ought to precede the study of philosophy; the philosophical life is concomitant
with habituation toward virtue.338 In addition, the most important of these virtues (faḍā’il)
is the deliberative virtue (al-quwwa al-fikrīa), which governs practical matters, and the
most important form of deliberation is the political deliberative virtue (al-quwwa al-fikrīa
al-madaniyya), which governs practical matters for whole cities and nations.339 AlFārābī’s account of happiness cannot be reduced to a solipsistic account; he has no model
like Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqzan which posits a human in isolation reaching his own
felicity on the merit of his perfection alone.340 As al-Fārābī explains:
Indeed man arrives at the ultimate perfection (whereby he attains that which
renders him truly substantial) only when he labors with these principles toward
achieving this perfection. Moreover, he cannot labor toward this perfection except
by exploiting a large number of natural beings and until he manipulates them to
render them useful to him for arriving at the ultimate perfection he should
achieve. Furthermore, it will become evident to him in this science that each man
337
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achieves only a portion of that perfection, and what he achieves of this portion
varies in its extent, for an isolated individual cannot achieve all the perfections by
himself and without the aid of many other individuals. It is the innate disposition
(fiṭra) of every man to join another human being or other men in the labor he
ought to perform: this is the condition of every single man. Therefore, to achieve
what he can of that perfection, every man needs to stay in the neighborhood of
others and associate with them.341
وذلك أن اإلنسان إنما يصير إلى الكمال األقصى الذي له ما يتجوهر به في الحقيقة إذا سعى عن هذه
المبادىء نحو بلوغ هذا الكمال وليس يمكنه أن يسعى نحوه إال باستعمال أشياء كثيرة من الموجودات
الطبيعية وإلى أن يفعل فيها أفعاالً تصير بها تلك الطبيعيات نافقة له في أن يبلغ الكمال األقصى الذي سبيله
 ويتبين له مع ذلك في هذا العلم أن كل إنسان إنما ينال من ذلك الكمال قسطا ً ما وإن ما يبلغه من. أن يناله
ذلك القسط كان أزيد أو أنقص إذ جميع الكماالت ليس يمكن أن يبلغها وحده بانفراده دون معاونة ناس
 وإن فطرة كل إنسان أن يكون مرتبطا ً فيما ينبغي أن يسعى له بإنسان أو ناس غيره وكل إنسان.كثيرين له
 وإنه كذلك يحتاج كل إنسان فيما له أن يبلغ من هذا الكمال إلى مجاورة ناس آخرين.من الناس بهذه الحال
342
. واجتماعه معهم
Prior to becoming acquired intellect, the human being is human qua sublunar existent;
she requires association and requires the moral development which allows philosophical
study to proceed.343 It is part of her natural character (fiṭra). Put simply, while happiness
is purely intellectual for al-Fārābī, political association and practical moral development
are necessary, irreducible preconditions for intellectual happiness.

3.2.1.2. The Revealed-as-Determined Model
Before finally turning to the culmination of al-Fārābī’s model for beneficent
political deception in light of his cosmology, namely, both how beneficent political
deception comes about and the role political deception plays in the development of the
community, one final idiosyncratic feature of the Active Intellect, as found in the Perfect

341

AH 14.
AH (Ar.) 15-16.
343
How the originary Imām is able to transcend his circumstances by achieving happiness and legislating,
despite his birth into a city of nation which has yet to establish true religion (milla ṣaḥīḥa) is something alFārābī never addresses, although a gradual developmental account could perhaps be reconstructed from his
thoughts in BL 140-147.
342

199
State, should be noted. Whereas elsewhere al-Fārābī only credits the Active Intellect for
the bestowal of intellectual powers to human beings, thereby consigning the
establishment of religious images to the Imām through an act of invention or construction
(ikhtara‘a), in PS, religious images are given, through emanation (fayḍ), to the Imām’s
representative faculty (quwwa al- mutakhayyila) through the mediation (tawassaṭa) of the
Active Intellect and the acquired intellect by God.344 This doctrine of religion as
revelation (waḥy), as opposed to religion as construction, is mirrored elsewhere in PS by
an elaborate model to justify the existence of divination (nubuwwa), as I will discuss
below.345 This model, henceforth called the ‘Revealed-as-Determined’ model, stands in
sharp contrast to the titular ‘Construction of Social Knowledge’ model discussed below,
which is more representative of al-Fārābī’s thought.346 That said, as will be seen in
Chapter 4, the Revealed-as-Determined model gains parlance with later thinkers, with
Maimonides even constructing an amalgamation between the two approaches.347
At PS 15.10, al-Fārābī introduces that it is God, not the Imām, who bestows
religious images on a nation (although the Active Intellect, acquired intellect, and
representative faculty mitigate their reception). He explains:
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The English terminology for these distinct categories has shifted, partially due to al-Fārābī’s
idiosyncratic usage. Nubuwwa literally means prophecy, for example in the Qur’anic epithet (Qur’an
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When this occurs in both parts of his rational faculty, namely the theoretical and
the practical rational faculties, and also in his representative faculty, then it is this
man who receives Divine Revelation (yūḥī) , and God Almighty grants him
Revelation through the mediation (tawassaṭa) of the Active Intellect, so that the
emanation from God Almighty to the Active Intellect is passed on to his Passive
Intellect through the mediation of the Acquired Intellect, and then to the faculty of
representation. Thus he is, through the emanation from the Active Intellect to his
Passive Intellect, a wise man and a philosopher and an accomplished thinker who
employs an intellect of divine quality, and through the emanation from the Active
Intellect to his faculty of representation a visionary prophet (al-mutakhayyila
nabiyyan): who warns of things to come and tells of particular things which exist
at present.348
 كان هذا،  ثم في قوته المتخيلة،  وهما النظرية والعملية، وإذا حصل ذلك في كال جزئي قوته الناطقة
 فيكون ما يفيض من،  يوحي إليه بتوسّط العقل الفعّال،  عز وجل، ّللا
ّ  فيكون.االنسان هو الذي يوحى إليه
 ثم إلى،  إلى العقل الفعّال يفيضه العقل الفعّال إلى عقله المنفعل بتوسّط العقل المستفاد،  تبارك وتعالى، ّللا
ّ
 فيكون بما يفيض منه إلى عقله المنفعل حكيما فيلسوفا ومتعقال على التمام وبما يفيض منه إلى.قوته المتخيلة
349
.  بوجود يعقل فيه اإللهي، قوته المتخيلة نبيا منذرا بما سيكون ومخبرا بما هو اآلن (عن) الجزئيات
Here, God (i.e., the First) emanates something, through the chain of Secondary Causes
(even if not stated explicitly here), to the imaginative faculty, using the Active Intellect
and the perfected acquired intellect as intermediaries. The result of this emanation upon
the human person is two-fold: first, the rational faculty is perfected and the recipient
receives revelation (waḥy); second, the perfected imaginative faculty of the recipient
receives images, what al-Fārābī calls prophecy or, more accurately in context, divination
(nubuwwa). The former is identified as nothing more (or less) than the state of being a
wise person (ḥakīm) or philosopher (faylasūf). The latter hearkens back to al-Fārābī’s
previous discussion of divination (nubuwwa).
At PS 14.7, al-Fārābī introduces a peculiar activity of the Active Intellect upon the
sublunar world, especially given his otherwise economical account of the role the Active
Intellect plays. He explains that sometimes the Active Intellect provides intelligibles
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directly to the representative faculty of individuals, whether they have perfected rational
faculties or not, and calls this divination (nubuwwa). He explains:
Since it has been made clear that the Active Intellect is the cause of the potential
intelligibles becoming actual and of the potential intellect becoming actual; and
that it is the rational faculty which is made to become actually intellect; and that
there are two forms (species) of the rational faculty, theoretical and practical, and
that the function of practical reason is to direct action towards present and future
particulars, and that of theoretical reason to become aware of the intelligibles
which cannot be translated into action; and since the faculty of representation is
closely connected with the two forms (species) of the rational faculty —for what
the rational faculty obtains from the Active Intellect (which is to it as light is to
sight) emanates sometimes from the Active Intellect to the faculty of
representation —it follows that the Active Intellect acts in some way upon the
faculty of representation as well, by providing it sometimes with the intelligibles
whose proper place is in theoretical reason, and sometimes with particulars in the
form of sensibles whose proper place is in practical reason. It receives the
intelligibles by imitating them with those sensibles which it puts together, and
receives the particulars, which are usually produced by practical reason through
deliberation, sometimes by representing them as they are and sometimes by
imitating them with other sensibles. Some of those particulars are present, and
some arise in the future, but all of them reach the faculty of representation without
the intervention of deliberation. It is for this reason that such things can also be
present in the faculty of representation without having been discovered by
deliberation, and so true visions will arise from the particulars which the Active
Intellect gives to the faculty of representation in dreams. But divinations
concerning things divine will arise from the intelligibles provided by the Active
Intellect, which it receives by taking their imitations (muḥākāt) instead.350
 وأن يصير،  لما كان هو السبب في أن تصير به المعقوالت التي هي بالقوة معقوالت بالفعل، والعقل الفعّال
 وكانت الناطقة،  وكان ما سبيله أن يصير عقال بالفعل هي القوة الناطقة، ما هو عقل بالقوة عقال بالفعل
 وكانت العملية هي التي شأنها أن تفعل الجزئيات الحاضرة،  ضربا نظريا وضربا عمليا: ضربين
 وكانت القوة المتخيلة،  والنظرية هي التي شأنها أن تعقل المعقوالت التي شأنها أن تعلم، والمستقبلة
 فان الذي تنال القوة الناطقة عن العقل الفعّال ـ وهو الشيء الذي منزلته، مواصلة لضربي القوة الناطقة
 تعطيه،  فيكون للعقل الفعّال في القوة المتخيلة فعل ما.الضياء من البصر ـ قد يفيض منه على القوة المتخيلة
 وأحيانا الجزئيات المحسوسات التي شأنها أن، أحيانا المعقوالت التي شأنها أن تحصل في الناطقة النظرية
. فتقبل (القوة المتخيلة) المعقوالت بما يحاكيها من المحسوسات التي تركبها هي، تحصل في الناطقة العملية
 وهذه هي التي شأن،  وأحيانا بأن تحاكيها بمحسوسات أخر، وتقبل الجزئيات أحيانا بأن تتخيلها كما هي
 إال أن ما يحصل للقوة المتخيلة. ومنها كائنة في المستقبل،  فمنها حاضرة.الناطقة العملية أن تعملها بالروية
 فيكون ما يعطيه العقل. فلذلك يحصل في هذه األشياء بعد أن يستنبط بالرويّة. بال توسط روية، من هذه كلها
 بالمنامات والرؤيات الصادقة؛ وبما يعطيها من المعقوالت التي تقبلها، الفعّال للقوة المتخيلة من الجزئيات
351
. بأن يأخذ محاكاتها مكانها بالكهانات على األشياء اإللهية
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This passage is likely in conversation with the Arabic Parva Naturalia, particularly On
Divination in Sleep as likely translated and edited by the al-Kindī circle, which represents
a significant departure from Aristotle’s text.352 Whereas Aristotle describes the predictive
accuracy of dreams as “mere coincidences”, that such dreams “are not sent from God”,
that these kind of dreams are experienced in inferior persons, and that the dreamers’
success in these matters are “like that of persons who play at dice”, the only extent copy
of the Arabic On Divination in Sleep takes the predictive power of dreams very seriously,
insisting that they come, not from the human acquired intellect, but the Universal
Intellect, influencing al-Fārābī’s passage above.353 That said, this position is peculiar for
al-Fārābī. While he does link the imagination closely to the rational faculty, giving some
justification for his contention that the Active Intellect can act directly upon the faculty of
representation, insofar as the imagination is ruled by the rational faculty and the
imagination can imitate the intelligibles given to it by the rational faculty, two aspects of
this passage are hard to reconcile with his broader philosophy, beyond its aforementioned
inflationary description of the activities of the Active Intellect.354 First, while the faculty
of representation serves as the intermediary between intellect and sensation, is ruled by
the rational faculty, and is capable of receiving intelligibles from the rational faculty (as
images), al-Fārābī does not inextricably link thought and representation. Unlike Aristotle
in De Anima 3.3, who suggests that thought, in part, depends upon imagination, al-Fārābī

352
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makes no such claim.355 For, while it is parsimonious with al-Fārābī’s broader
psychology (beyond the idiosyncratic aspects of the Active Intellect providing
intelligibles to the human person directly) to suggest that that which supplies the intellect
with intelligibles also supplies images (muḥākāt) to the representative faculty (insofar as
the former can be translated into the latter), there is no obvious reason to assume a similar
psychological model for translation sans the acquired intellect as a mediator. Put simply,
despite al-Fārābī’s conjecture that from his psychological model it follows that the Active
Intellect can act directly on the imagination, this remains nebulous. Secondly, the
outcomes of divination, e.g., knowledge of present particulars (al-ḥāḍira al-juzay’āt) and
future particulars (al-mustaqbal al-juzay’āt), seem discordant with al-Fārābī’s other
commitments, e.g., the Active Intellect’s ignorance of particulars and the logical
indeterminacy of future events.356 This passage, the only place where al-Fārābī adopts
divination as philosophically defensible, remains enigmatic and worthy of study, despite
the plethora of literature already devoted to the topic.357
Yet, al-Fārābī’s model for divination raises some important aspects about the way
that intelligibles (ma‘qulāt) and images (muḥākāt) relate to one another, for both the
Revealed-as-Determined and the Construction of Social Knowledge models of religion.

Kemal, relying on al-Fārābī’s commitment to an Aristotelian method, contends that he does, but
provides no proof text beyond the texts of Aristotle. Kemal 2003, 40f. And al-Fārābī is careful to
distinguish between thought and images in LDI. See LDI 10-11; LDI (Ar.) 24.
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Regarding the first case, al-Fārābī is clear in numerous places that the acquired intellect is similar to the
rank of Active Intellect insofar as it has knowledge of universals and is free from matter. The only
intelligibles al-Fārābī ever describes the Active Intellect as thinking are other Separated Substances. In
short, it is unclear how the Active Intellect could provide the imagination with any kind of particular, given
that the Active Intellect does not itself know particulars. See Section 3.2.1.1; PS 3.10; PR 34; and Note
103. Regarding the second case, al-Fārābī seems to deny the determinacy of future events as a result of the
inherent contingency of human will and choice. See PS 2.1; LDI 83-96; LDI (Ar. 89-100). See also
Adamson 2006; cf. Terkan 2004; Marmura 1985; Rescher 1963.
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First, these images which represent sensibles and intelligibles, even divine things (al’ashyā’ al-’ilāhiyya), are received without deliberation; the images received arise in the
representative faculty prior to understanding their meaning.358 And, in the case of
individuals who lack a perfected rational faculty, but have a perfected representative
faculty, these images can appear without understanding.359 Second, these images are
assembled according to the limitations of the representative faculty which receives them,
beings themselves imitations of what is provided by the Active Intellect, but comprised of
sensibles which are already present in the representative faculty.360 The capacity of an
individual’s representative faculty limits the images it is able to represent, and, in the case
of intelligibles, it simply imitates them with the most appropriate sensibles available.361
And third, the appropriateness of an imitation is based upon the correspondence between
the excellence (’afḍal) of the sensibles (maḥsūsāt) and the excellence (’afḍal) of the
intelligibles (ma‘qulāt).362 Put otherwise, as there is a universal aesthetic ranking for
intelligibles (with the First being the most beautiful, excellent, and perfect), there is a
universal aesthetic ranking for sensibles.363 And the most perfect intelligibles should be
represented by the most perfect (’akmal), excellent (’afḍal), and good (ḥasana) things.364
Likewise, defective (nāqiṣa) intelligibles should be represented by the most defective
(’anqas) and most base (’aḳass) sensibles.365 And, analogous to the happiness and delight

In al-Fārābī’s works on poetry, he stipulates that the best poetry occurs spontaneously. This passage
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which occurs through thinking the most perfect intelligibles, representing the most
perfect intelligibles in the imagination brings about wonderful and great pleasure (laḏḏa
‘ajīb ‘aẓīm).366 So, while a perfect imaginative faculty could represent a beautiful
intelligible with any number of beautiful images, it would be amiss and erroneous to
represent a beautiful intelligible with a base image and vice versa. (For example, alFārābī uses the illustration of appropriately representing the base concept of matter
variously with the base images of water, abyss, or darkness, using the myths of the
Timaeus as a model for this kind of representation.)367 This accounts for the possible
plurality of true religions, while still having a means by which to appraise the
appropriateness of religious representation. It also explains why certain religious images
can be more appropriate for specific nations, but still universally fitting, insofar as the
Imām can represent philosophical truths in a variety of appropriate ways.
In this context, returning to the Revealed-as-Determined Model, what al-Fārābī
calls revelation (waḥy), the doctrine in the aforementioned passage at PS 15.10 is made
clearer. Regarding the representative faculty, both the recipient of divination (nubuwwa)
and the recipient of revelation (waḥy) possess a perfected imagination. And in both cases,
the Active Intellect acts upon the representative faculty, generating sensible images of
intelligibles (although for the recipient of revelation, the acquired intellect mediates this
process). Neither the diviner nor the recipient of revelation invents the images; they are
revealed to their imaginations as determined (muqaddara) by God (through the mediation
of the Active Intellect).368 But whereas the diviner receives images and images only, not
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understanding the images, the recipient of revelation is a wise person (ḥakīm) and a
philosopher (faylasūf). He understands the intelligibles which inspire the images, even if
he receives the images without deliberation. He receives the images first and understands
them after reflection. The diviner receives the images entirely without understanding.

3.2.2. Extrapolations from the Role of the Active Intellect
On the whole, the Active Intellect effects providence (‘ināya) over the sublunar
world and especially human beings, being the trustworthy (al-amīn) and holy spirit (rūh
al-qudus).369 While limited in its activity by that which the celestial bodies prepare, the
teleological fulfillment of human beings as actual intellects and non-human sublunar
existents as actual intelligibles is only possible through its activity. That said, this is a
significant limitation; humans, as embodied, need both a well-ordered community and
good luck to even be in a state upon which the Active Intellect can fully act.370 For this
reason, at least in PS, the Active Intellect emanates intelligibles directly to the
imaginative faculty of perfected individuals, revealing determined images by which they
can set up a well-ordered community. In other words, in PS, the Active Intellect helps
foster human felicity by fostering wise rule. However, in other places in al-Fārābī’s
corpus, the providence of the Active Intellect is limited to the powers for intellection, and
it is the responsibility of the philosopher, the Imām, to legislate by creating images which
foster cooperation and give citizens a semblance of the truth.
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4. The Imām and Beneficent Political Deception
In Chapter 2, Figure 2.1.1.1, a model of beneficent political deception was
presented which showed why the Imām of the city must resort to beneficent deception,
rather than truth, to legislate and educate the denizens of his city. Namely, beneficent
deception is a means by which to impose order on what is naturally disordered. In this
chapter, it has been shown why human society has a tendency toward disorder,
specifically that at the level of sublunar existence deficiency has an outsized effect on
sublunar existents. Only the providence of the Active Intellect offers the hope of
teleological fulfillment through intelligibility. The model can now be updated to look as
such:
Figure 4

But whereas it has been explained a) how the cosmos originates in unity and truth via the
First, b) how the intelligibility and order of the cosmos is accounted for in the emulation
of the First by the Secondary Causes, c) how deficiency originates in the cosmos through
the motions of the heavens, d) how this deficiency constitutes the existence of the
existents of the sublunar world, and e) how the Active Intellect, despite the deficiency of
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its charge, acts upon the sublunar world, rendering it intelligible, the actual mechanisms
by which beneficent political deception imposes order on what it naturally disordered
have yet to be discussed.

4.1. The Imām as Translator
Recall that for al-Fārābī, beneficent political deception is a mechanism by which
the founding ruler of a city, the Imām, creates images, expressed through language as a
kind of new vernacular, in order to express universal truths demonstrated through
philosophy to those without philosophical talents or skills, a vernacular composed of
these selfsame images and laws which are justified through these images, a vernacular
called religion )milla).371 Al-Fārābī envisions a healthy polis as a city ruled by a wise
man who is simultaneously a philosopher, a visionary prophet, and the owner of a
perfected representative faculty. This Imām, understanding that many citizens are
themselves unable to encounter truth directly through science and demonstration, is
charged, nonetheless, with communicating truth to his citizenry. Thus, this Imām must
somehow translate philosophical truths to those who cannot themselves assess the
validity of demonstrations, via his perfected intellect and representative faculty, in order
to rouse citizens’ imaginations by well-chosen words. In this function, the Imām must be
a philosopher qua poet, who establishes laws, myths, and images which are, strictly
speaking, not true, but are nonetheless similitudes of the truth. He must translate
demonstrable truths into the imagery of religion, and, when the Imām does so, al-Fārābī
insists that the former can be known through the latter.

Al-Fārābī calls these justifications jurisprudence (fiqh). ES 107; BR 50. See also PS 15.13; SA 58; BL
109-112; PR 80-81.
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Unfortunately, al-Fārābī never clearly explicates how demonstrable truths, i.e.,
propositional truths, can be translated faithfully into the symbols and laws of religious
imagery.372 In some ways, his account is lacking specificity. For all his discussion of the
Imām, he never devotes any texts about how this translation, a translation from
proposition to image, from universal to particular, from immaterial to material, occurs,
other than pointing to the perfection of the Imām’s representative faculty, as discussed
above.373 He never explains how intelligibles can be appropriately translated into sensible
images, instead simply gesturing to some common characteristics of excellence and
perfection held by both the intelligibles and sensibles.

4.1.1. Revealed as Determined versus Construction of Social Knowledge
In other ways, his account is overabundant. As mentioned previously, PS adopts
the Revealed-as-Determined Model, a model for the origin of religion, also mentioned in
BR, which credits the genesis of the images of religion to the activity of the Active
Intellect.374 In AH, al-Fārābī adopts the Construction of Social Knowledge model,
emphasizing that the Imām deliberately translates the demonstrations of philosophy into
the images consumed by the multitude, describing him as inventing (ikhtara‘a( the
images.375 He does not mention emanation (fayḍ) at all in this context.376 This seems to
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be the model adopted in BL also, which describes religion as something established as
human (’insāniyya).377 And PR merely discusses the need for a king to establish laws and
images, focusing on the images themselves, not the translation process.378 In BR, aside
from the aforementioned passage which distinguishes between the Revealed-asDetermined model and the Construction of Social Knowledge model for the origination
of religion, he again focuses primarily on the images and the laws themselves, not the
translation from philosophy into images and laws. And, as he does elsewhere, he focuses
on the proper procedure for following a religion after the first ruler dies without
determining all proper courses of human action.379 The places where al-Fārābī is most
clear about the role of symbols and imagery are in his texts on poetry, but here revelation
and religion are not discussed. Instead, poetry is analyzed, described as both, strictly
speaking, false (kaḏba) and as a kind of syllogism (sulujismus) which causes the hearer to
imagine a proposition which is like the truth.380 He even describes these poetic syllogisms
as having the power of analogy (quwwa qiyās), a term which carries a juridical
connotation, as analogy (qiyas) is the method used by certain schools of Islamic
Jurisprudence to extrapolate from existing laws contained within the Qur’ān and Sunnah
in order to apply this analogical reasoning to novel scenarios.381 All told, establishing a
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definitive Fārābīan position for the origin of religious images is impossible, given the
scattered and dissonant variations of his discussion of the topic.
But largely speaking, his texts on this issue can be grouped into 3 positions: a)
texts which support the Revealed-as-Determined model, b) texts which support the
Construction of Social Knowledge model, and c) neutral texts. (BR, while clearly in the
neutral category, explicitly supports both of the other models as viable possibilities and
even suggests that they represent two distinct phenomena, not competing models.)382 But,
while it would be a mistake to collapse the distinction between these two models, it is
also a mistake to read them as radically distinct. While these texts differ as to whether the
Active Intellect, through the mediation of the acquired intellect, or the acquired intellect
alone, provide intelligibles to the representative faculty which translates these
intelligibles into sensible images, both models rely upon the same fundamental
psychological and linguistic presumptions about the relationship between the intellect and
the imagination and intelligibles and sensible images, respectively. As al-Fārābī explains
in PR, which does not explicitly espouse the Revealed-as-Determined model, insofar as
the Active Intellect is essential for human psychology, giving the Imām the principle for
intellection as well as a faculty for seizing definitions and knowing happiness, “it is
possible due to this to say that the first cause is what brings about revelation to this
human being by the intermediary of the Active Intellect.”383 Needless to say, this chapter
will not establish a definitive reading of al-Fārābī’s model for beneficent political
deception regarding the translation of intelligibles into sensible images, although the
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Construction of Social Knowledge model is certainly the more prevalent model in his
texts and will be the focus henceforward.384 His texts are simply unclear about the issue.

4.1.2. Markers of Translation
However, what is clear is that a sort of translation occurs, starting with certain
truths and ending in images (although, to my knowledge, he never uses the term
‘translation’ himself). It is essential for the Fārābīan project that what occurs is a
translation, not a mere deceit, not a Noble Lie (at least as exemplified by the Phoenician
Tale). Because, while al-Fārābī clearly draws on Plato for his doctrine (who he reads
more charitably on this issue than perhaps Plato deserves), and while al-Fārābī’s Imām is
the “more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller” described in Republic 3,
“one who would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in
accordance with the patterns… laid down”, al-Fārābī’s conception of religion does not
parallel the Phoenician Story of the Republic.385 Unlike the Phoenician Tale which
famously establishes a class system of gold, silver, and bronze citizens and is intended to
deceive the citizenry in order to maintain the established hierarchical order, al-Fārābī’s
religion is itself a form of education. What makes it a translation, a beneficent deception,
rather than a mere lie, is that it can be translated back. Proper translations are not
unidirectional. This is vital, not only for the ethical justifiability of al-Fārābī’s own
project, but for the justification of those who adopt al-Fārābī’s insight: e.g., Avicenna,
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Averroes, Maimonides, and even Ibn Ṭufayl, who is otherwise distrustful of anything alFārābī has to say on religion (or, frankly, philosophy outside of logic).386 Like al-Fārābī,
these thinkers view religion as an imagistic translation of the truths of philosophy (though
they vary, like al-Fārābī’s texts, as to whether the translation is revealed to the prophet or
invented by the prophet, e.g., Ibn Ṭufayl and Avicenna hold the former position, though
in distinct manners, Averroes the latter, and Maimonides adopts an amalgamation
between the two).387 It is doubly vital for the Latin reception of al-Fārābī’s insight, as the
critique of Averroes, as well as Latin Averroists like Siger of Brabant, particularly that
they had adopted a doctrine of some sort of ‘double truth’, are a misunderstanding of alFārābī’s doctrine (as mediated by Averroes).388 If philosophy and religion do not express
the selfsame truth, if it is not a translation, then the Latin critiques are warranted.389
Having laid out some of the broader issues at play, let us now focus on exactly
how and why al-Fārābī’s translation project occurs, and more importantly, how the
Imām’s translation from philosophy to religion prompts a corresponding translation in
some citizens, going from religion back to philosophy. Al-Fārābī explains in AH:
Once the images (makhīla) representing the theoretical things (al-’ashīā’ alnaẓariyya) demonstrated in the theoretical sciences are produced in the souls of
the multitude (fī nufūs al-jamāhīr) and they are made to assent (al-taṣdīq) to their
images, and once the practical things (together with the conditions of the
possibility of their existence) take hold of their souls and dominate them so that
they are unable to resolve to do anything else, then the theoretical and practical
things (al-’ashīā’ al-naẓariyya wa al-‘amaliyyā) are realized (qad ḥaṣalat). Now
these things are philosophy (falsafa) when they are in the soul of the legislator (fī
For these thinkers’ reception of the Fārābīan Doctrine of Beneficent Political Deception, see Chapter 4,
3. For Ibn Ṭufayl’s critique of al-Fārābī, see Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzan, 13-14.
387
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nafs wāḍi‘ al-nawāmīs). They the religion )milla) when they are in the souls of
the multitude (fī nufūs al-jamāhīr). For when the legislator knows these things (fī
‘ilm wāḍi‘ al-nawāmīs), they are evident to him by sure insight (baṣīra yaqīnīa),
whereas what is established in the souls of the multitude (fī nufūs al-jamāhīr) is
through an image (mutakhayyl) and a persuasive argument (’iqnā‘). Although it is
the legislator who also represents (yatakhayyalu) these things (hāḏihi al-’ashīā’)
through images, neither the images (mutakhayylāt) nor the persuasive arguments
(muqanna‘āt) are intended for himself. As far as he is concerned, they are certain
(balla yaqīnīa li-hu). He is the one who invents )ikhtara‘a( the images
(mutakhayylāt) and the persuasive arguments (muqanna‘āt), but not for the sake
of establishing these things in his own soul (al-’ashīā’ fī nafs) as a religion for
himself (malaka li-hu). No, the images (mutakhayyl) and the persuasive
arguments (’iqnā‘) are intended for others, whereas, so far as he is concerned,
these things are certain (yaqin). They are a religion for others, whereas, so far as
he is concerned, they are philosophy (falsafa). Such, then, is true philosophy (alfalsafa bi-l-ḥaqīqa) and the true philosopher (al-faylasūf bi-l-ḥaqīqa).390
ْ
 وأوقع،حصلت [هذه] األشيء النظرية التي تبرهنت في العلوم النظرية مخيلة في نفوس الجمهور
و متى
ْ
ْ
واستولت
وحصلت األشياء العملية بشرائطها التي بها وجودها ممكنة في نفوسهم
التصديق بما تخيّل منها
ْ
ْ
،حصلت األشياء النظرية والعملية تلك
وصارت عزائمهم ال تنهضم نحو فعل شيءٍ آخر غيرها؛ فقد
،عليها
 وذلك. إذا كانت في نفوس الجمهور فهي ملة،وهذه بأعيانها إذا كانت في نفس واضع النواميس فهي فلسفة
ّ
، والتي تم ّكن في نفوس الجمهور متخيّ ٌل وإقناع،أن الذي يُبيّن هذه في علم واضع النواميس بصيرة يقينية
ّ على
 وهو، وال المقنعات فيه؛ بل يقينية له، ليست المتخيالت له،أن واضع النواميس يتخيّل أيضا ً هذه األشياء
 <إنما> على انّها،الذي اخترع المتخيالت والمقنعات ال ليم ّكن بها تلك األشياء في نفسه على أنّها ملكةٌ له
 فهذه هي الفلسفة بالحقيقة والفيلسوف.وعلى أنها <مِ لّة> وله هو فلسفة،متخيل وإقناع لغيره ويقين له
391
.بالحقيقة
Here al-Fārābī lays out the basic structure for translation from demonstrable truths to
images, beginning with the nature of the Imām’s knowledge and proceeding to the nature
of the reception of the images within the souls of the multitude (fī nufūs al-jamāhīr). The
Imam knows all that can be known through the demonstrative science (burhan), both
theoretical and practical. And these things are certain (yaqīn), as he has had a certain
insight (baṣīra yaqīnīa). Certitude (yaqīn) is a technical term for al-Fārābī, having very
particular epistemological conditions (at least insofar as it is absolute), namely 1) belief,
2) agreement between the belief and the external world, 3) knowledge of the
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correspondence between the belief and the external world, 4) that the untruth of the
aforementioned correspondence is impossible, 5) that the truth of this belief is timeless,
and 6) the essentiality of the truth of this belief.392 While al-Fārābī does not say here that
the Imām’s certainty is absolute, his emphasis of yaqīn in the passage should be read as
an emphasis of the Imām’s demonstrative knowledge (which he also discusses) and the
nature of this knowledge: universal, immaterial, and propositional. Moreover, his
insistence that the images the Imām invents are not necessary for his own soul, not
required as what Butterworth translates as ‘a religion for himself’ (malaka li-hu), but
should be more literally read as ‘a disposition for himself’, means that no new knowledge
is created through the process of this translation (contra the Revealed-as-Determined
model, in which the Active Intellect provides something to the Imām). The Imām has a
perfected intellect through the normal process of empirical knowledge, abstraction, and
demonstration, the selfsame knowledge that any philosopher could have.
This excerpt is preceded in AH by a similar passage, where al-Fārābī emphasizes
the responsibility the Imām has to provide some semblance of truth to those who could
not otherwise attain it. He says:
When the theoretical sciences are isolated and their possessor does not have the
faculty for exploiting them for the benefit of others, they are defective philosophy.
To be a truly perfect philosopher (al-faylasūf al-kāmil) one has to possess both the
theoretical sciences and the faculty for exploiting them for the benefit of all others
according to their capacity. Were one to consider the case of the true philosopher,
he would find no difference between him and the supreme ruler. For he who
possesses the faculty for exploiting what is comprised by the theoretical matters
for the benefit of all others possesses the faculty for making such matters
intelligible as well as for bringing into actual existence those of them that depend
on the will. The greater his power to do the latter, the more perfect is his
philosophy. Therefore he who is truly perfect possesses with sure insight (baṣīra
yaqīnīa), first, the theoretical virtues, and subsequently the practical. Moreover,
he possesses the capacity for bringing them about in nations and cities in the
392
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manner and the measure possible with reference to each. Since it is impossible for
him to possess the faculty for bringing them about except by employing certain
demonstrations (barāhīn yaqīnīa), persuasive methods, as well as methods that
represent things through images, and this either with the consent of others or by
compulsion, it follows that the true philosopher is himself the supreme ruler.
Every instruction is composed of two things: (a) making what is being studied
comprehensible and causing its idea to be established in the soul and (b) causing
others to assent (taṣdīq) to what is comprehended and established in the soul.
There are two ways of making a thing comprehensible: first, by causing its
essence to be perceived by the intellect, and second, by causing it to be imagined
(yatakhayyala) through the similitude (mithāl) that imitates it. Assent (taṣdīq),
too, is brought about by one of two methods, either the method of certain
demonstration or the method of persuasion (’iqnā‘). Now when one acquires
knowledge of the beings or receives instruction in them, if he perceives their ideas
themselves with his intellect, and his assent (taṣdīq) to them is by means of
certain demonstration, then the science that comprises these cognitions is
philosophy. But if they are known by imagining them through similitudes
(mithālāt) that imitate them, and assent (taṣdīq) to what is imagined of them is
caused by persuasive methods, then the ancients call what comprises these
cognitions religion (milla). And if those intelligibles themselves are adopted, and
persuasive methods are used, then the religion comprising them is called popular,
generally accepted, and external philosophy. Therefore, according to the ancients,
religion is an imitation of philosophy. Both comprise the same subjects and both
give an account of the ultimate principles of the beings. For both supply
knowledge about the first principle and cause of the beings, and both give an
account of the ultimate end for the sake of which man is made—that is, supreme
happiness (al-sa‘āda al-quṣwā)—and the ultimate end of every one of the other
beings. In everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual
perception or conception, religion gives an account based on imagination. In
everything demonstrated by philosophy, religion employs persuasion. Philosophy
gives an account of the ultimate principles (that is, the essence of the first
principle and the essences of the incorporeal second principles), as they are
perceived by the intellect. Religion sets forth their images by means of similitudes
of them taken from corporeal principles and imitates them by their likenesses
among political offices. It imitates the divine acts by means of the functions of
political offices. It imitates the actions of natural powers and principles by their
likenesses among the faculties, states, and arts that have to do with the will, just as
Plato does in the Timaeus. It imitates the intelligibles by their likenesses among
the sensibles: for instance, some imitate matter by abyss or darkness or water, and
nothingness by darkness. It imitates the classes of supreme happiness—that is, the
ends of the acts of the human virtues—by their likenesses among the goods that
are believed to be the ends. It imitates the classes of true happiness by means of
the ones that are believed to be happiness. It imitates the ranks of the beings by
their likenesses among spatial and temporal ranks. And it attempts to bring the
similitudes of these things as close as possible to their essences. Also, in
everything of which philosophy gives an account that is demonstrative and
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certain, religion gives an account based on persuasive arguments. Finally,
philosophy is prior to religion in time.393
ْ
حصلت له ،قوة على استعمالها في غيره كانت فلسفة باقصة.
وأّذا انفردت العلوم النظرية ،ثم لم يكن لمن
والفيلسوف الكامل على اإلطالق هو أ ْن تحصل له العلوم النظرية ،و تكون له قوة على استعمالها في كل َم ْن
سواه بالوجه الممكن فيه .وإذه تومل أمر الفيلسوف على اإلطالق لم يكن بينه وبين الرئيس األول فرق،
وذلك ّ
أن الذي له قوة على استعمال ما تحتوي عليه النظرية في كل َم ْن سواه <أ> هل هو أن تكون له القوة
على إيجادها معقولة و على إيجاد اإلرادية منها بالفعل .وكلّما/كانت قوته على هذه أعظم كان أكمل فلسفة؛
فيكون الكامل على اإلطالق هو الذي حصلت له الفضائل النظرية أوالً ،ثم العملية ببصيرةٍ يقينيةٍ .ثم أن
تكون له قدرة على إيجادها جميعاً/في األمم والمدن بالوجه والمقدار الممكنين في كل واحد منهم .ولما كان ال
يمكن أن تكون له قوة على إيجادها إال بستعمال براهين يقيني ٍة و بطرق إقناعية وبطرق تخيلية؛ إما طوعا ً أو
كرها ً صار الفيلسوف على اإلطالق هو الرئيس األول .وإذا ً [كان] كل تعليم فهو يلتئم بشيئين؛ بتفهيم ذلك
الشيء الذي يُتعلم وإقامة معناه في النفس ،ثم <ب> إيقاع التصديق بما فهم واقيم معناه في النفس .وتفهيم
الشيء على ضربين :أحدهما ْ
أن تعقل ذاته ،والثاني بأن يُتخيل بمثاله الذي يحاكيه .وإيقاع التصديق يكون
بأحد طريقين :إ ّما بطريق البرهان اليقيني ،وإ ّما بطريق اإلقناع .ومتى حصل علم الموجودات أو تعلمت؛ْ
ْ
ع ِقلَ ْ
ت معانيها أنفسها وأوقع التصديق بها عن البراهين اليقينية؛ كان العلم المشتمل على تلك المعلومات
فإن ُ
ُ
ْ
ْ
ص َل التصديق بما خيّل منها عن الطرق اإلقناعية،
فلسفة .ومتي علمت بأن تخيلت بمثاالتها التي تحاكيها ،و َح َ
ْ
أخذت تلك المعلومات أنفسها واستعمل فيها
كان المشتمل على تلك المعلومات تسمية القدماء مِ لّة .وإذغ
س ْ
ميت الملكة المشتملة عليها الفلسفة الذائعة المشهورة البرانية .فالمِ لة محاكية للفلسفة
الطرق اإلقناعية ُ
عندهم وهما يشتمالن على موضوعات بأعيانها ،وكلتاهما تعطيان المبادىء القصوى للموجودات .فإنهما
كون اإلنسان وهي
تعطيان علم البدأ األول والسبب األول للموجودات ،وتعطيان الغاية القصوى التي ألجلها ّ
السعادة القصوى ،والغاية القصوى في كل واح ٍد من الموجودات األخر .وكل ما تعطيه الفلسفة من
هذه/معقوالً أو متصوراً؛ فإن المِ لّة تعطيه متخيالً ،وكل ما تبرهنه الفلسفة من هذه ّ
فإن المِ لّة تقبع .فإن الفلسفة
تعطي ذات المبدأ األول وذات المبادىء الثواني غير الجسمانية التي هي المبدىء القصوى معقوالت ،والملةّ
تخيلها بمثاالتها المأخوذة من المبادىء الجسمانية وتحاكيها بنظائرها من المبادىء المدنية ،وتحاكي األفعال
اإللهية بأفعال المبادىء المدنية ،وتحاكي أفعال القوى والمبادىء الطبيعية بنظائرها من القوى والملكات
والصناعات اإلرادية؛ كما يفعل ذلك أفالطن في طيماوس .وتحاكي المعقوالت منها بنظائرها من
المحسوسات مثل َم ْن حاكى المادة بالهاوية/أو الظلمة ،أو الماء و العدم بالظلمة .و تحاكي أصناف الصناعات
القصوى ،التي هي غايات أفعال الفضائل اإلنسانية ،بنظائرها من الخيرات التي يظن أنّها هي الغايات.
وتحاكي السعادات ،التي <هي> في القيقة سعادات ،بالتي يظن أنها سعادات .وتحاكي مراتب الموجود في
الوجود بنظائرها من المراتب المكانية والمراتب الزمانية ،وتتحرى ْ
أن تقرب الحاكية لها من ذواتها .وكل ما
ّ 394
تعطي الفلسفة فيه البراهين اليقينيةّ ،
فإن المِ لّة تعطي فيه اإلقناعات ،والفلسفة تتقدم بالزمان المِ لة.
The philosopher has sure insight (baṣīra yaqīnīa) through certain demonstrations
(barāhīn yaqīnīa), i.e., he has everything required for individual happiness, and yet, he is
not a perfect philosopher (al-faylasūf al-kāmil) unless he uses this insight to benefit
others, even those incapable of philosophy. He does so through two methods:
demonstration, for those capable of philosophy, and persuasion (’iqnā‘), for those
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incapable. The ultimate goal of this demonstration and persuasion is assent (taṣdīq), even
if, in the case of the latter, the assent it merely to similitudes (mithālāt) of the truth.395
Even if the philosopher’s charges are unable to encounter the truth qua intelligible, they
can encounter it qua image, even in the case of ultimate happiness (al-sa‘āda al-quṣwā),
which is itself obtained through intelligibility. This method of imitation and persuasion is
called religion (milla).
The philosopher is only a true philosopher (al-faylasūf bi-l-ḥaqīqa) insofar his
perfected representative faculty, his poetic skill, allows him to return to the multitudes
with images and laws which serve as similitudes of demonstrable truths.396 These images
are variously labeled in different passages as a makhīla or mutakhayyl (an image or
fantasia), a muḥakī (a similitude), or as mithālat (likenesses) of the truth.397 Al-Fārābī
does not clarify how religious imagery could possibly be a similitude or likeness of a
demonstrable truth, only that religion becomes a disposition (malaka) for the multitude,
something he echoes when he discusses the compulsion (al-’ikrāh) brought about by
religious law which structures the character of the citizenry.398 The basic legislative
picture is one in which the Imām, who has an ordered soul brings order, cooperation, and
unity through compulsion and images. Even though these images are strictly speaking
false (as is all poetry, as will be discussed shortly), they are near the truth (mithālāt
qarība) and like the truth, which is beneficial to those who would otherwise believe
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falsehoods, creating a kind of ordered-disorder, which imitates the order of the cosmos
(even though it lacks the inherent intelligibility and the necessity of the cosmos).399
That images are required is determined by the nature of human beings.400
Humanity is divided into just two broad groups of people: those with philosophical
ability and those without. As al-Fārābī explains in PR:
Now a human being either forms a concept (ya‘qilu) of the principles of the
existents, their rankings, happiness, and the rulership of the virtuous cities and
intellects them or imagines (yatakhayyalu) them. To form a concept of them is to
have their essences sketched in the human soul as they exist in truth (al-ḥaqīqa).
To imagine them is to have their images (khayālāt), their likenesses (mithālat),
and the objects representing them (’umūr tuḥākīhā) sketched (tartasamu) in the
human soul. That is similar to what is possible with objects that are seen-for
example, a human being. Either we see him himself, we see a statue of him, we
see an image of him in water, or we see an image of his statue in water or in other
mirrors. Now our seeing him resembles the intellect's forming a concept of the
principles of the existents, happiness, and the rest. And our seeing a human being
in water or our seeing a statue of him resembles imagination. For our seeing a
statue of him or our seeing him in a mirror is our seeing what represents him.
Similarly, our imagining those things is in truth our forming a concept of what
represents them, not our forming a concept of them in themselves. Most people
have no ability (qudra), either by innate character (fiṭra) or by custom (‘āda), to
understand and form a concept of those things. For those people, an image ought
to be made, by means of things that represent them, of how the principles, their
rankings, the active intellect, and the first ruler come about. While their meanings
and essences are one and immutable, the things by which they are represented are
many and different. Some are closer to what is represented and others more
distant. That is just as it is with visible things. For the image of a human being
seen in water is closer to the human being in truth than the image of the statue of a
human being seen in water. Therefore it is possible to represent these things to
one group and one nation by objects other than those by which they are
represented to another group and another nation. Thus it may be possible for the
religions of virtuous nations and virtuous cities to differ even if they all pursue the
very same happiness. For religion is a sketch of these things or of their images in
the soul. Since it is difficult for the public to understand these things in
themselves and the way they exist, instructing them about these things is sought
by other ways-and those are the ways of representation. So these things are
represented to each group or nation by things of which they are more cognizant.
And it may be possible that what one of them is more cognizant of is not what
another is more cognizant of. Most people who pursue happiness pursue what is
399
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imagined, not what they form a concept of. Similarly, the principles such as to be
accepted, imitated, extolled, and exalted are accepted by most people as they
imagine them, not as they form a concept of them. Those who pursue happiness as
they form a concept of it and accept the principles as they form a concept of them
are the wise, whereas those in whose souls these things are found as they are
imagined and who accept them and pursue them as though they are like that are
the faithful.401
ومبادئ الموجودات ومراتبها والسعادة ورئاسة المدن الفضلة إما أن يتصورها اإلنسان ويعقلها وإما أن
يتخيلها  .وتصورها هو أن ترتسم في نفس اإلنسان ذواكها كما هي موجودة في الحقيقة .وتخيلها هو أن
ترتسم في نفس اإلنسان خياالتها ا ومثاالتها وأمور تحاكيها  .وذلك شبيه ما يمكن في األشياء المرئية
كاإلنسان مثال بأن نراه هو نفسه أو نرى تمثاله أو نرى خياله في الماء أو نرى خيال تمثاله في الماء أو في
سائر المرايا .فإن رؤيتنا له تشبه تصور العقل لمبادئ الموجودات وللسعادة ولما سوى ذلك  .ورؤيتنا
لإلنسان في الماء أو رؤيتنا تمثاله تشبه التخيل ،ألن رؤيتنا تمثاله أو رؤيتنا له في المرآة هو رؤيتنا لما
يحاكيه .كذلك تخيلنا لتلك هو في الحقيقة تصورنا لما يحاكيها ال تصورها في أنفسها  .وأكثر الناس ال قدرة
لهم إما بالفطرة وإما بالعادة على تفهم تلك وتصورها .فأولئك ينبغي أن تخيل إليهم مبادئ الموجودات
ومراتبها والعقل الفعال والرئاسة األولى كيف تكون بأشياء تحاكيها  .ومعاني تلك وذواتها هي واحدة ال
تتبدل  .وأما ما تحاكى بها فأشياء كثيرة مختلفة بعضها أقرب إلى المحاكاة وبعضها أبعد .كما يكون ذلك في
المبصرات فإن خيال اإلنسان المرئي في الماء هو أقرب إلى اإلنسان في الحقيقة من خيال تمثال اإلنسان
المرئي في الماء  .ولذلك أمكن أن تحاكى هذه األشياء لكل طائفة ولكل أمة بغير األمور التي تحاكى بها
للطائفة األخرى أو لألمة األخرى  .فلذلك قد يمكن أن تكون أمم فاضلة ومدن فاضلة تختلف مللهم وإن كانوا
كلهم يؤمون سعادة واحدة بعينها  .فإن الملة هي رسوم هذه أو رسوم خياالتها في النفوس  .فإن الجمهور لما
عسر عليهم تفهم هذه األشياء أنفسها وعلى ما هي عليه من الوجود التمس تعليمهم لها بوجوه أخر وتلك هي
وجوه المحاكاة .فتحاكى هذه األشياء لكل طائفة أو أمة باألشياء التي هي أعرف عندهم .وقد يمكن أن يكون
األعراف عند كل واحد منهم غير األعراف عند اآلخر  .وأكثر الناس الذين يؤمون السعادة إنما يؤمونها
متخيلة ال متصورة  .وكذلك المبادئ التي سبيلها أن تتقبل ويقتدى بها وتعظم وتجل إنما يتقبلها أكثر الناس
وهي متخيلة عندهم ال متصورة  .والذين يؤمون السعادة متصورة ويتقبلون المبادئ وهي متصورة هم
الحكماء  .والذين توجد هذه األشياء في نفوسهم متخيلة ويتقبلونها ويؤمونها على أنها كذلك هم
402
المؤمنون .
Unsurprisingly, given the cosmological model discussed above, most citizens are too
deficient (naqṣ) to think (ya‘qilu) the principle causes and aims of the cosmos as
intelligibles. Most human beings are incapable of thinking at the level of second
intentionality which is required to attain happiness, lacking both the natural disposition
(fiṭra) and habit (‘āda) for philosophical thought. Thus, a placeholder is required. This
explains why the Imām needs no religion, needing no placeholder insofar as he thinks the

PR 85. Echoes of Republic 509e-510a are found in al-Fārābī’s account of the human itself, the image of
a human in a statue, and the reflection of a human in the water.
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truth without the mediation of images.403 But most people need images. (In PR, al-Fārābī
even specifies that people capable of knowledge in one science may need images to
understand another science.)404 PS further subdivides the ranks of human capabilities,
noting that there are those who need no images (e.g., the Imām), those who need images
(e.g., the masses), and a third group which knows the intelligibles directly, but only
insofar as they are provided by the philosophers. He explains:
Now these things can be known in two ways, either by being impressed on their
souls as they really are or by being impressed on them through affinity and
symbolic representation. In that case symbols arise in man's minds, which
reproduce them by imitation. The philosophers in the city are those who know
these things through strict demonstrations and their own insight; those who are
close to the philosophers know them as they really are through the insight of the
philosophers, following them, assenting to their views and trusting them. But
others know them through symbols which reproduce them by imitation, because
neither nature nor habit has provided their minds with the gift to understand them
as they are. Both are kinds of knowledge, but the knowledge of the philosophers
is undoubtedly more excellent. Some of those who know them through symbols
which reproduce them know them through symbols which are near to them, and
some through symbols slightly more remote, and some through symbols which
are even more remote than these, and some through symbols which are very
remote indeed. Now, these things are reproduced by imitation for each nation and
for the people of each city through those symbols which are best known to them.
But what is best known often varies among nations, either most of it or part of it.
Hence these things are expressed for each nation in symbols other than those used
for another nation. Therefore it is possible that excellent nations and excellent
cities exist whose religions differ, although they all have as their goal one and the
same felicity and the very same aims. When these things thus held in common are
known through strict demonstrations, no ground for disagreement by argument
can be found in them, neither by introducing sophistic fallacies nor by somebody's
lack of understanding: for then the point disputed would not be the thing itself but
his wrong notion of it. But when they are known through symbols which
reproduce them by imitation, grounds for objection may be found in these
symbols, in some less, in others more, and grounds for objection will be more
easily seen in some and less in others. It is not impossible that among those who
know these things through such symbols, there is someone who puts his finger on
the grounds for objection to those symbols and holds that they are inadequate and
false. There are different kinds of these people: first those who seek the right path.
When one of them rejects anything as false, he will be lifted towards a better
403
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symbol which is nearer to the truth and is not open to that objection; and if he is
satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. When that better symbol is also
rejected by him as false, he will be lifted to another rank, and if he is then
satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. Whenever a symbol of a given
standard is rejected by him as false, he will be lifted to a higher rank, but when he
rejects all the symbols as false and has the strength and gift to understand the
truth, he will be made to know the truth and will be placed into the class of those
who take the philosophers as their authorities. If he is not yet satisfied with that
and desires to acquire philosophical wisdom and has himself the strength and gift
for it, he will be made to know it.405
وهذه األشياء تعرف بأحد وجهين :إما أن ترتسم في نفوسهم كما هي موجودة ،وإما أن ترتسم فيها بالمناسبة
والتمثيل ،وذلك أن يحصل في نفوسهم مثاالتها التي تحاكيها .فحكماء المدينة الفاضلة هم الذين يعرفون هذه
ببراهين وببصائر أنفسهم .ومن يلي الحكماء يعرفون هذه على ما هي عليه موجودة ببصائر الحكماء اتباعا
لهم وتصديقا لهم وثقة بهم .والباقون منهم يعرفون بالمثاالت التي تحاكيها ،ألنهم ال هيئة في أذهانهم لتفهمها
على ما هي موجودة إما بالطبع وإما بالعادة وكلتاهما معرفتان .إال أن التي للحكيم أفضل ال محالة؛ والذين
يعرفونها بالمثاالت التي تحاكيها ،بعضهم يعرفونها بمثاالت قريبة منها ،وبعضهم بمثاالت أبعد قليال،
وبعضهم بمثاالت أبعد من تلك ،وبعضهم بمثاالت بعيدة جدا .وتحاكي هذه األشياء لكل أمة وألهل كل مدينة
بالمثاالت التي عندهم األعرف فاألعرف ،وربما اختلف عند األمم أما أكثرة وأما بعضه ،فتحاكي هذه لكل
أمة بغير األمور التي تحاكي بها األمة األخرى .فلذلك يمكن أن يكون أمم فاضلة ومدن فاضلة تختلف متلهم،
وهذه األشياء المشتركة ،إذا كانت معلومة فهم كلهم يؤمون سعادة واحدة بعينها ومقاصد واحدة بأعيانها.
ببراهينها ،لم يمكن أن يكون فيها موضع عناد بقول أصال ،ال على جهة المغالطة وال عند من يسوء فهمه
لها ،فحينئذ يكون للمعاند ،ال "حقيقة" األمر في نفسه ،ولكن ما فهمه هو من الباطل في األمر .فإما إذا كانت
معلومة بمثاالتها التي تحاكيها ،فإن مثاالتها قد تكون فيها مواضع للعناد ،وبعضها يكون فيه مواضع العناد
أقل ،وبعضها يكون فيها مواضع العناد أكثر ،وبعضها يكون فيه مواضع العناد أظهر ،وبعضها يكون فيه
أخفى .وال يمتنع أن يكون في الذين عرفوا تلك األشياء بالمثاالت المحاكية ،من يقف على مواضع العناد في
وهؤالء شيء ما رفع إلى مثال آخر أقرب إلى الحق ،ال يكون فيه ذلك العناد ،تلك المثاالت ويتوقف عنده.
فإن قنع به ترك ،وإن تزيف عنده ذلك أيضا رفع إلى مرتبة أخرى ،فإن فنع به ترك .وإن تزيف عنده مثال
في مرتبة ما رفع فوقه ،فإن تزيفت عنده المثاالت كلها وكانت فيه فيه نية للوقوف على الحق عرف الحق،
406
وجعل في مرتبة المقلدين للحكماء؛ فإن لم يقنع بذلك وتشوق إلى الحكمة ،وكان في نيته ذلك ،علمها.
The first division in this passage is between those who know things “by being impressed
on their souls as they really are or by being impressed on them through affinity and
symbolic representation”. The first group has knowledge, the latter has merely the
opinions of religion. The category of those that know things as they really are is then
further divided between those who know through their own insights, i.e., philosophers
who know through demonstration (burhan) and are capable of certitude (yaqīn), and
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those who know through assent (taṣdīq) to the philosophers. Between those that know
through demonstration and, one assumes, those who assent to those who know through
demonstration, no dissonance or disagreement is possible. However, for those who know
through images, disagreement remains. Because even the best images in the best cities
are still only near the truth and are still, strictly speaking, false; objections can be made to
them.
Al-Fārābī further notes that some people will recognize the falsity of religious
images and divides those who are clever enough to object to the inadequacy of religious
imagery into three groups: those who, due to the inadequacy of symbols, stop looking for
truth all-together; those who use the inadequacy of symbols to achieve a base aim, like
wealth, pleasure, or honor, using sophistic tricks to reject any symbols which stand as an
obstacle to their desires; and last, those who, recognizing one symbol as false, abandon it
for another one which is nearer to the truth, until they abandon this symbol also. Within
this final group, it is possible that someone will eventually tire of all symbols, and assent
to philosophical knowledge. Of all the citizens, philosophy is only truly translated for this
group. The philosophers and those who assent to their authority need no images. Religion
for those that assent without examining the images of religion is not truly a translation of
philosophy, but a compulsion which leads them to a virtuous and pseudo-ordered life.
However, for this final group, they use the images like a Wittgensteinian ladder. As
quoted in Chapter 2, Wittgenstein explains at the end of the Tractatus that:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used
them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the
ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then
he will see the world aright.407
407
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Simply replace “propositions” in this passage with “mithālāt” and one sees the Fārābīan
model for religion. Here, al-Fārābī’s project becomes a true translation project, in which
the Imām not only translates philosophy into religion, but the citizen can in turn translate
the images of religion back into philosophy. And insofar as this occurs, it stands as
evidence that the Imām’s images really are near likenesses of the truth, that they really
represent demonstrative knowledge. In short, it is evidence that religion is a translation of
philosophy, a beneficent deception, not an outright lie.408 And while religion serves other
functions, namely, as a means by which to encourage cooperation and a means by which
to maximize possible teleological fulfillment in the deficient citizenry (even if this
fulfillment does not qualify as happiness), the pedagogical role of these images lies at the
heart of any justification for beneficent political deception.

4.1.3. The Poetic Syllogism
While al-Fārābī is clear in his political works that some kind of translation occurs,
translating intelligibles to sensible images for the establishment of a nation’s religion,
these works are silent as to the internal mechanisms by which this process happens.409 Put
simply, he explains that the Imām represents intelligibles through religious images (or
variously that these images are represented in his imaginative faculty by the Active
Intellect), but he does not explain how intelligibles can be represented by images as such.
The only places he discusses the topic with precision are in his works on poetry, where he
introduces the notion of the poetic syllogism.

The pedagogical nature of al-Fārābī’s model and the importance of translatability to its justification will
be further addressed in the Conclusion.
409
See Black 1990, 209f.
408

225
Al-Fārābī clearly has his poetics in mind while discussing the Imām. He says in
his Canons of Poetry:
Of false statements (al-kāḏiba), some register in the mind (ḏihn) of the hearer the
object (al-shay’) referred to, taking the place of a direct statement, while others
register in his mind an imitation (al-muḥākī) of the object (li-l-shay’): these last
are poetical statements (al-’aqāwīl al-shi‘riyya).410
والكاذبة منها ما يوقع في ذهن السامعين الشىء المبر عنه بدل القول ومنها ما يوقع فيه المحاكى للشىء
411
.وهذه هى األقاويل الشعريّة
And he says later:
Now let no man suppose that the terms “sophistry” (al-maḡlaṭ) and “imitation”
(al-muḥākī) are identical: on the contrary, they differ in several respects. To begin
with, their purposes (ḡaraḍa) are different: the sophist (al-maḡlaṭ) deludes his
hearer into supposing that he is listening to a contrary proposition (naqīḍ alshayʾ), so that he imagines that what is is not (al-mawjūd ḡayru mawjūd), and
what is not is (ḡayru al-mawjūd mawjūd); the imitator, however, causes his hearer
to imagine, not a contrary (naqīḍ), but a like proposition (shabīh)… This analysis
proves that the poetical statement is one which is neither demonstrative (alburhāniyya), nor argumentative (jadaliyya), nor rhetorical (khiṭābiyya), nor
sophistical: yet for all that it belongs to a kind of syllogism (sulujismus), or rather
post-syllogism (yatba‘ sulujismus) [by “post-syllogism” I mean a deduction,
image, intuition, or the like, something 'which has the same force as an analogy
(quwwa qiyās)].412
ّ أن المغلط والمحاكى قول وهحد وذلك أنهما مختلفن بوجه منها
ّ ظان
ّ يظن
ّ وال
ان غرض المغلط غير غرض
ّ أن الموجد غير موجود
ّ المحاكى اذ المغلط هو الذى يغلط السامع الى نقيض الشىء حتي يوهمه
وأن غير
ّ وقد تبيّن من هذه القسمة...الموجد موجد فأ ّما المحاكى للشىء فليس يوهم النقيض لكن الشبيه
أن القول
ى هو الذى ليس بالبرهانيّة وال الجدليّة وال الخطابيّة وال المغالطيّة و هو مع ذلك يرجع الى نوع من
ّ الشعر
أنواع السولوجسموس أو ما يتبع السولوجسموس وأعنى بقولى ما يتبعه االستقراء والمثال والفراسة وما
413
.قوة قياس
ّ قوته
ّ أشبهها م ّما
Thus, the goal of the poetry is not the image itself, but a proposition caused by the image,
which is like, but not identical to a true proposition.414 This mechanism of poetry, the
410
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poetic syllogism, holds the power of analogy (quwwa qiyas), and, while not strictly
speaking true, does not, like sophistry, try to claim that ‘what is is not’ or ‘what is not is’.
Instead, beginning with what is strictly speaking false, poetry tries to show that ‘what is
is’, even though it begins with an image which ‘is not’. While the premises of the ‘postsyllogisms’ of poetry are false, the conclusion drawn by good poetry is true or near the
truth.415 And these conclusions, on the whole, are relational, insofar as the poet
manufactures a resemblance between two seemingly unlike objects, by showing, first, the
resemblance between A and B and, second, the resemblance between B and C, even if A
and C seemingly differ.416 The skillful poet can convincingly establish a link between two
very remote and disparate images. In the case of the Imām, he can successfully map out
images which correspond to the premises and the conclusion of a demonstration, and,
through intermediary images which serve as middle terms for the analogy, establish
assent (taṣdīq) to the conclusion in the soul of the listener.
When a poetic syllogism begins with beautiful and desirable images and links
them through simile to a conclusion, the conclusion takes on the characteristic of
desirability in the soul of the listener. The same is true for loathsome images which repel
the listener from a conclusion. As Al-Fārābī explains in his Treatise on Poetry, these
poetic syllogisms are useful in order to cause the listener to associate a loathsome image
with what is loathsome in reality (without an argument) and to associate a beautiful

false. What is clear is that the Imām, who presents the image as true, rather than as poetry, is surely
involved in deception.
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of a poetic syllogism, for example, when someone resting upon a boat feels that their body is moving as
their relation changes to the bank of the river. While strictly speaking, this is a false sensation, it also
conveys something true about the world, namely, changing relative position between oneself and the bank.
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image with what is desirable, impelling “the listener towards doing that thing which has
been imagined to him in a certain matter (either making him seek it or avoid it, withdraw
from it or detest it, or any other action of harm or charity) regardless of whether what has
been imaginatively made to appear is true or not.”417 This passage echoes another passage
from his categorization of poetry in ES, where al-Fārābī explains that the imagination has
an outsized effect on human action, given humankind’s tendency to privilege imagination
over wisdom, giving poetry profound influence over human behavior.418 The poet can
make that which would otherwise appear undesirable desirable.
The importance of this for the Imām is obvious. For those who merely assent to
religion through compulsion and benefit from the order and character building that
religious laws and images provide, the aimed for effect is clear. For example, imagine
both a philosopher and someone who holds only to the opinions of religion engaged in
business dealings. The philosopher believes the propositions: “human beings cannot
complete their necessary affairs nor gain their most excellent state except by coming
together” and ‘the excellent city is filled with “co-operation to acquire felicity.”’419 The
religious observer believes the proposition: ‘thieves burn in physical hellfire’. Both the
philosopher and the observer engage in orderly business and cooperation because each

As Al-Fārābī continues, he says: “The purpose thus of statements that make imaginable (mukhayyila) is
to impel the listener towards doing that thing which has been imagined (khuyyil) to him in a certain matter
(either making him seek it or avoid it, withdraw from it or detest it, or any other action of harm or charity)
regardless of whether what has been imaginatively made to appear (yukhayyal) is true or not.” TP 107.
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holds a proposition which results in the practical action of not stealing from one another.
Both the philosophical arguments in favor of cooperation and the image of hellfire create
an aversion to theft in the soul of the listener (although their effectiveness differs
according the character of the listener). While distinct, the propositions formed by the
demonstration and the poetic syllogism are not contrary. Even though, of course, there
are nearer images which could more faithfully reflect the true proposition for why one
should not steal than hellfire (e.g., a poetic syllogism which links civic cooperation to
nobility).
The sparse examples al-Fārābī gives of religious poetic syllogisms give some
indications about how true religion should function. Linking matter to the abyss creates
an aversion to materialism in the soul of the listener.420 Linking the Active Intellect with
the attributes traditionally ascribed to Gabriel creates an affinity in the soul to the
providence of immaterial existents.421 Along with the compulsion (al-’ikrāh) toward
virtue brought about by religious law, which assures civic order and a worldly facsimile
of happiness, poetic syllogisms, involving the highest and lowest intelligibles bring
common citizens closer to theoretical virtue (even if this virtue is confined to the
theoretical and practical analogues in the representative faculty). Matter should be
avoided; immateriality is desirable. And, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, this model of
poetic syllogisms in conjunction with compulsion gets adopted by al-Fārābī’s successors.
One particular example by Maimonides is illustrative: his account of the Sabbath.
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For Maimonides, the images which undergird the Sabbath commandment have
both theoretical and practical benefits inspired by philosophical truths. Maimonides
explains:
Perhaps it has already become clear to you what is the cause of the Law's
establishing the Sabbath so firmly and ordaining death by stoning for breaking
it...You know from what I have said that opinions do not last unless they are
accompanied by actions that strengthen them, make them generally known, and
perpetuate them among the multitude. For this reason we are ordered by the Law
to exalt (ta‘ẓīm) this day, in order that the principle of the creation of the world in
time be established and universally known in the world through the fact that all
people refrain from working on one and the same day. If it is asked: What is the
cause of this?, the answer is: For in six days the Lord made. For this
commandment two different causes are given, corresponding to two different
effects. In the first Decalogue, the cause for exalting the Sabbath is stated as
follows: For in six days the Lord made, and so on. In Deuteronomy, on the other
hand, it is said: And thou shalt remember that thou wast a slave in Egypt.
Therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day. This is
correct. For the effect, according to the first statement, is to regard that day as
noble and exalted. As it says: Wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and
hallowed it. This is the effect consequent upon the cause stated in the words: For
in six days, and so on. However, the order given us by the Law with regard to it
and the commandment ordaining us in particular to keep it are an effect
consequent upon the cause that we had been slaves in Egypt where we did not
work according to our free choice and when we wished and where we had not the
power to refrain from working. Therefore we have been commanded inactivity
and rest so that we should conjoin the two things: the belief in a true opinion—
namely, the creation of the world in time, which, at the first go and with the
slightest of speculations, shows that the deity exists and the memory of the benefit
God bestowed upon us by giving us rest from under the burdens of the Egyptians.
Accordingly the Sabbath is, as it were, of universal benefit, both with reference to
a true speculative opinion and to the well-being of the state of the body.422

The Sabbath obligation has two parts: one must remember the Sabbath and keep it. In
remembering the Sabbath, the Kiddush prayer must be said over the wine, as Maimonides
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explains in a passage of the Mishneh Torah, on “Shabbat”.423 This is itself in reference to
the Talmud which mandates that the Kiddush and Havdalah, the ‘sanctifying’ prayer and
the prayer of ‘distinction’, respectively, which mark the beginning and end of the
Sabbath, must occur, as traditionally set down by the Great Assembly.424 In GP II.31,
Maimonides highlights the two remembrances noted in the Kiddush prayer—creation and
Pesach—noting that remembering each cause of the Sabbath brings out a different effect
in the participant. In the former, one reflects on the theoretical foundation of Judaism,
namely the existence of the Deity and his causal relationship to the world. In the latter,
one reflects on and attends to the needs of the body. The former ensures the health of the
intellect; the latter ensures the health of the body. Meanwhile, the compulsion to keep the
Sabbath ensures that, even for those unable to benefit from the images themselves, a
tangible good is gained, namely rest. Here, one can readily see the poetic syllogism and
legislation as al-Fārābī envisions them. Images, the story of the seven days of creation
and the story of the plague of the death of the firstborns passing over the Jewish
households in the land of Egypt, lead to legislation, the keeping and remembering of the
Sabbath through the saying of the Kiddush prayer. This legislation helps perfect the
multitudes who follow the law, all while pointing to the deeper philosophical meaning of
God’s causality and existence and the physical needs of the body. Neither Genesis nor
Exodus give demonstrations for God’s causality or providence, but their imagery links
the day of rest to God’s causality and providence through analogy. The common adherent
of Judaism need not know why one should rest or reflect on the Sabbath; the images
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themselves, in conjunction with compulsion, dictate that one does rest on the Sabbath.
And, as a result, the community receives practical and theoretical benefits.

4.2. The Imām as Expressing Order through Disorder
In al-Fārābī’s cosmos, every existent aims at emulating the First. And teleological
fulfillment is measured according to one’s ability to emulate the First. But the First is
simultaneously perfectly one and perfectly intelligible, something impossible to emulate
for any other existent. For some existents, like the Secondary Causes, who have minimal
deficiency, their teleological task is straightforward: think the First and be part of an
ordered whole of Separate Intellects. For others, like the elements, minerals, and nonrational animals, there is no possibility of individual teleological fulfillment, only the
possibility to contribute to the teleological fulfillment of others, namely human beings.
But for some human beings, teleological fulfillment is possible, but only through both
cooperation, which requires worldly community, and philosophy, which requires worldly
detachment. Both of these aims are derived from the First, even though in the sublunar
world these aims are discrete and usually divergent.425
Good rule requires that the Imām establish a city that enables each human being,
however deficient they happen to be, to maximize their happiness. But due to the
deficiency of the sublunar world, most humans, like most sublunar existents, are
incapable of individual happiness; their highest teleological fulfillment comes through
being in community with the elite who are capable of intellectual happiness.426 The
virtuous city (al-madīna al-fāḍila) is one which simultaneously allows for a) the
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philosopher to be intellectually happy, b) the average citizen to be as close to happiness
as her nature allows, c) the citizen capable of philosophy but ignorant of philosophy to be
educated, and d) all three groups of people to cooperate to maintain order. Achieving this
aim is impossible both through philosophy alone and in the absence of philosophy. A city
which relies on philosophy alone would fail to motivate its citizens to cooperate; most
people require, according to al-Fārābī, something other than philosophy and truth to
motivate their actions. A city lacking philosophy could not cooperate; the proper ordering
of the city requires knowledge of the proper ordering of the heavens and the ultimate aim
of the human person.427 Thus, the nature of al-Fārābī’s cosmos requires that the Imām
both order the city in accordance with what is known through philosophy while
motivating citizens to uphold this order through something distinct from the truths of
philosophy. He must express truth at the level of deficiency. He must render what is more
intelligible in itself into what is more intelligible for deficient human beings. The picture
looks like this:
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Figure 4.2.

As can be seen in Figure 4.2., al-Fārābī’s Imām functions as the mediator between
intelligibility and deficiency. The Construction of Social Knowledge, the Imām’s
beneficent political deception, is necessitated by the very structure of al-Fārābī’s cosmos
and the nature of human beings. Insofar as both truth and cooperation are required for any
chance at human happiness, religion, as an imagistic expression of philosophical truth, is
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required to convey as much of philosophy as can be conveyed while also maintaining
civic order.

5. Conclusion
In this chapter, a possible justification for al-Fārābī’s model of beneficent political
deception was raised, insofar as political deception is necessitated by the teleology of alFārābī’s cosmos. Furthermore, the precise factors which necessitate beneficent political
deception (e.g., intelligibility and deficiency, truth and cooperation, etc.) were explored,
while also modeling what justified political deception looks like for al-Fārābī (e.g., the
Construction of Social Knowledge model). Several topics still need exploration: Is alFārābī’s justification sufficient? Is it philosophically cogent? And what does his model
reveal about the problem of political deception writ large? For now, these questions must
wait, as Chapter 4 will further delve into al-Fārābī’s model by, first, exploring the
historical context in which his model arose and, second, surveying its reception in later
medieval thought.
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IV. AL-FᾹRᾹBῙ’S BENEFICENT POLITICAL DECEPTION IN CONTEXT

1. Introduction
Chapter 3 examined the cosmological foundations for al-Fārābī’s model for the
Construction of Social Knowledge. Likewise, it presented a particular reading of alFārābī’s texts as found throughout his political works. That said, as mentioned in Chapter
2, there are other viable readings of al-Fārābī concerning the relationship between
religion and the truth. For this reason, Chapter 4 will bolster the description of al-Fārābī
as found in Chapter 3 by exploring both the historical context out of which his position
developed as well as the reception of his model. By exploring the context out of which alFārābī’s notion of religion as an imaginative expression of philosophy arose and the
reception of al-Fārābī’s position by his successors, further credence regarding the
relationship between his cosmology and the need for religion will be shown. In particular,
al-Fārābī established a groundwork for demonstrative knowledge to take precedence over
religion, and his successors read him this way. For, while the primary concern here is the
relationship between al-Fārābī’s model for the Construction of Social Knowledge and
beneficent political deception, the primary debate in 10th century Baghdad centered
around the principle source of truth, whether it be revelation or philosophy. Only by
appreciating al-Fārābī’s conciliation between revealed truth and philosophy (as well as
the defense of his approach by his receptors) can one fully understand the context out of
which al-Fārābī’s model arises. In particular, it highlights two things. First, for al-Fārābī,
philosophy is measured as superior to religion, at least concerning the acquisition of
truth. Second, al-Fārābī denies that knowledge of truth is feasible for most people.
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2. Abbasid Baghdad
Long before the Condemnation of 1277 highlighted the growing tension in the
Latin West brought about by the famed “recovery of Aristotle” and the increasing
influence of both Aristotle and his Muslim commentators upon the Faculty of Arts at the
University of Paris— a tension between the authority of faith and the authority of
reason—, Greek philosophy had already undergone intense monotheistic scrutiny in the
Dār al-Islām (“the lands under Muslim rule”).1 In the 9th century, al-Kindī (d. ~870), the
earliest Muslim adopter of Greek philosophy, falsafa, of any note, and overseer of the
famed ‘Kindī Circle’, which systematically translated Greek philosophy into Arabic for
the first time, attempted to initially sidestep the issue by consigning reason and revelation
to two separate and distinct domains.2 As al-Kindī explains in his On First Philosophy,
“Of the human arts (al-ṣinā‘āt al-’insāniyya), the highest in rank and the noblest in
degree is the art of philosophy, which is defined as the knowledge of things as they are in
truth, insofar as it is possible for man (yaqdaru ṭāqa al-’insān).”3 Thus, philosophy is
relegated to the domain of the purely human, leaving room for revelation as something
beyond mere human faculties. (Still, he does elsewhere try to harmonize philosophy and
revealed religion more directly, using logic to refute the idea of the Christian trinity, as
preserved by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, Greek cosmology to defend a specific reading of an ’āya of
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the Qur’ān about the heavens, and Aristotelian psychology to explain prophetic dreams.)4
Nonetheless, this harmonization was not widely received, and, by the 10th century, Greek
philosophy and logic were still viewed as foreign to Muslim theology and Arabic culture.
Two public debates in the early 10th century illustrate this point clearly. The first,
which will be discussed in more depth below, took place around 920 between the famed
iconoclast, Platonist, and ‘freethinker’ (zindīq) Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā alRāzī (d. 925) and the Isma‘ili missionary Abū Ḥātim Ahmad ibn Hamdan al-Rāzī (d.
935).5 This debate, transmitted to us through Abū Ḥātim’s own account, focuses largely
on Abū Ḥātim’s rebuttal of al-Rāzī’s critiques of the prophets, specifically the claim that
God would allow no special revelation given the preeminence and universality of reason.
One of Abū Ḥātim’s central defenses of prophetic revelation centers around a tu quoque
fallacy: philosophers (and thus philosophy) lack credibility because philosophers are as
divergent from one another as the heretics (and more so than the believers), each
philosopher having his own set of doctrines.6 (As a side note, it is no wonder that, within
the context of this milieu, al-Rāzī wrote a treatise defending his ethics, both lived and
theoretical, within the context of their compatibility with the life of Socrates, and alFārābī wrote a work harmonizing the positions of Plato and Aristotle.)7 On a macro level,
Abū Ḥātim discusses philosophy as if it is one set of doctrines amongst many sets (e.g.,
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Islam, Christianity, Manichaeism, etc.), in effect, just another religion in which followers
adhere to the teachings of a founding philosopher through imitation.8
This theme is echoed in a debate which took place in 932 between Abū Bishr
Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 940), al-Fārābī’s Nestorian Christian teacher, and the grammarian
Abu Sa‘id al-Sirāfi (d. 979) regarding the distinction between logic and grammar. While
we again only have a seemingly unreliable account of the debate from Abū Ḥayyān alTawḥīdī (d. 1023), the protégé of Abū Salaymān al-Sijistānī (d. 1000) and a known
imaginative exaggerator (and even forger), using al-Sirāfi as his ultimate authority, Abū
Bishr appears to have fared poorly in his claim that “logic investigates meaning (alma‘nā), whereas grammar investigates expression (al-lafaẓa)”, falling prey to al-Sirāfi’s
grammatic trickery.9 The debate resulted in logic being viewed as simply another
grammar, the grammar of the Greeks. As al-Sirāfi asks:
If Logic be the invention of a Greek made in the Greek language and according to
Greek conventions, and according to the descriptions and symbols which Greeks
understood, whence does it follow that the Turks, Indians, Persians, and Arabs
should attend to it, and make it umpire to decide for them or against them, and
judge between them, so that they must accept what it attests and repudiate what it
disapproves?10
In short, these debates show that falsafa was viewed in the early 10th century, not as a
universal syllogistic method giving structure to natural reason, but rather as a culturally
determined set of comprehensive doctrines particular to the pagan Greeks. These debates
were not about specific philosophical doctrines, but, instead, they focused on the merit of
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both falsafa and reason, itself. They questioned whether philosophy as a method was, in
fact, universal or even pertinent to the culture of the Dār al-Islām.
It is within this context that al-Fārābī advocated for the preeminence of natural
reason over the symbols of religion, his advocacy as much a defense of reason as a sly
political maneuver or a provocation of religion (at least religion as construed by either the
more liberal Mu’tazilites or the traditionalist Ḥanbalites, both of whose influence grew in
Abbasid Baghdad). His defense of the preeminence of reason as the sole source for truth,
even while fashioning a place for religion as a Construction of Social Knowledge, was
not the only attempt in Abbasid Baghdad to address the competition between faith and
reason as the sole source of truth. Some, like al-Kindī tried to ameliorate the tension
between these two potential sources of truth. The Ikhwān al-safā’, a clandestine group of
encyclopedists based in Baṣra roughly contemporary to al-Fārābī, took a similar tact to
al-Kindī, though their amelioration holds a distinctly cosmopolitan flair, as will be
discussed below. The aforementioned Abu Bakr al-Rāzī was far less conciliatory. Special
revelation was not only inferior to philosophy, but contrary to God’s justice and the
egalitarian universality of reason. At best, religious leaders were tricksters and jackasses
(tiyūs, literally ‘a billygoat’), and, at worst, the prophets were inspired by evil spirits.11
Compared to Abu Bakr al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī was no less radical in his subsumption of
revelation under the rule of philosophy, but like the Ikhwān al-safā’ and unlike al-Rāzī,
he created a role for religion as a poetic, symbolic expression of truth. Revelation
certainly has no privileged claim to the truth in comparison to philosophy (contra alKindī and, in places, the Ikhwān al-safā’), but it serves a function as an imagistic
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translation of philosophy for those incapable of following the intricacies of demonstration
(contra al-Rāzī). Both al-Rāzī and al-Fārābī hold natural reason to be the highest possible
fulfillment of the human person. Both reject the authority of revealed religion over
philosophy. Both were roundly criticized for their views on prophecy, even amongst
fellow philosophers: Maimonides claims that al-Rāzī is “merely a physician” and not a
philosopher; even al-Fārābī, according to Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, wrote a refutation of al-Rāzī
called The Book of the Response to al-Rāzī on Divine Science which is no longer extent;
while Ibn Ṭufayl claims that, other than his work on logic, al-Fārābī 's philosophical
works are “full of doubts”.12 Yet al-Fārābī allows a place in his city for the founding
Imām, and in doing so avoids criticism of the Prophet himself and the Qur’ān, even while
subsuming revelation under philosophy. It is no wonder then that al-Fārābī, and not alRāzī, avoided being labeled an iconoclast, heretic (mulḥid), and a zindiq, even while
staking out an unabashedly rationalist position distinct from the likes of al-Kindī and the
Ikhwān al-safā’.13

2.1. Al-Kindī and the Compatibility between Philosophy and Prophecy
While the Abbasid Caliphate was not the first Muslim foray into scholarship
beyond the topics of jurisprudence and theology—e.g., the founding Umayyad Caliph,
Mu‘āwiyah (d. 680), reportedly had an impressive library in Damascus and the sixth
Umayyad Caliph, al-Walid (d. 715), chartered a position in his court for a curator of
books (ṣāḥib al-maṣāḥif) which reputedly included both secular and Qur’ānic works—, it
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marks the earliest fulsome Muslim exploration into Greek philosophy.14 There is
evidence of ‘houses of wisdom’ (buyūt al-ḥikma) under both the founder of Baghdad, alManṣūr (d. 775), and the fifth Abbasid Caliph, Hārūn al-Rashīd (d. 809), but it was under
the patronage of Hārūn al-Rashīd’s son, al-Ma’mūn (d. 833), that Greek philosophy (and
scholarship in general) truly flourished.15 Whether or not al-Ma’mūn’s patronage
manifested institutionally through the establishment of a school, the ‘house of wisdom’
(bayt al-ḥikma), or simply through multiple personal patronages (which grew in the
telling into the famous ‘house of wisdom’) is contested in scholarship.16 However, what
can be clearly stated is that under al-Ma’mūn translations of Greek philosophy into
Arabic, of which there had been some previous attempts, became a priority for the Caliph
himself.17
As the story goes, as reported by Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 995) in his catalogue al-Fihrist,
al-Ma’mūn was visited by Aristotle in a dream. Ibn al-Nadīm relates:
One of the reasons for [the translation of books on philosophy] was that alMa’mūn saw in a dream the likeness of a man white in color, with a ruddy
complexion, broad forehead, joined eyebrows, bald head, bloodshot eyes, and
good qualities sitting on his bed. Al-Ma’mūn related, “It was as though I was in
14
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front of him, filled with fear of him. Then I said, ‘Who are you?’ He replied, ‘I
am Aristotle.’ Then I was delighted with him and said, ‘Oh sage, may I ask you a
question?’ He said, ‘Ask it.’ Then I asked, ‘What is good (ḥusn)?’ He replied,
‘What is good in the mind.’ I said again, ‘Then what is next?’ He answered,
‘What is good in the law (al-sharī‘a).’ I said, ‘Then what next?’ He replied,
‘What is good with the public.’ I said, ‘Then what more?’ He answered, ‘More?
There is no more.’”... This dream was one of the most definite reasons for the
output of books.18
For our purposes, it matters little whether this tale is authentic or apocryphal; whether alMa’mūn really dreamt of Aristotle or was simply the kind of ruler to which such a tale
could be credibly ascribed amounts to the same thing: al-Ma’mūn patronized philosophy
with a fervor fitting of someone directed by Aristotle, himself.19 The story tells us
something important about the reputation of al-Ma’mūn’s court: there was nothing
contradictory about Aristotle, a pagan Greek, explaining goodness, including the
goodness (ḥusn) of the law (al-sharī‘a), to the Caliph, even the Caliph who instituted the
miḥna against religious leaders to establish himself as the supreme authority on religious
matters. Under al-Ma’mūn’s rule, there was no dispute between Aristotle and Islam.
Unsurprisingly, al-Kindī, who would rise to prominence under both al-Ma’mūn
and his half-brother al-Mu‘taṣim (d. 842), directed little of his attention to the issue of
whether revelation or philosophy held preeminence.20 Whether due to his patrons’
disinterest, his own personal disinterest, or a shared assumption with the general milieu
of the court about the obvious compatibility between reason and revelation, al-Kindī’s
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writings address the issue directly in only one place, to my knowledge. In a fascinating
passage of his Letter on the Quantity of Aristotle’s Books and What is Required for the
Attainment of Philosophy, al-Kindī uses prophetic knowledge as a foil for the kind of
knowledge obtained through philosophy and the human sciences (al-‘alūm al-’insāniyya).
After enumerating Aristotle’s works, he explains that philosophy is a methodic,
arduous process, saying:
This then is the enumeration of his books, of which—as we have said before—the
perfected philosopher (al-faylasūf al-tāmm) ought to acquire knowledge, after
knowledge of the propaedeutics (‘ilm al-riyāḍāt), which I have already defined by
name. For if someone lacks knowledge of the propaedeutics (‘ilm al-riyāḍāt),
which are arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmonics, then even lifelong
study will not allow him to complete his knowledge of any of these [more
advanced topics].21
Thus, philosophical knowledge is, first and foremost, a process of mastering humanly
knowable sciences, each science relying on the propaedeutic sciences which undergird it.
According to al-Kindī, these higher sciences are known only through the study of
“substance and the predicates belonging to substance”, namely quantity and quality.22 But
even these higher sciences, including the knowledge of stable, unceasing secondary
substances, are human sciences (al-‘alūm al-’insāniyya), requiring the propaedeutics,
sensation, and knowledge of primary substances. Thus, they pale in comparison to divine
science (‘ilm al-’ilāhī), which requires no method, effort, study, or time to attain.23 This
divine science is specific to the prophets (rusul).24
The exact content of divine science, according to al-Kindī, is difficult to ascertain.
He clearly identifies philosophy and the human sciences as being of a lower rank
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(martaba) than divine science, but it is unclear whether this is due to the way prophets
obtain knowledge, the way they convey knowledge, or that their knowledge has superior
content. As al-Kindī notes:
If one reflects upon the answers given by the prophets to questions about hidden
and true topics (al-’umūr al-khafiyya al-ḥaqqiya), which the philosopher aims
(qaṣada) to answer using his own method (ḥīla), which he has come to know
through long practice of inquiry and training, one will find that he [sc. the
philosopher] does not provide [an answer] similar to them [the prophets' answers]
in brevity, clarity, unerringness, and comprehensiveness. This was, for instance,
the case when the Prophet, the blessing and peace of God be upon him, answered
the questions of the idolaters. The answer was made known to him by Him who
knows all things, and has neither beginning nor end, but is forever eternal. They
spoke to him arrogantly, believing that he would not have an answer to their
question directed at him (blessings of God be upon him): ‘O Muḥammad, who
will revive the bones, when they are decayed?’25
Here, al-Kindī clearly distinguishes between philosophy and prophecy regarding method
(ḥīla) —insofar as the philosophers are bound by the systematic and arduous process laid
out earlier in al-Kindī’s letter, while the prophets obtain their knowledge “only through
the will (’irāda)” of God—and conveyance.26 Even if the philosophers and prophets
share the same knowledge, the prophets are able to provide an answer (jawāb) more
briefly, clearly, unerringly, and comprehensively. Less clear is whether the philosophers
and the prophets share the same knowledge or the prophets have sui generis knowledge
of hidden and true topics (al-’umūr al-khafiyya al-ḥaqqiya). The above passage can be
read as suggesting either that the prophets have knowledge of hidden topics which is
unobtainable to the human science or that they have knowledge of hidden topics which is
obtainable to philosophers only though their philosophical method (ḥīla). Although, the
philosopher clearly aims (qaṣada) at the same knowledge as the prophet, whether he
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obtains this knowledge is unclear. The answer to this question is muddled by his only
example of prophetic knowledge, noted at the end of the quote above: knowledge of the
cause of resurrection.27
Taking each of these distinctions between philosophy and prophecy in turn, it is
clear how the method (ḥīla) of the philosophers is distinct from the prophets’ lack of
method. Whereas the philosopher requires the propaedeutics and the lower sciences to
attain knowledge about secondary substances, the prophets needs no preliminary
knowledge for what they know, insofar as knowledge is bestowed upon them by God.
Rather, God is responsible for any preparatory work, by purifying (taṭhīr) the prophet’s
soul without recourse to study (ṭalab) or time (zamān(.28 And, in fact, it is the prophets’
independence from any method which distinguishes them from the rest of humankind; it
is a sign (’āya) of prophethood. As al-Kindī explains:
This knowledge is specific (khāṣṣa) to the prophets, may God's blessings be upon
them, and not to [the rest of] mankind. It is one of their marvelous unique
properties, that is, one of the signs (’āyāt) which they bear that distinguish
(fāṣila) them from the rest of mankind, since there is no path (sabīl), for anyone
other than the prophets, to the momentous knowledge of the true secondary
substances, or to knowledge of the primary sensible substances and their
accidents, without study (ṭalab) and the methods (ḥiyal) of logic and mathematics,
as we have mentioned, and in time (zamān(.29
Here, again, al-Kindī insinuates that the prophets have a particular or specific (khāṣṣa)
kind of knowledge, only to later confusingly suggest that the prophets’ knowledge is the
same as that of the philosophers, namely, knowledge of secondary substances. He is
again ambiguous as to whether both the content and method of knowing are distinct

This question comes from the Qur’ān 36:78-79.
Quantity of Aristotle’s Books 373.
29
Quantity of Aristotle’s Books 373.
27
28

246
between the philosophers and prophets or only the method is distinct, as will be examined
shortly.
The second distinction between the prophets and philosophers, namely the ability
to convey truth to others, is similarly straightforward, although also entangled in
ambiguities about whether the content or the method is the source of the dissimilarity. As
noted above, al-Kindī credits the prophets with skill for “brevity, clarity, unerringness,
and comprehensiveness” which far outstrip the philosopher.30 And, were al-Kindī’s
position to focus exclusively upon the prophets’ ability to communicate, his position
would not be all that dissimilar to al-Fārābī’s position. As he explains, following his
example of prophetic knowledge, knowledge of the cause of resurrection:
What man could use human philosophy to compose in so few letters as are used in
these verses, what God, the great and exalted, clearly composed in them for His
prophet, may God bless him and give him salvation, showing that the bones are
revived after they decayed, and that He has the power to create the like of the
heavens and earth, and that something comes to be from its contrary. Tongues
(’alsin) which speak confusedly are too weak for such a task; the limits of
mankind fall short of it, and it is veiled (ḥajaba) from [our] partial intellects (al‘uqūl al-juz’iyya).31
Again, al-Kindī conflates process and content here. Are the prophets distinct from the
philosophers because they are able to convey their knowledge more eruditely? Or are
they truly more knowledgeable? Is this distinction in the tongue or the intellect?
While no definitive claims can be made, al-Kindī’s example of prophetic
knowledge suggests that prophets have access to at least some content distinct from the
philosophers. An examination of his full treatment of the topic of resurrection is
unnecessary here, but the fact that he chooses resurrection, a topic outside the bounds of
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Aristotelian science, as the exemplar case of prophetic knowledge is telling.32 Raised as
Muḥammad’s response to an objection from idolaters who doubted the possibility of
resurrection, the argument in its simplest form reduces to this: since God created
everything that is (including bones) from a state of non-being according to His will, the
state of non-being which occurs in decayed bones is not an impediment to God’s causal
power.33 The Prophet’s argument, which relies upon, in al-Kindī’s explanation, an appeal
to more mundane examples of generation, is not in discordance with Aristotelian
causality (or at least al-Kindī’s own reading of Aristotelianism which allows for creation
in time).34 That said, it also relies upon knowledge separate and distinct from what is
obtainable through the methods of philosophy; philosophy could never provide any
indication (dalīl) of a future occurrence which is dependent upon God’s will (’irāda), as
al-Kindī describes the issue of resurrection.35
Thus, al-Kindī seems to hold that, while the philosophers aim (qaṣada) at the
same knowledge as the prophets, they do not always obtain it. When they do obtain it,
they do so only through an arduous method and are less adept at communicating it. For
this reason, while praiseworthy of philosophy, particularly philosophy which concerns
itself with knowledge of God as the First Cause, he is wary about theoretical knowledge
(naẓar) which is not in conformity with the message of the prophets.36 As he explains:
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By knowing the things in their true nature, one knows divinity, oneness, virtue,
and, in general everything beneficial and how to obtain it, and how to stay away
from, and protect oneself against, all harm. The way to acquire all these is what
the true prophets brought from God, great be His praise. For the true prophets
(may God's blessings be upon them) brought the assurance that God alone is
divine, and made [us] adhere to the virtues that are pleasing to Him, whilst
forsaking the vices that are essentially opposed to the virtues and preferring the
latter [to the former].37
Philosophy is noble, but it does not supersede the authority of the Qur’ān. Rather, the
knowledge of the prophets helps to distinguish between noble philosophy and base
speculation.
All told, al-Kindī seems to view philosophy and prophecy as distinct,
complimentary ways to obtain the truth. And while both the method and communication
of philosophy remain inferior to prophecy, the contents of both the most noble
philosophy and prophecy seem to be largely, if not entirely, the same (e.g., the Secondary
Substances and God). That said, al-Kindī clearly gives prophecy authority over
philosophy, even if at times suggesting that philosophy or the acquisition of truth is
useful for the interpretation of religion.38 Philosophy and prophecy are compatible, if
unequal, partners.
This model befits someone whom sympathized with al-Ma’mūn’s dream, but it
did not become the dominant view in Abbasid Baghdad. The miḥna, initiated by alMa’mūn to centralize religious authority with the Caliph, failed under al-Mutawakkil (d.
861) and with it al-Ma’mūn’s vision of a universal understanding of Islam, including his
vision of Islam’s compatibility with philosophy. Rather than destabilizing the religious
authority of the elite religious scholars (‘ulamā’), the miḥna appears to have strengthened
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their influence, particularly the traditionalist Ibn Ḥanbal, who had suffered imprisonment,
flogging, and exile during the miḥna, only to return to Baghdad a popular hero under alMutawakkil.39 By the time of the 10th century, sectarian debates flourished, and with
them came divergent views about the value of philosophy.

2.2. Al-Rāzī and the Injustice of Prophetic Knowledge
Amongst the philosophers, one is hard pressed to find someone less conciliatory
to prophetic knowledge (and al-Kindī’s position) than the early 10th century physician
Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī. Unfortunately, due to the polemical
character of his philosophical works, very few of al-Rāzī’s texts are extent beyond his
medical writings. In fact, at least according to al-‘Āmirī (d. 992), only his proficiency in
medicine provided him with a reputation as having wisdom (ḥikma) at all, rather than a
reputation for ignorant blathering (haḏayān).40 Regardless, whether due to his
preeminence as a physician or his usefulness as a foil to more doctrinaire authors, several
of his texts have survived, although one must reconstruct many of his positions through
the accounts of historians and his detractors, of which there were, fortunately for us,
many, e.g., Maimonides, al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Hazm, Nāsiri Ḥusrau, Ṣā‘id al-Andalusī, and the
aforementioned Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī.41
Of the texts by al-Rāzī we do have, he is effusive in his praise of reason. For
example, in the opening of the Spiritual Physick, he says:
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The Creator (Exalted be His name) gave and bestowed upon us Reason (al-‘aql)
to the end that we might thereby attain and achieve every advantage (manāfi‘) that
lies within the nature of such as us to attain and achieve, in this world and the
next. It is God’s greatest blessing (ni‘am) to us, and there is nothing that surpasses
it in procuring our advantage and profit… By Reason we reach all that raises us
up, and sweetens and beautifies our life, and through it we obtain our purpose
(buḡya) and desire (murād)… By Reason we have comprehended matters obscure
and remote, things that were secret and hidden from us… by it we have achieved
even the knowledge (ma‘rifa) of the Almighty, our Creator, the most majestic of
all that we have sought to reach and our most profitable attainment… Since this is
its worth (miqdār) and place (maḥall), its value (khaṭar) and significance (jalāla),
it behooves us not to bring it down from its high rank (rutba) or in any way
degrade it, neither to make it governed seeing that it is governor (ḥākim), or
controlled seeing that it is controller (zimām), or the subject seeing that it is
sovereign (matbu‘)…42
Here reason takes on the privilege and responsibilities normally afforded religion: reason
is the source of any advantage (manfa‘a) we might find in the next life; reason, not the
Prophet nor a Sacred text, is God’s greatest blessing (ni‘am); reason is our purpose and
ought to be our chief desire (murād); reason reveals God; and reason alone should be the
governor (ḥākim) of our lives. In his Book of the Philosophic Life, he echoes these
claims: since we are all servants of God, who is Himself a Knower, those of us who are
the most learned are closest to Him. He explains, “Philosophy is making oneself similar
to God, may He be glorified and magnified, to the extent possible for a human being (biqadr fī ṭāqa al-’insān).”43 In this work, he again insists that it is through the acquisition of
knowledge and justice that we become praiseworthy after death, because God “loves us
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to be knowledgeable (‘ilm) and just” and he detests “injustice and ignorance (jahl) on our
part.”44
Of course, al-Rāzī was not the first or last faylasūf to praise reason; as effusive as
he is, he is not unique in this regard. Rather, he is unique insofar as he established a clear
polemic between reason and revealed religion, as he views the latter as corrosive to the
former. As Abū Ḥātim relates al-Rāzī’s claims from their debate:
Those who adhere to religious laws received their religion through imitation
(taqlid). They forbade rational investigation (naẓar) of religious principles and
were very strict in this regard. They transmitted from their leaders traditions that
require them to abandon rational inquiry as a matter of religious belief… Among
these traditions related from ancestors are the following: ‘Debating religious
questions with affectation is unbelief (kufr);’ ‘Whoever subjects his religious
belief to analogical reasoning will be forever confused;’ Do not reflect upon God
but, rather, upon His creation;’ ‘Predestination is a mystery of God…’ When
people who argue thus are asked for proof of what they say, they grow wild and
angry and declare licit the blood of whoever questions them in this manner,
forbidding rational investigation and urging their opponents to be killed. For this
reason, the truth is buried very deep and falls totally silent.45
Put simply, unreflective assent to or imitation (taqlid) of religion stifles the human life,
insofar as religion discourages rational speculation (naẓar) (at least according to Abū
Ḥātim’s depiction of al-Rāzī, who views religion as little else than unreflective assent).
It is on precisely these grounds—that adherence to religion precludes the use of
reason and thus the fulfillment of humankind’s God-given purpose—that, as al-Bīrūnī
and Nāsiri Ḥusrau relate, al-Rāzī considers the possibility that revelation is actually
caused by evil spirits (posing as angels) intent to sow discord, confusion, and war.46 Abū
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Ḥātim’s account gives a different causal story for the evils of religion, although it is
equally provocative: it is humankind’s feeblemindedness (combined with the passage of
time and religious leaders’ deceptive tricks) which has created the customs of religion. As
he credits al-Rāzī as saying:
They are able to act thus because of long force of habit in their belief, the passage
of days, and the customs of mankind who are deceived by the imposing beards of
these jackasses (tiyūs) who sit in the front row of assemblies, tearing their throats
out with their lies (akāḏīb) and their superstitious fairy tales (khurāfāt) and their
‘so-and-so told me on the authority of so-and-so,’ all of it untrue (zūr) and slander
(buhtān)… What deceived (ḡarra) mankind is the length of the beards of these
jackasses (tiyūs) and the white clothes worn by their followers, who are feebleminded men, women, and children, as well as the passage of time, until this has
become nature (ṭab‘) and custom (‘āda).47
Al-Rāzī does not mince words. While one can rightfully ascribe the term beneficent
deception to al-Fārābī’s views of religion, given its historical roots in Plato, he is too
respectful to use the term himself. Al-Rāzī embraces the language of deception to
describe religion, depicting the customs of religion as being built upon lies (akāḏīb),
superstitious fairy tales (khurāfāt), untruth (zūr), and slander (buhtān). The prophets have
deceived (ḡarra) religious adherents through the appearance of wisdom—dramatic
clothing, imposing assemblies, and sagacious beards (like billygoats)—, but anyone who
escapes the feeble-mindedness brought about by religious custom ought to recognize that
God would not be so miserly in his bestowal of wisdom. God’s love of justice demands a
more egalitarian way to obtain the truth. Revealed religion is antithetical to God’s
purposes, and must, in actuality, have been brought about by demons or tricksters.
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Al-Rāzī was famously committed to egalitarianism, both practically and
theoretically.48 He described the virtuous life simply: “it consists in treating all men justly
(bi-’l-‘adl).”49 Unsurprisingly, he described God as meting out rationality equally and
justly. Rationality is “simple (qarīb) and universal (shāmil), and may readily be observed
on all hands, and in fact every child is accustomed to it and is brought up accordingly.”50
And while the philosophical life is hard and laborious (and while he admits that living the
philosophical life can be made harder by one’s natural temperament), he indicates that
only unwillingness to seek knowledge and habituate self-control ever prevents anyone
from becoming a philosopher.51 Only choosing not to engage in rational investigation
prevents the philosophical life, as had anyone “devoted his energies to what I [al-Rāzī]
have devoted mine and sought what I seek, he would have reached the same rank as I”.52
With this conception of justice in mind, al-Rāzī’s critique of special revelation
becomes even clearer. As he objects to Abū Ḥātim:
It would have been more worthy (’awlā) of the wisdom of the Wise One—more
worthy also of the mercy of the Merciful— for Him to have inspired (yali) all His
creatures with the knowledge (ma‘rifa) of what is to their benefit (manāfi‘) as
well as their harm (maḍārr) in this world and the next. He would not have
privileged (yufaḍḍilu) some over others; and there would be no cause for quarrel
and no dispute among them, leading to their destruction. This would have been
more protective of them than to cause some to act as guides for others.53
It is not in line with God’s character to choose prophets, nor to choose specific people
groups for the benefits of revelation. Access to the truth ought to be universal, not
special. Moreover, al-Rāzī did not find that religion encouraged virtue: the Manicheans
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acted unjustly toward those outside their belief system; the Khurramites permitted
deception for their cause; the Ismā‘īlī’s allowed for concealment (kitmān); and Jesus,
Moses, Muhammad, Mani, and Zoroaster all contradicted one another about fundamental
truths.54 For al-Rāzī, special revelation lacks merit on the grounds of its usefulness, its
fairness, and its truthfulness.
Yet, al-Rāzī does not object to the mythology of religion per se; he was, after all,
a devoted Platonist, reader of the Timaeus, and constructor of myth himself.55 Rather, he
objects to the notion that religion has privileged information not universally accessible to
any rational creature. He denies that the knowledge of the prophets is exceptional, nor
does he spare the Qu’rān or Muḥammad from critique. As he explains to Abū Ḥātim in
two related passages:
You claim that the miracle exists and is manifest—namely, the Qu’rān. You also
say that whoever denies this should bring forth something similar... We can bring
you a thousand like it.56
And:
We would be obliged to adduce a thousand examples like it from the speech of
men of eloquence and high style, prose rhymers, and poets (shu‘arā’). All of these
examples would be more fluent in phrasing, more concise in meaning, more
eloquent in both substance and form, and more elegant as rhymed prose.57
According to al-Rāzī, the Qu’rān should only be afforded the respect of poetry, and poor
poetry at that—this despite the Qu’rān’s repeated insistence that it is not a work of
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poetry, nor is Muḥammad a poet.58 Instead, al-Rāzī finds works of philosophy, like the
Almagest, more worthy of veneration.59 Given his stridence, perhaps it is no surprise that
al-Rāzī’s philosophical works were, for the most part, rejected, destroyed, or ignored.

2.3. Al-Fārābī as Coopting Religion
While it would be disingenuous to describe al-Fārābī’s views about the
relationship between philosophy and religion as a direct response to either al-Kindī or alRāzī (although, he seems to have been familiar with the thought of both, having been
likely influenced by the former and having reportedly written a rebuttal of the latter),
their thought provides helpful context for his model.60 While more insistent about the
preeminence of reason than al-Kindī, al-Fārābī also recognizes the value of religion to
communicate what would otherwise be hidden truths.61 At places, he acknowledges that
individuals can obtain insight without the arduous process of scientific inquiry (e.g.,
through divination and seizing upon the definitions of things).62 And, like al-Kindī, he
holds no qualms regarding the unequal distribution of the abilities by which human
beings acquire knowledge.63 While less caustic in tone than al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī also
delimits the authority of revealed religion.64 He asserts the preeminence of reason as the
purpose of the human life.65 He claims that the ruler of the city ought to rule according to

Qu’rān 69:40-41; 37:36-37; 36:39.
PoP 168.
60
See Janos 2012, 30f., 203f.; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a 1882, 608.
61
PS 15.11.
62
PS 14.7; PR 79. See also Chapter 3, 3.2.1.2 and 4.1.1. For Avicenna’s engagement with al-Fārābī on this
issue, see Chapter 4, 3.1.
63
PR 74, 77-78.
64
AH 44; AH (Ar.) 61.
65
PR 74; PS 15.8-10.
58
59

256
philosophy, not according to special revelation.66 He agrees with al-Rāzī that the aim of
religion is, in fact, to compel adherents into imitation, not the use of their reason
(although they disagree about the morality of this aim).67 And like al-Rāzī, he relegates
Muḥammad to the role of poet (though not by name).68 But unlike al-Kindī, al-Fārābī
does not espouse the priority of revealed religion. Unlike al-Rāzī, he does not reject
religion outright. Rather, he coopts its authority, identifying revelation with a specific
expression of philosophy, and, in doing so, positions philosophy as the preeminent
expression of the human person, achievable only by a few.
Against these two models, al-Fārābī’s own philosophical commitments are
highlighted. Rather than integrating philosophy into religious life or distinguishing
between philosophy and religious life, al-Fārābī coopts religion for use by philosophers.
This choice, which, while conciliatory toward religion compared to al-Rāzī, is not
conciliatory per se, highlights both the supremacy of philosophy over revealed religion
and the supremacy of philosophers over religious adherents. Put simply, the preeminence
of natural reason is conspicuous in al-Fārābī’s writings, as is his insistence that
knowledge is unobtainable for most people. His need to subsume religion under
philosophy insists that there is a standard for truth which measures religion as inferior to
philosophy. His need to coopt religion insists that the superiority of philosophy is not
reachable by everyone. If he lacks commitment to the former, why insist that
philosophers do not require religion?69 Why insist that religious rulers must, themselves,
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be philosophers?70 If he lacks commitment to the latter, why not, like al-Rāzī, reject the
usefulness of special revelation altogether?
As discussed in Chapter 3, al-Fārābī’s universe (or at least his sublunar universe)
is a pessimistic one. Unlike al-Kindī, al-Fārābī’s God does not bestow knowledge upon
people by purifying (taṭhīr) their souls according to His will (’irāda).71 Unlike al-Rāzī,
al-Fārābī’s God does not mete out justice, ensuring that every human is able to lead a
happy, philosophic life.72 For al-Fārābī, philosophy is both the aim of the human life and
entirely inaccessible to most human lives. It is only within this context that the
concession of religion becomes justifiable. It is only within this context, i.e., when the
preeminent truth of philosophy is only sporadically attainable, that beneficent deception
becomes ‘the next best’ thing, as discussed in Chapter 1. A full accounting of the
importance of these two commitments held by al-Fārābī which help to justify the
Construction of Social Knowledge—that philosophers have the preeminent form of
human knowledge, while many lack the wherewithal to know—will have to wait to be
more fully addressed. That said, the consistency with which al-Fārābī’s successors
recognize these twin commitments, i.e., the preeminence of philosophical knowledge and
the deficiency of most human knowers, as integral to his model (and subsequently theirs)
indicates that they also read al-Fārābī as endorsing the pessimistic worldview explored in
Chapter 3, also.
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2.4. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’
Before turning to the reception of al-Fārābī’s thought by thinkers who could
rightly be described as adopters of Fārābīan political philosophy, generally, and the
Construction of Social Knowledge, specifically, one final set of contemporaries of alFārābī should be noted: the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’. A full account of the relationship between
al-Fārābī and the Ikhwān would require addressing a series of issues too vast to even
enumerate here, let alone explore —the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’s unknown identity, the unknown
terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of their writings, the heterogeneity of their
doctrines, and their quizzical relationship with philosophy and Islamic theology,
specifically Ismā‘īlī theology, chief among them. But while the complexities of these
issues necessitate further explanation, the Ikhwān, even in simple terms, provide another
model of the relationship between philosophy and revelation which serves as a useful foil
in contradistinction with al-Fārābī’s own model. After all, along with being
contemporaries of al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān, perhaps more than any other thinkers prior to
the turn of the 11th century, find common cause with al-Fārābī in viewing revelation as a
political issue. As the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā explain in their 22nd epistle:
Religion and the State are inseparable twin brothers. Neither can survive without
the other. But religion is the elder. The state is the younger brother, the follower.
A state cannot do without a religion for its people to live by; and religion needs a
king to command the people to uphold his institutions, freely or by force.73
Within this framework, like in al-Fārābī’s own, political authority is susceptible to the
familiar nexus of complications surrounding the epistemological and sociological
authority of revelation, while revelation manifests itself in the political sphere. But, while
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the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ adopt a model as political and pluralistic as al-Fārābī’s own, they still
regard special revelation as holding a uniquely authoritative epistemological category.
It should be noted that the Ikhwān are methodologically eclectic, intentionally so.
They are simultaneously Neoplatonic philosophers, Muslim theologians (possibly
Ismā‘īlī), magicians, astrologers, and critics.74 Nor do they see any tension in their
multifarious methodological approaches. For example, in their famous Epistle 22, a story
in which non-human animals sue human beings before the King of the Jinn for
humanity’s poor treatment of non-human animals, the idyllic hero of the story, the only
interlocutor to successfully explain what makes human beings superior to non-human
animals, thus justifying human treatment of non-human animals during the fictional court
case, is described as “Persian by breeding, Arabian by faith, a ḥanīf by confession, Iraqi
in culture, Hebrew in lore, Christian in manner, Damascene in devotion, Greek in
science, Indian in discernment, Sufi in intimations, regal in character, masterful in
thought, and divine in awareness”.75 Only someone who has mastered the best qualities
of multifarious methods from numerous nations and religions can resolve the argument of
the work. A diverse, and at times inconsistent, method is a feature, not a bug of their
thought. As they say in the beginning of Epistle 45 and elsewhere:
In general, our brothers, may God help them, should not reject any branch of
knowledge, nor turn their backs on any of the books of the Ancients, nor cling
fanatically to a single school (maḏhab). This is because our belief system and
school (maḏhab) embraces all schools (maḏāhib) and branches of knowledge.76
The practical result of this approach is that the Ikhwān often conflate or confuse the roles
of religion, politics, and the imagination. Put crudely, while al-Fārābī carefully fits
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together the societal roles of philosophy, metaphysics, rulership, religion, and political
imagination into a well-constructed model, like pieces in a carefully planned puzzle, the
Ikhwān take those same pieces and sand down their edges. While this has the benefit of
making the pieces fit together, it also renders them less distinguishable from one
another.77
In fairness to the Ikhwān, though, comparing the precision of a single author like
al-Fārābī, who has inconsistencies of his own, to an encyclopedic collection of works by
a clandestine association of numerous authors is uncharitable.78 Al-Fārābī and the Ikhwān
were rough contemporaries, with al-Fārābī’s death placed in 950/951 C.E. and the
Ikhwān having a terminus a quo from between 873 C.E. and 961 C.E. and a terminus ad
quem around 986 C.E.79 And while they lived geographically near one another, with alFārābī spending his adult life in Abbasid Baghdad, before eventually moving to
Damascus, the Ikhwān reportedly living under the Būyid regents in Basra. Providing
much more information of note is difficult, with rather sparse reliable biographical
accounts the nature of the Ikhwān’s association.80 The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’s name, literally
‘the brethren of purity’ (purity being the aim of the human life and the key to knowledge,
happiness, and the afterlife), is pseudonymous, given their idiosyncratic doctrines and
status as persona non grata within the Abbasid milieu (although al-Tawḥidi does provide
a list of purported members in his Book of Enjoyment and Sociability).81 One more thing
can be said, namely that the Ikhwān read al-Fārābī, or at least some of the Ikhwān read
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al-Fārābī, given some deep parallels between their cosmological models, a passage which
implicitly critiques al-Fārābī’s rejection of astrology, their shared emphasis on the
development of a “perfect state” (al-madīna al-fāḍila) and the Law-giver (wāḍi‘ alsharī‘a/wāḍi‘ al-nawāmīs), and a large uncited quotation of al-Fārābī by the Ikhwān,
heretofore, to my knowledge, not noted elsewhere in any secondary literature.82
Philosophically, the Ikhwān share many commitments with al-Fārābī, the relevant
of which, for the sake of time, I will simply list here:
1) Like al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān hold philosophy and demonstration in high esteem.
But whereas for al-Fārābī, demonstration is the only method by which to
obtain certainty (yaqīn), for the Ikhwān, revelation is the shorter, straighter
path to certainty of belief and happiness.83 Revelation avoids the difficulties
brought about through discussion, arguments, and finding sound analogy
(qiyās ṣaḥīḥ).84 The Ikhwān are concerned about the philosophically inclined
falling into errors through engaging in futile debate, particularly the errors of
denying the creation of the world, a precondition and cause of happiness for
the Ikhwān, and the immortality of the soul.85 Interestingly, they hold the view
that, by definition, “wise men” (ḥukamā’) believe in creation, insofar as the
innovation of the world is part of knowing the true nature of things, and claim
that the Greek philosophers endorsed creation in pre-eternity by placing God’s
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creative act prior to the motions of the heavens, even while critiquing the
Ash‘arite occasionalists, who adopt a very robust notion of creation, as
pretenders to philosophy.86 Still, the Ikhwān are concerned about “apostates
(murtāḍīn) by means of the philosophical sciences”.87 Nonetheless, despite the
Ikhwān’s occasional reticence, philosophy plays a central role for the human
attainment of happiness. But whereas al-Fārābī identifies happiness in this life
and the next through the development of the human intellect through the
acquisition of intelligibles, particularly those intelligibles which are not and
never were in matter, e.g., the First and Secondary Causes, which, once
acquired, allow one to become an acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafāḍ), the
Ikhwān identify becoming a wise, old philosopher as the last stage in life for
the ‘pure’ prior to eternal happiness.88 (Elsewhere, they identify happiness
with purity alone, without any intellectual qualifications mentioned).89
2) Like al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān identify religion as the primary tool by which a
ruler can habituate a citizenry to virtue.90
3) Like al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān view humanity as fundamentally flawed, though
al-Fārābī credits this deficiency (naqṣ) to the sublunar world’s origination
through the contrary motions of the heavens, while the Ikhwān credit human
impurity to embodiment, insofar as the soul must use the body during its
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preparatory purification, which, once completed, allows the soul to leave the
body.91
4) And like al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān think that human beings require cooperation
(ta‘āwun) or help (mu‘āwana) from one another in order to achieve
happiness.92
These four doctrines are held by both al-Fārābī and the Ikhwān: the essential role
philosophy plays in human happiness, the value of religion to habituate people toward
virtue, the fundamental deficiency of human persons, and the necessity of cooperation for
human happiness.
But whereas al-Fārābī orders philosophy and religion by identifying religion as
the imagistic expression of philosophy, the Ikhwān conflate philosophy and revelation in
their effort to harmonize them, ultimately collapsing all humanly knowable truth into the
domain of a single faculty of thought (al-quwwa al-mufakira) which includes both reason
and imagination. All knowledge ends up being built upon analogy (qiyās), allusion
(’ashāra), and indication (dilāl).93 While the Ikhwān privilege the prophets (largely, for
the same reason al-Kindī does —they require no propaedeutic science which might lead
them into error), both philosophy and religion reflect an analogy which exists in reality,
the analogy between the individual human soul and the cosmos, as well as the analogy
between human actors and the Creator. This analogy, the famous Neoplatonic analogy
between the microanthropos (the human) and the macroanthropos (the cosmos), is the
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foundation of, not just the Ikhwān’s cosmology, but their epistemology.94 Using the
human soul as an analogue for the cosmos must be the starting point for all true
knowledge.95 The truth of creation is evident in the human soul.96 And the Ikhwān warn
that philosophy is a dangerous method, precisely and only because philosophers might
begin with the wrong analogy, not the human soul (beginning, instead, for example, with
sensation).97
Once philosophy is founded upon the proper analogy, the Ikhwān equate
philosophers with the spiritually learned, those who properly orient human life and
pronounce truth (descriptions they also give the prophets), and describe logic as a
spiritual discipline, even identifying it with revelation (al-waḥy).98 They identify
philosophers/the wise, as the successors to the prophets, indicating that only they, also,
can determine the specificities (ma‘ālim) of religion.99 And they explain that only those
who follow the prophets and the philosophers obtain happiness—they are less pessimistic
than al-Fārābī in this regard.100 In effect, by defining philosophy in an odd way (the
philosophers are, after all, viewed as creationists, believers in the immortality of the
individual human soul, believers that the human soul is inscribed with its
macroanthropotic character by God, and the successors to the prophets who look into and
specify the exterior and interior meaning of religion, according to the Ikhwān), the
Ikhwān adopt a Fārābīan model of political imagination, but harmonize religion and
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philosophy by placing both revelation and reason into the same epistemic category as one
another, both being founded on analogy. In other words, both religion and philosophy are
expressions of political imagination. They even both occur in the same faculty of the
soul. As they explain:
Know that the contemplative faculty (al-quwwa al-mufakira) has many actions in
which the actions of the rest of the faculties are subsumed... As for what actions
are particular to it, they are contemplation, reflection, imagination (al-taṣawwur),
expression (al-i‘tibār), compounding and analysis, joining together, and the
drawing of analogies (al-qiyās). It also does physiognomy, auguries, soothsaying,
suggestion, inspiration, receiving revelation (al-waḥy), imagining dreams, and the
evaluation of these... Receiving revelation is understanding the giving of laws
(wāḍi‘ al-nawāmīs) and recording the divine books and the concealed
interpretations (al-ta’wīlāt al-maknūna) of them that none may touch except those
purified...101
Put simply, reason, imagination, revelation, analogy, and expression are all housed in a
muddled faculty which produces multiple methods by which to encounter the truth. As a
result, there must be multiple methods by which a teacher must express the truth. (This
lines up with what the Ikhwān describe above concerning method.)
That their account of religion as political imagination is basically Fārābīan is
clear. They describe the Qur’ān, as well as the Holy Books of the other monotheistic
religions, as providing indications (’adilla) of the truth, not the truth itself.102 The truth of
religion is masked in allusions (’ashāra), symbols (rumūz), and secrets (’asrār), which,
when taken too literally (e.g., stories of Adam, Iblīs, the Tree of Life, etc.) lead to
error.103 But unlike al-Fārābī, these truths are not anchored to philosophy (or even the
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certainty of revelation). Even the Law-giver never goes beyond the epistemic status of
opinion and belief, even when he feels certain:
These opinions (’ārā’) are in the soul of the Law-giver (wāḍi‘ al-sharīa), and he
conceived (taṣawwara) of them in his thought (fikr) as if (ka’annahu) seen with
certainty (yaqīn), without doubt. He calls upon his people, he who was sent to
them, and strives to inform (’inbā’) them about what he believes (i‘taqada) in an
explanation to individual members of his people in secret (sirr) and by
declaration, not symbolically and not in a hidden way. Then, he alludes to [his
beliefs] and symbolizes (yarmuzu) them with common expressions (’alfāẓ) and a
possible meaning (ma‘ānī) for an interpretation that the public will understand
and their souls will accept.104
In the Ikhwān’s model, philosophy and religion are both reduced to a semblance of
authority; they are useful pedagogically, but imperfect. They lead to happiness but are
simply one method among many. As they explain:
Some portion [of people] only accept what is proclaimed by the utterances of the
poet. [There is] a portion who only accept story and rumor. Some portion only
accept by argumentation and debate. And some are satisfied by imitation and
submit to convention.105
Different methods are required, none having authority over one another. So, while only
religion, for the Ikhwān, properly relies upon political imagination (in the sense of wahm,
of producing images), both religion and philosophy function politically as methods which
unify people and bring them toward happiness. They are both housed in the same faculty,
rely on analogy, and can be rightfully described as political speech.
Viewed in purely political terms, the Ikhwān’s model, at least on a basic level,
achieves many of the same goals as al-Fārābī’s own, by accounting for the esoteric and
exoteric aspects of religious images, reconciling Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy
with religion, and providing an explanation for the variance of monotheistic religious
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expression in the world (after all, the importance of truth is that it is built upon the
analogy of the macroanthropos). Unlike al-Kindī, the Ikhwān do not place the truth of
religion at the level of certain knowledge, but rather at the level of opinion (ra’y), which
is seen by the Law-giver as if it (ka’annahu) is certain. The Ikhwān are not skeptics —
some knowledge is naturally innate (ṭabī‘iyy ḡarīziyy) and some is inscribed on the
human soul, like knowledge of the macroanthropotic character of the universe. However,
they do not indemnify the rectitude of religious images against critique and analysis. Both
religion and philosophy are built, after all, on analogy. Unlike al-Rāzī and al-Fārābī, they
do not privilege philosophy over religion. Rather, they restrict epistemic certainty to very
few arenas and embrace the quixotic and pluralistic approaches toward knowledge that
human beings manifest. Their “belief system and school (maḏhab) embraces all schools
(maḏāhib) and branches of knowledge.”106

2.5. Al-Fārābī in Context
In the context of these thinkers, one can readily see how typical al-Fārābī’s
thought is for his time. While groundbreaking in the execution and care he takes to
establish a comprehensive, architectonic, and unified theory of state, religion, and
metaphysics, his solution is just one amongst many attempts to explore the issue.
Moreover, in the alternative models proposed by his predecessors and contemporaries, alFārābī’s decisions become more pronounced. While al-Rāzī and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’
certainly suffered from critical notoriety, the Abbasid period allowed for numerous
explorations of the relationship between philosophy and revealed religion. Al-Fārābī
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could have emphasized the authority of revealed religion or could have rejected it in toto;
he could have embraced a more amorphous view of the methods by which humans obtain
truth. Instead, he deliberately adopts a triumphant view of demonstration, with religion,
as imaginative expression, serving as the handmaiden to certain philosophy. The care
with which he establishes his metaphysics and grounds his political philosophy upon it is
no accident. Fārābīan political philosophy is built upon the certitude of the Imām, and
certitude is made possible through al-Fārābī’s careful and laborious cosmological model.

3. Al-Fārābī’s Adopters
Al-Fārābī’s successors, the adopters of his political philosophy writ large, never
lost sight of the importance of al-Fārābī’s metaphysics to his political philosophy.
Following in his footsteps, they carefully adopted, adapted, and integrated the basics of
his metaphysical model regarding the establishment of religion. Most importantly, they
recognized philosophy as the preeminent expression of truth, with religion serving as its
imagistic expression. Put simply, they recognized religion as a Construction of Social
Knowledge, a beneficent deception, or an imagistic translation of philosophical truth. The
thinkers discussed briefly below, Avicenna (d. 1037), Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185), Maimonides
(d. 1204), and Averroes (d. 1198), all received and adapted the Fārābīan model for their
own purposes.

3.1. Avicenna
Perhaps no one popularized (and adapted) al-Fārābī’s Neoplatonic-Aristotelianism
more for broad consumption by the Muslim world than the famed “principal master” (al-
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shaykh al-ra’īs), Avicenna.107 A great deal of ink has been spilt on Avicenna’s
philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and its effect on his view of prophecy, so new
ground need not be broken here.108 But the parallels to al-Fārābī’s own position, at least
the Revealed-as-Determined model, are notable and lend credence to the cohesion
between Fārābīan metaphysics and politics. Avicenna, happy to forge his own path in
other arenas, leaves the metaphysical underpinnings of his theory of revelation relatively
unchanged from their roots in al-Fārābī.
Like al-Fārābī, Avicenna explains revelation through a philosophical psychology
built upon a precise cosmological model which grounds the intelligibility of the world
upon a series of emanated Intellects which flow from the fecundity of the First Cause,
which Avicenna describes as the Necessary Existent.109 These Intellects culminate, in like
manner to al-Fārābī, in the Active Intellect, which empowers human intellection and
serves as the source of sublunar intelligibility.110 And while Avicenna’s model remains
distinct from al-Fārābī’s own model in its precise mechanics—Avicenna’s Active Intellect
plays both a larger psychological role in the process of abstraction and a larger
metaphysical role, as the dator formarum of the sublunar world—, the basic components
which accompany prophecy as beneficent political deception remain unchanged, namely
the preeminence of philosophical knowledge insofar as it is built upon a metaphysics and
psychology which allow for certainty and a metaphysics which necessitates the
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deficiency of some subset of human beings.111 Expounding upon these issues in detail
goes beyond the scope of this project and adds little to the already rich secondary
literature available. But for the purposes of understanding al-Fārābī better, Avicenna
reveals that, even in a model which avoids having the prophet deliberately convert
philosophical knowledge into images, instead having the particularization of religious
images occur through an entirely natural psychological process, the legitimacy of religion
requires, as discussed in Chapter 1, that images are both necessary (given the inability for
many humans to attain philosophical certainty) and the ‘next best thing’ to universal
philosophy.
Drawing upon al-Fārābī’s Revealed-as-Determined model as discussed in Chapter
3, Avicenna grounds prophecy upon demonstration, with the distinguishing characteristic
of the prophet being his aptitude for acquiring the middle terms of syllogisms. As
Avicenna explains:
The acquisition of knowledge (‘ulūm), whether from someone else or from within
oneself, is of various degrees. Some people who acquire knowledge come very
near to immediate perception, since their potential intellect which precedes the
capacity we have mentioned is the most powerful. If a person can acquire
knowledge from within himself, this strong capacity is called ‘intuition’ (ḥads). It
is so strong in certain people that they do not need great effort, or instruction and
actualization, in order to make contact (yataṣalla) with the active intelligence
(‘aql al-fa‘‘āl)... This is the highest degree of this capacity. In this state the
material intelligence must be called ‘Holy Intellect’ (‘aql qudsī). It belongs to the
genus of intellectus in habitu (al-‘aql bi-l-malaka), but is so lofty that not all
people share it. It is not unlikely, indeed, that some of these actions attributed to
the ‘Holy Spirit’ (al-rūḥ al-qudsī) because of their powerful and lofty nature
overflow into the imagination (mutakhayyila) which symbolizes them in images
(’amthila) and words (al- kalām) in the way which we have previously indicated.
What proves this is the evident fact that the intelligible truths are acquired only
when the middle term (al-ḥadd al-’awsaṭ) of a syllogism (al-qiyās) is obtained.
This may be done in two ways: sometimes through intuition (al-ḥads), which is an
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act of mind by which the mind itself immediately perceives the middle term (alḥadd al-’awsaṭ). This power of intuition is quickness of apprehension. But
sometimes the middle term is acquired through instruction... There might be a
man whose soul has such an intense purity (al-ṣafā’) and is so firmly linked to the
rational principles that he blazes with intuition (ḥads), i.e. with the receptivity of
inspiration (’ilhām) coming from the active intelligence concerning everything.
So the forms of all things contained in the active intelligence are imprinted on his
soul either all at once or nearly so, not that he accepts them merely on authority
(taqlīd) but on account of their logical order which encompasses all the middle
terms. For beliefs accepted on authority (’umūr) concerning those things which
are known only through their causes possess no rational certainty (yaqīnīa
‘aqliyya). This is a kind of prophetic inspiration (al-nubuwwa(, indeed its highest
form and the one most fitted to be called prophetic power (quwwa al-nubuwwa);
and it is the highest human faculty.112
Here, Avicenna outlines the natural process for knowledge acquisition, in its various
degrees: either the middle terms (al-ḥadd al-’awsaṭ) of syllogisms are learned through
instruction or through intuition (ḥads), what Gutas translates as ‘Guessing Correctly’,
which itself can vary in quickness and degree.113 (Moreover, as Avicenna describes in the
Persian Philosophy for ‘Alā’-ad-Dawla, all knowledge ultimately reduces to intuition,
insofar as “every problem has been found by means of Correct Guesses, since everybody
has learned from somebody else but he who was the very first never learned from
anybody”.)114 This process of correct guessing, which falls under the activity of the
intellectus in habitu, can occur quickly, after delay, or not at all, according to the quality
of human souls.115 This process is then guaranteed via the activity of the Active Intellect,
whose contact (ittiṣāl) imprints the forms of things on the human soul. And, at times, this
intellective process can be so powerful that some of the activity attributed to intuition
(ḥads) overflows into the “imagination (mutakhayyila) which symbolizes [this activity] in
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images (’amthila) and words (al-kalām)”. This process, an entirely natural process
grounded in the normal, but exemplary, functioning of the human intellect, is what
Avicenna labels ‘prophetic power’ (quwwa al-nubuwwa). Moreover, it is entirely
grounded in al-Fārābī’s Revealed-as-Determined model, as will be discussed below.
Without delving into the sophisticated proximate Avicennian psychological
commitments which abut knowledge acquisition through intuition (ḥads)—e.g.,
abstraction (tajrīd), methodic experience (tajriba), the various stages and powers of
intellect, and conjunction (ittiṣāl) with the Active Intellect—, it is important to recognize
how philosophically predictable and necessary, both in an Aristotelian and a Fārābīan
sense, Avicenna’s account of prophecy is.116 Put otherwise, revelation is a concomitant
philosophical outcome of Avicenna’s psychology which happens to explain what religion
calls prophetic power (quwwa al-nubuwwa), not an aberration or a deus ex machina of
Avicenna’s philosophical commitments in order to justify religious tradition. As Gutas
explains:
The great merit of this theory lies in the fact that, first, it enables Avicenna to
combine into one the two seemingly disparate ways of acquiring the secondary
intelligibles, the “demonstration” and “revelation” or “inspiration”... by making
the common feature of both cognitive processes the discovery of the middle term,
and second, it integrates this process firmly into the function of the intellect in
habitu, a philosophically well defined stage of the rational soul's relation to the
intelligibles. The mechanism of acquiring the intelligibles is thus fully explained,
“revelation” and “inspiration” are demystified and adapted to this mechanism,
incongruities in terminology are eliminated or explained away, and the whole
account is made not only to fit neatly in the theory of the soul as developed in the
Aristotelian tradition, but also to harmonize and interrelate the various branches
of this philosophical tradition: psychology provides the framework within which
epistemology, through logic, reproduces ontology which posits psychology. In
other words, the agent engaged in intellection (the intellect/psychology), the
process of intellection (Guessing Correctly the middle term/epistemology), the
116
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method of intellection (syllogistic reasoning, the middle term/ logic), and the
objects of intellection (the intelligibles/ ontology) are interdependent and
mutually explanatory elements unified in a coherent and systematic theory.117
This systematic integration of psychology, epistemology, ontology, and religion mirrors
what is found in al-Fārābī, as discussed in Chapter 3, even if the precise mechanics are
adjusted by Avicenna, as mentioned above. But for the purposes of this project,
Avicenna’s identification of intuition (ḥads) with the rational prophetic power and its
overflow into the imagination (mutakhayyila), which produces the particular images
associated with religion, most readily reveal Avicenna’s foundation in al-Fārābī’s model.

3.1.1. Intuition (ḥads)
As has been noted elsewhere, Avicenna’s conception of ḥads is not original; it is
rooted in Aristotle’s own conception of εὐστοχία and αγχίνοια, the former of which
Aquinas later describes as a “valid conjecture” (bona coniecturatio) but literally means
‘hitting the mark’, the latter of which is the acumen for the former.118 Put simply,
αγχίνοια is the aptitude for εὐστοχία.119 The landmark study by Dimitri Gutas, already
noted, explores the origination of ḥads in Avicenna’s thought, from its foundation as
εὐστοχία and αγχίνοια in Aristotle, εὐστοχία’s translation as ḥusnu ḥadsin in Abū Bishr
Mattā ibn Yūnus’ translation of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Syriac translation of Posterior
Analytics, as well as the lack of Greek development, outside of the ethics of the Stoics,
from the original Aristotelian notion (beyond faithful, continuous transmission).120
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Helpfully, Gutas even notes how discrete Muslim concepts—revelation (waḥy),
inspiration (ilhām), and innate knowledge (badīha), chief among them—lent themselves
to integration under the Aristotelian notion of εὐστοχία and the Avicennian notion of
ḥads. Like al-Fārābī before him, Avicenna subsumes revelation under the authority of
philosophy, by defining it as simply the preeminent version of intuition, a part of normal
human psychology. For this reason, Gutas credits the general synthesis between
Aristotelian psychology and Muslim religion as originating in al-Fārābī.121 However,
Gutas identifies the systematic synthesis of philosophy and religion under intuition (ḥads)
as an Avicennian invention.122
This is not the case.123 Al-Fārābī, too, links εὐστοχία, in the Aristotelian sense of
identifying middle terms, with revelation. As he explains in PR, what demarcates the first
ruler, the Imām, from others is that he needs no instruction, as he is able to apprehend the
means by which happiness is attained through conjunction (ittiṣāl) with the Active
Intellect (after having reached the status of the acquired intellect). Through this
conjunction, the Active Intellect emanates a power “by which [the Imām] is able to seize
upon the definition (taḥdīd) of things and action and direct them toward happiness,”
which al-Fārābī calls revelation (waḥy).124 Taḥdīd is the verbal noun of ḥaddada, to
define, and shares the same root as Avicenna’s concept of the ‘middle term’ (al-ḥadd al’awsaṭ) which is seized by intuition. It may indeed be the case that this passage is
Avicenna’s proximate source for his synthesis between Aristotelian εὐστοχία and Islamic
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waḥy. That said, Avicenna’s development of the notion of intuition (ḥads) far outstrips
al-Fārābī’s own doctrine, who, to my knowledge, only mentions the concept in this
passage, seemingly in reference to the Stoic concept of having an acumen (αγχίνοια) for a
conjecture (εὐστοχία) toward appropriate action (καθῆκον).125 In sum, both al-Fārābī and
Avicenna insist that the ability to seize upon definitions, enabling demonstrative
knowledge (beyond the instruction received by others), is a key component of revelation,
although Avicenna builds out his model more consistently and in detail.
Why is it important that a prophet or Imām can intuit the middle terms of
syllogisms? And what does Avicenna’s inclusion of this doctrine, qua reader of al-Fārābī,
say about al-Fārābī’s justification for beneficent political deception? Both al-Fārābī and
Avicenna require that revelation begins, first and foremost, with knowledge. Moreover, it
begins with the kind of knowledge that is certain, insofar as it is verified by a certain
method, i.e., demonstrative syllogisms. Only after certain knowledge does revelation take
on the particularity of the images of religion. For al-Fārābī and Avicenna, beneficent
political deception is not the crass maneuver of a skeptic trying to consolidate power for
some personal aim or unknowable good. Nor is beneficent political deception the sincere,
but unverified, expression of religious experience, taken as gospel on authority. For both
al-Fārābī and Avicenna, knowledge precedes religious expression. Knowledge precedes
beneficent deception.
But while for al-Fārābī, the importance of the certain knowledge which
undergirds revelation is apparent in almost every text, for Avicenna, reader of al-Fārābī,
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the importance of the knowledge which precedes revelation is a development in his
thought. This reveals how important knowledge is for a Fārābīan account of revelation,
given that Avicenna, apparently, changes his mind on the issue, taking a more Fārābīan
position. The early Avicenna had no conception of intuition (ḥads) as providing the
middle terms of syllogisms, instead he speaks about ‘alertness’ (yaqaẓa), which provides
a means by which one may skirt around the need for middle terms. In the early Avicenna,
conjunction (ittiṣāl) serves to sidestep, rather than bolster, demonstration. As Avicenna
explains in his first philosophical work, The Compendium on the Soul:
In some people, keenness of mind (al-yaqaẓa) and contact (al-ittiṣāl) with the
universal intellect may so predispose the rational faculty as to free it from having
recourse to syllogisms and reasoning in order to acquire knowledge; inspiration
(al-’ilhām) and revelation (al-waḥy), rather, are sufficient sustenance for it. This
specific property of the rational faculty is called sanctification (taqdīs), in
accordance with which it is then called sanctified spirit (rūḥ muqaddis(. None
shall gain the enjoyment of this rank except prophets (’anbiyā’) and messengers
(rusul) of God, peace and prayers be upon them.126
Rather than providing the middle terms for syllogisms, the young Avicenna viewed
revelation, ungrounded and unphilosophical, as sufficient for knowledge. Yet by the
writing of the Najāt, it is not enough for Avicenna that the prophet accepts things “merely
on authority (taqlīd) but on account of their logical order which encompasses all the
middle terms. For beliefs accepted on authority (’umūr) concerning those things which
are known only through their causes possess no rational certainty (yaqīnīa‘aqliyya)”.127
The mature Avicenna identifies this—certainty through demonstration aided by
intuition—with the prophetic power. The images of religion must be grounded upon
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certain knowledge. Avicenna, reader of al-Fārābī, reorients himself to be more in line
with the Second Teacher’s position.

3.1.2. Avicenna’s Revealed-as-Determined Model
Concerning the production of the images of religion themselves, Avicenna gives
an entirely naturalistic account in accord with al-Fārābī’s Revealed-as-Determined
model.128 In the previously quoted passage from the Najāt, he explains that the
emanations from the Active Intellect “overflow into the imagination (mutakhayyila)
which symbolizes them in images (’amthila) and words (al-kalām),” echoing al-Fārābī’s
Revealed-as-Determined model as presented at PS 15.10.129 In his Proofs of Prophecy,
Avicenna makes the content of these images even more clear:
Revelation (al-waḥy) is the emanation (al-ifāḍa) and the angel (al-malak) is the
received emanating power (al-quwwa al-maqbūla al-mufayḍa) that descends on
the prophets as if it were an emanation continuous with the universal intellect (al‘aql al-kullī). It is rendered particular (mujzzi’aa), not essentially (li-ḏāt), but
accidentally (bi-l-‘araḍ(, by reason of the particularity of the recipient. Thus the
angels have been given different names because [they are associated with]
different notions (ma‘ānin); nevertheless, they form a single totality, which is
particularized, not essentially, but accidentally, because of the particularity of the
recipient. The message, therefore, is that part of the emanation termed
“revelation” (waḥy) which has been received and couched in whatever mode of
expression is deemed best for furthering man’s good in both the eternal and the
corruptible worlds as regards knowledge and political governance, respectively.
The messenger is the one who conveys what he acquires of the emanation termed
“revelation,” again in whatever mode of expression is deemed best for achieving
through his opinions the good of the sensory world by political governance and of
the intellectual world by knowledge.130
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Revelation is the reception of the universal qua particular in the imagination of the
messenger. And while the images are revealed as already determined, they are received
by those who know both the particular (e.g., Gabriel) and the universal (e.g., the Separate
Intellects).131 Only then does the messenger decide whether the universal or the
particular, i.e., philosophy or image, is the more appropriate mode of expression for the
sake of political governance. Put otherwise, like al-Fārābī’s Revealed-as-Determined
model, the Avicennian model does not credit the prophet with creating the images of
religion, as they are given to him as already determined according to the strictures of his
own particular imagination, but neither does the Avicennian model deny the prophet’s
understanding that the particular is a mere stand-in for the universal. These two modes of
discourse, the universal and the particular, differ in both expression and in content.132
Because while, in totality, the images approximate the truth, individually, they signify
different notions (ma‘ānin). In simple terms, for Avicenna, the images of religion are
conceptually distinct from the universals to which they are meant to refer. Even if they
are likenesses of the truth, they are, strictly speaking, not true. The particularity of the
images introduces, even if by accident, a degree of falsity.
Nonetheless, the images are often more preferable than the universals, when given
practical consideration. Avicenna, like al-Fārābī, acknowledges and insists upon the
deficiency of some (large) subset of the human species. As Avicenna explains in his
Pointers and Reminders, “The Truth Itself is loftier than to be a drinking place for every
comer... one who listens to it and is then revolted by it must accuse his soul of not being
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appropriate for it.”133 Some human beings are incapable of philosophical knowledge and,
thus, require a substitute for the truth. Avicenna is so strident in this view that he
prohibits “any human to reveal that he possesses knowledge he is hiding from the
commonality.”134 Because, while he acknowledges that particular religious impositions
are not required for those that know the truth universally, Avicenna worries that to
introduce any kind of sophisticated philosophy to the hoi polloi will only result in
confusion and error.135 After all, “it is only with great strain that they can conceive the
true states of such matters in their true aspects; it is only the very few among them that
can understand the truth of divine ‘unity’ and divine ‘transcendence’... For it is not for
everyone that [the acquisition] of divine wisdom is facilitated.”136 Yet, despite the elitist
aspects of this view, Avicenna, like al-Fārābī before him, is concerned for those who may
both a) have the ability for philosophy and b) lack access to philosophy. For this reason,
he ends his discussion of revelation in the Shifā’ by saying, “There is no harm if the
legislator’s words contain symbols and signs that might call forth those naturally
disposed toward theoretical reflection to pursue philosophic investigations.”137 The
images of religion are not meant only for societal cohesion, but also as pedagogical tools.

3.1.3. What Avicenna tells us about al-Fārābī
In sum, Avicenna, as reader of al-Fārābī, confirms the elements required for the
internal cohesion of al-Fārābī’s political philosophy as already identified in Chapter 3. If
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religion is composed of images meant to be consumed by the masses, then those images,
given their conceptual distinction (even if accidental) from the universals which they
serve as proxy, must be necessitated by the deficiency of the people and corroborated as
appropriate surrogates via universal knowledge. Concerning this latter point, Avicenna
even changes his position: it is not enough to take religious images on authority; they
must be understood by the messenger. Of course, that Avicenna seems to put stock in
these elements does not necessitate anything regarding al-Fārābī himself, but the fact that
Avicenna alters his position to more closely adhere to the Fārābīan Revealed-asDetermined model bespeaks its internal coherence.

3.2. Ibn Ṭufayl
Avicenna’s philosophical doctrines would come to dominate the eastern portion
of the Muslim world, rendering al-Fārābī’s direct influence insignificant.138 But in the
court of the Almohad Caliphate in the Andalusian west, under Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf (d.
1184), philosophy and the influence of al-Fārābī would thrive (quizzically, given the
regime’s fundamentalist, Ẓāhirīte, doctrines). Interestingly, the first Andalusian
‘Fārābīan’ discussed here, Ibn Ṭufayl, was notoriously critical of the Second Teacher,
even while adopting many of his views.139 Living from the first decade of the 12th
century until 1185, he served primarily under the Caliphate of the Almohads. Born near
Grenada during a century of peaceful Almoravid rule in the Maḡrib (North Africa) and
Andalusia (known in Europe as Moorish Spain), in his early years, Ibn Ṭufayl saw the
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overthrow of the Almoravids begun by the zealous Berber scholar, religious leader, and
politician, Ibn Tumart. While Ibn Tumart died in 1130, more than a decade and a half
before his successor, the father of Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, al-Mu’min (d. 1163), finished the
conquest of the Almoravids, Ibn Tumart’s religious fervor lived on in the doctrines of the
Almohads.140 Taking their name from the Arabic al-Muwaḥḥidun or ‘the monotheists,’ a
name etymologically linked to the term tawḥīd which signifies Divine simplicity, the
Almohads were strict monotheists, and under their rule ḏimmī status, the protection of
other non-Muslim monotheists, was revoked.141 Some scholars even speculate that a
young Maimonides and his family were forced to convert from Judaism to Islam until
they could flee to Fez, Morocco after the final triumph of the Almohads in Cordoba in
1148.142 With the Almohads came stark religious reforms, most notably the adherence to
Ẓāhirīte jurisprudence, which emphasized following the apparent meaning of Qurʼān and
Ḥadīth. As A.S. Fulton characterizes, “This reformed doctrine demanded two things: in
belief, a purely spiritual conception of Allah; in conduct, a literal acceptance of Koranic
teaching.”143 In short, during Ibn Ṭufayl’s life, Andalusia quickly changed from a bastion
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of religious plurality, heightened learning, and cosmopolitanism, to a strict puritanical,
dogmatic, and, to a certain extent, xenophobic brand of Islam.144
Despite what one might expect, Ibn Ṭufayl thrived under Almohad rule. While the
society writ large was fundamentalist, demanding strict adherence to the most literal
interpretation of religious symbols and laws, the court was philosophical. Put simply,
Almohad society, at least under Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, was, broadly speaking, Fārābīan,
with philosophers in power, charged with implementing religious symbols throughout
society. (I make no claims as to whether these symbols were, in practice, grounded in
philosophy, nor whether the court was truly devoted to philosophy, except as a topic of
interest.) Ibn Ṭufayl became Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf’s primary physician and trusted
counselor, even, reportedly, introducing Averroes to the caliph. And while the colorful
reports we have should be taken with a grain of salt, they, if nothing else, reflect the
reputation of the court. As reported by the historian ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī, a
student of Averroes reported that:
I often heard Ibn Rushd relate the following story: ‘When I went in to the Sultan
Abū Ya‘qūb, I found him alone with Abū Bakr Ibn Tufayl. Ibn Tufayl began
praising me and speaking of my family and my background, very kindly adding
many good things which I really did not deserve. Having inquired as to my name
and origins, the first thing the Commander of the Faithful asked me was “What do
they (he meant the philosophers) believe about the heavens? Are they eternal or
created?” I was seized with consternation and did not know what to say. I tried to
excuse myself by denying that I had studied philosophy. I had no idea how far his
prior discussions with Ibn Tufayl had gone. His Excellency saw that I was
frightened and confused. He turned to Ibn Tufayl and began to discuss the
question with him, referring to the positions of Aristotle and Plato and all the
other philosophers, and citing the arguments of the Muslims against them. I soon
realized that he was more learned than I would have expected a full time specialist
to be. He put me so well at ease that I myself spoke up and he soon saw that I was
not as ignorant as I had seemed. When I had gone he sent me a gift of money, and
a splendid robe of honor, and a horse.145
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Thus, Ibn Ṭufayl, and likewise Averroes, who followed him, enjoyed the pleasure and
protection of the court; they also enjoyed an intellectual freedom allowed only to the elite
of Almohad society. (The same cannot be said for the Jewish Maimonides, who will be
discussed below.) Along with reflecting the theoretical framework of a broadly Fārābīan
political philosophy, Ibn Ṭufayl reflects the political reality of the surrounding milieu:
philosophy is meant for consumption only by the elite; something else must satiate the
lower rungs of society.

3.2.1. Summary of Ibn Ṭufayl’s Novel
Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophical thought only survives as a result of the popularity of
his novel, Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān (lit. “Alive, son of Awake”), a retelling and reworking of
Avicenna’s own philosophical tale of the same title, even though Ibn Ṭufayl’s account
bears little resemblance to Avicenna’s own.146 In this philosophical tale, Ibn Ṭufayl tells
the story of a man, who, depending upon which of two beginnings of the tale the reader
follows, is either deserted or spontaneously abiogenerates upon a lush equatorial island
divorced from the mainland, in isolation from all other human beings.147 As other
scholars have noted, Ḥayy’s dual beginnings—one account, that of a princess, secretly
wed against the wishes of her brother, the king, trusting her baby to the ocean’s waves
and God’s providence to prevent the exposure of her secret, the other account, that of a
physical and natural narrative of spontaneous generation—mirror the dual nature of
religion and philosophy, the former reminiscent of the stories of the prophets, the latter
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reminiscent of the Neo-Aristotelian cosmologies of al-Fārābī and Avicenna.148 In either
case, Ḥayy’s journey is a solitary one, a thought experiment about humanity outside of
society.149
But to survive in isolation as a child, Ḥayy would need help. A fallow doe who
had lost her fawn, laden with milk, responds to his cries and nourishes him into
childhood.150 From here the story quickly progresses, as Ḥayy becomes a natural
scientist, mimicking animal cries, learning the difference between human and non-human
animals, and classifying (and miming with tools) animal weaponry. Upon his mother
doe’s death when he turns seven, he even learns about different organs by dissecting her,
in the hope of identifying the obstacle which is preventing her from living and removing
it.151 He begins to study the animals more systematically, finding the difference between
the living and the non-living.152 He studies physics.153 And eventually, realizing that there
are no creatures on the island like him, he begins to study the stars at age 28.154 Seeing
their motion, he knows that they must be alive, and after watching carefully, that they
must be incorruptible in their consistency. The heavens are the only creatures which he
has found that are greater than he, and he begins to mimic them, as he once mimicked the
animals. He circumambulates his island to mimic their eternal motion, a nod to the
circumambulation of the Ka‘ba in Mecca, and spins in place, a seeming reference to the
Sufi practice of the whirling dervishes.155 Ḥayy attempts to focus on their nature. He
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Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān 26, 33f.
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Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān 50f.
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realizes that even these heavenly bodies are, in fact, bodies: limited, spacial, finite, and
interconnected.156 Here the story turns. In the interconnection of the motions of the
heavens, Ḥayy recognizes a telos behind the universe.157 There must be a being which is
not finite, and therefore, a being eternal and without a body. He devotes himself fully to
imitating the heavens and this final, necessary being, imposing upon himself a strict diet
of the fallen fruits of plants, being careful never to eat the living seeds in order to avoid
the ethical violation that would be taking a life (even the life of a plant).158 He eats very
little, that he might focus on the being behind the heavens rather than focusing on bodily
pleasure. In this state, Ḥayy experiences his first beatific vision: the culmination of the
human life, ineffable, transcendent, and entirely beyond the meager limits of Aristotelian
philosophy.159 It is in this beatific achievement that Ibn Ṭufayl tries to explain, through
Ḥayy, the non-Aristotelian secrets of Avicennian Eastern philosophy which I will discuss
below. It should be noted, as has been argued by others, that these notions are not, in fact,
truly Avicennian, but a contrived position of Ibn Ṭufayl.160
Eventually, reminiscent of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, Ḥayy must return to the
enmattered world. An ascetic named Absāl appears on the island looking for solitude.161
After teaching Ḥayy to speak, as Ḥayy, of course, had no access to human language prior
to socialization, Absāl is determined to share with him the religion of the nearby island
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Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān 120f. While Ibn Ṭufayl admits that descriptions of the beatific are impossible, he does
try to give the reader “hints” (ishārāt) by “coining symbols” (ḍaraba mithāl). Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān 122. At this
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upon which Absāl and, at least according to one story, Ḥayy had originated.162 But Ḥayy
has already experienced the deepest truths of the religion himself, without need for the
images which the religion applies to the ineffable God.163 At first, Ḥayy is confused as to
why the prophet who set down the symbols and images of the religion would not just
simply reveal the truth.164 But after Absāl, recognizing Ḥayy’s wisdom, convinces him to
travel to the mainland, the prophet’s actions become clear.165 The people of the mainland,
including Absāl’s friend Salāmān, do not recognize their images as images, but literal
truth.166 Realizing that “most men are no better than unreasoning animals”, Ḥayy
apologizes to them, pretending to disavow the truths he has spoken, and leaves with
Absāl to return to the island.167

3.2.2. Ibn Ṭufayl and Fārābīan Political Philosophy
There is a great deal to be said about Ibn Ṭufayl and his predecessors, and indeed
a great deal has already been written.168 Moreover, the purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl’s work is
itself enigmatic, being at once an exploration of human learning in isolation from society
and an exploration of the learned human confronting an unlearned society.169 And these
issues barely touch upon the most inexplicable element of Ibn Ṭufayl’s thought, an
epistemology which culminates in a suprarational principle which transcends language
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Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān 146.
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and expression.170 Unsurprisingly, like with the figures both above and below, the
conversation here needs to be more constrained than, perhaps, Ibn Ṭufayl deserves. The
most pertinent questions for these purposes are not ‘What is Ibn Ṭufayl saying?’ or ‘What
is Ibn Ṭufayl’s purpose?’ Rather, the question here is ‘What does Ibn Ṭufayl as reader of
al-Fārābī and adopter (at least in part) of Fārābīan political philosophy tell us about alFārābī himself?’
In the introduction to Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, Ibn Ṭufayl speaks plainly about his
disdain for al-Fārābī. He says:
Those of Farabi’s books that have reached us are for the most part on logic, and
those on philosophy are full of doubts. In The Ideal Religion he affirms that the
souls of the wicked live on forever in infinite torments after death. But in his Civil
Politics he says plainly that they dissolve into nothing and that only the perfected
souls of the good achieve immortality. Finally in his commentary on Aristotle’s
Ethics, discussing human happiness, he says that it exists only in this life, and on
the heels of that has words to the effect that all other claims are senseless ravings
and old wives’ tales. This makes mankind at large despair of God’s mercy. It puts
the wicked on the same level with the good, for it makes nothingness the ultimate
destiny of us all. This is an unspeakable lapse, an unforgivable fall. This on top of
his misbelief, openly avowed, that prophecy belongs properly to the imagination,
and his preference of philosophy to revelation—and many more failings which I
pass over.171
Several aspects of this passage merit consideration.
First, Ibn Ṭufayl correctly identifies al-Fārābī’s inconsistency concerning the
afterlife.172 But while nothing definitive can be said about al-Fārābī’s position in his no
longer extant commentary on Aristotle’s ethics, al-Fārābī’s position in PS more closely
reflects Ibn Ṭufayl’s own than does the position of Avicenna, whose secrets Ibn Ṭufayl
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espouses to be unveiling.173 Ibn Ṭufayl’s discussion of the afterlife occurs in the context
of his discussion of Ḥayy’s beatific vision. Ibn Ṭufayl explains:
Ḥayy had “died” (mir) to himself, and to every other self. He had witnessed his vision
and seen nothing in all existence (wujūd) but the everliving ONE. Recovered now
from his seemingly intoxicated ecstasy, he saw other things once more, and the notion
came into his head that his identity was none other than that of the Truth. His true self
was the Truth. What he had once supposed to be himself, as distinct from the Truth,
was really nothing in itself, but was in reality in no way discrete from the Truth.174
But Ḥayy is in error, as beyond materiality and embodiment, the accidents of number do
not apply. Ibn Ṭufayl continues:
This specious thinking might well have taken root in his soul, had not God in His
mercy caught hold of him and guided him back to the truth. He then realized that he
would never have fallen prey to such a delusion unless some shadows of the physical
or taint of sensory things still lurked within him. For ‘many’ (kathīr), ‘few’ (qalīl),
and ‘one’ (wāḥid); ‘singularity’ (waḥda) and ‘plurality’ (jam‘); ‘union’ (ijtimā‘) and
‘discreteness’ (iftirāq), are all predicates applicable only to physical things.175
Put simply, Ibn Ṭufayl suggests that souls, absent the body, lack particularity, contra
Avicenna.176 He seems to agree more closely with al-Fārābī, who rejects that accidents of
the body, including number, apply to the soul absent the body.177
Second, Ibn Ṭufayl suggests that al-Fārābī attributes prophecy only to the
imagination. But, as has been discussed, this is false.178 Prophecy (nubuwwa) might
belong to the imagination, but revelation (waḥy), is placed in the rational faculty for alFārābī. That said, there is genuine disagreement between the two thinkers here; the
suprarational mystical vision Ḥayy experiences in the passages quoted above has no place
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in Fārābīan philosophy, but neither does it have a place in Avicennian philosophy, as
noted above.179 Ibn Ṭufayl argues for an experience of truth beyond what is possible
through Aristotelian philosophy (though he seems to hold that the sciences serve as
propadeutics for mystical experience and never stand in conflict with mystical
experience).180 Nonetheless, Ibn Ṭufayl, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna all agree on the role that
imagination plays in political philosophy and religious expression: some individuals are
incapable of encountering the truth directly and require surrogate images to guide them.
In sum, despite the passage from Ibn Ṭufayl’s introduction, quoted above, which
disparages al-Fārābī’s political philosophy, there is significant overlap between the two
thinkers, with the main source of authentic disagreement sourced in whether
demonstration or suprarational mystical experience serve as the highest expression of
human knowledge. This discrepancy between what Ibn Ṭufayl says about al-Fārābī and
his seeming reliance upon Fārābīan philosophy has led some, most notably Sami Hawi, to
suggest that Ibn Ṭufayl is a closet Fārābīan, hiding his agreement with al-Fārābī behind a
“riddle” (ramz) and a “veil” (ḥijāb).181 Of course, there is another, simpler, possibility—
Ibn Ṭufayl was either a poor reader of al-Fārābī (and Avicenna) or lacked direct access to
his texts.182
Whatever the case, whether directly due to a reliance upon Fārābīan texts,
mediately due to a reliance upon Avicenna, or due to a recognition of the internal
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coherence of al-Fārābī’s Construction of Social Knowledge, Ibn Ṭufayl adopts many of
the same conditions for beneficent political deception as al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Prior to
teaching anyone, through the use of images or otherwise, Ḥayy carefully develops his
reason through repeated practice and mastery of the propaedeutic sciences (even if his
knowledge goes beyond reason, culminating in a mystical experience which never
“contradicts what is revealed by reason”, but is simply “an increase in what is seen”).183
Upon meeting Absāl, recognizing in Absāl’s character that he was capable of knowing
the truth, Ḥayy speaks honestly with him, and Absāl recognizes, at once that “ all the
traditions of his religion about God, His angels, bibles and prophets, Judgement Day,
Heaven and Hell were symbolic representations (’amthila) of these things that Ḥayy ibn
Yaqẓān had seen for himself”.184 When Absāl teaches Ḥayy about his religion, Ḥayy
“recognized that whoever had offered this description had given a faithful picture and
spoken truly”.185 But Ḥayy was confused as to why the prophet relied on symbols,
“instead of simply revealing the truth”, and Ḥayy was “confounded” (yastaḡribu) by the
particularity of the rituals of the religion, which seemed “superfluous” (taṭwīl).186 Ibn
Ṭufayl explains that Ḥayy’s confusion stems from his ignorance that human beings are
“deficient” (naqṣ) and “stupid” (balāda).187 But Ḥayy finally recognizes the human
condition and the need for symbols after he journeys to Salāmān’s island, recognizing the
inability of most people to learn, realizing that:
If ever they were to venture beyond their present level to the vantage point of
insight, what they had would be shattered, and even so they would be unable to
reach the level of the blessed. They would waver and slip and their end would be
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all the worse. But if they went along as they were until overtaken by death, they
would win salvation and come to sit on the right.188
The deficiency of human beings necessitates the use of images as a surrogate for truth.
Here, Ibn Ṭufayl, like Avicenna before him, endorses the Fārābīan conditions for
justified political deception. Untruths, i.e., images, are required when the truth will not
suffice. But the mere fact of human deficiency does not give carte blanche justification
for beneficent political deception. Political deception is only permissible from the
standpoint of someone who knows the truth, recognizes the deficiency of the human
condition, and can create untruths which, while not true in themselves, function as
surrogates for the truth. Even Ibn Ṭufayl, who explicitly distances himself from Fārābīan
philosophy, endorses the necessity of these conditions.

3.3. Maimonides
Like Ibn Ṭufayl and Averroes, Maimonides (d. 1204), born in Almoravid
Córdoba, benefitted from growing up in a city rivaling classical Athens and Abbasid
Baghdad in learning, culture, and wealth, and thereby received the cumulative knowledge
of the Islamic world, having access not only to the texts of his Jewish heritage, but
accounts of the Greeks, the Muslim commentators, and the ‘Ilm al-Kalām, the rationalist
theological tradition of Islam and, later, Judaism. While born as a ḏimmī under the
relatively secure auspices of Almoravid Spain, a young Maimonides and the surrounding
Jewish community were thrown into turmoil as a result of the Almohad conquest of
Córdoba in 1148. The conquering Berber tribe’s fundamentalist fervor was so great that
ḏimmī status was removed, and compulsory apostasy was enacted for non-Muslims.

188
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Whether or not Maimonides was himself a crypto-convert to Islam, an anusim or ‘forced
one,’ coerced apostasy was a recurring problem for the Jewish community during
Maimonides’ life, even after he had escaped the Almohad Dynasty.189 Unlike Ibn Ṭufayl
and Averroes, Maimonides lacked the protection of the Almohad court (although he
would later enjoy the patronage of the famous Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn as a physician).190 Needless
to say, the importance of religious truth, religious identity, and political power were
manifest within the context of his life. And Maimonides turned to Fārābīan political
philosophy to navigate the complicated nexus between philosophical truth, religion, and
politics.

3.3.1. Maimonidean Prophecy and al-Fārābī
In a famous passage of the Guide of the Perplexed, Part II, Chapter 32,
Maimonides claims that his own doctrine of prophecy is similar to the opinion of the
philosophers, excepting one factor: the role played by the Divine Will (mashī’a
’ilāhiyya). Whereas the philosophers, namely al-Fārābī and Avicenna, view prophecy to
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be an entirely natural process, achieved only when human beings perfect their nature,
Maimonides explains that, while training and perfection are required for prophecy to
occur, God must also will that a prophet become a prophet, or more specifically, God
must not prevent (yamna‘u) him from becoming a prophet. That Maimonides’ doctrine is
extremely close to the philosophers’ doctrine is clear; in fact, he provides some of the
best available practical examples of prophecy as an imagistic and legal expression of
philosophy, as will be discussed below. However, how his position is distinct from theirs,
namely how the Divine Will determines who will become a prophet, remains unclear,
especially given Maimonides’ insistence upon Divine Simplicity, meaning God’s Will is
not distinct from his Wisdom (and neither are distinct from his Essence).191 This has led
some to believe (or at least consider) that Maimonides’ disagreement with the
philosophers is a distinction without a difference, that Maimonides position collapses into
al-Fārābī’s own, and Maimonides’ stated, exoteric, position is a red herring, masking his
true, esoteric views.192 Whether any meaningful distinction can be drawn between
Maimonides’ position and the philosophers, especially in contrast with the one espoused
by al-Fārābī, likely depends upon Maimonides’ conception of particularization (takhṣīṣ)
and purpose (qaṣd), but this issue will not be settled here.193 Instead, the important issue
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for the task at hand is that, regardless of the role God’s Will plays in Maimonidean
prophecy, the prophet’s knowledge precedes any prophetic act, and thus beneficent
political deception. Both the content and the psychology of prophecy is the same for
Maimonides and al-Fārābī, even if Maimonides raises differences between al-Fārābī and
himself regarding the metaphysical underpinnings of prophecy, replacing the role played
by necessity and accident with purpose (qaṣd) and particularization (takhṣīṣ),
respectively.194 For both Maimonides and al-Fārābī, knowledge precedes beneficent
political deception.

As a result of this thin distinction, readers of Maimonides as early as Joseph ibn Kaspi have
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the Mishnah where he identifies the miracle of the parting of the Red Sea as built into the nature of the
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In Guide II 32, Maimonides distinguishes between the opinion of the hoi polloi,
the philosophers, and himself concerning prophecy. Maimonides explains, in the
following edited quotation:
The opinions of people concerning prophecy (nubuwwa) are like their opinions
concerning the eternity of the world (qadm al-‘ālam) or its creation in time
(ḥudūthhu). I mean by this that, just as the people to whose mind the existence of
the deity is firmly established, have, as we have set forth, three opinions
concerning the eternity of the world (qadm al-‘ālam) or its creation in time
(ḥudūthhu), so are there also three opinions concerning prophecy (nubuwwa)...
The first opinion — that of the multitude of those among the Pagans who
considered prophecy as true and also believed by some of the common people
professing our Law — is that God, may He be exalted, chooses whom He wishes
from among men, turns him into a prophet, and sends him with a mission.
According to them it makes no difference whether this individual is a man of
knowledge (‘ālim) or ignorant (jāhil), aged or young. However, they also posit as
a condition his having a certain goodness (khayriyya) and sound morality
(ṣalāḥiya)...
The second opinion is that of the philosophers (ra’y al-falāsifa). It affirms that
prophecy is a certain perfection (kamāl) in the nature of man (ṭabī‘a al-’insān).
This perfection is not achieved in any individual (shakhṣ) from among men except
after a training that makes that which exists in the potentiality (quwwa) of the
species pass into actuality (fi‘l), provided an obstacle due to temperament or to
some external cause does not hinder this, as is the case with regard to every
perfection whose existence is possible in a certain species. For the existence of
that perfection in its extreme and ultimate form in every individual (shakhṣ) of
that species is not possible. It must, however, exist necessarily in at least one
particular individual (shakhṣ); if, in order to be achieved, this perfection requires
something that actualizes it, that something necessarily exists. According to this
opinion it is not possible that an ignoramus should turn into a prophet; nor can a
man not be a prophet on a certain evening and be a prophet on the following
morning, as though he had made some find. Things are rather as follows: When,
in the case of a superior individual who is perfect (al-shakhṣ al-fāḍil al-kāmil)
with respect to his rational and moral qualities, his imaginative faculty is in its
most perfect state and when he has been prepared in the way that you will hear, he
will necessarily become a prophet, inasmuch as this is a perfection that belongs to
us by nature. According to this opinion it is not possible that an individual should
be fit for prophecy and prepared for it and not become a prophet...
The third opinion is the opinion of our Law and the foundation of our doctrine
(maḏhabnā). It is identical (mithl) with the philosophic opinion except in one
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thing. For we believe that it may happen that one who is fit (yaṣlaḥu) for
prophecy and prepared for it should not become a prophet, namely, on account of
the divine will (mashī’a ’ilāhiyya). To my mind this is like all the miracles
(mu‘jizāt) and takes the same course as they. For it is a natural thing (al-’amr alṭabī‘iyy) that everyone who according to his natural disposition (jibilla) is fit
(yaṣlaḥu) for prophecy and who has been trained in his education and study
should become a prophet. He who is prevented from it is like him who has been
prevented (muni‘a), like Jeroboam, from moving his hand, or, like the King of
Aram's army going to seek out Elisha, from seeing. As for its being fundamental
with us that the prophet must possess preparation and perfection in the moral and
rational qualities, it is indubitably the opinion expressed in their dictum: Prophecy
only rests upon a wise, strong, and rich man. We have explained this in our
Commentary on the Mishnah and in our great compilation, and we have set forth
that the disciples of the prophets were always engaged in preparation. As for the
fact that one who prepares is sometimes prevented (yumna‘u) from becoming a
prophet, you may know it from the history of Baruch, son of Neriah.195
There is a great deal worth detailing here and continual reference to this passage will be
made through the remainder of this discussion, but for now, three things are worth
highlighting. First, Maimonides, correctly characterizes the philosophers as describing
prophecy as a natural and necessary expression of human perfection brought about
through education, even though it is only necessary that any perfected individual be a
prophet and necessary that at least one individual within, and not all of, the human
species be a prophet. In other words, one cannot have a perfected nature and not be a
prophet, nor can either all or none of humanity attain perfection, as it is one extreme end
of a natural, accidental process. Second, Maimonides’ position is similar to the
philosophers’ position, except one difference, namely the role of the Divine Will. And
third, understanding the distinction between Maimonides’ position and that of the
philosophers is made clearer in reference to his doctrine of miracles. In other words, to
understand how the Divine Will affects prophecy, one must first understand how it
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affects miracles (and, given his explanation of miracles, creation, itself), a task too far
afield to be addressed fully here.196
Maimonides’ characterization of the philosophers is faithful. For al-Fārābī, as
discussed in Chapter 3, the prophet or Imām is simply an instantiation of human
perfection: someone who, while having a sound body and temperament, as well as a
perfected imagination, through the mundane process of being able to abstract (intaza’a)
or transfer (naqala) potential intelligibles (ma‘qūlāt bi-l-qūwa) to the potential intellect
(‘aql bi-l-quwa), renders both the intelligible and the intellect actual (fi‘l) to the point of
no longer needing the process of abstraction anymore, because the intellect acts as its
own intelligible, forming a noetic unity that al-Fārābī brands as both the Acquired
Intellect (‘aql al-mustafāḍ) and the state of happiness (sa‘āda(.197 Put simply, a prophet is
a healthy, virtuous person with a strong imagination and knowledge. This is how alFārābī defines human perfection, through the transition from potential to actual, as
Maimonides describes in Guide II 32, and it is synonymous with being an Imām or a
prophet. The rise of an Imām is largely determined by natural forces (given the view that
the Active Intellect plays a natural, not supernatural, role for human existence), namely,
the contrary motions of the heavens which act through heat and light upon the world
thereby creating a mixture which results in the existence of all possible existents (both
deficient and perfect). In al-Fārābī’s cosmos, which is the most fecund of all worlds,
everything is brought about through necessary cosmological principles (except that which
is brought about by human choice) but much of the world is deficient and accidental,
including whether a nation produces demonstrative philosophy or an Imām. That both
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prophets and human beings with deficiency (naqṣ) exist is necessary for al-Fārābī as a
result of these cosmological principles. Needless to say, Maimonides reads al-Fārābī as
espousing the views described in Chapter 3.
Now, compare al-Fārābī’s Revealed-as-Determined model to Maimonides’ own.
Maimonides explains:
Know that the true reality and quiddity of prophecy consist in its being an
overflow overflowing from God, may He be cherished and honored, through the
intermediation of the Active Intellect, toward the rational faculty in the first place
and thereafter toward the imaginative faculty. This is the highest degree of man
and the ultimate term of perfection that can exist for his species; and this state is
the ultimate term of perfection for the imaginative faculty. This is something that
cannot by any means exist in every man. And it is not something that may be
attained solely through perfection in the speculative sciences and through
improvement of moral habits, even if all of them have become as fine and good as
can be. There still is needed in addition the highest possible degree of perfection
of the imaginative faculty in respect of its original natural disposition.198
Here, Maimonides confirms in his own doctrine the major principles of al-Fārābī’s own.
Prophecy is empowered by the activity of the Active Intellect, but it is determined by
natural disposition and education. A perfected rational faculty is not possible in every
human being (nor is a perfected imaginative faculty). Moreover, prophecy is the state of
perfection for humankind—it is happiness. Even given Maimonides’ claim that God may
veto prophecy through an act of Will, Fārābīan prophecy is a necessary, if not sufficient,
condition for Maimonidean prophecy.
More germane to the discussion here is how al-Fārābī describes the socio-political
and religious function of the prophet. And in this domain, Maimonides and al-Fārābī
most closely converge. (So much so that one could characterize Maimonides’ exegetical
project in the Guide as a Fārābīan endeavor.)199 For al-Fārābī, the Imām is a philosopher
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qua poet; he is someone able to translate philosophical truth into images (mutakhayylāt),
emulations (muḥākāāt), likenesses (mithālāt), or near likenesses (mithālāt qarība) of the
truth for the multitude, who, due to the same accidents which produced the Imām, lack
the perfections which would allow them to understand the truth through strict
demonstration.200 Using poetical statements (al-’aqāwīl al-shi‘riyya), the Imām is able to
link virtuous conduct to images which are familiar to the multitude and express
theoretical truths through these same images, resulting in an aversion to vicious behavior
and a desire for virtuous behavior.201 Under this model, religion serves as a stand-in for
the philosophical life. As al-Fārābī explains, in a passage addressed previously:
Although it is the legislator who also represents (yatakhayyalu) these things
(hāḏihi al-’ashīā’) through images, neither the images (mutakhayylāt) nor the
persuasive arguments (muqanna‘āt) are intended for himself. As far as he is
concerned, they are certain (balla yaqīnīa li-hu). He is the one who invents
)ikhtara‘a( the images (mutakhayylāt) and the persuasive arguments
(muqanna‘āt), but not for the sake of establishing these things in his own soul (al’ashīā’ fī nafs) as a religion for himself (malaka li-hu). No, the images
(mutakhayyl) and the persuasive arguments (’iqnā‘) are intended for others,
whereas, so far as he is concerned, these things are certain (yaqin). They are a
religion for others, whereas, so far as he is concerned, they are philosophy
(falsafa). Such, then, is true philosophy (al-falsafa bi-l-ḥaqīqa) and the true
philosopher (al-faylasūf bi-l-ḥaqīqa).202

Here, al-Fārābī gives the theoretical model for the invention of religion, which is a near
truth or an image of philosophy. But, like Maimonides describes in Guide II 32, this only
occurs within the person who has a perfected rational and imaginative faculty.
Unfortunately, al-Fārābī focuses almost exclusively upon giving a theoretical model for
this doctrine, writing in universal terms without specifying how this would be expressed
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in any given religion. Here, Maimonides, given his numerous examples, provides useful
insight as to what a Fārābīan political philosophy looks like in practice.
Maimonides’ use of Avicenna and al-Fārābī for his own doctrine has been long
established.203 Certain passages, like where Maimonides compares the flashing of truth to
the flashing of lightning through the dark of the night in the Introduction to Part I of the
Guide, are lifted directly from Avicenna.204 And Maimonides’ project in the Guide as a
whole is Fārābīan, aiming to explicate how the images of religion refer to a truer,
philosophical understanding. Citing Proverbs in a passage from his Introduction to the
Guide noted in previous chapters, Maimonides explains that every parable of the prophets
is twofold, holding an outer and inner meaning, like a golden apple covered in silver
filigree.205 The outer imagistic meaning is itself beautiful and valuable, like the silver
filigree, but nothing in comparison to the internal golden demonstrative truth. As he says:
The external (ẓāhir) meaning ought to be as beautiful as silver, while its internal
(bāṭin) meaning ought to be more beautiful (’aḥsan) than the external one, the
former being in comparison to the latter as gold is to silver. Its external meaning
also ought to contain in it something that indicates (yadullu) to someone
considering it what is to be found in its internal meaning, as happens in the case
of an apple of gold overlaid with silver filigree-work having very small holes.206
For those with limited faculties, the outer imagistic meanings are valuable, allowing these
people to live a virtuous, if unreflective, life.207 But for those with the ability to look
closer, the prophet’s images, i.e. religion, deconstruct themselves, leading to
demonstrative truth. This idea is sourced in al-Fārābī himself.
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Maimonides even takes al-Fārābī’s three distinct kinds of prophetic activity—
divination (nubuwwa), and the aforementioned models for revelation (waḥī), the
Revealed-as-Determined model and the Construction of Social Knowledge model— and
places them on scale, the lower end of which occurs through an emanation which spurs a
prophet toward action, speech, or a dream and the highest of which is known by Moses
alone, who Maimonides places in a special category outside of the spectrum.208 Those on
the lower end appear to receive what al-Fārābī would describe as divination (nubuwwa),
an emanation to the lower faculties which results in dreams, images, and actions. Those
on the higher end, but below Moses, seem to receive Revealed-as-Determined prophecy,
an emanation that appears as an imaginative vision, but expresses itself rationally. (For
example, the highest degree of non-Mosaic prophecy takes the form of a prophet
receiving the image of a speaking angel and reporting its words.) Moses, alone,
experiences the content of prophecy through his rational faculty without the aid of his
imagination, following the Construction of Social Knowledge model by deliberately
setting down the law. As Maimonides describes in Shemonah Perakim, Moses
encountered God though nothing but the ‘pellucid lens’ of his intellect as an
intermediary.209 Although, it should be noted that Avicenna is still influential here:
Maimonides is surely referring to Moses when he discusses the unnamed prophet in the
aforementioned lightning analogy whose rational intuition (ḥads) is so perfect that he
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experiences such frequent flashes of truth that it is like he experiences perpetual
brilliance.210
Maimonides’ clear understanding of the philosophers who preceded him and his
adoption of the general framework of their doctrine results in a fascinating case study for
al-Fārābī’s conception of beneficent political deception when applied to a particular
religion. The Guide’s exegetical project which aims to parse out the inner meaning of the
images provided in the language of the prophets, usually concerning the images
suggestive of the corporeality of God, reveals a tangible case study of a Fārābīan
Construction of Social Knowledge in practice.
One particularly fascinating example can be found in Maimonides’ treatment of
the Sabbath, already mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 4.1.3.211 Unlike the Account of the
Beginning (Ma’aseh Bereshit) or the Account of the Chariot (Ma’aseh Merkabah), the
effects of the law concerning the Sabbath have less theoretical and more tangible aims.212
One can see in this example how the outer, literal meaning of the commandment has
meaningful benefits for the multitude, even as the inner meaning points toward both
theoretical and practical truths from philosophy. Maimonides explains:
Perhaps it has already become clear to you what is the cause of the Law’s
establishing the Sabbath so firmly and ordaining death by stoning for breaking
it...You know from what I have said that opinions do not last unless they are
accompanied by actions that strengthen them, make them generally known, and
perpetuate them among the multitude. For this reason we are ordered by the Law
to exalt (ta‘ẓīm) this day, in order that the principle of the creation of the world in
time be established and universally known in the world through the fact that all
people refrain from working on one and the same day. If it is asked: What is the
cause of this?, the answer is: For in six days the Lord made. For this
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commandment two different causes are given, corresponding to two different
effects. In the first Decalogue, the cause for exalting the Sabbath is stated as
follows: For in six days the Lord made, and so on. In Deuteronomy, on the other
hand, it is said: And thou shalt remember that thou wast a slave in Egypt.
Therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day. This is
correct. For the effect, according to the first statement, is to regard that day as
noble and exalted. As it says: Wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and
hallowed it. This is the effect consequent upon the cause stated in the words: For
in six days, and so on. However, the order given us by the Law with regard to it
and the commandment ordaining us in particular to keep it are an effect
consequent upon the cause that we had been slaves in Egypt where we did not
work according to our free choice and when we wished and where we had not the
power to refrain from working. Therefore we have been commanded inactivity
and rest so that we should conjoin the two things: the belief in a true opinion—
namely, the creation of the world in time, which, at the first go and with the
slightest of speculations, shows that the deity exists and the memory of the benefit
God bestowed upon us by giving us rest from under the burdens of the Egyptians.
Accordingly the Sabbath is, as it were, of universal benefit, both with reference to
a true speculative opinion and to the well-being of the state of the body.213
The two parts of the Sabbath obligation, keeping it and remembering it, each serve a
purpose. Remembering the Sabbath via the Kiddush prayer causes the listener to reflect
on creation and pesach. Through the former, the existence of the Deity is remembered;
through the latter, one remembers the needs of the body even while one rests, as
Maimonides describes in a passage of the Mishneh Torah, on “Shabbat” and Guide II
31.214 (As noted in Chapter 3, the Talmud mandates both the Kiddush prayer, to be said
over the wine, and the Havdalah prayer , the ‘sanctifying’ prayer and the prayer of
‘distinction’, respectively, which mark the beginning and end of the Sabbath. Each must
occur each Sabbath, as traditionally set down by the Great Assembly.)215 Here, one can
readily see prophecy and legislation as al-Fārābī envisions them. The story of the seven
days of creation serves as an image of God’s causal role; the story of Jewish households

213

GP II.31.
Mishneh Torah, Sefer Zemanim, “Shabbat” 29; GP II.31.
215
Talmud, Shabbat 119b; Berakot 33a.
214

304
in the land of Egypt serves as a reflection on forced servitude. The former venerates the
Divine; the latter values freedom and reflects upon the needs of the body. Each are
required for a happy life and a healthy society. For the multitudes who follow the law,
these images serve as an introduction to philosophical considerations of God’s causality
and the physical needs of the body, even if they fail to demonstrate any truths using
philosophy.

3.3.2. What Maimonides tells us about al-Fārābī
Perhaps more than any other thinker, Maimonides provides us with both a clear
understanding of al-Fārābī’s thought and an example of faithful Fārābīan political
philosophy in practice. The Guide, as a whole, is a rich exploration of the philosophically
appropriate meaning behind the images of religion, a key for recognizing the truth that
undergirds the untruth of religious expression. With this exploration comes a consistent
refrain: the internal, philosophical meaning of the law is superior to the external,
imagistic meaning, but it is necessitated by the deficiency of the people and grounded
upon the knowledge of the founder of the law.
Despite Maimonides’ insistence (whether sincere or otherwise) that his position
concerning prophecy remains distinct from the philosophers’ account, his justification
remains identical to al-Fārābī’s own insofar as it hinges upon the theoretical knowledge
of the prophet. As he explains:
We have explained this in our Commentary on the Mishnah and in our great
compilation, and we have set forth that the disciples of the prophets were always
engaged in preparation. As for the fact that one who prepares is sometimes
prevented from becoming a prophet, you may know it from the history of Baruch,
son of Neriah. For he followed Jeremiah, who trained, taught, and prepared him.
And he set himself the goal of becoming a prophet, but was prevented... It is
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possible to say that this is a clear statement that prophecy is too great a thing for
Baruch... However, we shall find many texts, some of them scriptural and some of
them dicta of the Sages, all of which maintain this fundamental principle that God
turns whom He wills, whenever He wills it, into a prophet; but only someone
perfect and superior to the utmost degree. But with regard to one of the ignorant
among the common people, this is not possible according to us—I mean, that He
should turn one of them into a prophet—except as it is possible that He should
turn an ass or a frog into a prophet. It is our fundamental principle that there must
be training and perfection, whereupon the possibility arises to which the power of
the deity becomes attached... For this is the state of every prophet: he must have a
natural preparedness in his original natural disposition, as shall be explained.216
Prophecy is not an expression of pure political persuasion, but an expression of
knowledge, gained through preparation and natural disposition, to those incapable of
knowledge. Even God cannot turn someone who lacks knowledge into a prophet, except
miraculously, in the same manner that He can make an ass or a frog prophesy. Prophecy
is undergirded by truth; the silver filigree is judged by its golden core. As Maimonides
explains, “everyone who communicates knowledge as to something secret” must be fit to
achieve “the rank of prophecy, and even those in various degrees”.217 If one lacks
knowledge, then one is not a prophet. If one lacks a fully developed rational faculty, then
one is a lesser. As Maimonides says:
You should know that the case in which the intellectual overflow overflows only
toward the rational faculty and does not overflow at all toward the imaginative
faculty—either because of the scantiness of what overflows or because of some
deficiency existing in the imaginative faculty in its natural disposition, a
deficiency that makes it impossible for it to receive the overflow of the intellect—
is characteristic of the class of men of science engaged in speculation. If, on the
other hand, this overflow reaches both faculties—I mean both the rational and the
imaginative—as we and others among the philosophers have explained, and if the
imaginative faculty is in a state of ultimate perfection owing to its natural
disposition, this is characteristic of the class of prophets. If again the overflow
only reaches the imaginative faculty, the defect of the rational faculty deriving
either from its original natural disposition or from insufficiency of training, this is
characteristic of the class of those who govern cities, while being the legislators,
the soothsayers, the augurs, and the dreamers of veridical dreams. All those who
216
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do extraordinary things by means of strange devices and secret arts and withal are
not men of science belong likewise to this third class. You ought to obtain
knowledge of the true reality, which is that some people belonging to this third
class have—even while they are awake—extraordinary imaginings, dreams, and
amazed states, which are like the vision of prophecy so that they think about
themselves that they are prophets. And they are very much pleased with what they
apprehend in these imaginings and think that they acquired sciences without
instruction; and they bring great confusion into speculative matters of great
import, true notions being strangely mixed up in their minds with imaginary ones.
All this is due to the imaginative faculty, to the weakness of the rational faculty,
and to its not having obtained anything—I mean thereby that it has not passed into
actuality.218
Even those members of society with perfected imaginative faculties who lack the
perfection of the rational faculty, due either to disposition or training, pose a danger to
civic happiness, as they cause great confusion through inappropriately relating to their
images. Only a prophet, someone who has actualized their rational faculty and their
imagination, is equipped to establish religious law.219
Resorting to imagination, in accordance with al-Fārābī, occurs only as a response
to human deficiency. As Maimonides explains:
Now as the nature of the human species requires that there be those differences
among the individuals belonging to it and as in addition society is a necessity for
this nature, it is by no means possible that his society should be perfected
except—and this is necessarily so—through a ruler who gauges the actions of the
individuals, perfecting that which is deficient and reducing that which is
excessive, and who prescribes actions and moral habits that all of them must
always practice in the same way, so that the natural diversity is hidden through
the multiple points of conventional accord and so that the community becomes
well ordered. Therefore I say that the Law, although it is not natural, enters into
what is natural. It is a part of the wisdom of the deity with regard to the
permanence of this species of which He has willed the existence, that He put it
into its nature that individuals belonging to it should have the faculty of ruling.
Among them there is the one to whom the regimen mentioned has been revealed
by prophecy directly; he is the prophet or the bringer of the nomos.220
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This passage from Guide II 40 echoes one from Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic: natural
political science establishes right rule for a city by aiming the habits of citizens toward
happiness, as established by those who have “knowledge of true happiness”.221 The
Mosaic Law supersedes natural political philosophy (I will leave open the question of
whether the Mosaic Law simply is the natural political philosophy for the Jewish people
according to Maimonides), but every polis needs a moral prescription from one who has
knowledge, given the deficiency of most human existence. Rulership, nomos, prophecy,
the Law, and religious images all stem from the same need: many humans are not capable
of self-rule or knowledge of true happiness.
In Maimonides, one finds both an able reader and faithful disciple of al-Fārābī, as
well as another data point for how al-Fārābī was read in subsequent centuries. Al-Fārābī’s
beneficent political deception does not occur arbitrarily. Political deception is necessary,
given human deficiency. It is only justified given the knowledge of the deceiver. And its
justification depends upon the beneficent political deception, the image, adhering as
closely as possible to the truths of philosophy. Presenting an apple of silver filigree to the
people is only justified given their inability to appreciate the gold at its center.

3.4. Averroes
While Maimonides serves as an exemplar for the adoption of al-Fārābī’s
Construction of Social Knowledge in a wholesale manner, providing examples and
synthesizing dissonant texts, Averroes (d. 1198), the Commentator, presents Fārābīan
political philosophy in its starkest light. The context of Averroes’ life has been mentioned
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above, concerning his relationship to Ibn Ṭufayl and the Almohad court, although he did
fall into disfavor with the court after the death of his and Ibn Ṭufayl’s patron, Abū
Ya‘qūb Yūsuf.222 While Averroes enjoyed a period of patronage under Abū Ya‘qūb’s
son, Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb (d. 1199), he was ultimately expelled from the court for unclear
reasons, resulting in many of his books being burned and his exile to Lucena (alYussāna).223 For the purposes here, the most pertinent work of Averroes was written
before his exile, commonly referred to as The Decisive Treatise, but which, as Richard
Taylor, at times, and A. El Ghannouchi note, is more appropriately translated as The
Book of the Distinction of Discourse and the Establishment of the Connection between
the Religious Law and Philosophy (Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl wa-taqrīr mā bayna al-sharī‘a
wa-l-ḥikma min al-ittiṣāl).224 At the time of its writing, likely around 1179-1180,
Averroes still enjoyed the privileged status of a qāḍī or judge.225
Unlike his predecessors, Averroes does not adopt al-Fārābī’s Revealed-asDetermined model, but rather seems to endorse the Construction of Social Knowledge
model wholesale. In the barest terms, Averroes seems to reject that any kind of emanation
or extramission from a higher being, whether God or the Active Intellect, is responsible
for prophecy. Rather, religion is constructed for political purposes from truths known to
philosophy. Religion, as image and law, serves as a kind of truth, at a different level of
discourse, for the masses, even though it is not, strictly speaking, true in the way that
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demonstration is. In Averroes, one finds a clarity and brazenness to the Fārābīan position,
especially as explored in The Decisive Treatise.

3.4.1. Averroes and the Construction of Social Knowledge
Before turning to Averroes’ distinctions concerning the different modes of
discourse and its roots in al-Fārābī, Averroes’ reasoning and rejection of the Revealed-asDetermined model should be explored in light of this project, even though, on its own
terms, it has already been well documented by the likes of Herbert Davidson and Richard
C. Taylor.226 In his Epitome on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia, Averroes argues against
both, as Taylor describes, an “account of prophecy that is congruous with the traditional
religious conception of prophecy as literally a conveyance and instruction provided to
human beings on the nature of God, on the things of world, or on the proper nature of
human conduct and fulfillment” and against the Revealed-as-Determined approach, in
which a Separate Substance provides prophets or an Imām with rational emanations,
which are then particularized through their own imaginations.227 Neither God nor the
Active Intellect particularize religious images to a prophet, nor do They provide universal
knowledge which is subsequently particularized within a prophet. The former, a position
rejected by the Fārābīan school in toto, is a result of the impossibility of Separate
Substances knowing particulars.228 The latter, an argument never made explicitly by alFārābī, is the reason why the Social Construction of Knowledge model is more
parsimonious than the Revealed-as-Determined model. As Averroes explains:
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In general, the acquisition of any of the concepts of the theoretical sciences in this
manner would be accidental (bi-l-‘arḍ) and rare. It is therefore impossible that a
theoretical art be fully acquired by a person, by God, unless a person assumes that
we have here a species of man that can comprehend the theoretical sciences
without training. Now this species, if it indeed existed, would be called “man”
only equivocally (bi- ishtirāk al-‘ism), but actually it would be closer to angels
than to man. Now it will be seen that this is impossible from that which I shall
say. This is so for the reason that theoretical knowledge in itself is one (wāḥida)
and not subject to change, whether it is acquired by training or it is acquired
without training. Now if it is acquired by both means together, training would not
be included in the definition (ḥadd) of theoretical knowledge nor would training
be necessary for the acquisition thereof. We are therefore confronted with a
dilemma. Either we admit that this kind of knowledge is applied to human
knowledge only equivocally, or we agree that one thing in itself can exist through
different causes. According to the latter assumption, the relationship of the thing
to its causes, whereby it has its existence, would not be a necessary (ḍarūriyy)
relationship. Such assumption, of course, is entirely false. But if one were to
assume that it is possible for the images of theoretical things to be acquired by a
species of man in this manner of comprehension, such assumption would be
untenable, since their acquisition in this manner would be superfluous, inasmuch
as man has already acquired them in a more perfect manner; except that one may
say that it is possible that this kind of comprehension may be found in one for
whom the training in the theoretical sciences is impossible, either by nature or for
some other reason. If such people do exist, they are “men” only in an equivocal
sense.229
In effect, Averroes’ argument is this: 1) if the human species is one, 2) the truths that
humans know are one (qua universals), and 3) the relationship between human knowing
(properly understood) and universals is necessary, then, in conclusion, there can only be
one means by which humans know. If there are two means by which humans know, then
either there are two distinct types of human beings (demonstrative knowers and prophetic
knowers) or the means by which we know (i.e., demonstration) does not hold a necessary
relation to the truth (i.e., certainty). Both of these are absurd conclusions, and the latter,
in particular, is worrisome. To borrow from Averroes’ Decisive Treatise, “truth does not
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oppose truth”, and were there to be two methods by which one knows the truth, then the
agreement between truths would not be, in principle, necessary.230
This passage from the Epitome on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia, suggests that
Averroes does not endorse any kind of emanative revelation. There is only one means by
which human being can obtain truth: philosophy. As Davidson describes:
Averroes is making an extremely radical statement for a medieval philosopher, a
statement from which he appears to retreat elsewhere. He is asserting that the
phenomena we are considering, including revelation and prophecy, give no
reliable information about matters belonging to the domain of science, not even
by furnishing the uneducated with a figurative representation of theoretical truths.
Revelation and prophecy do not, either expressly or allusively, instruct mankind
about God, the universe, creation, the human soul. They promulgate no rules of
human behavior leading to eudaemonia. Revelation as well as the written record
of revealed knowledge thus contribute nothing to the soul's well-being.231
And while, as Davidson notes, Averroes at times, especially in his dialectical works,
seems to adopt a more robust view of prophecy, Taylor gives a convincing argument that
the dissonance between Averroes’ texts indicates methodological precision concerning
his mode of discourse (as will be discussed below), more than indicating some sort of
confusion or an evolution in his thought.232 As Taylor explains:
[Averroes] clearly enough explains his philosophical worldview methodically and
generally follows that method in his writings, setting out teachings that accord
with the principles of religion in his ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) works while reserving
explanations that clash with religion for investigation by philosophers suited for
‘interpreted’ (mu’awwal) writings... Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that
Averroes found in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth
content and highest levels of knowledge and understanding and from them
constructed his worldview. Given that perspective, religion—which is
indispensable for proper human ethical and political development—is like an
Aristotelian practical science in that it concerns good and right conduct in the
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achievement of an end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own
sake.233
In other words, Averroes totally rejects prophetic knowledge, redefining prophetic
activity as a purely political and pedagogical act. As Davidson explores, this would mean
that:
...the human author of Scripture first acquired theoretical knowledge through
proper scientific methods and then coolly and deliberately—not through an
inspired imaginative faculty—recast his hard-won philosophic knowledge into
language appropriate for his less enlightened brethren. The term prophet would,
on this reading, mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the
term revelation would mean a high level of philosophic knowledge.234
This model is familiar. It is al-Fārābī’s Construction of Social Knowledge model, in
which the Imām “invents )ikhtara‘a( the images (mutakhayylāt) and the persuasive
arguments (muqanna‘āt)” for the people of the city.235

3.4.2. Tripartite City, Tripartite Discourse
Returning to a passage from the Perfect State addressed in Chapter 3, one can see
how Averroes seizes upon elements within Fārābīan philosophy and expands upon them.
At PS 17.2, noted earlier, al-Fārābī explains, concerning the beliefs required for an
excellent city:
[T]hese things can be known in two ways, either by being impressed on their
souls as they really are or by being impressed on them through affinity
(munāsaba) and symbolic representation (mathīl). In that case symbols arise in
man’s minds, which reproduce them by imitation. The philosophers in the city are
those who know these things through strict demonstrations and their own insight;
those who are close to the philosophers know them as they really are through the
insight of the philosophers, following them, assenting to their views and trusting
them. But others know them through symbols which reproduce them by imitation,
because neither nature nor habit has provided their minds with the gift to
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understand them as they are. Both are kinds of knowledge, but the knowledge of
the philosophers is undoubtedly more excellent.236
Things can either be known truly or by affinity and symbolic representation. Either one
knows the truth or something else, which stands in for the truth. But then al-Fārābī
introduces a third category: those who know, not through their own insight, as the
philosophers do, but need not rely on images. Embedded into this passage are the keys to
justifying Fārābīan beneficent political deception: some members of society know, others
are incapable of knowledge, and those that know are responsible for providing something
resembling the truth to those that are incapable of knowledge.
Averroes develops this short passage into an entire method for proper discourse,
adopting the tripartite distinction that al-Fārābī suggests. In The Decisive Treatise,
Averroes explains:
...some assent by means of demonstration; some assent by means of dialectical
statements in the same way the one adhering to demonstration assents by means
of demonstration, there being nothing greater in their natures; and some assent by
means of rhetorical statements, just as the one adhering to demonstration assents
by means of demonstrative statements.237
Some know. Some can assent to the knowledge of those that know. And some need
something to stand in for knowledge. As he continues:
Concerning the things that are known only by demonstration due to their being
hidden, God has been gracious to His servants for whom there is no path by
means of demonstration—either due to their innate dispositions, their habits, or
their lack of facilities for education—by coining for them likenesses (’amthāl)
and similarities (’ashbāh) of these [hidden things] and calling them to assent by
means of those likenesses, since it is possible for assent to those likenesses to
come about by means of the indications shared by all—I mean, the dialectical and
the rhetorical. This is the reason for the Law being divided into an apparent sense
and an inner sense. For the apparent sense is those likenesses coined for those
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meanings, and the inner sense is those meanings that reveal themselves only to
those adept in demonstration.238
Things are known either as they are (i.e., in truth), according to the inner meaning of the
Law in agreement with demonstration, or known via likenesses (’amthāl) and similarities
(’ashbāh). In combination, these passages create a systematic reading of PS 17.2—there
are two ways to know (as things are and through likeness), but three kinds of citizens and
modes of discourse (demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical). Averroes affirms this by
saying:
[T]here are three methods of bringing about assent for people—demonstrative,
dialectical, and rhetorical—and two methods of forming concepts, either by
means of the thing itself or by means likeness of it; and not all people have
natures such as to accept demonstrations or dialectical arguments, let alone
demonstrative arguments given the difficulty in teaching demonstrative arguments
and the length time needed by someone adept at learning them.239
In effect, Averroes systematizes the methods of discourse which are implicit in alFārābī’s own text.240 In doing so, he explicates many of the commitments which belie alFārābī’s model.
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In doing so, Averroes draws further distinctions within the second group of people, those who know by
relying upon the philosophers. He identifies this group with those that know via dialectic (jadal). Whereas
rhetoric gets associated with those who are adept at preaching (maw‘iẓa) (DT 18) and demonstration is
implied to be the purview of the philosophers (DT 1f.), those who know via dialectic are never identified
explicitly. A ready answer seems to be the dialectical theologians (mutakallimūn), but as, unlike in the
English translation, Averroes does not explicitly link Kalām with jadal, more reflection is required. In
dialectic (jadal), the two axes of the present passage seem to intersect, insofar as dialectic can concern itself
with either “the thing itself” or “the likeness of it” within the Law. Averroes discusses how dialectic can be
built upon likenesses (’amthāl) (DT 19), which would clearly fall under the domain of the dialectical
theologians (mutakallimūn), but he also describes a form of assent through dialectic (and even rhetoric)
which is certain, because it is built, not upon likenesses, but upon certain premises, i.e., “matters taken in
themselves rather than likenesses” (DT 24-25). While these arguments also seem to be a regular activity for
the dialectical theologians (mutakallimūn), this is a distinct method for bringing about assent than dialectic
built upon likenesses. Only those that rely upon this latter activity which is built upon “matters taken in
themselves” would fall under al-Fārābī’s description of “those who are close to the philosophers” who
“know [things] as they really are through the insight of the philosophers” (PS 17.2).
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First and foremost, Averroes makes explicit the Fārābīan position concerning the
truth of philosophy and religion. There is only one truth, and that truth is attained through
demonstration. Despite the famous confusion surrounding Averroistic “double truth”,
Averroes is emphatic that “truth does not oppose truth; rather, it agrees with and bears
witness to it”.241 And while the “Law is true and calls to the reflection leading to
cognizance of the truth”, cognizance comes about through demonstration.242 As he
describes, “[W]hat is intended by the Law is only to teach true science and true practice.
True science is cognizance of God (may He be blessed and exalted) and of all the existing
things as they are...”243 Recall that for both al-Fārābī and Averroes, knowing things
themselves, as they really are, is reserved only for the philosophers. Those that believe
the law only in the apparent sense do not know the truth, only a likeness.
In the Perfect State, al-Fārābī introduces, shortly after distinguishing between
these modes of discourse, the possibility of using the images of religion to climb toward
demonstration. At PS 17.4, he considers the individual who, rejecting the falsity of a
symbol, is lifted toward a better symbol, which, when rejected, leads to a better symbol
still.244 If he remains persistent and dissatisfied with symbols, “He will be made to know
the truth (ḥaqq) and will be placed into the class of those who take the philosophers as
their authorities. If he is not yet satisfied with that and desires to acquire philosophical
wisdom and has himself the strength and gift for it, he will be made to know it.”245
Implicit in this model is the notion that the symbols are not themselves the truth; they are
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beneficent deceptions. Nonetheless, they orient one toward the truth, and, given skill and
desire, they can facilitate one toward reaching the truth.
Yet here Averroes diverges from al-Fārābī. While Averroes views the Law as
pedagogical for practical matters, i.e., ethics; theoretical matters remain beyond the reach
of those who are not already philosophers. Admittedly, he suggests that the Law contains
“a means of alerting those adept in the truth to the true interpretation”, but he is more
concerned with censorship than upward mobility. For Averroes demonstrative truth is
dangerous, because:
...for anyone not adept in science, it is obligatory to take them [the descriptions of
the next life] in their apparent sense it is unbelief to interpret them because it
leads to unbelief. That is why we are of the opinion that, for anyone among the
people whose duty it is to have faith in the apparent sense, interpretation is
unbelief because it leads to unbelief. Anyone adept in interpretation who divulges
that to him calls him to unbelief; and the one who calls to unbelief is an
unbeliever. This is why it is obligatory that interpretations be established only in
books using demonstrations.246
Symbols, rather than an invitation to knowledge, are permanently fixated as a
replacement for the truth. Revealing the inner sense to those citizens incapable of
demonstration causes confusion and unbelief, not knowledge.247 For this reason, “What is
obligatory for the imams of the Muslims is that they ban those of his books that contain
science from all but those adept in science, just as it is obligatory upon them to ban
demonstrative books from those not adept in them.”248 Furthermore, even this distinction
between discourse should not be mentioned to the multitude, lest they realize that their
images are in fact merely images. He explains, “This interpretation ought not to be
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declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude.”249 In Averroes, one
can recognize Fārābīan beneficent political deception in its starkest terms, as a
Construction of Social Knowledge which holds no pretense of being the truth itself,
having the same weight as demonstration, or as coming from God. For this reason, the
political purpose of the Law as rhetorical, symbolic discourse must be hidden.

3.4.3. What Averroes tells us about al-Fārābī
Averroes develops different aspects of Fārābīan political philosophy than any of
the other preceding thinkers discussed above. He rejects any kind of special emanation
from the Active Intellect to the prophet and, with it, the Revealed-as-Determined model.
Instead, he lays bare the deceptive quality of Fārābīan political philosophy. Religion, as
imagistic and rhetorical, is a form of untruth. Yet it is constructed by those with
demonstrative knowledge for those who lack it. It is a surrogate for truth, but still leads to
true practice, allowing those who lack knowledge the ability to “follow the actions that
promote happiness and to avoid the actions that promote misery”.250 In short, while
neither mean nor cruel, it is clearly a beneficent deception. Even though it is born out of
necessity for Averroes, untruth presents itself as truth and is bolstered by a program of
careful censorship. In Averroes, one finds a true Construction of Social Knowledge, as
the Law is meant to permanently displace demonstration (although, only for those
incapable by nature or education).
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3.5. What Al-Fārābī’s Adopters Teach Us
Despite spanning multiple religions, continents, and empires, al-Fārābī’s adopters
all recognize the same internal coherence to his doctrine of beneficent political deception.
Whether an adapter and adopter of the Revealed-as-Determined model (e.g., Avicenna),
an innovator who expands upon, even while rejecting, Fārābīan political philosophy (e.g.,
Ibn Ṭufayl), a disciple who attempts to create an amalgam of the two distinct doctrines
present in al-Fārābī’s texts (e.g., Maimonides), or a brazen Aristotelian who rejects the
Revealed-as-Determined model wholesale (e.g., Averroes), each of these thinkers
recognizes the same internal coherence to al-Fārābī’s thought. There is no justification
for political deception, as such. Beneficent political deception, however, is justified
through its necessity, its nearness to the truth, and the ability of the deceiver to know
what is best for the citizenry.

4. Conclusion
Through discussing al-Fārābī’s context, it is clear that his position was not
necessitated by historical circumstance. He could have rejected deception wholesale,
rejected philosophy wholesale, rejected religion wholesale, claimed that religion and
philosophy were simply two maḏāhib amongst many, or claimed that religion and
philosophy were compatible. He did not. Through examining his adopters, it is clear that
his commitments have an internal coherence. His adopters could have untethered political
deception from the truth, allowed for deception for purely political power, or denied the
necessity of images which serve as surrogates for philosophical truth. They did not.
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This is not to say that my preceding interpretation of al-Fārābī is definitive.
Instead though, the context out of which he writes and the interpretations of those who
adopt his philosophy lends a great deal of credence to my account in Chapter 3.
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V. AL-FᾹRᾹBῙ’S JUSTIFICATION FOR BENEFICENT POLITICAL DECEPTION

1. Introduction
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I explored the nuances of al-Fārābī’s position, showing
that, while there are challenges to reading al-Fārābī, he develops a clear Doctrine of
Beneficent Political Deception grounded in a metaphysics which attempts to justify the
need for the Construction of Social Knowledge. Moreover, his doctrine was developed in
environs which would have allowed for numerous distinct approaches; his commitments
appear to be sincere. Further, his successors shared his core commitments. Clearly, alFārābī thinks beneficent political deception is ethically warranted. But are his
justifications successful?
In Chapter 5, I explore some common critiques of Plato’s Noble Lie and
Phoenician Story and explore whether al-Fārābī’s own form of beneficent political
deception can address them. All told, al-Fārābī can meet the objections of critics like
R.H.S. Crossman and Karl Popper through an appeal to his metaphysical commitments
and the certainty they allow. While al-Fārābī is successful in defending that beneficent
political deception is warranted in some cases, if and only if one presumes the accuracy
of his metaphysical approach, one ambiguity remains: how beneficent political deception
qua surrogate of the truth can be assessed. Put otherwise, even if al-Fārābī can show that
political deception is necessary (as opposed to the explicit expression of a universal
truth), it remains ambiguous how he can justify the use of any particular deception, given
that the falsehood and particularity of the deceptive image prevents it from being
knowable qua particular. Simply, if rectitude is determined in reference to truth, how
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could any falsehood be recognized as the ‘right’ falsehood. The answer to this question
will have to await Chapter 6.

2. Crossman and Popper
In both Plato To-Day (1937) and The Open Society & Its Enemies (1945), R.H.S.
Crossman and Karl Popper famously object, respectively, to the aspects of Plato’s
political philosophy built upon the foundation of deception. Not all of these objections
are specifically directed at the Phoenician Story or the Noble Lie, but all of them address
a political system built upon Plato’s genealogical account of his city’s entrenched caste
system. Each objection is, in part, an implicit objection to the Phoenician Story. If, as
Crossman and Popper contend, Plato is an illiberal paternalist, i.e., a totalitarian, the
centralization of Plato’s state power rests first and foremost upon a lie.
It is beyond the scope of this project to assess the soundness of Crossman and
Popper’s claims, i.e., whether their objections are fair to Plato. Instead, this chapter will
abstract six useful objections to al-Fārābī’s model from their objections to Plato, namely
that his political model results in injustice concerning: 1) paternalistic control of
information; 2) the rejection of equality, freedom, and self-government; 3) a hereditary
caste system; 4) censorship; 5) the identification of the state with the ruling class; and 6)
totalitarianism. That said, two tendencies concerning their critiques of Plato should be
noted.
First, both Crossman and Popper assume a state of affairs for proper human
political association that could be described, broadly speaking, as classically liberal in its
approach. As will be discussed in my concluding chapter, I agree with this approach
concerning the actual state of affairs for proper human political association. But as
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readers of Plato, importing liberalism as a standard to which Plato must be held to
account flattens the nuances of his position. For example, Crossman’s claim that “Plato’s
philosophy is the most savage and the most profound attack upon liberal ideas which
history can show” does not reveal much about Plato’s philosophy itself, other than,
perhaps, that Plato lived prior to the existence of modern political theory.1 Popper even
admits to his lack of concern for Plato’s views in relation to the context of time,
admitting:
I wish to make it quite clear that I am confining my treatment of Plato to his
historicism, and to his ‘best state’. I must therefore warn the reader not to expect a
representation of the whole of Plato’s philosophy, or what may be called a ‘fair
and just’ treatment of Platonism. My attitude towards historicism is one of frank
hostility, based upon the conviction that historicism is futile, and worse than that.
My survey of the historicist features of Platonism is therefore strongly critical.
Although I admire much in Plato’s philosophy, far beyond those parts which I
believe to be Socratic, I do not take it as my task to add to the countless tributes to
his genius. I am, rather, bent on destroying what is in my opinion mischievous in
this philosophy. It is the totalitarian tendency of Plato’s political philosophy
which I shall try to analyse, and to criticize.2
Put simply, neither Crossman nor Popper aim to give a full account and justification for
Plato’s political philosophy; instead, they both aim to defeat it in the context of
contemporary politics.
This is all well and good for their respective projects, but for the purposes here it
will not do. Just as, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is philosophically uninteresting to
examine political deception through, say, a Kantian lens (for example: 1. All lies are
morally impermissible; 2. Political lies are lies; therefore, Political lies are morally
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impermissible), it is philosophically uninformative to import liberalism into a robust
account of political deception.3 To say that:
1. All human beings ought to have political rights granting equal access to
political power.
2. Truth holds political power.
3. Political lies create unequal access to political power.
∴ Political lies are a violation of political rights.
is perhaps both true and informative concerning the justifiability of political lies from the
standpoint of liberalism, but it is uninformative about the nature of political lies
themselves. Understanding the conditions by which political deception is made to be
justifiable gives a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. It establishes the limit to
which political deception can be understood to be justifiable.
This leads to the second tendency of note in Crossman and Popper’s accounts: a
dismissiveness concerning the relationship between metaphysics, ethics, and politics.
Crossman’s dismissiveness is implicit, with a narrow focus toward the political, but
Popper makes his approach clear. He explains:

I believe, in common with a great number of thinkers, and especially with many
social scientists, that the distinction between laws in sense (a), i.e. statements
describing regularities of nature, and laws in sense (b), i.e. norms such as
prohibitions or commandments, is a fundamental one, and that these two kinds of
law have hardly more in common than a name. But this view is by no means
generally accepted; on the contrary, many thinkers believe that there are norms—
prohibitions or commandments—which are ‘natural’ in the sense that they are laid
down in accordance with natural laws in sense (a). They say, for example, that
certain legal norms are in accordance with human nature, and therefore with
psychological natural laws in sense (a), while other legal norms may be contrary
to human nature; and they add that those norms which can be shown to be in
accordance with human nature are really not very different from natural laws in
sense (a). Others say that natural laws in sense (a) are really very similar to
normative laws since they are laid down by the will or decision of the Creator of
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the Universe—a view which, undoubtedly, lies behind the use of the originally
normative word ‘law’ for laws of the kind (a).4
Again, within the scope of his project of rejecting totalitarianism, this approach seems
fine. But it is not Plato’s approach, a thinker who clearly looks to nature, particularly the
nature of the good, in his assessment of the nomoi of the city.5 Moreover, assuming we
take Plato to be sincere that humans ought to order ourselves according to the orderliness
of nature, such an approach can lead to the misnomer that political aims dictate
metaphysical models, not the other way around.6 Popper himself seems to fall prey to this
worry, saying:
According to our analysis, the theory of Forms or Ideas has at least three different
functions in Plato’s philosophy, (1) It is a most important methodological device,
for it makes possible pure scientific knowledge, and even knowledge which could
be applied to the world of changing things of which we cannot immediately
obtain any knowledge, but only opinion. Thus it becomes possible to enquire into
the problems of a changing society, and to build up a political science. (2) It
provides the clue to the urgently needed theory of change, and of decay, to a
theory of generation and degeneration, and especially, the clue to history. (3) It
opens a way, in the social realm, towards some kind of social engineering; and it
makes possible the forging of instruments for arresting social change, since it
suggests designing a ‘best state’ which so closely resembles the Form or Idea of a
state that it cannot decay.7
Again, assessing Popper’s faithfulness to Plato is beyond the scope of this project, but his
framing here seems suspect. In the realm of the political, the Theory of Forms does not
have a mere functional role in relationship to the best state for the purpose of social
engineering; it is the model by which the best state can be assessed. The Form of the
Good is not, if taking Plato to be sincere, a mere tool by which Plato can justify his polis,
but the metaphysical ground upon which his polis is built.
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That said, concerning Plato’s use of the Noble Lie, distinguishing between nature
and custom lends traction to Popper’s discussion, given that the inequality of the city is
grounded upon a myth, which, while presumably is itself grounded upon nature, never
gets justified via an explicit model of nature.8 Put simply, the caste system in the
Republic hinges upon the admittedly false Phoenician Story, not a careful appeal to the
metaphysical necessity of deficient expressions of humanity.9 But for al-Fārābī, who
takes care to explain the principles for deficiency in his metaphysical model and models
his city after the macroanthropotic organization of the cosmos, many of Crossman and
Popper’s objections fail to register. Put simply, as will be discussed below, certain
critiques, e.g., that the city lacks equality, ring hollow, because al-Fārābī does not build
inequality into his political system through lies; his conception of nature recognizes and,
indeed, even necessitates the inequality of the citizenry.

2.1. Crossman
R.H.S. Crossman’s critique of Plato stems from his historical assessment of
Plato’s context, in particular “his bias in favour of aristocracy” and Plato’s mistake that
the elite of society can be trusted with “absolute freedom of action” via “a virtue far
beyond their reach.”10 Plato failed to account for the corrupting influence of power, while
neglecting to provide a trustworthy metric by which one can assess whether someone is
deserving of power.11 What starts as a misconception concerning a human being’s
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relationship to the state becomes amplified when political deception is made available.
As Crossman explains:

The real problems, therefore, were firstly the conversion of the Greek gentleman
to Platonic philosophy, and secondly the pacification of a proletariat avid for selfgovernment. These are the practical questions which the Republic tries to answer,
and both are in a sense educational. Of the first we have already spoken and we
shall return to it in a later chapter. But the second is no less important. The
civilian must be educated to accept his subjection to the rule of law. But since he
is naturally incapable of philosophy or of directing his life according to reason
and cannot understand the raison d’être of the State, it is useless to explain the
truth to him. He must therefore be fed on political and religious myths, ‘noble
lies’ as Plato called them, which appeal to his emotions and stimulate him to obey
the law. By the ‘noble lie’ Plato meant propaganda, the technique of controlling
the behaviour of the stupid majority: and he believed that this was the only sort of
general education which the civilian should receive. He must, in fact, be content
with the education which Plato had prepared for the children of the ruling class,
since politically and morally he would always remain a child. Just as children are
told improving stories to prevent them from biting their nails or stealing or telling
lies, so the civilian must be fed on propaganda to prevent him from asserting his
right to self-government...12
Care must be taken here to distinguish between two related but distinct critiques. The first
critique, one which Plato cannot answer successfully, focuses on whether Plato has
recourse to reality which justifies his use of deception, what Crossman describes as
propaganda. In other words, is Plato justified in describing that there is a necessary need
to control the “stupid majority”? Crossman thinks, I think rightly and obviously, that
Plato is wrong about his elitism and his low view of the capabilities of most humans. But
this critique is distinct from a more difficult question: does Plato have recourse to
something which justifies his use of deception via his own model of reality? In other
words, does Platonic metaphysics justify the use of propaganda via explaining the
necessary deficiency of human beings and providing a mechanism by which one can
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distinguish between deficient and capable human beings? As was discussed in Chapter 1,
Plato never provides his reader with a foolproof method for distinguishing between the
different kinds of citizens, nor does he ground the distinction between citizens in any
clear metaphysical mechanism.13 But to say either that Plato does not justify his use of
deception because his conception of the world is wrongheaded or that Plato does not
justify his use of deception via his metaphysics because he lacks an explicit justification
in his texts is distinct from saying that Platonic philosophy could not justify deception via
a recourse to metaphysics.
Added to Crossman’s concern about the imprecise elitism of Plato’s politics is the
vacuous nature of Platonic propaganda. Even though Plato discusses the falsehoods
through which we teach our children and, paternalistically, the masses as “though they
have some truth in them” and as if they have medicinal value, he never describes how
falsehoods serve to educate the populace.14 The Phoenician Story has an anti-educational
effect, keeping citizens from questioning their social status. As Crossman describes:
Philosophy for the ruler, and propaganda for the rest—this, says Plato, is the best
way of avoiding bloodshed in the establishment and maintenance of the
‘dictatorship of the best’. The mistake of Socrates had been his belief that the Law
of Reason was suitable for everyone. He had condemned rhetoric and sophistical
education altogether and tried to convert the city of Athens to philosophy. But
philosophy and reason are poison to the masses. Misunderstood and perverted by
them, they merely intensify social unrest. The masses need not the truth, but a
convenient falsehood...15
Political lies thus serve as a tool for pacification, not as ‘the next best’ thing in
subservience to the truth.16 If, as Crossman suggests, political lies function only to
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effectively consolidate power and prevent social unrest, it is difficult to ascertain how
they could ever be justifiable.
Crossman’s critique culminates in a lucid and impassioned rejection of the
consequences of Platonic political philosophy, even if it does import some of Crossman’s
own commitments. He writes:
Plato’s philosophy is the most savage and the most profound attack upon liberal
ideas which history can show. It denies every axiom of ‘progressive’ thought and
challenges all its fondest ideals. Equality, freedom, self-government—all are
condemned as illusions which can be held only by the idealists whose sensibilities
are stronger than their sense. The true idealist, on Plato’s view, will see men as
they are, observe their radical inequalities, and give to the many not selfgovernment but security, not freedom but prosperity, no knowledge but the ‘noble
lie’. The perfect State is not a democracy of rational equals, but an aristocracy in
which a hereditary caste of cultured gentleman care with paternal solicitude for
the toiling masses.17
Plato wrongly ascribes inequality to the citizenry, paternalistically deciding that the
(arbitrarily impossible) aims of freedom and self-government are inferior to the goods of
security and prosperity. Moreover, he condemns the citizenry to a life of untruth,
restricting access to knowledge. Instead, the masses are fed a diet of propaganda, while
the aristocracy enjoys access to truth. Crossman’s biting critique of Plato’s hereditary
castes readily highlights the danger of consolidating power in a rejection of selfgovernment, especially in a political system which also consolidates access to truth.

2.2. Popper
In many ways, Karl Popper’s critiques of Plato serve as a reiteration, elucidation,
and expansion upon those which Crossman raises.18 And Popper, as mentioned
previously, is particularly sensitive to the ways that Plato’s political philosophy could be
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put to use and abuse in living political systems. He does not suffer the anesthetization of
his reader to the implications of Plato’s politics. Distinguishing between elites and
inferiors is dangerous; hereditary class distinctions are dangerous. The doctrines within
Plato’s Republic are no mere idyllic game, and they should not be engaged with purely on
theoretical terms. And Popper is right in this regard. As he explains:
Before proceeding to this description, I wish to express my belief that personal
superiority, whether racial or intellectual or moral or educational, can never
establish a claim to political prerogatives, even if such superiority could be
ascertained. Most people in civilized countries nowadays admit racial superiority
to be a myth; but even if it were an established fact, it should not create special
political rights, though it might create special moral responsibilities for the
superior persons. Analogous demands should be made of those who are
intellectually and morally and educationally superior; and I cannot help feeling
that the opposite claims of certain intellectualists and moralists only show how
little successful their education has been, since it failed to make them aware of
their own limitations...19
These, again liberal, principles should be kept in the forefront of the reader’s mind.
Plato’s elitism has been superseded by better political theory. But to fully understand
Plato’s recommendation for the use of political lies, one must temporarily bracket (in the
sense of ἐποχή) the truth of Plato’s views about human nature and engage with his
political philosophy on its own terms. Because, as we will see with al-Fārābī, even if
Plato does not himself justify the use of political deception in his political philosophy,
Platonic political deception can be justifiable on its own terms (even though justifiability
on its own terms does not equate to justifiability as such).
Given the above caveat that Popper denies the possibility of any justification for
totalitarianism, elitism, or paternalism, he critiques Plato on these grounds. As he
explains, the Spartan state, to which Plato looks for inspiration, “was a slave state, and
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accordingly Plato’s best state is based on the most rigid class distinctions. It is a caste
state. The problem of avoiding class war is solved, not by abolishing classes, but by
giving the ruling class a superiority which cannot be challenged”.20 Popper continues:

It is true that Plato discusses nowhere explicitly the status of slaves in his best
state, and it is even true that he says that the name ‘slave’ should better be
avoided, and that we should call the workers ‘supporters’ or even ‘employers’.
But this is done for propagandist reasons. Nowhere is the slightest suggestion to
be found that the institution of slavery is to be abolished, or to be mitigated. On
the contrary, Plato has only scorn for those ‘tenderhearted’ Athenian democrats
who supported the abolitionist movement. And he makes his view quite clear, for
example, in his description of timocracy, the second-best state, and the one
directly following the best. There he says of the timocratic man: ‘He will be
inclined to treat slaves cruelly, for he does not despise them as much as a welleducated man would.’ But since only in the best city can education be found
which is superior to that of timocracy, we are bound to conclude that there are
slaves in Plato’s best city, and that they are not treated with cruelty, but are
properly despised. In his righteous contempt for them, Plato does not elaborate the
point.21
Here, Popper highlights the importance of political representation as an expression of
freedom. If, as the Republic states, the hoi polloi are to be convinced that they are inferior
in quality, fit only to accept a lower lot in life, devoid of political representation or
agency, in what sense can they be said to be free?22 Moreover, if there is no reliable
mechanism by which the gold, silver, bronze, and iron citizens can distinguish
themselves from one another, in what sense can this restriction of freedom be said to be
anything but capricious and arbitrary? Perhaps one can conceive of a natural order which
puts restrictions on freedom and political power and is expressed most readily through
myth, but for such a state of affairs to be just, the necessity of this arrangement must be
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apparent.23 Yet, the Republic admits that “only a general pattern and not the exact details”
of the divisions within society are provided.24 Plato, here, is not being a good butcher and
cutting society up precisely at the natural joints, but rather cutting up his myth, the
Phoenician Story, a myth, itself, based upon just a general sense of society, at the joints.25
He is expressing a myth, which he claims reflects reality generally with inexactitude, and
is then pretending that the myth is in fact the natural order. This is prima facie unjust.
Further, as Popper notes, one should be suspect that Plato’s class divisions are
merely descriptive when they would have the obvious practical ramifications of stifling
upward mobility. Because, while Plato considers the possibility of intergenerational
upward and downward mobility, in which a silver citizen is born to a gold citizen and
vice-versa, the results of Plato’s educational system are obvious.26 If truth is restricted to
the guardians and the children of the guardians are assumed at birth to be protoguardians, then they alone will receive the proper education to be eventually deemed
golden in soul. As Popper explains:
The stronger the feeling that the ruled are a different and an altogether inferior
race, the stronger will be the sense of unity among the rulers. We arrive in this
way at the fundamental principle, announced only after some hesitation, that there
must be no mingling between the classes: ‘Any meddling or changing over from
one class to another’, says Plato, ‘is a great crime against the city and may rightly
be denounced as the basest wickedness.’27
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Plato also warns about the dangers of an iron or bronze citizen becoming a guardian.28
All of this bespeaks a paranoia directed at the masses, fear that the hoi polloi will exert
political control. Yet the elite have no inherent checks upon their power, only their own
self-control. As Popper continues:
The problem is important from the point of view of the political equilibrium, or
rather, of the stability of the state, for Plato does not rely on an equilibrium of the
forces of the various classes, since that would be unstable. A control of the master
class, its arbitrary powers, and its fierceness, through the opposing force of the
ruled, is out of the question, for the superiority of the master class must remain
unchallenged. The only admissible control of the master class is therefore selfcontrol.29
The ultimate result of Plato’s model is a political system which restricts political power to
the elite, built upon a lie, without a defined natural order which undergirds the hereditary
castes it proposes. The system is capricious, restrictive, coercive, and lacks justification.
Popper summarizes the elements best in a long passage which opens his argument
that Plato is a totalitarian. He says:
I believe that practically all the elements of Plato’s political programme can be
derived from these demands. They are, in turn, based upon his historicism; and
they have to be combined with his sociological doctrines concerning the
conditions for the stability of class rule. The principal elements I have in mind
are: (A) The strict division of the classes; i.e. the ruling class consisting of
herdsmen and watch-dogs must be strictly separated from the human cattle. (B)
The identification of the fate of the state with that of the ruling class; the
exclusive interest in this class, and in its unity; and in its unity; and subservient to
this unity, the rigid rules for breeding and educating this class, and the strict
supervision and collectivization of the interests of its members. From these
principal elements, others can be derived, for instance the following: (C) The
ruling class has a monopoly of things like military virtues and training, and of the
right to carry arms and to receive education of any kind; but it is excluded from
any participation in economic activities, and especially from earning money. (D)
There must be a censorship of all intellectual activities of the ruling class, and a
continual propaganda aiming at moulding and unifying their minds. All
innovation in education, legislation, and religion must be prevented or suppressed.
28
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(E) The state must be self-sufficient. It must aim at economic autarchy; for
otherwise the rulers would either be dependent upon traders, or become traders
themselves. The first of these alternatives would undermine their power, the
second their unity and the stability of the state. This programme can, I think, be
fairly described as totalitarian.30
Here, new critiques are explicitly introduced which were merely implicit before, namely
the presence of censorship and the identification of the success of the city with the
success of its rulers. I ignore Popper’s (C), the restriction on military training, and (E),
the self-sufficiency of the state, because they do not address al-Fārābī’s own model.
Whether or not any reading of Plato can survive these critiques is beyond the scope of
this project.

3. Enumeration of Potential Objections
All told, I number the possible objections made toward Plato which translate to alFārābī’s model at six: 1) paternalistic control of information; 2) the rejection of equality,
freedom, and self-government; 3) a hereditary caste system; 4) censorship; 5) the
identification of the state with the ruling class; and 6) totalitarianism. While each of these
critiques presents at least some challenge to al-Fārābī’s model, within the framework of
his own metaphysics, al-Fārābī is able to provide justification for his use of beneficent
political deception. They are all, in part, interrelated. So, before turning to al-Fārābī’s
response, I will define each critique more clearly in turn, in order to more sharply focus
the conversation.

30

Popper 2013, 83-84.

334
3.1. Paternalistic Control of Information
The first critique of Plato by Crossman and Popper is the most obvious
incompatibility between political deception and liberal values. Political deception, by
definition, requires the withholding of truth from the populace and the substitution of that
truth for a falsehood. Within a democratic context, this means determining citizens’
political power without their consent, because, after all, they do not even know that it is a
lie to which they are consenting.31 It should not be forgotten within this theoretical
discussion of propaganda, deceit, and lies that political deception, with or without the
qualification that it is ‘beneficent’, is first and foremost a false depiction of reality to
others who are intended to take the falsehood to be true. To assert one’s right to dictate
(or, equally brazenly, to accept the onus of dictating) the terms of reality to a fellow
human being requires either an inherent lack of empathy or a necessity born out of
profoundly unfortunate circumstances. In either case, political lies are, by nature,
paternalistic. The only question that remains is whether there can be cases of justifiable
paternalism. Are there circumstances unfortunate enough that some rational agents must
necessarily restrict access to information and coerce other rational agents to believe in
falsehoods?
Moreover, even if such a state of affairs can be justified, it does not seem apparent
that just any substitution for the truth will do. If, say, there are some citizens to whom one
must lie, not every kind of lie can be justified. A lie which causes undue harm or which
inhibits access to a good life is clearly never acceptable. Even a neutral lie that lacks
benefit for the infantilized subject seems like an abuse of power. And even still, a lie
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which confers benefit upon the infantilized subject is surely not justifiable if a smaller,
less egregious, lie is available. While accepting the (perhaps dubious) premise that
paternalism can be justified through necessity, greater restrictiveness is still required.
For example, imagine a (literally) paternalistic lie: Santa delivers presents to
children on Christmas Eve. This lie we tell our children is surely not justifiable in
absolutist terms; it is not necessary. The affability of this Christmas myth is in its low
stakes and the presumed benefits it affords (e.g., a shared sense of social history, the
instillation of the feeling the “magic of Christmas” in children, the excuse for parents to
eat a few more cookies prior to their children waking, etc.). But one can imagine two
distinct instantiations of this lie: one which contains its own exposure and another which
insists upon itself. The former, which is typical, says that Santa delivers presents to all
children across the world in a single night, coming down chimneys one by one. The
clever child or the maturing child is able to ask questions: ‘How does he deliver toys to
every house in one night?’; ‘How does he fit down the chimney?’; ‘Does Santa deliver
toys to children whose religious traditions do not celebrate Christmas?’; ‘Why do Santa’s
presents come with price tags?’ Eventually, they will stumble upon the reality: Santa is
merely a mythic tradition which inspires feelings of generosity at Christmas. But we can
also imagine the latter, a version of the lie which insists upon itself. Questions are met
with ready responses: ‘Santa follows a particular set of flight paths using proprietary
Santatech®’; ‘Santa uses Pym particles to shrink and grow at will’; ‘Santa delivers
presents to non-Christian children on other holidays’; ‘Santa is a minority stakeholder in
Wal-Mart’. Ultimately, further questions are met with censorship, as will be discussed
below (e.g., ‘Stop asking so many questions’). Surely, the former case can be considered
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innocuous enough, but the latter borders on abuse of parental authority. It is one thing to
tell a lie prior to the giving of explicit consent and another entirely to insist upon a lie
once consent has been explicitly denied. (After all, what is questioning if not an
insistence that one deserves the truth?) It seems that even if one justifies lying, one
cannot justify insisting upon a lie. Even better than a lie which does not insist upon itself
would be a lie which mitigates the inherent harm of deception by containing the keys to
its own rejection, i.e., a lie which hints at the truth. This seems to be the standard by
which justification is possible. Otherwise, political deception would simply be a rank
abuse of power and the intentional harm of one’s fellow citizens.

3.2. Rejection of Equality, Freedom, and Self-Government
Deception is, at its heart, a rejection of equality. Either it is the case that certain
subjects, according to nature, do not merit equal access to the truth, or circumstances
dictate that equal access to the truth is not tenable. In either case, the effect of a lie is the
creation of an in-group and out-group. Some know the truth; some believe a fiction.
Insofar as the in-group initiates the creation of the out-group (or enforces it by
disingenuously endorsing a convenient falsehood), they reject, in practice, a belief in
equality as it pertains to accessing truth.
Rejecting equality, freedom, and self-governance is not, in principle, prima facie
unjustifiable. After all, if, as Jefferson writes, the truth “that all men are created equal” is
as “self-evident” as he describes, the American War of Independence would not have
needed to be fought (nor, would the American Civil War have been necessary).32 Instead,
it seems more accurate to say something along the lines of ‘it ought to be self-evident that
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all human being are created equal’ or some such. Needless to say, throughout human
history the equality, innate freedom, and right to self-governance of individuals has not
been universally recognized. There are ways to justify inequality. To say that these
justifications fail, insofar as their premises are false, is not the same as to say that they are
not justifications. To say that inequality is not ever successfully justified is not the same
as to say that inequality is not justifiable in principle. Again, here, the discussion is not
yet concerned with the truth or falsity of the reasons through which one justifies political
deception. Soundness will be address in the concluding chapter. Rather, this project aims
to examine the structure of such justifications. How could one justify inequality and, in
particular, the inequality of lies?
One more thing ought to be said. To merely claim that inequality is justifiable is
less tenable than giving reasons explaining the necessity of inequality. Moreover,
claiming that one has reasons which justify inequality is less tenable than demonstrating
how one knows that inequality is necessary. I take it as a point of principle that only the
latter case truly approaches justifiability. The innate human desire for self-governance,
freedom, and equal treatment is such that to deny it would need the most unimpeachable
justification. From the standpoint of liberalism, no one deserves to have their autonomy
stripped away from them, full-stop. But even from the standpoint of other worldviews, it
seems apparent that no one deserves to have their autonomy stripped away from them if
such an act is based upon a guess or a mere opinion.
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3.3. Hereditary Caste
A lie whose effect is to establish a caste system which allows no possibility for
upward mobility is unjustifiable. A lie which establishes inequality upon the basis of birth
is beyond the pale. Even within the context of a project which is trying to understand the
inner workings of political deception on its own terms, I am unwilling, given the
historical abuse of such ‘justifications’, to seriously consider that any political system
which initiates or devolves into a caste system based upon heredity is worthy of moral
consideration.33

3.4. Censorship
The censorship critique of political deception follows a similar pattern to some of
the critiques mentioned above. If the truth is censored, then political power, autonomy,
and freedom are also censored. But censorship highlights a second component of
potential injustice in a political arrangement built upon untruth, namely the speech act
and belief, itself. Prior to now, the critique has focused upon access to truth, but
censorship adds a prohibition against the expression of truth to the mixture. Put another
way, one can discuss censorship in either the sense of a) a government’s restriction upon
official speech or b) the government’s restriction upon individual speech. The former
censors access to the truth; the latter censors and censures the expression of truth. Both
instances are repugnant to liberalism, but only the latter adds something unique to the
previous critiques.
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This critique is further complicated by the two domains in which censorship can
occur: the public and the private. Censorship of public speech, while illiberal, is not
prima facie unjustifiable. After all, censorship of certain public speech acts (e.g.,
classified information, hate speech, etc.) is familiar even within liberal democratic
contexts. Even more restrictive censorship seems plausibly justifiable if the public good
(in coordination with the individual good) is necessarily predicated upon the conformity
of public speech. (Again, to say that the world does not necessitate the conditions by
which censorship would be required is distinct from saying that the world could not
necessitate such conditions in principle.) But the restriction of private speech seems
intrinsically unjustifiable. To limit private speech, and thus belief, to a lie, means
divorcing an individual from the truth forever. This level of censorship does more than
posit the necessity of deception insofar as some rational agents are incapable of knowing
the truth, but, instead, insists upon the rectitude of deception even when rational agents
are capable of knowing the truth (as said rational agents are not, even in private, afforded
the opportunity to learn and discuss). Private censorship would require inhuman
conditions, either a society in which belief itself was legislated (something which is
surely impossible) or in which the expression of belief is legislated even amidst the
confines of the home (something which is surely cruel). Any justified censorship must
surely, thus, restrict itself to public discourse.

3.5. The Identification of the State with the Ruling Class
Popper’s critique that Plato identifies the fate or success of the state with the fate
or success of the ruling class hinges upon Popper’s justifiable belief that there is nothing
which intrinsically distinguishes the ruling class from the hoi polloi. But, given a
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metaphysics which necessitates an intrinsic distinction between the capabilities of
individual members of society, there is no reason to suggest that a politics which
identifies the success of the state with the success of the ruling class is prima facie unjust.
To say that a world which contains intrinsic inequality resulting in distinct levels of
possible human fulfillment is not the best of all possible worlds is distinct from saying
that a politics, within the context of a deficient world, cannot be justified in evaluating its
success upon the highest levels of human fulfillment. Justice, in this kind of deficient
world, seems to require a politics which maximizes the happiness of all human agents
within the political sphere, insofar as happiness is constrained by nature. But the use of
the happiness of the ruling class as a metric for the success of a polis seems justifiable,
given certain metaphysical conditions.

3.6. Totalitarianism
While Popper and Crossman’s critique of Plato’s totalitarianism encompasses all
of the aforementioned issues noted above, one aspect concerning the unjustifiability of
totalitarianism should be noted, namely, the relationship between totalitarianism and
knowledge. Foundationally, prior to concerns about speech, equality, etc., totalitarianism
is unjustifiable because political governance is messy. Given the imprecision of knowing
the good life, the ordering of the well-ordered city, and the correct course of action in the
context of the particularity of political life, and given the, seemingly obvious, fact that no
human being has privileged access to the truths of politics, no rational agent has the right
to rule over another. Political power must be built upon the consent of equally fallible
creatures. Given universal epistemic uncertainty, no rational agent can justifiably orient

341
the lives of others without their consent. For if one is to justifiably mandate that another
orient themselves toward a perceived good, one must first know that said good is, in fact,
good. It is precisely in light of the messiness of the world that Winston Churchill
famously said:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin
and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been
said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other
forms that have been tried from time to time...34
Democracy, as opposed to totalitarianism, is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination,
but given the epistemic uncertainty which lies at the heart of the human condition “in this
world of sin and woe”, democracy, i.e., consent, is minimally injurious.
Yet again, this critique relies on a certain conception of metaphysics, one with
which both Plato and al-Fārābī disagree. They recognize the multiplicity inherent to
democracy, acknowledging the good that arises in a democratic context while
admonishing the evils which occur concurrently.35 Their view of democracy is not
dissimilar to Churchill’s own; it is a form of government of mixed quality. But unlike
Churchill, they posit an alternative which allows for an unconditionally good political
system, insofar as knowledge of the unconditional good is viewed as possible within their
metaphysics. The totalitarian justification in Plato and al-Fārābī is grounded upon their
belief that human beings can, at least in principle, have total knowledge of the truth.
Surely, Churchill’s historicity presents a more empirically grounded view of human
governance and limitations, but rejecting the underlying metaphysics of a justified
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totalitarianism is distinct from rejecting the justification of totalitarianism from Plato and
al-Fārābī’s metaphysics, itself.
4. Al-Fārābī’s Justification for Beneficent Political Deception
Given the legwork done in previous chapters, al-Fārābī’s ability to sidestep these
problems is apparent. While he is committed to beneficent political deception, his entire
model ensures that each and every beneficent political deception is minimally injurious.
In fact, given the underlying nature of the recipients of his beneficent political deception
they are maximally beneficent, giving citizens the maximum possible chance for
happiness. The deceptions are themselves tethered to the truth, allow for (and empower)
upward mobility, encourage virtue and maximal happiness, and educate the citizenry.
Where Popper and Crossman’s critiques are inevitable, al-Fārābī rejects that they are
critiques of his ethics. Equality as a principle is well and good, but al-Fārābī’s
metaphysics, through the contrary motions of the heavens, necessitate unequally
distributed deficiency. Identifying the state with the hoi polloi is charitable, but in a
cosmos in which the human species (and all of the sublunar world) is only teleologically
fulfilled through the actualization of the most elite of human individuals, it is
metaphysically wrongheaded. Self-rule is a beautiful ideal, but it will impinge on even
marginal happiness when the city is no longer oriented toward virtue. Put simply,
beneficent political deception is not merely permitted for al-Fārābī; it is required.
Taking the objections above in turn, while al-Fārābī is susceptible to critiques of
totalitarianism, paternalism, and inequality, his totalitarianism and paternalism is in
response to a natural inequality found in nature. The world and humans with it are
constituted through the contrary motions of the heavens rendering the world deficient.
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The heat and light of the heavens do not apply across all matter equally, and, thus, there
is inequality in nature amongst nations and individuals. And while the Secondary Causes,
through the Active Intellect, provide an opportunity for human happiness, this happiness
is not available to all. Moreover, as a result of the deficiency of human beings in general,
humans are only capable of happiness in the context of community and cooperation,
which, given individual deficiency, cannot occur by self-rule. Thus, the only available
options are: a) live in a community in which only a few individuals are truly happy, while
the rest of the community is maximally happy; or b) live in a community in which
everyone is equally unhappy. Within this context, forming a community, even a
totalitarian one, which orients the community toward maximal happiness is clearly
justified.
But totalitarianism does not entail dishonesty. One can be a totalitarian and tell
the truth. Yet here again, al-Fārābī’s metaphysics necessitate beneficent deception. A
virtuous city is such that its citizens believe and act according to the principles by which
exemplary members can attain true happiness and typical members can attain maximal
happiness. But demonstrations and truth are not sufficient for the political rule which
enables cooperation, given the deficiency of human persons; a leader must “rouse
imagination”.36 That said, as noted above, requiring the replacement of demonstrative
knowledge with deception, rhetoric, and images in public discourse is not carte blanche
permissibility for any form of deception, rhetoric, or images. They must be minimally
injurious deceptions. Here al-Fārābī clearly feels the ethical pull of the truth, because,
while he clearly believes that the truth is only known through philosophy, and thus
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philosophers, he insists that any and all images be likenesses of the truth or near-truths.
Even when fellow humans are incapable of knowledge, al-Fārābī insists upon maximally
true untruths, which, through the poetic syllogism, orient the citizenry toward a life of
virtue. Moreover, al-Fārābī even uses the very falsehood of the images he recommends
to serve as a pedagogical tool. As he describes in PS 17.3, one of the citizens may put
“his finger on the grounds for objection to those symbols and [hold] that they are
inadequate and false”. Using these objections, anyone in the city may climb from the
ranks of those who use the symbols and images of religion to the rank of the
philosophers, themselves. Not only does al-Fārābī reject the hereditary caste system as
found in Plato’s Phoenician Story, he rejects a rigid caste system altogether, allowing for
anyone with the disposition for philosophy to rise to the highest political ranks. This also
bespeaks the kind of censorship which al-Fārābī recommends. Unlike Averroes (and even
Avicenna), al-Fārābī does not seem to fear questioning the images of religion. While
there is certainly a religious and educational program in al-Fārābī’s city which publicly
enforces the symbols and images of religion, individual questioning is welcomed,
assuming that one rejects the images in favor of the truth.37 Instead, those who desire
more truth and have a disposition enabling their advancement receive further education.
Unlike Plato, who stifles upward mobility through a lie, al-Fārābī’s beneficent deceptions
encourage education, enabling upward mobility.
Yet, al-Fārābī’s political model still seems problematic, given Crossman and
Popper’s critiques. Can one really justify a political regime based upon deception? What
gives the Imām the right to decide for other agents what is and is not true? What gives the
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Imām the authority to take absolute rulership, rulership even over the truths of religion?
This is the point upon which al-Fārābī’s entire justification hinges.
Al-Fārābī’s Imām is not merely well-intentioned. He is not simply the most
intelligent member of the city. He does not give his best guess at the good life. Nor does
he establish religious imagery upon truths that he believes to be true. Beneficent political
deception is not built upon conjecture; it stems from knowledge.
Al-Fārābī’s Imām is certain. He knows, and he knows that he knows. He even
knows why he knows. He knows the metaphysical cause for deficiency comes from the
heavens. He knows “every action by which felicity can be reached”.38 And he knows that
human happiness and cooperation is only enabled through beneficent political deception.
He knows that communities require a Construction of Social Knowledge. He is like the
heart in relation to the body; he is like the First in relation to the cosmos.39 He is meant to
rule on account of his knowledge. Only in the Imām’s rectitude and certainty is al-Fārābī
justified.

5. Conclusion
One question remains before settling whether al-Fārābī provides a justified model
of political deception: how is it that the Imām is certain? Chapter 6 will explore alFārābī’s notion of certainty and address in what manner and regarding what issues the
Imām can have certain knowledge.
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VI. CERTAINTY

1. Introduction
If there is to be any hope that Fārābīan beneficent political deception is justified,
it must be established in the certain knowledge of the Imām. Without certainty,
beneficent political deception cannot be warranted. While al-Fārābī can rely upon his
metaphysics as a bulwark against critiques like those found in Crossman and Popper in
Chapter 5, if the Imām aims to justify beneficent political deception, said metaphysics
cannot be mere conjecture. Put simply, a deception justified through other falsehoods is
not justified at all. Likewise, a deception justified through uncertain premises is not
properly justified. Given the gravity of deception and the preeminence of the truth, as
agreed to in Chapter 1, any justification for any single deception requires a higher
standard than mere belief. An entire political system built as a Construction of Social
Knowledge requires the highest degree of epistemic surety, both that it is necessary and
that it is minimally injurious.
Al-Fārābī, himself, seems to agree with this assessment, as he requires the
certainty of the legislator, i.e., the Imām. As he says, in the, now familiar, passage from
the Attainment of Happiness noted previously:
Although it is the legislator who also represents (yatakhayyalu) these things
(hāḏihi al-’ashīā’) through images, neither the images (mutakhayylāt) nor the
persuasive arguments (muqanna‘āt) are intended for himself. As far as he is
concerned, they are certain (balla yaqīnīa li-hu). He is the one who invents
)ikhtara‘a( the images (mutakhayylāt) and the persuasive arguments
(muqanna‘āt), but not for the sake of establishing these things in his own soul (al’ashīā’ fī nafs) as a religion for himself (malaka li-hu). No, the images
(mutakhayyl) and the persuasive arguments (’iqnā‘) are intended for others,
whereas, so far as he is concerned, these things are certain (yaqīn). They are a
religion for others, whereas, so far as he is concerned, they are philosophy
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(falsafa). Such, then, is true philosophy (al-falsafa bi-l-ḥaqīqa) and the true
philosopher (al-faylasūf bi-l-ḥaqīqa).1
The true philosophy upon which religion is built is not probable, possible, or likely, but
rather certain (yaqīn). Prior to any expression of beneficent political deception, the
legislator must know the truth in order to know both that deception is required and what
manner of deception is required. Moreover, he must know that this deception will lead
the city to happiness.

2. Conditions of Certitude
When al-Fārābī demands that the legislator ought to have certitude of that which
he expresses within religion, he has a very specific conception of what certitude entails.
As Deborah Black explains:
‘Certitude’ is identified as the cognitive state produced in the knower by her
employment of demonstrative methods, in contrast to the inferior logical arts of
dialectic, rhetoric, poetics, and sophistry, which produce cognitive states that
approximate the certitude of demonstration in varying degrees.2
Certitude, for al-Fārābī, thus follows as the conclusion of the demonstrative method
which Aristotle describes in Prior and Posterior Analytics, where he explains
respectively , “A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something
other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so” and that these things
which are initially stated are pre-existent knowledge and ultimately “depend on things
which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and
explanatory of the conclusion”.3 In other words, certainty only occurs through a process
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in which certain first principles are used in syllogisms in order to lead to conclusions
which are themselves certain as a consequence of their necessary relation to the certainty
of the initial first principles. True first premises followed by valid deduction leads to
certainty.
According to al-Fārābī, absolute certainty requires six specific conditions: 1)
belief, 2) agreement between the belief and the external world, 3) knowledge of the
correspondence between the belief and the external world, 4) that the untruth of the
aforementioned correspondence is impossible, 5) that the truth of this belief is timeless,
and 6) the essentiality of the truth of this belief.4 And while there are relative grades of
certitude provided by arts other than demonstration, absolute certitude is clearly the
normal sense of the term yaqīn, the standard by which one must judge beneficent political
deception according to the Attainment of Happiness.5 Deborah Black helpfully designates
the six conditions for certitude: the belief condition, the truth condition, the knowledge
condition, the necessity condition, the eternity condition, and the non-accidentality
condition, respectively.6 For the Imām to be certain of the truths which are translated into
the images which govern the city, his knowledge must meet this standard.

2.1. The Belief Condition
The first condition of certitude, the belief condition, is the most easily cleared
hurdle for certitude, as it merely requires belief, and frankly, any belief will do. Al-Fārābī
only uses this first condition to establish the parameters of the kind of thing of which
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certitude is descriptive. Belief is the epistemological genus of all knowledge. As al-Fārābī
explains:
Our saying “to believe of something that it is thus or not thus” is the genus of
certitude. And there is no difference between calling this “belief” or calling it
“consensus” (al-ijmā‘) that the thing is thus or not thus. And this is opinion (alra’y). And what comes after this are the differentiae (fuṣūl) of certitude.7
Belief is simply the epistemological state of asserting the truth of some proposition.
Beyond this meager description, al-Fārābī moves on. As Black notes, “Since the belief
condition is relatively straightforward… he devotes most of his attention to explaining
the role of each of the five differentiae (fuṣūl) in specifying a subset of beliefs as
certain.”8

2.2. The Truth Condition
The second condition for certitude is the truth condition. The truth condition
merely ensures that the belief one holds corresponds to the external world. Al-Fārābī
places caveats upon his initial externality definition to nuance scenarios in which one
questions the certitude of beliefs about beliefs, but these exceptions are beyond the scope
here.9 He says:
In our saying “to agree that it corresponds and is not opposed to what belongs to
the existence of the thing externally,” the meaning of “corresponds and is not
opposed” is that if the soul’s belief is affirmative, then this thing which is external
(external to the belief, that is), is also affirmative, and if the belief is negative,
then the thing which is external to the belief is negative. For this is the meaning of
truth (al-ṣidq), namely, the relation (iḍāfa) of what belongs to the belief to the
object of belief insofar as the latter is external to the soul, or insofar as it is
external to the belief, or insofar as it is a subject (mawḍū) of the belief.10
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The second condition is a correspondence condition. Given one’s belief, does one’s belief
correspond to evidence? Is the world really how one believes it is? As al-Fārābī continues
to whittle down the genus of belief, the first step is to determine if the belief is verified
outside the mind.

2.3. The Knowledge Condition
The third condition of certitude, the knowledge condition, mandates that it is not
enough for one to believe in something and for that thing to correspond to the external
world; one must know that one’s belief corresponds. As al-Fārābī explains:
And our saying, “and to know that it corresponds and is not opposed to it,” is only
made a condition for [certitude] because it is conceivable that there should be
agreement and that it correspond to the thing, but that believer is not aware that it
corresponds, but rather, it is in his view possible that it may not correspond.11
It is possible, therefore, for someone to both believe a proposition and have that
proposition correspond to the state of the external world and yet for that person to have
no verification that her belief does correspond to the outside world. A person cannot be
certain unless she knows that she knows. As Black explains:
This allows Fārābī to introduce a level of second-order knowledge into the theory
of demonstration without obvious regress or circularity. The object which one
knows is now established as distinct from the object about which one is certain:
knowledge is usually about the external world, e.g., my belief that “a human
being is an animal”; whereas certitude concerns the status of my first-order belief
about p, e.g., “My belief that ‘human being is an animal’ is true.” If the third
condition for certitude is absent, then, a person may indeed have a true belief that
corresponds to some actual state of affairs, but she will not have the requisite
second-order belief that this correspondence itself must hold.12
Certainty requires both correspondence and verification of said correspondence.
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2.4. The Necessity Condition
The fourth condition of certitude, the necessity condition, explains that for a belief
to be certain it must be known that it corresponds to the world necessarily. In other
words, it is not enough that the belief is true, nor enough that it is known to be true, but it
must also be known to be true via a reliable method of ascertainment. As al-Fārābī
explains:
And our saying, “that it is not possible for it not to correspond or to be opposed,”
is the assurance (ta’kīd) and strength (wathāqa) by which conviction and belief
(al-i‘tiqād wa-al-ra‘y) enter into the definition of certitude. And it is necessarily
required that it does conform to it (and that it was not possible for it not to have
corresponded to it), and that be in some state that is not possible to be opposed to
it, but rather, it is in a state in which it is necessarily required that it correspond to
it, and that it not be opposed to nor contradict it. And this strength and assurance
in the belief itself is an inference/acquisition (istifāda) from the thing which
produces [the belief]. This thing is either by nature (bi-ṭabī‘a) or the syllogism.13
Put another way, al-Fārābī is restricting what can be known with certainty to that which is
known innately (i.e., via first principles) and that which is known through demonstration.
Following the Posterior Analytics, it is not enough to know the correspondence of the
belief to the world, but one must know the cause of the knowledge of the correspondence
of the belief to the world for the belief to constitute unqualified knowledge. If this
condition is met, the belief can be known necessarily and in an unqualified way. As
Aristotle explains:
We think we understand a thing without qualification, and not in the sophistic,
accidental way, whenever we think we know the cause in virtue of which
something is—that it is the cause of that very thing—and also know that this
cannot be otherwise. Clearly, knowledge (epistêmê) is something of this sort.
After all, both those with knowledge and those without it suppose that this is
so—although only those with knowledge are actually in this condition. Hence,
whatever is known without qualification cannot be otherwise.14
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That which is demonstrated cannot be doubted, because one knows that the veracity of
the conclusion is guaranteed by the method of demonstration itself and the truth of the
demonstration’s premises. Given that the premises cannot be otherwise and the method
cannot be otherwise, the conclusion of the demonstrative syllogism is guaranteed. As
Black explains:
The necessity condition itself, despite initial indications to the contrary, does
not stipulate that only necessary propositions or necessary existents can be the
objects of absolute certitude. Rather, the necessity condition states that the
believer must not only know—that is, be aware—that her belief is true; she
must also recognize that it is impossible for it to be false. And that
impossibility, Fārābī rather cryptically explains, ultimately derives from the
fact that the believer has acquired her belief by a process that ensures or
necessitates cognitive success.15
The necessity condition is met by properly following a specific process which begins
with first principles and continues via demonstration.

2.5. The Eternity Condition
The fifth condition, the eternity condition, limits certitude to universal subjects
which cannot change. Al-Fārābī adds:
And our saying, “And moreover that it is not possible for something opposed to it
to exist at any time.” This too is another additional assurance of the
acquisition/inference of the belief from the assurance of the thing which is its
subject in its existence outside the belief and its strength. For the first condition
may also occur in sensibles and in existential propositions, whereas this
[condition] may occur in beliefs whose subjects are unqualifiedly necessary
intelligibles. For sensibles may be true, and it may be impossible for them to be
opposed to our beliefs that they are such and such; however, they may either be
capable (mumkina) of ceasing in an indeterminate time, such as Zayd’s being
seated; or it may be inevitable for them to cease at some determinate time, such as
the eclipse of the moon which one is now seeing. Likewise universal existential
propositions, like your saying, “Every human being is white.” And as for what is
not possible to be opposed, and not at any particular time, this is only in the case
of the necessary intelligibles. For in this case the belief cannot become opposed to
15

Black 2006, 23-24.

353
existence at any particular time, nor can existence opposed to the belief at any
particular time.16
Here, al-Fārābī restricts certitude to those things which are beyond corruption and decay.
This condition, as Black notes, is not surprising for al-Fārābī to hold, as it “reflects the
traditional assumption that knowledge can only be had of objects which are absolutely
necessary in themselves, inasmuch as they are eternal and immutable”.17

2.6. The Non-Accidentality Condition
The last condition required for certitude, the non-accidentality condition, is meant
to ensure that the person who attains certitude does so using the proper method for
gaining certitude, i.e., demonstration. Al-Fārābī finishes his list of conditions saying:
And our saying, “that whatever of this occurs should occur essentially, not
accidentally,” is that by which the definition of unqualified certitude is completed.
And this is because it is not impossible that all these things might arise in a human
being by chance, rather than from things whose natural function is to cause them
to arise.18
He raises the possibility of someone accidentally fulfilling the other conditions without
using demonstration, e.g., someone who fulfills these conditions through overconfident
trust in another person (a person who does have certitude) or someone who is driven by
emotion to believe a particular (but true) claim.19 But as Deborah Black notes, this final
condition seems redundant, as the examples al-Fārābī gives seem not to meet the other
conditions, e.g., the overconfident, trusting person does not meet the necessity condition,
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insofar as the method is not necessary, and the emotional person does not meet either the
knowledge or the necessity conditions. As Black clarifies:
The principal function of Fārābī’s sixth criterion is to eliminate those rare but
conceivable cases in which all the conditions of certitude are met by chance.
Fārābī’s motivations for adding this sixth condition are closely tied up with his
concern to differentiate philosophically demonstrative certitude from dialectical
and rhetorical conviction. But his account is puzzling in some ways, since the
other five conditions taken conjointly (and in some cases even in isolation), seem
sufficiently strong to rule out any such chance occurrences.20
The sixth condition seems to lack value above and beyond the previous five.

3. The Certainty of the Imām
Given al-Fārābī’s robust conception of certainty, one might scoff at first glance at
finding any worthwhile beneficent political deception which is grounded in certainty. If
politics is the sphere of the particular and certainty only pertains to the demonstrable and
eternal, what overlap is available for the Imām? Ethical and political certainty, the
primary domain of religious images and law, seem particularly elusive, due to their
inexactitude. From an Aristotelian perspective, ethics deals primarily with particulars, not
universals, and can be at best an inexact application of universal truths, just like the
sciences of medicine and navigation.21 (As will be discussed below, al-Fārābī seems to
part with Aristotle on this topic.) Another Aristotelian concern regarding certitude of
ethics comes from the questionable reliability of a human being’s acquisition of
foundational first ethical principles, which come from a variety of sources, e.g.,
induction, perception, well established popular truths, habituation, etc.22 It is likely due to
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this plurality of sources for first principles and the contingency of some of them (e.g.,
culture and circumstance seem to play a fundamental role in both ‘established truths’ and
‘habituation’) that Aristotle concedes that ethics admits of variation and that ethics differs
in its precision compared to other sciences.23
This challenge in Aristotle is due in part to the fact that first principles
themselves, whether ethical first principles or otherwise, are a confounding topic in the
Aristotelian corpus. Aristotle himself raises the concern in Posterior Analytics in a
famous passage. He says:
Some people think that since knowledge obtained via demonstration requires
the knowledge of primary things, there is no knowledge. Others think that
there is knowledge and that all knowledge is demonstrable. Neither of these
views is either true or necessary. The first group, those supposing that there is
no knowledge at all, contend that we are confronted with an infinite regress.
They contend that we cannot know posterior things because of prior things if
none of the prior things is primary. Here what they contend is correct: it is
indeed impossible to traverse an infinite series. Yet, they maintain, if the
regress comes to a halt, and there are first principles, they will be unknowable,
since surely there will be no demonstration of first principles—given, as they
maintain, that only what is demonstrated can be known. But if it is not
possible to know the primary things, then neither can we know without
qualification or in any proper way the things derived from them. Rather, we
can know them instead only on the basis of a hypothesis, to wit, if the primary
things obtain, then so too do the things derived from them. The other group
agrees that knowledge results only from demonstration, but believes that
nothing stands in the way of demonstration, since they admit circular and
reciprocal demonstration as possible.24
Regarding first principles there are two possibilities: either they are indemonstrable and
therefore knowledge is impossible or they are demonstrable, themselves requiring a
demonstration via other first principles, which themselves require first principles, ad
nauseum. The former position mandates skepticism; the latter mandates belief in circular
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demonstration. In either case, first principles do not seem to provide the Archimedean
point for logic which certitude demands. (Ultimately, Aristotle proposes a third way, in
which we acquire first principles through perception. He explains, “And from experience,
or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul [as a result of perception]
(the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there
comes a principle of skill and understanding…”25 Any further discussion as to the
meaning or the success of this approach goes beyond the scope of this project, but,
needless to say, al-Fārābī seems sensitive to the issue).
Whether as a response to the aforementioned issues in Aristotle or otherwise, alFārābī departs from the Stagirite, grounding his first principles within the interaction
between the human intellect and the Active Intellect, thereby having the Active Intellect
act as a guarantor for their rectitude. He says while addressing the issue of certainty:
The knowledge that is a virtue of the theoretical part is for the soul to attain
certainty of the beings whose existence and constitution owe nothing at all to
human artifice, as well as about what each one is and how it is, from
demonstrations composed of accurate, necessary, universal, and primary premises
of which the intellect becomes certain and attains knowledge by nature.26
Those first principles which are required to know are known by human beings by nature
in accordance with the activity of the Active Intellect. As al-Fārābī explains in the Perfect
State:
When, then, that thing which corresponds to light in the case of sight arises in the
rational faculty from the ‘Active Intellect’, intelligibles arise at the same time in
the rational faculty from the sensibles which are preserved in the faculty of
representation. Those are the first intelligibles which are common to all men, as
for example, that the whole is greater than the part, and that things equal in size to
one and the same thing are all equal to another. The common first intelligibles are
of three kinds, (a) the principles of the productive skills, (b) the principles by
which one becomes aware of good and evil in man’s actions, (c) the principles
25
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which are used for knowing the existents which are not the objects of man’s
actions, and their primary principles and ranks: such as the heavens and the first
cause and the other primary principles and what happens to come to be out of
those primary principles.27
Primary principles exist in human beings potentially according to nature but are only
brought about through the activity of the Active Intellect which brings about the
principles of intellection.28 As al-Fārābī details:
This intellect may be potential as long as it has not attained these first [things].
When it attains them, it becomes an intellect in act and of a powerful disposition
for inferring what remains. With respect to what it attains, it is not possible that
error befall this faculty; indeed, it is not possible for anything pertaining to the
sciences to befall it other than what is certainly accurate.29
The Active Intellect functions as a guarantor of the theoretical faculty’s rectitude and
ensures the necessity of its first principles and thus any further demonstration dependent
upon these first principles.30
Interestingly, the first principles the Active Intellect provides extend well beyond
“the whole is greater than the part” or the law of non-contradiction. According to alFārābī, those first principles provided by the Active Intellect include things like “the
principles by which one becomes aware of good and evil” and “the principles which are
used for knowing... the first cause and the other primary principles and what happens to
come to be out of those primary principles”.31 In other words, the Active Intellect
provides humans with the first principles of ethics and the first principles of metaphysics.
Moreover, it provides humans with the ability to know what ensues as a result of the
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primary principles of the cosmos (presumably, including the doctrines discussed in
Chapter 3 which necessitate beneficent political deception). As a result, an Imām could
conceivably have certain knowledge about both metaphysical and ethical/political truths.

3.1. Knowledge of Metaphysics
While knowledge of the First Cause and the Secondary Causes may seem like a
peculiar avenue for beneficent political deception aimed at producing happiness within
the city, al-Fārābī views knowledge of the immaterial beings as paramount to a virtuous
city. As al-Fārābī explains, in order to lead the city to happiness, the city must believe in
the First Cause and the Secondary Causes. This is not only because true happiness is
achieved when a human reaches the status of the acquired intellect, the stage which
denotes the human attainment of universal knowledge and designates transcendence over
material life.32 (As was addressed in Chapter 3, once someone philosophically adept has
abstracted all the intelligibles from things which are forms in matters, one can shift one’s
attention to those things which are not, never were, nor never will be in matter, i.e., the
immaterial existents like the First Cause and the Active Intellect.)33 Rather, the Imām
must know the Secondary Causes as they really are and provide images to those who
cannot know, allowing them to receive an image of the truth as likenesses in their souls.34
As al-Fārābī explains, the first and second universal characteristics of all excellent cities,
regardless of differences in culture, taste, and familiar symbolism, is belief in the First
cause and the other immaterial existents.35 Yet, these things can be “known in two ways,
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either by being impressed in their soul as they really are or by being impressed on them
through affinity (munāsaba) and symbolic representation (mathīl)”.36 The ultimate
principles should be known by all, but “the vulgar ought to comprehend merely the
similitudes of these principles”.37 Whereas the foremost cause of happiness in a nation is
having a legislator who develops a science which achieves certain demonstration of the
immaterial beings, having a legislator who develops a rhetorical science and a method of
persuasion which leads the citizens of the nation to similitudes of the immaterial existents
in their souls is also critical for the success of the perfect and happy nation.38 Without the
Imām’s certitude to ground the other methods by which happiness can be achieved, the
rest of the city would not know the immaterial beings at all. Without the Imām’s political
deception, most of the citizenry would lack even an image of the Secondary Causes.
And, given al-Fārābī’s suggestion that “the principles which are used for
knowing... the first cause and the other primary principles and what happens to come to
be out of those primary principles” are given to us directly by the Active Intellect, one
can readily conceive of how, at least in principle, the Imām knows the First Cause and
Secondary Causes with certainty.39 Via the belief in the Secondary Causes and the First
Cause, the external evidence of their activity by the motion of the heavens, the first
principles given to us by nature (bi-ṭabī‘a) to know the First Cause and Secondary
Causes, and the eternality of their substances, one can readily see how a demonstration
and certainty could be produced.40 The Imām believes in the Secondary Causes. The
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belief corresponds. He verifies his belief. He is able to demonstrate his belief with certain
premises (given the first principles provided by the Active Intellect). And the object of
his belief is eternal. The Imām could, in principle, have certitude concerning the
Intellects, justifying his production of images of the Secondary Causes (e.g., angels and
the like).

3.2. Knowledge of Ethics
Ethics and politics exhibit a more difficult case. Moreover, the lack of any extant
copies of al-Fārābī’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics make any precision about
this topic near impossible.41 That said, a similar pattern could be adopted, given alFārābī’s suggestion that “the principles by which one becomes aware of good and evil in
man’s actions” are produced in the human intellect by the Active Intellect.42 And in fact,
at times, al-Fārābī suggests that demonstration within the science of ethics is possible,
even saying that there exists “demonstrative proof for the determined actions that are in
virtuous religion”.43 While the form of any such demonstration would likely take the
shape of a practical syllogism (for example: 1) All humans desire to know; 2) Reading
this book will help me learn; therefore, I will read this book), as Thérèse-Anne Druart
notes, practical syllogisms are not, strictly speaking, demonstrative, given that they
conclude in actions not propositions.44 The kind of reasoning al-Fārābī suggests seems to
look more like this:
1) All humans desire to know.
41

See Chapter 2, 4.2.3.
PS 13.3.
43
BR 47. See Druart 97, 407.
44
De Anima 434a15-20; De Motu 701a20-24; Nicomachean Ethics 1147a-23-30. See Druart 97, 407. See
also Broadie 1968.
42

361
2) Studying regularly increases knowledge.
∴ Humans ought to have a time devoted to study.
From this proof, one can readily imagine why an Imām might construct a myth
establishing the Sabbath, with instructions to study the religious law on that sacred day.
The image, the political deception, is born out of demonstration.
Given the first principles al-Fārābī suggests are available from the Active
Intellect, one can see how knowledge of this type could be certain. The value of study
(and free time to study) is believable. It corresponds to human nature. It is verifiable in
experience. And it is produced (given the first principles provided by the Active Intellect)
via a necessary method, i.e., demonstration. It could also be argued to be eternal, if one
takes the subject matter to be the universal human being, i.e., the intelligible, as such, not
any individual human. Thus, the Imām has adequate knowledge to ground his justified
beneficent political deception.

4. Images in Flux
One final note should be mentioned before advancing to the conclusion of this
project. While al-Fārābī provides the mechanisms by which the Imām can have certain
knowledge, the images of religion are never themselves certain. In universal terms, one
can justify political deception as necessary using al-Fārābī’s model, and even suggest that
it is built upon universal knowledge, but there are no mechanisms which justify any
particular beneficent deception. The expression of philosophy “through those symbols
which are best known” to the people of any given city is not measurable or assessible in
any meaningful way.45 While the religious law can be judged according to its effect (i.e.,
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whether it is functioning as a successful poetic syllogism), there is no knowable
justification for why any particular image is used, because knowledge does not extend to
particularity. No argument can determine the exact nearness of an image to the truth.
Images qua particulars are untruths. They are never near the truth, except insofar as they
lead to virtuous action and belief which accords with the truth.
Al-Fārābī seems to recognize this problem when he builds a corrective into his
system. In the Perfect State, one of the qualities of the second ruler is his ability “to meet
new situations for which the first sovereigns could not have laid down any law”.46 In the
Political Regime, al-Fārābī even discussed reform:
Just as it is permissible for one of them to change a Law he legislated at one
moment if he is of the opinion that it is more fitting to change it at another
moment, so may the one now present who succeeds the one who has passed
away change what the one who has passed away has already legislated. For
the one who has passed away would change [it] himself, were he to observe
the [new] condition. When there does not happen to be a human being of this
condition, the Laws that the former [kings] prescribed or ordained are to be
adopted, then written down and preserved...47
Given the particularity of religious images, their efficacy is constrained by context.
Eventually, their pedagogical and social value will diminish, requiring new images to
take their place. Beneficent political deception might be justifiable on a universal level,
but the truth will out.
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VII. CONCLUSION
1. The Necessary and Known Next Best Thing
In Chapter 1, I argued that to advance the conversation surrounding the tension
between the realpolitik need for political deception and the prima facie prohibition
against political deception, one required a philosophical exploration of the topic which
recognized the horns of the dilemma, yet tried to navigate it anyway. Finding a robust
and meaningful justification for political deception, which neither dismissed the tension
between truth and expediency out of hand nor denied the pull of the truth itself, could
spark a deeper understanding of the shape of political deception and what a justified
version might look like.
In al-Fārābī, one finds a successful justification for beneficent political deception,
as long as one grants him his metaphysical premises. The construction of religious
imagery in his model is not born out of frivolity; it is necessitated. His beneficent
political deception is not untethered from reality; it educates. In a meaningful sense,
within his metaphysics, beneficent deception is not only ‘the next best’ thing, it is better
than the simple truth, insofar as unmediated truth leads those unequipped for knowledge
into confusion and error. Beneficent deception serves as a surrogate of the truth for those
who cannot encounter the truth directly. Most importantly, al-Fārābī’s Construction of
Social Knowledge is grounded in knowledge: knowledge of its own necessity, knowledge
of the truths it emulates, and knowledge of its own knowledge. Al-Fārābī’s beneficent
political deception is fully justified as necessary, known, and ‘the next best’ thing to
problematic simple truth, when one grants him the truth of his metaphysics.
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But rather than strengthening the case for the usefulness of political deception as
such, al-Fārābī’s successful model reveals how feeble a tool political deception is when
limiting its usage to justifiable conditions. (Of course, the realpolitik efficacy of political
lies without moral scruples is not in dispute.) Beneficent political deception, that species
of political deception purported to be found in Plato and successfully expounded in alFārābī, is self-limiting. Beneficence, unsurprisingly, constrains the potency of deception.
Ethical considerations constrict the usage of deception to an exceedingly narrow set of
conditions, even when adopting Fārābīan metaphysics, e.g., the establishment of images
and laws which orient the citizens of a city toward the good life. No more should one
hear talk about the “noble lie” as an impetus to advance a specific war, a military action,
an economic or healthcare policy, or a particular policy position.1 Such lies cannot, in
principle, be noble. Even within Fārābīan metaphysics, noble lies or beneficent political
deceptions are only warranted concerning universal, not particular, truths, because
necessity only concerns the universal.2
It is important to highlight, at the risk of redundancy, that al-Fārābī’s entire
enterprise is founded upon a very particular conception of reality. Beneficent political
deception is only beneficent insofar as the world necessitates the impossibility of truth as

For example, the language of “noble lies” has been used inappropriately to describe: the impetus behind
the Second Gulf War (Mason 2004; Drury and Postel 2003; Leupp 2013); the portrayals of Columbus, the
bombing of Hiroshima, and the Second Gulf War in American Civic Education (Burch 2007); a variety of
popular medical simplifications and dogmas (Greenberg 2008); the notion of Irish Nationalism (Coakley
1983); the justification for certain treatments of epilepsy (Gallagher 2013); the appropriateness and
adequacy of reparations (Bass 2012); class difference in a contemporary context (Andrew 1989); and
rhetoric surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Welch 2014). I make no claims as to
the accuracy about the depiction of these topics as ‘lies’ or even falsehoods, nor am I suggesting that there
was ill-intent concerning any of these subjects. Rather, I am making the more pedantic point that policies
which do not reflect the universal end of human life cannot, in principle, be ‘noble’. Moreover, policies
which do not ground themselves in a metaphysics and epistemology which empower certain deceptions to
be ‘noble’ cannot be ‘noble’.
2
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a political tool, and this impossibility is knowable, demonstrable, and certain. Al-Fārābī’s
justification for beneficent political deception does not justify political deception in toto,
nor does it justify merely benevolent political deception.3 Deception, at least in reference
to the Fārābīan model, is only justified in light of its positive result, the reliance upon
deception to achieve this positive result, and knowledge about the necessity of reliance
upon deception to achieve this positive result by the author of said deceit.4 Al-Fārābī’s
example does not give carte blanche permission for lying in politics. Rather, his care and
rigor restrict the possible use of political deception to only those circumstances which can
emulate this care and rigor, a rigor expressed in his careful explication of the causes of
intelligibility and deficiency via a scrupulous charting of the cosmos. And even still, alFārābī’s justification hinges entirely upon the truth of this metaphysics.

2. Unwieldy Conditions
But no one should ever grant al-Fārābī the truth of his metaphysics (unless, of
course, one is writing a ~400 page thought experiment about him). There are significant
problems raised for his entire worldview by the heliocentric model of the solar system
and contemporary findings within biology, neuroscience, and the philosophy of mind.
Moreover, one should never grant an interlocutor, without some skepticism, a premise as
powerful as the Active Intellect, a near-literal deus ex machina. The Active Intellect
performs many of the most difficult to explain functions in al-Fārābī’s metaphysics, from
granting humans the power of intellection, providing divination and revelation, and
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to result in the best possible association.
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emanating (at times) the forms, to providing, wholesale, all of the most difficult truths of
human existence as first principles to the human mind. In short, concerning the perennial
problems which plague Neo-Aristotelian philosophy, the Active Intellect functions as a
metaphysical panacea. Even without the problems raised by more modern understandings
of the universe, human beings, and natural history, al-Fārābī’s metaphysics should be
viewed with more skepticism. In light of modern astronomy, physics, biology, and
psychology, al-Fārābī’s metaphysics is in even more dire straits. Put simply, al-Fārābī’s
metaphysics is false. I take this fact to be uncontroversial.
That said, al-Fārābī’s systematic and intricate care reveals something insightful
about political deception writ large. Justifying political deception takes an enormous
amount of work. Were one to try to recreate a model of justified political deception using
contemporary metaphysics, think of the onerous conditions one must meet in order to
simply mirror al-Fārābī’s own justification. One would need:

1) A particular conception of human beings in which some, but not all, human
beings are capable of knowledge
2) A means by which one could distinguish between the groups in (1) or a
mechanism through which the groups self-select
3) A particular conception of human beings in which truth is harmful to some,
but not all, human beings
4) A means by which one could distinguish between both the groups in (3) and
those to whom truth in neutral or a mechanism through which the groups selfselect
5) A particular psychology which allows for a functional replacement of the truth
6) A particular epistemology which allows for ‘near-truths’
7) A particular metaphysics which justifies (1), (3), (5), and (6)
8) An understanding of human happiness and how it is obtained
9) Epistemological certainty for (1-8)
10) A mechanism by which the functional replacement of the truth can serve as a
pedagogical tool for finding the truth
11) A commitment to only use political deception in service to others’ happiness
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Even in these general terms, meeting all of these conditions would be so unwieldy and
onerous that it renders political deception useless. If al-Fārābī presents his reader with a
successful, if restrained, model of justified political deception, outside of Fārābīan
metaphysics, the situation is even bleaker. Outside of Fārābīan metaphysics (or
something like it), political deception is seemingly unjustifiable. This is because, if
beneficent political deception is rendered beneficent only in reference to its own
necessity and the certainty of its necessity, what hope does any political deception have
of being justified outside of a metaphysics which grounds said necessity and certainty?
The principal problem for a model of beneficent political deception in a modern
democratic context is the reality of the lack of metaphysical certainty available to
contemporary discourse.5 First, even the idea of metaphysical certainty is no longer in
vogue.6 But even if one claims the metaphysical rectitude of one of the few particular
comprehensive metaphysical doctrines with contemporary parlance, e.g., the truth of
Kantianism, Thomism, or some particular sect of Judaism, Islam, or Christianity, this
would not alleviate the problem. Within a democratic context, the rectitude of these
comprehensive doctrines cannot be viewed as certain in the political sphere, as
democracy analytically assumes epistemological humility and empowers disagreement.7

5

Of course, one could readily point out that metaphysical certainty has never been truly available to any
discourse, in any epoch.
6
E.g., Kant famously viewed classical metaphysics as an intractable problem, a battlefield in which there
was no winner (Critique of Pure Reason B xv); Carnap viewed the value of any abstract ontological entities
as dependent upon language (Carnap 1950); Hume claimed that metaphysics was “sophistry and illusion”
(Hume 1748, 12.27, 12.34 ); and Strauss claims that “the right way of life cannot be established
metaphysically except by a completed metaphysics, and therefore the right way of life remains
questionable” (Strauss 1953, 122-123).
7
One might wonder why I have turned my focus to beneficent political deception within the context of
democracy, here. The reasons are twofold. First, I am committed to democracy (or at least something akin
to it, like democratic-republicanism), and thus beneficent political deception within a democratic context is
more pertinent to my thought. It is beyond the scope of this project to defend democracy wholesale as the
preeminent form of governance, but, suffice it to say, beneficent political deception is a fascinating concept
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This assumption is the foundation for the right to free speech and the freedom of religion.
In democracy, there is no publicly held certainty, only agreement. But a noble lie which
lacks certainty—certainty of the truth, certainty that a falsehood is required, and certainty
that said falsehood is maximally empowered to succeed at bettering the lives of the
deceived—is not noble. It is simply a brazen usurpation of power and autonomy from the
listener. Agreement built on a lie is no agreement at all. Put simply, even if one could
reconstruct al-Fārābī’s metaphysics as a justification for political deception, one cannot
use it as a justification for political deception within a democracy.8
Here lies the central paradox within the idea of a noble lie, i.e., the concept of
beneficent political deception. Lies can only occur between individuals, subjects, who
share the ability to ascertain truths about the world (even if one admits the possibility of a
discrepancy between the epistemological capabilities of various subjects). One cannot lie
to an object. Deception, as such, entails a shared subjectivity between the parties
involved. Lies are intersubjective acts. Yet lies, by their very nature, restrict access to the

precisely because it presents a paradox between an act of ‘beneficence’, a good, and an act of ‘deception’, a
harm, as done to someone who shares an equal claim to the truth. I take this, that all humans deserve equal
access to certain fundamental rights like the right to the truth, to be an inherently democratic intuition, as
discussed below. But second, relatedly, the problem of beneficent political deception seems to have a
unique relationship to democracy. I think it is no accident that the Athenian Plato has the Athenian
Socrates, both familiar with the democratic impulse, bashfully present the Phoenician Story as if Socrates is
“shrinking” from telling the story, not knowing where he could find the “audacity” (Republic 414c-d). Nor
do I think it is an accident that the justifications for both Plato’s and al-Fārābī’s beneficent political
deceptions fail at precisely the same joints as their justifications for autocracy. Once certainty is removed,
justifications for both autocracy and deception fail. Put most simply, the need for a justification on the part
of the government presumes a certain equality between ruler and ruled, as will be discussed below. The
recognition that others are owed the truth comes from the standpoint of rights, from the same standpoint as
the democratic impulse.
8
Whereas in a democratic state, the notion of justified beneficent political deception is self-defeating, in the
case of an undemocratic state, beneficent political deception remains logically possible in principle iff it is
metaphysically necessitated. However, whereas these deceptions would not be self-defeating, their
justification would depend entirely on the rectitude of the metaphysics upon which they are built (just like
the case of al-Fārābī’s model). So, while one can imagine a theocracy, for example, which claims the right
to control the access of information to its citizens, simple scrutiny concerning the certainty of the rulers of
said society would quickly reveal the fraudulent nature of their claim.
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truth. Lies are intersubjective acts which debilitate one of the subjects from knowing the
truth. Given the presumed right of a subject to know the truth, lies are inherently
injurious intersubjective acts. Rendering a lie noble, fashioning a deception into
something beneficent, requires a great deal of effort. One must defend (and even
recommend) the withholding and obscuring of truth between two human subjects. A
distinction between subjects must be made which renders the distinct treatment of the
subjects justifiable. (This distinction is not and cannot be made in a democratic context.)9
One obvious way to escape the paradox is to simply deny the legitimate respect
that is owed to the deceived subject. Such an approach is not unfamiliar; the
objectification of fellow human beings has been a useful excuse for denying other’s
rights throughout human history. Denying another’s right to the truth is no different. But
such an approach does not really confront the paradox. Infantilizing or objectifying others
might justify the expression of falsehoods, but it does not justify political deception,
insofar as deception requires that the other individual is capable of believing what is true.
If, in substance and according to nature, some subset of humans are merely lesser beings,
beings who are undeserving and incapable of truth, then they make no moral demands
upon us. There is no justification for political deception, because there is nothing to
justify. No harm was done. Political deception requires that both parties, deceiver and
deceived, each have some sort of claim to the truth. (Moreover, this approach is
antithetical to any democratic system, insofar as citizens in a democratic context are first
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While it is outside the scope of the argument of this project to make any affirmative metaphysical claims
about the rights and relations between human subjects, I would be remiss to leave my own position
ambiguous: no context, democratic or otherwise, allows any human subject to deny the rights and dignity
owed to another human subject.
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and foremost political agents, granted the rights afforded to a subject, regardless of an
individuals’ metaphysical commitments.)
Al-Fārābī’s own approach is not altogether dissimilar from this approach, except
that he allows for the shared humanity between all members of the city. Al-Fārābī,
following Aristotle, recognizes that all human beings, at a base level, desire to know the
truth.10 For al-Fārābī, it is true that some subset of citizens are incapable of fulsome
knowledge, but this is not a wholesale divorce from knowing, nor a result of their being
some distinct kind of being. Epistemologically limited human beings are still viewed as
part of the community; they are still rational subjects. They belong to the same species as
those empowered to know the truth. Still, the human species, necessarily, admits of
extremes in variability. There are different levels of intellectual attainment available to
different members of the species. But, in principle, all human beings are capable of
knowing; all are at least part of a single community which produces knowledge. Yet, alFārābī’s metaphysics explains, through the notion of deficiency, that there is an
insurmountable chasm between those capable of certain demonstrative arguments and
those capable only of images of the truth to which demonstration points.
This division between humans who are capable of knowing and humans incapable
of fulsome knowing is not a slapdash, haphazard elitism. Al-Fārābī is not merely dividing
society between the educated and the uneducated, the wise and the ignorant, or the
‘ulamā’ and the unwashed masses. Education admits of degrees. Wisdom admits of
degrees. Even the elite in society can be compared between the more learned and the less
learned. But certainty does not admit of degrees. It is either attained, or it is not. And, for
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those who have truly attained it, there is no disagreement between them (a point al-Fārābī
makes explicit).11 Certainty, at least in the Fārābīan sense, is not the accumulation of
right opinion, but a knowledge of reality which is guaranteed through a certain method. It
is not certain because of the depth of conviction; it is certain because of the infallibility of
its truth. For al-Fārābī, one cannot be ‘more certain’; certainty is achieved as the terminal
state of human intellection. It is the acquired intellect, that human state which is most
similar to the Active Intellect, itself. It is human perfection.
Here, al-Fārābī’s escape from the jaws of the paradox becomes clear. Humans are,
by nature, the same, even if they admit of degrees. Every human is a subject, a citizen,
someone who demands to know. But the manner in which humans engage with the truth
is radically distinct, because some, very few, humans know, while all others merely
opine. The difference between those who know and those who opine is not a matter of
degree, as if the Imām merely has the best opinions. Rather, the manner of difference is
as distinct as that between truth and falsehood. Certainty is the condition of the
geometrician who knows that the hypotenuse of a right triangle between sides of 3 and 4
cubits, respectively, ought to be measured at 5 cubits. Those who opine are like those
who, by estimate, guess its value to be 4 or 6 cubits. The latter is a kind of insight, if
imprecise, which corresponds in some way to the world. But only the former has any
claim to knowledge. The geometrician knows, knows the method by which they know,
and knows with certainty that any other value but 5 cubits is false, even if false values
can be said to be further or closer to the true value. But to say that 6 cubits is a better
estimate than 12 cubits is not to say that either should be placed in the same domain as 5
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cubits. That the hypotenuse is 5 cubits is not merely the best answer, it is the only true
answer. All other answers admit of falsehood to varying degrees.
Beneficent political deception, in the Fārābīan context, is not justified through the
superiority of some subset of human personages being superior to others. Rather, truth is
superior to falsehood; knowledge is superior to opinion. But the unfortunate reality, as a
result of deficiency, is that most humans are incapable of both knowing and
distinguishing between truth and knowledge. Within al-Fārābī’s model, an approximation
of the truth serves as a more readily accessible way to understand the world for those who
already view the world in a false way, not because they are somehow not counted as fullfledged rational subjects, but because the manner by which they ‘know’ the world is
objectively not knowledge. Those that construct beneficent political deceptions are
warranted to do so by virtue of their certainty about the nature of the world and their
certainty that some approximations are more favorable than the errors which would occur
in a vacuum. Al-Fārābī both recognizes the inferiority of lies to the truth while
necessitating political deception, even while avoiding objectifying or infantilizing the
deceived. All of this hinges on a very particular metaphysics, a particular conception of
human nature, and a particular view of epistemology. But al-Fārābī’s conception of
certainty also rejects the value of democracy (as does al-Fārābī, explicitly at times)
insofar as a universe which is intrinsically knowable with perfect correspondence does
not admit the need for political disagreement.12
Now, the possible positions concerning beneficent political deception are clear.
First, one can deny that there is such a thing as beneficent political deception and prohibit
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deception in the political sphere.13 Second, one can deny that there is such a thing as
beneficent political deception and dismiss the importance of beneficence in the political
sphere.14 Third, one can deny that there is such a thing as beneficent political deception,
but endorse a very similar activity, beneficent political falsehood, which is aimed at
intrinsically lesser members of society. Or fourth, one can take al-Fārābī’s approach and
affirm that there is beneficent political deception which is justified through the difference
in epistemic access that some people have to the truth. This final approach does not
require distinguishing between kinds of humans, nor does it divorce any member of
society from eventually knowing the truth. Instead, it justifies itself through a particular
conception of certainty and a particular picture of metaphysics. Any recreation of this
fourth approach would also have to endorse the notion of certainty. No individual who
lacks certain knowledge could appeal to this model as a justification for political lies.
Were one to recreate such a metaphysics and epistemology, then perhaps political
deception could be justified in a political context regarding certain topics, insofar as such
an approach recognizes the need for deception, the right to truth, and the restraints put
upon politicians who are required to deceive the populace. But even still, the context
required for this approach could not be democratic in nature, insofar as democracy
analytically presupposes the rights of an informed citizenry. (It is this intuition that drives
John Rawls’ famous Publicity Principle in a Theory of Justice).15 In short, even if it is
possible to recreate al-Fārābī’s justification for beneficent political deception, one could
never recreate al-Fārābī’s justification for beneficent political deception within a
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democratic context. Al-Fārābī and his inheritors should never be used as exemplars or
endorsers of paltry political lies nor any lie within the context of democracy.16

3. Politics, Pedagogy, and Untruth
Given the preceding discussion, it is clear that political deception, with or without
the caveat of being beneficent, is not justifiable without a metaphysics and an
epistemology which necessitate, respectively: (1) a clearly delineated inequality between
the rulers and the ruled, and (2) a way to know with epistemic certainty both how to
delineate between the two groups and how to delineate between truths that can be spoken
and truths that must be obscured. Political deception is only justified when it is needed,
minimally harmful, and sure. Without a model akin to al-Fārābī’s own model, it seems as
if any nuance regarding both the realpolitik need for and the prima facie prohibition
against political deception is lost. There seems to be no middle ground between the two
positions discussed in Chapter 1: either one must take a Truth Dominant view of
deception, in which political deception is never appropriate (despite its usefulness), or
one must take a Realpolitik Dominant view of deception, in which one is only concerned
with political power (despite truth’s preeminence).17 This whole project seems for
naught.
Yet the preceding examination of al-Fārābī’s model and the positions through
which he justifies beneficent political deception exposes more about the nature of

While slightly different from the Kantian point Rawls is making when he describes that publicity “arises
naturally from a contractarian standpoint”, the intuition is similar. If democracy is an accommodation for
disagreement between citizens, then deceit which constrains information by which one informs one’s
beliefs is counter to the intended principles of democracy itself. See Rawls 1971, § 23. For examples of
democratic ‘noble lies’, see also Footnote 1 of the present chapter.
17
See Chapter 1, 4.1 and 4.2.
16
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justified beneficent political deception than merely the conditions by which political
deception is justified. It brings to light the usefulness of a justified political deception. In
particular, beneficent political deception achieves three distinct (if still related) aims:
societal cohesion, the instructional value of the expression (quixotically) of minimally
harmful untruths to those uninterested or incapable of learning the truth directly, and the
instructional value of the expression of pedagogically useful untruths to those incapable
of learning the truth directly at this moment. Put simply, beneficent political deception
constructs a kind of shared societal knowledge, even if this shared knowledge contains
within it some untruth. Moreover, it seems that this must be the case for any justifiably
useful political deception, as, while there maybe be other uses for political deception, any
political deception which does not function as a Construction of Social Knowledge lacks
justifiability, given the terms agreed to above.18
Even without developing a comprehensive metaphysics of human beings and
how we relate to each other in society, I take the need for societal cohesion, untruth as
permanent truth-surrogate, and untruth as temporary pedagogical truth-surrogate to be
obvious and trivial. Even given the assumed equality of rational agents, an assumption
embedded into the structure of democracy, not all agents are equally adept at knowing the
truth in every domain. The economist, physicist, physician, and general need not know
equal amounts about domestic final supply, an azimuthal quantum number, the HPA axis,
or double envelopment. The functional value of al-Fārābī’s model (and Plato’s concept of
the Noble Lie, minus the problematic Phoenician Story) is as a shared vernacular that
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hegemony, but such deceptions, while useful, are also arbitrary, thus not minimally harmful, and thus not
justifiable.
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approximates the truth, even if it is built, strictly speaking, out of untruth. The images of
religion serve as a shared reference point across society, as a stand-in for truth, and as a
ladder to truth which serve society, regardless of capability. They provide something
simpler than the truth itself. But al-Fārābī’s Construction of Social Knowledge also
presents untruth as truth, a position which is unjustifiable in a modern democratic context
and outside his metaphysics.
However, one can conceive of a model which establishes a Construction of Social
Knowledge which rejects political deception (and the possibility of beneficent political
deception), yet it embraces the value of untruth in subservience to truth. Let us call this
Political Pedagogy. The central injustice of political deception is that it impedes access to
the truth; it is this injustice to which one must respond in order to justify deception. It is
not untruth itself which is offensive to justice; it is untruth under the guise of truth. From
this realization it is not hard to see an adjusted Fārābīan model which embraces, rather
than conceals, its untruth, yet holds to the same basic structure. Imagine, for example, an
image of the truth which prefaces itself with the caveat that ‘this is merely an image’.
Imagine a simplification which acknowledges its own untruth with the admission, ‘...but,
of course, it’s more complicated than this’. Or imagine a model which limits its own
terms with the admonition to ‘think of the issue like this, for the time being’. Political
Pedagogy provides many, if not all, of the benefits of beneficent political deception as a
Construction of Social Knowledge. (Its limitations will be addressed below).
Before turning to an example of Political Pedagogy, let us take a more banal
example of the use of untruth for the sake of pedagogy, outside the realm of politics, to
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illustrate the usefulness of Political Pedagogy. It is informative insofar as it clarifies the
model in an uncontroversial way.

3.1. Modeling the Atom
Using untruth for the sake of pedagogy should be uncontroversial. Within the
classroom, within the explicit context of learning, there is an assumption that examples,
approximations, provocations, and images will be used. No “Introduction to Physics”
student expects to learn the math behind the unpredictability of Lorenz systems or the
probabilistic nature of radioactive decay on their first day. Rather, there is an expectation
in learning engrained in us at a young age: first, one learns untruths, simplifications, and
near-truths. Only later, are these untruths complicated, problematized, and reoriented
toward the truth. At first, the Kindergartener learns that the letter ‘g’ says ‘guh’. It is a
hard and fast rule; more nuance would cause confusion. Only later does the teacher begin
to introduce words like ‘huge’, ‘tough’, and ‘though’ which complicate the simplification
of the general rule.
One stark example of this is the modeling of the atom. Despite significant
advances in our understanding of the atomic and subatomic world over the last century,
the Bohr model of the atom reigns supreme in middle school classrooms and in children’s
STEM books.19 While strictly speaking false, having been superseded by models which
depict the probabilistic nature of valence shells, like Schrödinger’s Quantum Mechanical
Model (which are themselves merely images of mathematical functions), the Bohr model
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has some advantages over more nuanced models: it is simple and commonly
recognized.20 It easily depicts ionic and covalent bonds, looks readily familiar given its
similarity to the planetary model, and, for the advancing student, opens up pedagogical
avenues for “scientific reasoning skills such as model building and making inferences
from observations”.21 Some view it as an essential step in a progression of learning.22
Even while others, due to its imprecision, seek to remove it from the cultural lexicon.23
(Studies of similar propaedeutic models suggest that lacking a simplified image for those
unready or unable to comprehend more accurate depictions of the world leads to either
further confused or entirely imagined explanatory depictions.)24 In short, while the Bohr
model is problematic and must eventually be excised from the thought of the burgeoning
scientist, it is also helpful both in teaching fundamental principles and fending off even
less accurate models.
Put simply, it is a falsehood, but a useful falsehood. For the toddler learning
quantum physics, it suffices.25 For the service industry worker trying to remember the
shape of H2O, it suffices. It is sufficient in part due to its similarity to the truth (e.g., it is
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not wholesale false, like the plum-pudding model) and in part due to its ubiquity.26 For
most non-specialists, it is the formative image of an atom. For the learning student, it is
an introduction to the notion of scientific modeling as such. But even in its untruth it
serves as an invitation. No one pretends it is the most accurate or up to date model. A
quick search on the internet renders it obsolete. But the image, readily available, at the
fore of our cultural folklore makes atoms, and science, less obscure to the hoi polloi.
Despite being publicly false, it still serves as a Construction of Social Knowledge. Now,
let us turn to the more difficult case of pedagogy in the political sphere.

3.2. Modeling an Ethos
At the heart of American democracy lies an image of the human person endowed
by the Creator with unalienable rights. As an image, it is striking, poignant, and
evocative. As a ‘truth’ it is so foundational, such a deeply embedded self-certifying myth,
to use the term coined by Max Black, that the obviousness of the second sentence of the
Declaration of Independence is sacrosanct in American political discourse.27 Yet even a
cursory examination of the history surrounding the Declaration reveals a less stable
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ontology for the truth of Jefferson’s words, both in their origination and in their
interpretation. While perhaps it would be inappropriate to describe Jefferson’s
aspirational words, following Plato, as ‘false, on the whole, while having some truth in
them’, it is certainly the case that if they are true, they have some falsity in them, as will
be discussed below.28 The words, the foundational idea grounding the American ethos,
are located in a liminal space between truth and falsity. Because at the time of their
adoption even the endorsers of these words, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness…”, rejected them
in practice, if not also in theory. The paradox is obvious in the stroke of their author’s
pen, himself a slaveholder who would later pen a defense of the inferiority of an entire
race as established by the selfsame “Nature’s God” who endows humans with rights.29
The paradox is obvious in the erasure of what John Adams described as Jefferson’s
“vehement philippic against Negro slavery” by Southern signatories.30 It was obvious to
Frederick Douglas, who, reflecting on Jefferson’s words wrote:
What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer: a day that reveals to
him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which
he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty,
an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of
rejoicing are empty and heartless; your denunciations of tyrants, brass fronted
impudence; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery…31
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The paradox was obvious to Abraham Lincoln who framed the Civil War and its
underlying causes as a test to a nation “dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal”.32 It was obvious to Martin Luther King, Jr. who viewed the founders as
“signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a
promise that all men—yes, black men as well as white men—would be guaranteed the
unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” despite the apparent
historical evidence to the contrary.33 And the paradox was obvious to Lin Manuel
Miranda who puts Jefferson’s Preamble into the mouth of the Schuyler sisters in
Hamilton, all actresses of color in the original cast, with Angelica subsequently saying,
“when I meet Thomas Jefferson… I’m ‘a compel him to include women in the sequel!”34
The tension between the promise of the Preamble of the Declaration of
Independence and the reality of American governance and culture at its founding is
palpable enough to have spawned an entire genre of literature devoted to untangling the
web of contradictions between the founders’ and framers’ theory and practice as it relates
to race.35 Further examination, while worthwhile, is not appropriate for the purposes here,
except to say that the presence of some degree of falsehood within the literal text of the
document is apparent. Where said falsehood lies is more difficult to parse and the key to
the brilliance of the Preamble as Political Pedagogy.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the natural rights claims in the
Declaration of Independence is their ability to grow in the telling. Beyond the intention
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of their author, even though the founders certainly recognized the irony of their assertions
about equality and liberty, given the institution of slavery, each subsequent generation
was able to find new and au courant meanings in Jefferson’s words.36 And while this
historical phenomenon of an ever pertinent, ever prescient text is fascinating, the
philosophical value of a text which deconstructs itself is more relevant to the current
discussion. Here, the concern is not that the text remained germane for future generation
through an ever-occurring transformative sense of its own meaning, but what about the
Preamble allowed it to have such a chimerical character, even while maintaining an
intelligible core. (After all, one could imagine an aphorism with similar staying power by
virtue of its lack of any meaning or its trite meaning.) What about the Preamble could
inspire a country which accommodated slavery, fought a war to abolish slavery, and
established and formalized civil rights from the same 35 words? What about the
Preamble allows it to serve as a Wittgensteinian ladder, a Fārābīan ladder, which allows a
nation to replace the previous image of equality with a new image of equality which
serves as a more inclusive and a more sophisticated understanding of the ethos of the
American project?
By my reading, outside of history (though certainly not in ignorance of history),
the text demands at least five distinct interpretations at the outset, each interpretation
insisting that the reader progress with thoughtfulness to a more sophisticated reading.
1) The Naïve Reading: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness...
For example, see the discussions in Ellis 356; O’Brien 1996, 320; Finkelman 2001, 139f. David
Armitage (2007) devotes an entire book to the subject of Jefferson’s profound influence in numerous
seemingly disparate contexts. For the founders’ recognition of the obvious tension between the
commitment to equality and the politics of slavery, see West 1997, 1f.; Kendi 2016, 107f.; Guyatt 2016,
21f.; Miller 1977, 12f.; Ceaser 2000, 177f.; Ellis 1998, 66, 105-106, 174.
36
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This reading is the most literal, even though it contains within it the most
contradiction. Here, Jefferson and the signatories of the Declaration, many of
them slaveholders and even theoretical defenders of the institution of slavery,
held that it is a self-evident proposition that all men are created equal. (It
should be noted that in an earlier draft of the Declaration, Jefferson is explicit
that slaves are themselves men, and that King George has done them
egregious harm by enslaving them.)37
2) The Epistemological Reading: We hold these truths to be [are] self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness...
Anyone remotely familiar with the signatories of the Declaration knows that
they did not all hold that all men are created equal. Jefferson admits as much
in an (in)famous passage in his Notes on Virginia, and many of the southern
slave-holding delegates were concerned with the implications of Jefferson’s
language about equality (and that his Preamble did not include the sovereignty
of property rights as one of the enumerated rights, which would have
protected the institution of slavery).38 In all likelihood, the Preamble was
accepted, not because of universal agreement, but because the Preamble to the
Declaration of Independence was viewed as being of little import, with the
enumerated grievances against King George being viewed as the main
objective of the document. Thus, knowing this contradiction, the “We hold”
aspect of the Preamble is viewed as just a formality. Instead, this reading
understands the Preamble as asserting the self-evidence of equality and rights.
One need not over-worry about the failings and foibles of the founders.
3) The Metaphysical Reading: We hold these truths to be [are] self-evident
[true], that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness...
Once one reflects even briefly on the paradox within the Epistemological
Reading, then one is forced to admit that these truths are not self-evident. If
the author and the signatories of the document were not themselves compelled
to admit the fullness of the meaning of the truths they espoused, in what sense
can they meaningfully be described as self-evident? A great deal of literature
has been produced about the meaning of “self-evidence” in the Declaration of
37
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Independence, ranging from definitions of self-evidence as common sense and
common parlance to idiosyncratic notions of self-evidences grounded upon
very particular principles of modern philosophy.39 But, regardless of the
specific usage of the term here, it seems disingenuous to describe these truths
as being genuinely self-evident given that they seem to have been unclear to
Jefferson himself, as a slaveholder. (Jefferson’s original draft, which describes
these truths as “sacred & undeniable”, seems unable to alleviate the apparent
tension.)40 As a result of the ambiguous epistemic certainty of the claims in
the Preamble, as evidenced by the doubt and disagreement of the signatories
themselves (and a cursory view of human history), one can imagine a new
reading of the Preamble which puts the onus on either a theological or a
natural principle. Rights are endowed by the Creator or Nature’s God. Even if
these rights are not self-evident, they are natural and grounded in reality.
4) The Ethical Reading: We hold these truths to be [are] self-evident [true], that
all men are [ought to be viewed as having been] created equal, that they are
[ought to be viewed as having been] endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness...
Of course, without the epistemological claim to self-evidence, the truths of the
Metaphysical Reading are in doubt. In the Metaphysical Reading, the laws of
nature are being conflated with the nomoi of the city. The Metaphysical
Reading might be true, but there is no force to the claim. Rather a political
entity is merely claiming to be in agreement with the laws of nature, but this
need not be assumed. The Metaphysical Reading does not hold a paradox
within itself, but neither does it compel its reader toward agreement. As a
result, it devolves into an axiological claim: one ought to view rights as if
endowed by nature.
5) The Social Contract Reading: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness...
The Ethical Reading suffers from the same problems as the metaphysical
reading, leading to the Social Contract Reading. Why ought one hold these
truths as true? Why ought one value equality and rights? Is it not only
convention? The uncomfortable but illuminating answer is yes.
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Here, the brilliance of Jefferson’s writing shines through. “We hold” could have easily
been avoided. The onus of the claims in the Declaration of Independence easily could
have been placed on the self-evidence of its truths or the inalienable rights endowed upon
humankind by our Creator, but the onus is placed on us. It is placed on the consent of the
governed. It is placed on ‘we, the undersigned’. It is placed on ‘we, the people’. ‘We hold
these truths’, whatever Jefferson’s original intentions, is not merely a (dubious)
descriptive account of the founders’ beliefs; it is a prescriptive intent. ‘We’ are those who
agree to the principles which follow. ‘We’ are those who aim, even if fallibly and
failingly, to view these truths as if self-evident. ‘We’ are those who agree to a social
contract concerning that which follows.
Whether Jefferson had this intent or not matters little, the effect is clear.
Jefferson’s life concerning the issue of slavery reveals his discomfort with his inability to
live up to his own commitment to equality.41 Many of the founders shared his anxiety.42
The Civil War, Civil Rights, and countless other advances in equality great and small
have been fought on precisely this ground: America holds these truths to be self-evident.

See Ceaser 2000, 177; Ellis 1998, 66, 105-106, 174; Allen 2014, 154f.; Armitage 2007, 57f.; O’Brien
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These truths do not rest on citizens’ belief in Lockean political philosophy, in a literal
theistic or deistic God who endows us with human rights, or the self-evidence of the
founders’ claims. These truths rest on agreement. The Declaration of Independence is
America’s founding myth. But rather than sowing class division like Plato’s Phoenician
Story, it establishes equality. And rather than being built on a lie, its humility lies at the
fore. We the undersigned hold... We invite you to hold this, too.
It is obviously the case that the Social Contract Reading is truer than the readings
which precede it. Even if rights are metaphysically endowed by a Creator, this is not the
reason that the United States, as a democracy, embraces the value of rights. In a
democratic context, the power of agreement is the ultimate authority. And yet, one
wonders: if Jefferson would have written the mere image of agreement into the
Declaration of Independence, would the force of the document have been forgotten in the
annals of history? If rights were described as mere convention, would they add any
particular value to the social order? The image of God imbuing each individual with
rights, even if it is image build upon the foundation of agreement, seems to carry more
weight. It adds a certain heft to the contract.
Jefferson’s image, myriad in its interpretation, is singular in its instantiation. Each
of the aforementioned readings of the Preamble are prevalent in American culture, and
yet they render little disagreement. These approaches —“The founders held that equality
is self-evident.”; “Well, the founders were themselves of two-minds about it, but equality
is self-evident.”; “Well, equality isn’t self-evident, but it is grounded in creation.”; “Well,
equality isn’t grounded in creation, but equality ought to be valued.”; “We only value
equality as if it were self-evident.”— all uphold the same societal order. They all
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contribute to the same ethos surrounding rights. Yet they are not equally accessible.
Social Contract Theory seems to lack the emotional resonance which is present in
Jefferson’s deistic appeal; societal cohesion seems to lack the narrative force which an
appeal to self-evidence does. Jefferson’s image gives societal cohesion, even while
giving a surrogate image for the truth of the social contract. Moreover, it does this
without lying (even if it does introduce some falsity).
Most importantly, the image the Preamble invites the audience into a deeper
understanding of its principles. Rather than serving as an obstacle to understanding the
social contract which lies at the heart of the Declaration’s democratic principles, it
introduces them (even while obscuring them with appeals to epistemological,
metaphysical, and theological principles). For the thoughtful citizen, a clearer
understanding of the political reality of democracy is elucidated. It is Political Pedagogy
which teaches its reader through the image it establishes.

3.3. Political Pedagogy
Societies are not built on principles alone. Human beings are complex creatures
with various modes of knowing, valuing, acting, and speaking. Even a society built on
principles needs images, emotional appeals, culture, arts, and myths. Many of these
modes of expression are more primordial to the inception of a member of society into the
social contract than pure contractual propositions. They contribute to the feeling of
belonging, the shared stories, and the shared values which lie at the heart of societal
cohesion. When a society is healthy, these myths, images, and emotional appeals do not
strain the social contract, they reinforce it.
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Ideally, they teach citizens the values of said society, while they introduce the
curious into the higher mysteries of civic engagement. And, in a perfect world, they help
both society and the individual flourish. But these images and myths need not
masquerade as truth to be effective. Visual art, music, and fiction have the power to move
people without an appeal to facticity. Histories which emphasize fellow citizens worthy
of emulation, journalism which highlights the best of society, and philosophy which
highlights virtue can reinforce the ethos of a culture, even while admitting caveats,
exceptions, difficulties, and doubts. Put simply, untruths, anecdotes, half-truths,
simplifications, and fictions can add to the richness of a society while educating the
populace, if carefully oriented toward the aim of the society as a whole, and they need not
pretend to be anything other than untruths, anecdotes, half-truths, simplifications, and
fictions.

4. Political Pedagogy in a Time of Uncertainty
The astute reader might object here: “What is this discussion of truth and falsity in
a democratic context? If democracy admits of nothing but mere agreement, a bare social
contract, then by what measure can anything be called a truth, a lie, or anything inbetween? Never mind the further confusions about any standard being applied to these
things to determine if they are properly qualified as noble or ignoble!” And it is certainly
the case that democracy is divorced to some degree from, to use a Rawlsian phrase,
comprehensive doctrines.43 Democracy does not endorse a standard metaphysics, insofar
as disagreement is protected in a democratic context. But jettisoning metaphysical truth,
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at least from the standpoint of the state, is not the same as jettisoning truth, as such. Here
at the close, some avenues for future study and thought can be raised in light of some
lessons al-Fārābī teaches.44
First, while societies are built for the sake of cooperation, cooperation is only
achieved through a shared set of customs, images, myths, beliefs, and culture. Outside of
democracy, this shared culture is itself founded, at least in a society with a true religion
(milla ṣaḥīḥa), i.e., a religion or culture with properly oriented images and customs, upon
the truth of philosophy and knowledge of the nature of the human person, the world, and
the cosmos. Put simply, in undemocratic contexts cooperation ought to be achieved by
adherence (whether through the medium of images or otherwise) to the truth.45 But
democracies do not admit the unity of belief, nor the unity of truth, something al-Fārābī
recognizes in his own discussion of democracy.46 So, in what meaningful sense can
cooperation be possible in a democratic context?
Several notable solutions to this problem come to mind. John Rawls famously
proposes a democracy built upon reverence for the social contract itself, with each citizen
valuing an imagined ‘original position’ in which each member of society is devoid of
identity and commitments to individual comprehensive doctrines, thereby viewing
societal issues through a ‘veil of ignorance’, namely ignorance of their own self-interest,
allowing the emergence of an overlapping consensus which empowers societal
cooperation.47 While elegant, this solution requires each member of society to divorce
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themselves from their own appetites, values, and habits, resulting in a solution with
dubious prospects of success, given the second lesson al-Fārābī teaches us (specifically,
that the instruments which engender societal cohesion must be universally accessible and
digestible for all members of society), as will be discussed shortly. Put simply, when
trying to compel cooperation, the ability of the concept of agreement itself to oblige
agreement seems suspect. (This is borne out in the example of the Preamble, in which the
Social Contract Reading must be embedded within the more normatively powerful and
enticing readings which appeal to metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.) Rawls
provides too rarified a solution for the common human experience. People are often
unable or unwilling to divorce themselves from sectarian and private commitments and
pursuits.
Richard Rorty’s likewise well-known solution suffers from a similar problem.
Whereas Rawls asks citizens to jettison their comprehensive doctrine in the public
sphere, Rorty recognizes their presence, as a certain lexicon of vocabulary and belief, in a
pluralistic public sphere, as a “perfected society would not only eliminate traditional
inequalities but would leave plenty of room for its members to pursue their individual
visions of human perfection”.48 (He does caution against some commitments, particularly
philosophical theory, playing a role in the public sphere, but not for any dramatic or
normative reason. They are simply politically ineffective, in his view.)49 His solution runs

Rorty 1999, 270-271. He discusses the importance of the “literalization of selected metaphors” in the
formation of community in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, admitting that his approach is a
“description” of liberalism, rather than a “search for foundations”, which stems, of course, from his
approach which claims that there are no foundations, given that “truth is not ‘out there’”. Rorty 1989, 44.
That said, he does endorse an ideal form of the culture of liberalism which would excise the vocabulary of
the divinized world, i.e., claims about natural, metaphysical, or supernatural forces, replacing it with a
focus on human beings. Rorty 1989, 45. His recommendations, of course, lack argumentative or normative
force, which he readily admits, being itself a description of the metaphors which undergird liberalism.
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afoul of al-Fārābī’s lessons in two main ways. The first being that, unlike the pluralism of
Rawls which is founded upon a conception of justice, Rorty’s pluralism is unfounded
entirely, its cooperation unmoored from a telos. Rorty thinks that cooperation is still
possible without a telos in a pluralistic context through language and reform, but I leave it
to the reader to ascertain whether such a project could succeed.50 It is clearly the case that
he lacks any metaphysical equipment to ground his “ideal liberal society” as “one which
has no purpose except freedom, no goal except a willingness to see how such encounters
go and to abide by the outcome” and “no purpose except to make life easier for poets and
revolutionaries while seeing to it that they make life harder for others only by words, and
not deeds”, but this is something he would readily admit.51 Instead of an appeal to a telos
or metaphysics, Rorty suggests that the unity of a society comes about through the
evocativeness of its language, not argument or truth, even though every culture is just
“one more vocabulary, one more way of describing things”.52
The more pertinent inadequacy with Rorty’s position as a response to al-Fārābī’s
lessons is shared by Rawls: he expects too much from the average citizen. As he explains:
...the ideal citizen of such an ideal state would be someone who thinks of the
founders and the preservers of her society as such poets, rather than as people
who had discovered or who clearly envisioned the truth about the world or about
humanity... To sum up, the citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had
a sense of the contingency of their language of moral deliberation, and thus of
their consciences, and thus of their community.53
But even if Rorty is right—there is no final truth; political actors are merely poets,
expressing a picture of the world; each culture’s values are just one vocabulary among
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many—the average citizen neither wants nor is equipped to live with this kind of double
vision. Living in a state of perpetual contingency concerning one’s most dearly held
values requires constant reflection, insight, and tenacity which is lacking in most people.
It also sounds exhausting.
A more rich avenue for study comes from analogues with the social
epistemologists in the scientific community dealing with a newfound recognition that the
explanatory power which is derived from empirical findings rests upon the paradigms,
models, and metaphors in which the empirical findings and their explanations arise,
rather than upon direct correspondence to the explanatory or intelligible structure of
reality.54 Obviously, these philosophers of science, Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi,
Stephen Pepper, being among the earliest and the most renowned, are dealing in a
different domain, i.e., the domain of scientific knowledge, than Political Pedagogy.55 But
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problems. Kuhn 1962, 10. Importantly, the paradigm acts as a mediator between the scientist and
knowledge of the world, insofar as the world is known only through paradigms, and paradigms change.
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393
their models for scientific cohesion, even in their distinctions, offer a more fruitful
approach than either Rawls or Rorty. To be part of scientific advancement is, in part, to
buy into certain assumptions: metaphors, models, rules, and explanations. In short, to use
Kuhn’s terminology, science is advanced only from within a paradigm. And within said
paradigm, there is truth, falsifiability, and structure which allows for cooperation.56 That
said, the paradigm is recognized as artificial and constructed. Becoming part of the
community takes buying into certain premises. (And the lived reality of most scientists
does not perpetually reflect on the artificiality of the aforementioned paradigm.)57
Paradigms can be altered, expanded, and rejected; there is no coercion. However, they

‘personal knowledge’.” Polanyi 1958, 18. Ultimately, because “personal judgement” is “involved in
applying the formulae of mechanics to the facts of experience”, scientific knowledge is entangled with
personal judgment. Polanyi 1958, 18. Stephen Pepper, discussing a broader epistemological phenomenon in
World Hypotheses, discusses how all knowledge begins with uncertain commitments at the outset. As he
explains: “A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches
upon some area of commonsense fact and tries to understand other areas in terms of this one. This original
area becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor. He describes as best he can the characteristics of this
area, or, if you will, discriminates its structure. A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic
concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories. In term s of these categories he
proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to
interpret all facts in terms of these categories. As a result of the impact of these other facts upon his
categories, he may qualify or readjust the categories, so that a set of categories commonly changes and
develops. Since the basic analogy or root metaphor normally (and probably at least in part necessarily)
arises out of common sense, a great deal of development and refinement of a set of categories is required if
they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of unlimited scope. Some root metaphors prove more fertile
than others, have greater powers of expansion and of adjustment. These survive in comparison with the
others and generate the relatively adequate world theories.” Pepper 1942, 91-92. See also Berry 1984. Put
simply, all knowledge is obtained through a relation to a certain root metaphor. These metaphors can be
adjusted and altered over time and can be more or less successful to describe phenomena in the world. But
human experience of the world begins by adopting a world theory.
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provide a framework for cooperation which allows for certain truths to be held firmly and
universally, and subsequently they allow for explanatory untruths, i.e., scientific models.
In the public, rather than the scientific, sphere, the analogue to this position would
depend on a kind of paradigm which arouses a shared sense of community and purpose,
not to examine the nature of the world, but to empower citizens to flourish, both
individually and cooperatively. The success of a political paradigm would be similarly
pragmatic to the scientific model, insofar as the paradigm can be altered, adjusted, or
overthrown in revolution, depending on the effectiveness of the paradigm in fulfilling its
purpose of societal cohesion and the happiness of citizens within the given paradigm. In
what sense the success of a political paradigm can be judged without some broader
metaphysical conception of the purpose of the human person and society is a difficult and
troublesome problem, which it is not appropriate to address here. One possible solution,
though, remains analogous to scientific views of paradigms: when the upholders of a
paradigm, whether scientists or citizens, no longer find it explanatorily powerful or
functional, it has failed.
The advantage of such an approach is found in where the onus of the normative
force of the social contract rests. Whereas Rawls’ approach requires citizens to value the
social contract over and beyond their own interests and Rorty requires citizens to view
the social contract (and their own values) as inherently mutable and impermanent, this
approach ignores the social contract altogether in day to day life. The geneticist working
in the lab is working under a particular post-Darwinian paradigm, but they need not
overburden themselves with reflecting on this fact while working on Fragile X Syndrome
in Drosophila. Nor does the citizen of a particular nation deciding who to vote for need to
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agonize over the contingency of their paradigm while voting. ‘As Americans we
believe...’ has a certain normative force within the American paradigm, even if the
democratic structure of the United States admits that it has no normative force, as such,
insofar as democracy admits of pluralism.58 A teleology can be in-built to the paradigm
of the social contract itself, even if the social contract is not dependent upon any external
teleology or metaphysics in order to be effective. Likewise, a citizen can relate to the
teleology of the paradigm, even while rejecting that there exists such a teleology external
to the paradigm. A British atheist need not believe in God or even the permissibility of
monarchy to be moved by the swell and lyrics of God Save the Queen. An Israeli citizen
need not be a Zionist, a triumphalist, or even a practicing Jew to be spurred toward civic
action when reflecting upon the imagery of the menorah from the Arch of Titus, which
refers to the promise of Isaiah 60:3 that “Nations will come to [Israel’s] light”. A welltraveled American need not believe in American exceptionalism or that the United States
is, in any unique sense, the land of the free to want to create a society which is
exceptional and uniquely free. A French philosopher need not actually believe that,
according to nature, human beings are free, equal, or part of a shared fraternal order to
live a life dedicated to liberté, égalité, fraternité. Nor does a black South African who
lived through apartheid have to believe that unity is possible in her lifetime to demand
that ǃke e꞉ ǀxarra ǁke (diverse people unite). The value of the belief rests upon the shared
nature of the contract and culture, a shared paradigm, not the external truth or possibility
of the claim. To be part of the contract is to partake in a shared paradigm and belief
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For example, one can disagree with the right to free speech in a democratic context, but to do so is to
challenge the social contract, the paradigm, itself. The normative force of an argument disputing free
speech must rest on some metaphysics or normative ethics outside the social contract. Whereas, for the
person upholding the paradigm, the argument is simpler: as Americans we believe in free speech as a right.
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structure, even if one knows that it is a constructed paradigm, even if one doubts that the
paradigm can account for all empirical phenomena.59
Here, a possible solution to the general problem of truth and teleology within a
democratic context is found in the very structure of a cooperative society. Whether
Rawls, Rorty, or an analogue to the social epistemology arising out of the scientific
community, cooperation must be built through the social contract itself. And likewise,
any ground for truth, the good, or the purpose of society must be built into the social
contract itself. Because, while metaphysical truth in a democratic context is not binding,
the truths of the contract which hold together society have normative force.
But the second lesson al-Fārābī teaches problematizes the first. Because while
cooperation is necessary, cooperation must be built through various modes of discourse
which serve various members of the community with various levels of cognitive ability
and interest in the grounds for cooperation. The cause of social unity must be universally
understood. It must be either simple or able to be expressed simply. But how can the fact
that truth is constructed, that societal cohesion is merely built upon a social contract, ever
be rendered simple? (This is the reason that both Rawls’ and Rorty’s approaches seem
utopian and romantic to me, respectively, in terms of actual political discourse.
Cooperation, which must appeal to our better angels, must be alluring to the well-read
political scholar and the provincially minded laity alike.) In this regard, the paradigm
model provides a more promising possible solution: values are accessible to all, even
59

Two examples come to mind here: 1) the physicist focusing on either general relativity or quantum
mechanics who knows that their paradigm is not explanatory for all phenomena, yet persists anyway (see
Footnote 56); and 2) a certain reading of Maimonides which suggests that, in like manner to what is
described above, Maimonides did not believe in the resurrection of the dead, even while he endorsed the
belief in the resurrection of the dead as one of the mandatory tenets of Judaism in the 13 Principles. As the
reading goes, while Maimonides did not believe in bodily resurrection, he did believe in the belief in bodily
resurrection. See Kirschner 1981.
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while the grounds for those values and the theory behind those values are appreciated by
only a few. One can work within a paradigm without ever reflecting upon the paradigm.
One can find truth in a social contract without ever even realizing that the truth hinges
upon the social contract. But it is unclear if this can be achieved without some level of
willful deception. In fact, it seems that, in practice, some deception must occur. And there
is still one more lesson al-Fārābī teaches.
The third and most difficult of al-Fārābī’s lessons is also the most important. Even
given the conditions described above, i.e., the need for cooperation and the need for
various levels of discourse, deception is not permissible. Without some knowledge which
is grounded in reality, there is no justification for political deception. Even if truth, within
a society, can be grounded upon the social contract itself, even if cooperation can be
established through this contract, and even if it is expressible through various modes of
discourse, there is still no recourse for truths derived from the social contract to be
presented, within a democracy, as anything but truths derived from the social contract. In
other words, constructed knowledge can never be justified as presenting itself as
unconstructed.60 There is no justification for an untruth expressing itself as true without
metaphysical necessity and certain knowledge. And there is no metaphysical necessity
and no certain knowledge within an artificial paradigm. In the simplest of terms, if a
society is a democracy, society must create social cohesion from a source other than
metaphysics, namely from a shared social contract. But when cooperation comes about
through the values embedded within the social contract, then these values are constructed.
Yet, if universal buy-in concerning the importance of these values is to be achieved

60

The caveat to this, as discussed through the present project, is if the constructed knowledge is minimally
harmful, necessary, and known to be necessary.
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across all coteries of society, the values need to be presented in such a way that they
appear to come from something more authoritative than mere agreement. But presenting
these values as if they arise from anything but the mere agreement codified in the social
contract is ethically impermissible.
Al-Fārābī’s lessons leave the reader with a web of contradictions, if that reader
lives in a democratic context.61 Cooperation is required for human flourishing. Fruitful
cooperation only occurs in a society which properly orients itself toward the truth. But
truth, as such, cannot be the ground for democracy; only agreement grounds democracy.
Agreement must be a substitute for truth (as the ground for societal truths). But
agreement can only occur between all members of society if many members of society do
not realize that the societal truths they hold dear are built upon agreement alone. Thus,
societal agreement, as an untruth, must present itself as the truth itself to achieve its aim
of cooperative flourishing. However, untruths which present themselves as truths cannot
be justified, unless they are grounded in necessity and knowledge. But in democracy,
only agreement is possible, not necessity or knowledge. Again, the reader is left in
conflict: political deception is necessary for the realpolitik of the society and the state,
while political deception remains unjustifiable.

5. Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I have attempted to open up new avenues for study,
even while closing any appeals to al-Fārābī as an advocate for justified political
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This, of course, is unsurprising given his own feelings toward democracy. It should also be noted that alFārābī raises the same problem for a reader in an undemocratic context, unless the undemocratic reader has
perfect certainty of metaphysical truth which create the conditions described in Section 2 of the present
chapter. I leave it to the reader to discern if that is at all likely.
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deception in a democratic context. Al-Fārābī raises a prolific number of entangled
philosophical issues concerning truth, deception, imagination, political cooperation,
pedagogy, and the metaphysical ground upon which they are all built. In al-Fārābī, one
finds one of the fiercest advocates in the history of philosophy for the need for a
pedagogical Construction of Social Knowledge, even to the point of justifying deception
for the aim of societal cohesion and edification. But paradoxically, one also finds a
thinker concerned about qualifying and restricting the use of untruth. Al-Fārābī is
meticulous in the conditions he sets up to justify his beneficent political deception as a
justified Construction of Social Knowledge. At once, he is an exemplar for modeling
political deception, even while he is a critic to those who would do so in our time.

400
SHORTHAND FOR PRIMARY TEXTS

Shorthand

Full Citation

Al-Fārābī
AAM:

English: The Aims of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. In Jon McGinnis & David C.
Reisman (Eds.). 2007. Classical Arabic
Philosophy: an Anthology of Sources.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. pp. 7881. (All references are to the Dieterici
edition, whose page numbers are noted in
the English translation.)
Arabic: The Aims of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. In Friedrich Dieterici
(Ed.). 1890. AlFārābī’s philosophische
Abhandlungen. Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 3438.

AH:

English: Attainment of Happiness. In
Muhsin Mahdi (Ed.). 1969. Alfarabi:
Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 2nd
edition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press. (All references are to the Hyderabad
edition of the Arabic whose page numbers
are noted in the English translation.)

AH (Ar.):

Arabic: Kitāb taḥṣīl as-saʻāda. 1981. Ja‘far
al-Yāsīn (Ed.). Beirut: Dār al-Andalus. (All
references are to the paragraph number.)

BL:

English: Book of Letters. In Muhammad Ali
Khalidi (Ed.). 2010. Medieval
Islamic: Philosophical Writings. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (All references
are to Mahdī’s edition, whose paragraph
numbers are followed in the English
translation.)
Arabic: Kitāb al-Ḥurūf. 1970. Muḥsin
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L’exalté. In Roshdi Rashed and Jean Jolivet
(Eds.). 1998. Oevres philosophiques et
scientifiques d’al-Kindī. Vol. 2. Leiden:
Brill. pp. 177-199.

On Sleep and Dreams:

English: On the Quiddity of Sleep
and Dreams. In Peter Adamson and Peter E.
Pormann (Eds.). 2012. The Philosophical
Works of Al-Kindī. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press. pp. 124-133. (All
references are to the ’Abū Rīda edition,
whose page numbers are noted in the
English translation.)
Arabic: On the Quiddity of Sleep and
Dreams. In Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Hādī ’Abū
Rīda (Ed.). 1950. Rasā‘il al-Kindī alfalsafiya. Vol. 1. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al‘Arabī. pp. 293-311.

Quantity of Aristotle’s Books:

English: On the Quantity of Aristotle’s
Books. In Peter Adamson and Peter E.
Pormann (Eds.). 2012. The Philosophical
Works of Al-Kindī. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press. pp. 279-296. (All
references are to the ’Abū Rīda edition,
whose page numbers are noted in the
English translation.)

407
Arabic: On the Quantity of Aristotle’s
Books. In Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Hādī ’Abū
Rīda (Ed.). 1950. Rasā‘il al-Kindī alfalsafiya. Vol. 1. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al‘Arabī. pp. 363-384.
Treatise on the Intellect:

Arabic/English: Treatise on the Intellect.
Richard J. McCarthy (Ed.). 1964. Islamic
Studies 3.2: 119-149.

Al-Rāzī
The Book of the Philosophical Life:

English: The Book of the Philosophic Life.
Charles E. Butterworth (Ed.). 1993.
Interpretation 20(3): 227-236. (All
references are to the Kraus edition, whose
page numbers are noted in the English
translation.)
Arabic: Kitāb al-Sīrah al-Falsafiyyah. In
Paul Kraus (Ed.). 1973 Reprint. Abū Bakr
Muḥammad Ibn Zakiriyyā al-Rāzī, Rasā’il
Falsafiyyah. Beirut: Dār alᾹfāq al-Jadīdah.
pp. 98-111.

Spiritual Physick:

English: Spiritual Physick. 1950. J.A.
Arberry (Ed.). London: Butler & Tanner
Ltd.

Spiritual Physick (Ar.):

Arabic: Al-Tibb al-Ruhani. In Paul Kraus
(Ed.). 1973 Reprint. Abū Bakr Muḥammad
Ibn Zakiriyyā al-Rāzī, Rasā’il
Falsafiyyah. Beirut: Dār alᾹfāq alJadīdah. pp. 17-97.

Aristotle
De Anima:

English: On the Soul. J.A.
Smith (Ed.). In Jonathon Barnes (Ed.)
1984. The complete works of
Aristotle: the revised Oxford
Translation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

408
De Interpretatione:

English: De Interpretatione. J.L.
Ackrill (Ed.). In Jonathon Barnes
(Ed.).1984. The complete works of
Aristotle: the revised Oxford
Translation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Metaphysics:

English: Metaphysics. W.D.
Ross (Ed.). In Jonathon Barnes (Ed.).
1984. The complete works of
Aristotle: the revised Oxford
Translation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

NE:

English: Nicomachean Ethics. W.D.
Ross and J.O. Urmson (Eds.). In
Jonathon Barnes (Ed.). 1984. The
complete works of Aristotle: the
revised Oxford Translation.
Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

On Divination in Sleep:

English: On Divination in Sleep. J.I. Beare
(Ed.). Ross and J.O. Urmson (Eds.). In
Jonathon Barnes (Ed.). 1984. The
complete works of Aristotle: the
revised Oxford Translation.
Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

Physics:

English: Physics. R.P. Hardie and
R.K. Gaye (Eds.). In Jonathon Barnes
(Ed.). 1984. The complete works of
Aristotle: the revised Oxford
Translation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Politics:

English: Politics. B. Jowett (Ed.). In
Jonathon Barnes (Ed.). 1984. The
Complete works of Aristotle: the
revised Oxford Translation.
Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

Posterior Analytics:

English: Posterior Analytics.
Jonathon Barnes (Ed.). In Jonathon

409
Barnes (Ed.). 1984. The complete
works of Aristotle: the revised
Oxford Translation. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Prior Analytics:

English: Prior Analytics. A.J.
Jenkinson (Ed.). In Jonathon
Barnes (Ed.). 1984. The complete
works of Aristotle: the revised
Oxford Translation. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.

Rhetoric:

English: Rhetoric. W. Rhys Roberts
(Ed.). In Jonathon Barnes (Ed.). 1984.
The Complete works of Aristotle: the
revised Oxford Translation.
Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

Topics:

English: Topics. W.A. PickardCambridge (Ed.). In Jonathon Barnes
(Ed.). 1984. The complete works of
Aristotle: the revised Oxford
Translation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Averroes
DT:

English/Arabic: Decisive Treatise. 2001.
Charles Butterworth (Ed.). Provo, Utah:
Brigham Young University Press.

CR:

English: Averroes on Plato’s Republic.
1974. Ralph Lerner (Ed.). Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.

EM:

English: Averroes on Aristotle’s
‘Metaphysics’: an Annotated Translation of
the So-Called ‘Epitome’. 2010. Rüdiger
Arnzen (Ed.). Berlin: de Gruyter.

EPC:

English: The Epistle on the Possibility of
Conjunction with the Active Intellect. 1982.
Kalman P. Bland (Ed.). New York: Jewish
Theological Seminary of America.

410

EPN:

English: Epitome of the Parva Naturalia.
1961. Harry Blumberg (Ed.). Cambridge,
MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America.

EPN (Ar.):

Arabic: Epitome of the Parva Naturalia.
1972. Harry Blumberg (Ed.). Cambridge,
MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America.

LCDA:

English: Long Commentary on the De
Anima of Aristotle. 2009. Richard C. Taylor
(Ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.

LCM:

Arabic: Tafsir Ma Ba‘d At-Tabi‘at. 1973.
Maurice Bouyges (Ed.) Vol. 1. Beirut: Dar
El-Machreq Sarl Éditeurs.

Avicenna
Compendium on the Soul:

English: Compendium on the Soul. In
Dimitri Gutas. 2014. Avicenna and the
Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to
Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works,
including an Inventory of Avicenna’s
Authentic Works. Boston, MA: Brill.

Compendium on the Soul (Ar.):

Arabic: Kitāb fī l-Nafs ‘alā sunnat aliḫtiṣār. In S. Landauer. 1875. “Die
Psychologie des Ibn Sīnā”. Zeitschrift der
Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
29: 335–418.

Najāt:

English: Avicenna’s Psychology. 1952. F.
Rahman (Ed.). London: Oxford University
Press.

Najāt (Ar.):

Arabic: Kitāb al-Najāt. 1985. M. Fakhry
(Ed.). Beirut: Manshūrāt Dār al-Ᾱfāq alJadīda.

On the Rational Soul:

English: On the Rational Soul. In
Dimitri Gutas. 2014.Avicenna and the
Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to
Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works,

411
including an Inventory of Avicenna’s
Authentic Works. Boston, MA: Brill.
Proof of Prophecies:

English: On the Proof of Prophecies and
the Interpretation of the Prophets’ Symbols
and Metaphors. 1963. Michael E. Marmura
(Ed.). In Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi
(Eds.). Medieval Political Philosophy: A
Sourcebook. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe/Collier–MacMillan Ltd. pp. 112121.

Proof of Prophecies (Ar.):

Arabic: Fi ithbāt al-nubuwwāt. 1991.
Michael E. Marmura (Ed.). Beirut: Dār alNahār. Reprint from 1968.

Remarks and Admonitions:

English: Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism, Remarks
and Admonitions: Part Four. 1996. S.C.
Inati (Ed.). New York: Kegan Paul
International. (References to Volume, Class,
and Section.)

Remarks and Admonitions (Ar.):

Arabic: Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt. 1994. S.
Dunya (Ed.). Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif bi Miṣr.

Shifā’ (Metaphysics):

English/Arabic: The Metaphysics of the
Healing. 2005. Michael E. Marmura (Ed.).
Provo, UT: Brigham Young University
Press.

Shifā’ (Soul):

Arabic: Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic
Text): Being the Psychological Part of Kitāb
al- Shifā’. 1959. F. Rahman (Ed.). London:
Oxford University Press.
Ibn Ṭufayl
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(Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

(All references are to the Gauthier Edition,
whose page numbers are noted in the
English Edition.)
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Arabic: Hayy Ben Yaqdhân. 1936. Léon
Gauthier (Ed.). Beirut: Imprimerie
Catholique.
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’
Epistle 22:
Epistle 22 (Ar.):

English: The Case of the Animals Versus
Man Before the King of the Jinn: An Arabic
Critical Edition and English Translation of
Epistle 22. 2009. Lenn E. Goodman and
Richard J. A. McGregor (Eds.). Oxford:
Oxford University Press in Association with
the Institute of Ismaili Studies. (Both
English and Arabic are found in Goodman
and McGregor, though the pagination
is distinct.)

Epistle 35:

English: Epistle 35. 2015. Paule E. Walker.
(Ed.). In Paul E. Walker, Ismail K.
Poonawala, David Simonowitz, and
Godefroid de Callataÿ (Eds.). Sciences of
the Soul and Intellect Part I. An Arabic
Critical Edition and English Translation of
Epistles 32–36. New York: Oxford
University Press in Association with the
Institute of Ismaili Studies.

Epistle 35 (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 35. In Mustafā Ghālib
(Ed.). 1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa
Khullān al-Wafâ’. Vol. 3. Beirut: Dār alSādir.

Epistle 39:

English: Epistle 39. 2017. Carmela Baffioni
(Ed.). In Carmela Baffioni and Ismail K.
Poonawala (Eds.). Sciences of the Soul and
Intellect: An Arabic Critical Edition and
English Translation of Epistles 39-41. New
York: Oxford University Press in
Association with the Institute of Ismaili
Studies.

Epistle 39 (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 39. In Mustafā Ghālib
(Ed.). 1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa
Khullān al-Wafâ’. Vol. 3. Beirut: Dār alSādir.
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Epistle 43:

English: Epistle 43. 2016. Toby Mayer
(Ed.). In Samer Traboulski, Toby Mayer,
and Ian Richard Netton (Eds.). On
Companionship and Belief: An Arabic
Critical Edition and English Translation of
Epistles 43-45. New York: Oxford
University Press in Association with the
Institute of Ismaili Studies.

Epistle 43 (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 43. In Mustafā Ghālib
(Ed.). 1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa
Khullān al-Wafâ’. Vol. 4. Beirut: Dār alSādir.

Epistle 44:

English: Epistle 44. 2016. Ian Richard
Netton (Ed.). In Samer Traboulski, Toby
Mayer, and Ian Richard Netton (Eds.).
On Companionship and Belief: An Arabic
Critical Edition and English Translation of
Epistles 43-45. New York: Oxford
University Press in Association with the
Institute of Ismaili Studies.

Epistle 44 (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 44. In Mustafā Ghālib (Ed.).
1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa Khullān
al-Wafâ’. Vol. 4. Beirut: Dār al-Sādir.

Epistle 45:

English: Epistle 45. 2016. Ian Richard
Netton (Ed.). In Samer Traboulski, Toby
Mayer, and Ian Richard Netton (Eds.).
On Companionship and Belief: An Arabic
Critical Edition and English Translation of
Epistles 43-45. New York: Oxford
University Press in Association with the
Institute of Ismaili Studies.

Epistle 45 (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 45. In Mustafā Ghālib (Ed.).
1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa Khullān
al-Wafâ’. Vol. 4. Beirut: Dār al-Sādir.

Epistle 47 (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 47. In Mustafā Ghālib (Ed.).
1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa Khullān
al-Wafâ’. 1957. Vol. 4. Beirut: Dār al-Sādir.

Epistle 52a:

English: Epistle 52a. 2011. Godefroid de
Callataÿ (Ed.). In Godefroid de Callataÿ and
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B. Halflants. Epistles of the Brethren
of Purity On Magic. An Arabic Critical
Edition and English Translation of Epistle
52a. New York: Oxford University Press in
Association with the Institute of Ismaili
Studies.
Epistle 52a (Ar.):

Arabic: Epistle 52a. In Mustafā Ghālib
(Ed.). 1957. Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā’ wa
Khullān al-Wafâ’. Vol. 4. Beirut: Dār alSādir.

Maimonides
Epistle to Yemen:

English: Epistle to Yemen. In Abraham
S. Halkin and David Hartman. 1985. Crisis and
Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides.
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of
America.

GP:

English: The Guide of the Perplexed. 1963.
Shlomo Pines (Ed.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. (All references are to the Part

and Section, present in both the English and
Arabic editions.)
Arabic: Dalāla al-ḥā’irīn. 1974. Huseyin
Atay (Ed.). Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Bes
Mevi.
Letter to Ibn Tibbon:

English: Letter to Ibn Tibbon. In H.
Adler (Ed.). 1872. Miscellany of Hebrew
Literature. London: N. Trübner and Co. pp. 219228.

Shemonah Perakim:

English: The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on
Ethics (Shemonah Perakim): a Psychological
and Ethical Treatise. 1966. Joseph I. Gorfinkle
(Ed.). New York: AMS Press. (The Hebrew of
the text, as well as Gorfinkle’s translation can be
found at Sefaria.org. URL=
<https://www.sefaria.org/Eight_Chapters%
2C_Introduction?ven=The_Eight_Chapters
_of_Maimonides_on_Ethics,_by_Joseph
_I_Gorfinkle&lang=he>.)
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Treatise on Logic:

English/Arabic:  תולמ ןויגהחMaimonides'
Treatise on Logic (Maḳālah fi-Ṣinā'at AlManṭiḳ): The Original Arabic and Three
Hebrew Translations. 1938. Israel Efros
(Ed.). Proceedings of the American
Academy for Jewish Research 8.
Plato

Gorgias:

English: Gorgias. 1997. Donald J. Zeyl
(Ed.). In John M. Cooper (Ed.). Plato
Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.

Laws:

English: Laws. 1997. Trevor J. Saunders
(Ed.). In John M. Cooper (Ed.). Plato
Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.

Phaedo:

English: Phaedo. 1997. G.M.A. Grube
(Ed.). In John M. Cooper (Ed.). Plato
Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.

Republic:

English: Republic. 1997. G.M.A. Grube
(Ed.). In John M. Cooper (Ed.). Plato
Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.

Republic (Bloom):

English: The Republic of Plato. In Allan
Bloom (Ed.). 1968. Plato Complete Works.
New York: Basic Books.

Republic (Cornford):

English: Republic. 1941. F.M. Cornford
(Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Republic (Emlyn-Jones and Preddy):

English: Republic. 2013. Chris Emlyn-Jones
and William Preddy (Eds.). Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.

Republic (Jowett):

English: Republic. 1888. Benjamin Jowett
(Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Republic (Lee):

English: Republic. 1974. Desmond Lee
(Ed.). Baltimore: Penguin.

416
Republic (Pappas):

English: Plato and the Republic. 1995.
Nickolas Pappas. New York: Routledge.

Republic (Voegelin):

English: Plato. 1966. Eric Voegelin. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Others
Alexander of Aphrodisias
CDA:

Abū al-Hassan Al-‘Āmirī
Kitāb al-Amad ‘alā l-abad’:

Pseudo-Apollodorus
Bibliotheca of Pseudo-Apollodorus:

Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologiae:

Greek: Alexandri De Anima. In I. Bruns
(Ed.). 1887. De Anima Liber cum Mantissa.
Berlin: Supplementum Aristotelicum.

English: A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul
and its Fate. Al-‘Āmirī’s ‘Kitāb al-Amad
‘alā l-abad’. 1988. Everett K. Rowson
(Ed.). New Haven, CT: American Oriental
Society.

English/Greek: Apollodorus: The Library.
1921. James George Frazer (Ed.). New
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.

English: Summa Theologica. 2017. Fr.
Laurence Shapcote (Trans.). Musaicum
Books.
Latin: Summa Theologiae. 1888. Leonine
edition. (Available at:
<https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/
iopera.html>)

Arabic Parva Naturalia
On Divination in Sleep (Ar.):

Arabic: Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs. Ms.
Rampur 1752 (R). Rampur, India: Raza
Library. Arabic excerpts and English
translation can be found in Rotraud E.
Hansberger. 2006. The Transmission of
Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia in Arabic.
Dissertation: University of Oxford.
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Augustine
The Enchiridion:

Jeremy Bentham
Book of Fallacies:

Principles of Morals:

Muḥammad al-Bukhārī
Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī:

Chrysippus, et al.
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta:

Ibn Daud
Book of tradition:

Pseudo-Dionysius
Divine Names:

Epictetus
Discourses:

English: On the Christian Doctrine: the
Enchiridion. 1873. J. F. Shaw (Ed.).
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

English: The Book of Fallacies. 1824.
London: John and H.L. Hunt.
English: An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation. 1876. London:
MacMillan and Co.
English/Arabic: Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī: the
translation of the meanings of Ṣaḥīḥ alBukhārī: Arabic-English. 1997. Muhammad
Muhsin Khan (Ed.). Riyadh-Saudi Arabia:
Darussalam Pub. & Distr.

Greek: Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.
1964. Ioannes Ab Arnim (Ed.). Stuttgart:
Teuhner.

English/Hebrew: A critical edition with a
translation and notes of the Book of
tradition (Sefer ha-qabbalah) by Abraham
Ibn Daud. 1967. G.D. Cohen (Ed.).
London: Routledge & Kegan.

English: Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine
Names and Mystical Theology. 1980. J.
Jones (Ed.). Milwaukee, WI: Marquette
University Press.

English/Greek: The discourses as reported
by Arrian, the Manual and fragments. 1928.
W.A. Oldfather (Ed.). 1952 Reprint.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Al-Ghazālī
Incoherence:

Hugo Grotius
De Iure Belli ac Pacis:

Hesiod
Works and Days:

Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan:

Ibn ʽIḏārī
al-Bayān al-Muḡrib (Ar.):

Immanuel Kant
Critique of Pure Reason:

English/Arabic: The Incoherence of the
Philosophers. A Parallel English-Arabic
text. 2000. M. E. Marmura (Ed.). Provo UT:
Brigham Young University Press.

English: The Rights of War and Peace,
including the Law of Nature and of Nations.
2001. A. C. Campbell (Ed.). Kitchener, ON:
Batoche Books.

English/Greek: Works and Days. In Hugh
G. Evelyn-White (Ed.). 1914. Hesiod: The
Homeric Hymns and Homerica. New York:
The MacMillan Co.

English: The Leviathan. 1996. Richard
Tuck (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Arabic: Histoire de l'Afrique et de
l'Espagne: intitulée al-Bayano'l-Mogrib.
1848-1851. Reinhart Pieter Anne Dozy
(Ed.). Leyde: E.J. Brill.

English: Critique of Pure Reason. 1998.
Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Eds.). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
(References to edition and marginal
notations.)

Critique of Practical Reason:

English: Critique of Practical Reason.
In M. Gregor (Ed.). 1996. Practical
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press. (References to
marginal notations.)

Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals:

English: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals. In M. Gregor (Ed.). 1996. Practical
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
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University Press. (References to marginal
notations.)
Metaphysics of Morals:

English: Metaphysics of Morals. In
M. Gregor (Ed.). 1996. Practical
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press. (References to marginal
notations.)

On a Supposed Right to Lie:

English: “On a supposed right to lie from
philanthropy (1797)”. In M. Gregor (Ed.).
1996. Practical Philosophy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.

Ibn Khaldūn
Muqaddima:

Niccoló Machiavelli
The Prince:

John Stuart Mill
Utilitarianism:

English: The Muqaddimah: an Introduction
to History. 1958. Vol. 2. Franz Rosenthal
(Ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.

English: The Prince: Literary Touchstone
Classic. 2005. N.H. Thomson (Ed.).
Clayton, DE: Prestwick House. (References
to Chapter and page number.)

English: Utilitarianism. 1906. Chicago:
Chicago University Press. (References to
Section and page number.)

Abū al-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Nadīm
Fihrist:
English: The Fihrist of al-Nadīm: a TenthCentury Survey of Muslim Culture. 1970.
Bayard Dodge (Ed.). New York: Columbia
University Press.
Fihrist (Ar.):

Plotiniana Arabica
Divine Knowledge:

Arabic: Kitāb al-Fihrist. 1871. Gustav
Flügel (Ed.). Leipzig: Vogel.

English: Treatise on Divine Knowledge.
1959. G. Lewis (Ed.). In P. Henry and H.R.
Schwyzer (Eds.). Plotini Opera, Tomus II:
Enneades IV-V. Paris: Desclée de
Brouwer.
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Greek Sage:

English: Sayings of the Greek Sage. 1959.
G. Lewis (Ed.). In P. Henry and H.R.
Schwyzer (Eds.). Plotini Opera, Tomus II:
Enneades IV-V. Paris: Desclée de
Brouwer.

Theology:

English: Theology of Aristotle. 1959. G.
Lewis (Ed.). In P. Henry and H.R. Schwyzer
(Eds.). Plotini Opera, Tomus II: Enneades
IV-V. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.

Plotinus
Enneads:

Proclus Arabus
The Discourse on the Pure Good:

Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī
PoP:

Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī
On the Specific Perfection of the
Human Species:
Abū Hayyān al-Tawhīdī:
Enjoyment and Sociability:

Themistius
De Anima Paraphrase:

De Anima Paraphrase (Ar.):

English/Greek: Enneads V. 1-9. 1984. A.
H. Armstrong (Ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

English/Arabic: The Liber de causis
(Kalâm fî maḥḍ al-khair: A Study of
Medieval Neoplatonism). 1981. Richard
C. Taylor (Ed.). Dissertation. Toronto:
University of Toronto.

English/Arabic: The Proofs of Prophecy.
2011. Tarif Khalidi (Ed.). Provo, UT:
Brigham Young University Press.
Arabic: Fi l-kamāl al-khāṣṣ bi-naw‘ alinsān. 1969. M. Kügel-Türker (Ed.).
Pensamiento 25: 207-224.
Arabic: AI-Imtā‘ wa al-mu’ānasa. 1953.
2nd Edition. A. Amin and A. al-Zayn (Eds.).
Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʻaṣrīyah.

Greek: Themistii in libros Aristotelis de
anima paraphrasis. 1899. Richard Heinze
(Ed.). Berlin: G. Reimeri.
Arabic: An Arabic Translation of
Themistius Commentary on Aristoteles De
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Anima. 1973. M.C. Lyons (Ed.). Columbia,
SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Theophrastus
On First Principles:

Ludwig Wittgenstein
Tractatus:

English/Greek/Arabic: Theophrastus On
First Principles. 2010. Dimitri Gutas (Ed.).
Boston: Brill.

English: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2001. David Pears and Brian McGuinness
(Eds.). London: Routledge.
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